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All Outputs (22)

Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument (2016)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2016). Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument. Manuscrito, 39(4), https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045

Dynamic theories of time typically commit to the claim that “time passes”. In this paper I develop a version of the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument in order to show that time does not pass, but that this is no threat to dynamic theories of time... Read More about Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument.

Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies (2016)
Journal Article
Leibowitz, U. D. (2016). Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 13(5), 507-529. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810045

Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not aty... Read More about Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies.

Additional reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats (2016)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. W. (2016). Additional reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats. Metaphysica, 17(2), https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0016

Putnam’s argument against the sceptical Brain-in-a-Vat hypothesis continues to intrigue. I argue in what follows that the argument refutes a particular kind of sceptic and make a proposal about its more general significance. To appreciate the soundne... Read More about Additional reflections on Putnam, Wright and Brains in Vats.

Found Guilty by Association: In Defence of the Quinean Criterion (2016)
Journal Article
Egerton, K. (2018). Found Guilty by Association: In Defence of the Quinean Criterion. Ratio, 31(1), 37-56. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12150

Much recent work in metaontology challenges the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ in metaphysics. Especially prominently, Amie Thomasson argues for a highly permissive ontology over ontologies which eliminate many entities. I am concerned with disputing... Read More about Found Guilty by Association: In Defence of the Quinean Criterion.

Getting off the Inwagen: A Critique of Quinean Metaontology (2016)
Journal Article
Egerton, K. (2016). Getting off the Inwagen: A Critique of Quinean Metaontology. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 4(6), 23. https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v4i6.2962

Much contemporary ontological inquiry takes place within the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ but, given that some aspects of Quine’s project have been widely abandoned even by those who consider themselves Quineans, it is unclear what this amounts to.... Read More about Getting off the Inwagen: A Critique of Quinean Metaontology.

Teresa of Avila on Theology and Shame (2016)
Journal Article
Loumagne, M. (2018). Teresa of Avila on Theology and Shame. New Blackfriars, 99(1081), 388-402. https://doi.org/10.1111/nbfr.12235

This article examines Teresa of Avila's understanding of the relationship between spiritual dryness, intellectual frustration, and shame. It argues that Teresa presents these experiences as interconnected, as well as spiritually and intellectually va... Read More about Teresa of Avila on Theology and Shame.

A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem (2016)
Journal Article
Hannon, M. (2017). A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem. Philosophical Studies, 174(3), 607-629. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0700-9

This paper is about the ‘threshold problem’ for knowledge, namely, how do we determine what fixes the level of justification required for knowledge in a non-arbitrary way? One popular strategy for solving this problem is impurism, which is the view t... Read More about A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem.

On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons (2016)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (in press). On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19(5), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8

According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has... Read More about On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons.

Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar (2016)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2016). Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar. Analysis, 76(3), 278-283. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw033

Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile al... Read More about Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar.

Monism: the islands of plurality (2016)
Journal Article
Baron, S., & Tallant, J. (2016). Monism: the islands of plurality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(3), 583-606. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12270

Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are mer... Read More about Monism: the islands of plurality.

Reasons, inescapability and persuasion (2016)
Journal Article
Sinclair, N. (2016). Reasons, inescapability and persuasion. Philosophical Studies, 173(10), 2823-2844. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0639-x

This paper outlines a new metasemantic theory of moral reason statements, focused on explaining how the reasons thus stated can be inescapable. The motivation for the theory is in part that it can explain this and other phenomena concerning moral rea... Read More about Reasons, inescapability and persuasion.

Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better (2016)
Journal Article
Jansson, L., & Tallant, J. (2017). Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(3), 781–803. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv064

Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories... Read More about Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better.

Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence (2016)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (in press). Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence. Erkenntnis, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9802-1

The notions of ground and ontological dependence have made a prominent resurgence in much of contemporary metaphysics. However, objections have been raised. On the one hand, objections have been raised to the need for distinctively metaphysical notio... Read More about Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence.

REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM (2016)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. (2016). REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM. Episteme, 13(1), 111-132. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.62

It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will... Read More about REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM.

Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience” (2016)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (2016). Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 53, 45-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.12.002

Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements. Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion o... Read More about Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”.

Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics (2016)
Journal Article
Barker, S. (2017). Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics. Philosophical Studies, 174, 123-140. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0624-4

I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreov... Read More about Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics.