All Outputs (20)

Truthmaker Accounts of Propositions (2022)
Book Chapter
Jago, M. (2022). Truthmaker Accounts of Propositions. In C. Tillman, & A. R. Murray (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge

Truthmaker Semantics for Relevant Logic (2020)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2020). Truthmaker Semantics for Relevant Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 49, 681-702. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09533-9

I develop and defend a truthmaker semantics for the relevant logic R. The approach begins with a simple philosophical idea and develops it in various directions, so as to build a technically adequate relevant semantics. The central philosophical idea... Read More about Truthmaker Semantics for Relevant Logic.

Impossible Worlds (2019)
Book
Berto, F., & Jago, M. (2019). Impossible Worlds. Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812791.001.0001

The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed an ‘intensional revolution’, a great collective effort to analyse notions which are absolutely fundamental to our understanding of the world and of ourselves—from meaning and information to knowledge... Read More about Impossible Worlds.

Logic for exact entailment (2019)
Journal Article
Fine, K., & Jago, M. (2019). Logic for exact entailment. Review of Symbolic Logic, 12(3), 536-556. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020318000151

An exact truthmaker for A is a state which, as well as guaranteeing A's truth, is wholly relevant to it. States with parts irrelevant to whether A is true do not count as exact truthmakers for A. Giving semantics in this way produces a very unusual c... Read More about Logic for exact entailment.

Knowing how things might have been (2018)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2021). Knowing how things might have been. Synthese, 198(S8), 1981–1999. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1869-6

I know that I could have been where you are right now and that you could have been where I am right now, but that neither of us could have been turnips or natural numbers. This knowledge of metaphysical modality stands in need of explanation. I will... Read More about Knowing how things might have been.

From nature to grounding (2018)
Book Chapter
Jago, M. (2018). From nature to grounding. In R. Bliss, & G. Priest (Eds.), Reality and its structure: essays in fundamentality. Oxford University Press

Grounding is a powerful metaphysical concept; yet there is widespread scepticism about the intelligibility of the notion. In this paper, I propose an account of an entity’s nature or essence, which I then use to provide grounding conditions for that... Read More about From nature to grounding.

Essential bundle theory and modality (2018)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2021). Essential bundle theory and modality. Synthese, 198(4), 1439–1454. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1819-3

Bundle theories identify material objects with bundles of properties. On the traditional approach, these are the properties possessed by that material object. That view faces a deep problem: it seems to say that all of an object’s properties are esse... Read More about Essential bundle theory and modality.

What Truth Is (2018)
Book
Jago, M. (2018). What Truth Is. Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823810.001.0001

© Mark Jago 2018. What Truth Is presents and defends a novel theory of what truth is, in terms of the metaphysical notion of truthmaking. This is the relation which holds between a truth and some entity in the world, in virtue of which that truth is... Read More about What Truth Is.

Material objects and essential bundle theory (2017)
Journal Article
Barker, S., & Jago, M. (2017). Material objects and essential bundle theory. Philosophical Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0990-6

In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property p... Read More about Material objects and essential bundle theory.

Material Objects and Essential Bundle Theory (2017)
Journal Article
BARKER, S., & Jago, M. (2018). Material Objects and Essential Bundle Theory. Philosophical Studies, 175(12), 2969-2986. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0990-6

In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property p... Read More about Material Objects and Essential Bundle Theory.

Propositions as truthmaker conditions (2017)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2017). Propositions as truthmaker conditions. Argumenta, 4(2), 293-308. https://doi.org/10.23811/47.arg2017.jag

Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an a... Read More about Propositions as truthmaker conditions.

Modal realism, still at your convenience (2017)
Journal Article
Noonan, H., & Jago, M. (in press). Modal realism, still at your convenience. Analysis, 77(2), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx037

Divers (2014) presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.

Advanced modalizing problems (2016)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2016). Advanced modalizing problems. Mind, 125(499), 627-642. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv172

I present an internal problem for David Lewis’s genuine modal realism. My aim is to show that his analysis of modality is inconsistent with his metaphysics. I consider several ways of modifying the Lewisian analysis of modality, but argue that none a... Read More about Advanced modalizing problems.

Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar (2016)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2016). Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar. Analysis, 76(3), 278-283. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw033

Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile al... Read More about Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar.

Essence and the Grounding Problem (2016)
Book Chapter
Jago, M. (2016). Essence and the Grounding Problem. In M. Jago (Ed.), Reality Making. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198755722.003.0006

Monism and Material Constitution (2014)
Journal Article
Barker, S., & Jago, M. (2014). Monism and Material Constitution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95(2), 189-204. doi:10.1111/papq.12024

Impossible Worlds (2013)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2015). Impossible Worlds. Noûs, 49(4), 713-728. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12051

© 2013 The Author(s). NOÛS published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for... Read More about Impossible Worlds.

Belief and bounded rationality
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2006). Belief and bounded rationality

Imagine the possibilities: information without overload
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2006). Imagine the possibilities: information without overload

Information is often modelled as a set of relevant possibilities, treated as logically possible worlds. However, this has the unintuitive consequence that the logical consequences of an agent's information cannot be informative for that agent. There... Read More about Imagine the possibilities: information without overload.

Rule-based and Resource-bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic
Conference Proceeding
Jago, M. (2006). Rule-based and Resource-bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic.

Syntactic logics do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting properties relating to epistemic notions. By focusing on the case of rule-based agents, I develop a framework for modelling resource-bou... Read More about Rule-based and Resource-bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic.