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All Outputs (281)

The problem of reference change (2020)
Book Chapter
Noonan, H. (2020). The problem of reference change. In H. Geirsson, & S. Biggs (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of linguistic reference (600). Routledge

From Essence to Metaphysical Modality? (2020)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. W. (2022). From Essence to Metaphysical Modality?. Axiomathes, 32(2), 345-354. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09527-2

How can we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality? How can someone come to know that he could have been elsewhere right now, or an accountant rather than a philosophy teacher, but could not have been a turnip? Jago proposes an account of a route... Read More about From Essence to Metaphysical Modality?.

Spinoza’s Analysis of his Imagined Readers’ Axiology (2020)
Journal Article
Rumbold, B. (2021). Spinoza’s Analysis of his Imagined Readers’ Axiology. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 103(2), 281-312. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2017-0099

Before presenting his own account of value in the Ethics, Spinoza spends much of EIAppendix and EIVPreface attempting to refute a series of axiological ‘prejudices’ that he takes to have taken root in the minds of his readership. In doing so, Spinoza... Read More about Spinoza’s Analysis of his Imagined Readers’ Axiology.

Consequentialism and Reasons for Action (2020)
Book Chapter
Woodard, C. (2020). Consequentialism and Reasons for Action. In D. W. Portmore (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism (178-196). Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.31

Consequentialist theories often neglect reasons for action. They offer theories of the rightness or the goodness of actions, or of virtue, but they typically do not include theories of reasons. However, consequentialists can give plausible accounts o... Read More about Consequentialism and Reasons for Action.

Relative Change (2020)
Book
Duncombe, M. (2020). Relative Change. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108581660

A relative change occurs when some item changes a relation. This Element examines how Plato, Aristotle, Stoics and Sextus Empiricus approached relative change. Relative change is puzzling because the following three propositions each seem true but ca... Read More about Relative Change.

Economic Theology: Credit and Faith II (2020)
Book
Goodchild, P. (2020). Economic Theology: Credit and Faith II. London: Rowman & Littlefield

A theological account of the dynamics of contemporary finance-based capitalism.

Disability, Impairment, and Marginalised Functioning (2020)
Journal Article
Jenkins, K., & Webster, A. K. (2021). Disability, Impairment, and Marginalised Functioning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(4), 730-747. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2020.1799048

One challenge in providing an adequate definition of physical disability is that of unifying the heterogeneous bodily conditions that count as disabilities. We examine recent proposals by Elizabeth Barnes [2016], and Dana Howard and Sean Aas [2018],... Read More about Disability, Impairment, and Marginalised Functioning.

Global Expressivism (2020)
Book Chapter
Barker, S. (2020). Global Expressivism. In The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics (270-283). UK: Routlege

In this chapter I consider the prospects of globalizing expressivism. Expressivism is a position in the philosophy of language that questions the central role of representation in a theory of meaning or linguistic function. An expressivist about a do... Read More about Global Expressivism.

Ontic Injustice (2020)
Journal Article
Jenkins, K. (2020). Ontic Injustice. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(2), 188-205. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.27

In this paper, I identify a distinctive form of injustice – ‘ontic injustice – in which an individual is wronged by the very fact of being socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind. To be a member of a certain social kind is, at least... Read More about Ontic Injustice.

Austerity and Illusion (2020)
Journal Article
French, C., & Phillips, I. (2020). Austerity and Illusion. Philosophers' Imprint, 20(15), 1-19

Many contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are incapable of accounting for illusions. Various sophisticated proposals have been ventured to meet this charge. Here, we take a different approach and dispute whether the naïve realist owes an... Read More about Austerity and Illusion.

Justice and the tendency towards good: the role of custom in Hume's theory of moral motivation (2020)
Journal Article
Chamberlain, J. (2020). Justice and the tendency towards good: the role of custom in Hume's theory of moral motivation. Hume Studies, 43(1), 117-137

Given the importance of sympathetic pleasures within Hume's account of approval and moral motivation, why does Hume think we feel obliged to act justly on those occasions when we know that doing so will benefit nobody? I argue that Hume uses the case... Read More about Justice and the tendency towards good: the role of custom in Hume's theory of moral motivation.

The Disrespectfulness of Weighted Survival Lotteries (2020)
Journal Article
Adams, J. (2020). The Disrespectfulness of Weighted Survival Lotteries. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa004

If we can save the lives of only one of multiple groups of people, we might be inclined simply to save whichever group is largest. We may worry, though, that automatically saving the largest group fails to take each saveable individual sufficiently i... Read More about The Disrespectfulness of Weighted Survival Lotteries.

Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics (2020)
Book
Predelli, S. (2020). Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics. Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854128.001.0001

This book defends a Radical Fictionalist Semantics for fictional discourse. Focusing on proper names as prototypical devices of reference, it argues that fictional names are only fictionally proper names, and that, as a result, fictional sentences do... Read More about Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics.

Network explanations and explanatory directionality (2020)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (2020). Network explanations and explanatory directionality. Philosophical Transactions B: Biological Sciences, 375(1796), https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0318

Network explanations raise foundational questions about the nature of scientific explanation. The challenge discussed in this article comes from the fact that network explanations are often thought to be non-causal, i.e. they do not describe the dyna... Read More about Network explanations and explanatory directionality.

Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited (2020)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2020). Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited. Metaphysica, 21(1), 151–165. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0004

Blackburn argues against naturalistic moral realism. He argues that there is no conceptual entailment from satisfying a naturalistic predicate to satisfying a moral predicate. But the moral is conceptually supervenient on the natural. However, this c... Read More about Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited.

Ancient Relativity: Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and Sceptics (2020)
Book
Duncombe, M. (2020). Ancient Relativity: Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and Sceptics. Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198846185.001.0001

In Ancient Relativity Matthew Duncombe explores how ancient philosophers, particularly Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Sextus Empiricus, understood the phenomenon and how their theories of relativity affected, and were affected by, their broader ph... Read More about Ancient Relativity: Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, and Sceptics.

A Defence of Lucretian Presentism (2020)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2020). A Defence of Lucretian Presentism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(4), 675-690. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697709

© 2019 Australasian Journal of Philosophy. In this paper, we defend Lucretian Presentism (‘Lucretianism’). Although the view faces many objections and has proven unpopular with presentists, we rehabilitate Lucretianism and argue that none of the obje... Read More about A Defence of Lucretian Presentism.