All Outputs (12)

Castles Built on Clouds: Vague Identity and Vague Objects (2014)
Book Chapter
Curtis, B., & NOONAN, H. (2014). Castles Built on Clouds: Vague Identity and Vague Objects. In K. Akiba, & A. Abasnezhad (Eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity: New Essays on Ontic Vagueness (305-326). Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7978-5

Can identity itself be vague? Can there be vague objects? Does a positive answer to either question entail a positive answer to the other? In this chapter, we answer these questions as follows: no, no, and yes. First, we discuss Evans’s famous 1978 a... Read More about Castles Built on Clouds: Vague Identity and Vague Objects.

Expressivism about Reference and Quantification over the Non-Existent without Meinongian Metaphysics (2014)
Journal Article
BARKER, S. (2015). Expressivism about Reference and Quantification over the Non-Existent without Meinongian Metaphysics. Erkenntnis, 80, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9699-5

Presentism, truthmaking and necessary connections (2014)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). Presentism, truthmaking and necessary connections. Theoria, 81(3), https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12062

Ross Cameron puts forward a novel solution to the truthmaker problem facing presentism. I claim that, by Cameron's own lights, the view is not in fact a presentist view at all, but rather requires us to endorse a form of Priority Presentism, whereby... Read More about Presentism, truthmaking and necessary connections.

Immodest and proud (2014)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). Immodest and proud. Erkenntnis, 80(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9678-x

In his ‘Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics’, Hofweber (Metametaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 260–289, 2009a) puts forward arguments against positions in metaphysics that he describes as ‘immodest’; a position he identifies as defended... Read More about Immodest and proud.

Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism (2014)
Journal Article
Mackie, P. (2014). Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism. Analysis, 74(4), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu088

Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special... Read More about Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism.

Metaphysics, intuitions and physics (2014)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). Metaphysics, intuitions and physics. Ratio, 28(3), https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12074

Ladyman and Ross (2007) do not think that contemporary metaphysics is in good standing. However, they do think that there is a version of metaphysics that can be made to work – provided we approach it using appropriate principles. My aim in this pape... Read More about Metaphysics, intuitions and physics.

Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement (2014)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (2014). Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 81(3), https://doi.org/10.1086/676687

When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third... Read More about Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement.

Kaplan's three monsters (2014)
Journal Article
Predelli, S. (2014). Kaplan's three monsters. Analysis, 74(3), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu059

This paper analytically distinguishes three concepts of a semantic 'monster', that is, of an operator on character, which are commonly confused in the literature

The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism (2014)
Journal Article
French, C. (2016). The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1), 86-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12105

I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does t... Read More about The formulation of epistemological disjunctivism.

Tollensing van Inwagen (2014)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. W. (2014). Tollensing van Inwagen. Philosophia, 42(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9521-2

Punishing states and the spectre of guilt by association (2014)
Journal Article
Hoskins, Z. (2014). Punishing states and the spectre of guilt by association. International Criminal Law Review, 14(4-5), https://doi.org/10.1163/15718123-01405009

Explaining moral knowledge (2014)
Journal Article
Leibowitz, U. D. (2014). Explaining moral knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 11(1), https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681012

In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—under... Read More about Explaining moral knowledge.