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All Outputs (15)

Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment (2023)
Journal Article
Burdea, V., Montero, M., & Sefton, M. (2023). Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 113-149. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.011

We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of... Read More about Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment.

A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance (2021)
Journal Article
Fatas, E., Nosenzo, D., Sefton, M., & Zizzo, D. J. (2021). A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance. Journal of Economic Psychology, 86, Article 102421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102421

We compare in a laboratory experiment two audit-based tax compliance mechanisms that collect fines from those found non-compliant. The mechanisms differ in the way fines are redistributed to individuals who were either not audited or audited and foun... Read More about A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance.

Social comparisons in job search (2019)
Journal Article
Fu, J., Sefton, M., & Upward, R. (2019). Social comparisons in job search. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 168, 338-361. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.013

© 2019 Elsevier B.V. Using a laboratory experiment we examine how social comparisons affect behavior in a sequential search task. In a control treatment subjects search in isolation, while in two other treatments subjects get feedback on the search d... Read More about Social comparisons in job search.

To tender or not to tender?: deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game (2018)
Journal Article
Heine, F., & Sefton, M. (2018). To tender or not to tender?: deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game. Games, 9(3), Article 41. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030041

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is... Read More about To tender or not to tender?: deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game.

Disappointment aversion and social comparisons in a real-effort competition (2017)
Journal Article
Gaechter, S., Huang, L., & Sefton, M. (2018). Disappointment aversion and social comparisons in a real-effort competition. Economic Inquiry, 56(3), https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12498

We present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real-effort competition. Specifically, we study the contribution of social comparison effects to the disappointment aversion previously identified in a two-... Read More about Disappointment aversion and social comparisons in a real-effort competition.

Team incentives and leadership (2017)
Journal Article
Drouvelis, M., Nosenzo, D., & Sefton, M. (in press). Team incentives and leadership. Journal of Economic Psychology, 62, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2017.07.002

We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism (team output is shared equally among team members) and a hierarchic... Read More about Team incentives and leadership.

How do risk attitudes affect measured confidence? (2016)
Journal Article
Murad, Z., Sefton, M., & Starmer, C. (2016). How do risk attitudes affect measured confidence?. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 52(1), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-016-9231-1

We examine the relationship between confidence in own absolute performance and risk attitudes using two confidence elicitation procedures: self-reported (non-incentivised) confidence and an incentivised procedure that elicits the certainty equivalent... Read More about How do risk attitudes affect measured confidence?.

Strategic and natural risk in entrepreneurship: an experimental study (2015)
Journal Article
Morgan, J., Orzen, H., Sefton, M., & Sisak, D. (2016). Strategic and natural risk in entrepreneurship: an experimental study. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 25(2), https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12140

We report on the results of experiments where participants choose between entrepreneurship and an outside option. Entrepreneurs enter a market and then make investment decisions to capture value. Payoffs depend on both strategic risk (i.e. the invest... Read More about Strategic and natural risk in entrepreneurship: an experimental study.

Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task (2015)
Journal Article
Gaechter, S., Huang, L., & Sefton, M. (2016). Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task. Experimental Economics, 19(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9465-9

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action (“catching balls”) with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the... Read More about Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task.

Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games (2015)
Journal Article
Montero, M., Possajennikov, A., Sefton, M., & Turocy, T. L. (2016). Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games. Economic Theory, 61(1), 55-89. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0902-y

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battlefields may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed discrete budget across battlefields. Each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to... Read More about Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games.

Risk taking and information aggregation in groups (2015)
Journal Article
Bougheas, S., Nieboer, J., & Sefton, M. (2015). Risk taking and information aggregation in groups. Journal of Economic Psychology, 51, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2015.08.001

We report a controlled laboratory experiment examining risk-taking and information aggregation in groups facing a common risk. The experiment allows us to examine how subjects respond to new information, in the form of both privately observed signals... Read More about Risk taking and information aggregation in groups.

Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game (2015)
Journal Article
Nosenzo, D., Offerman, T., Sefton, M., & Veen, A. V. D. (in press). Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game. Management Science, 62(2), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2124

We experimentally investigate a repeated “inspection game” where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategie... Read More about Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game.

Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders (2015)
Journal Article
Erkut, H., Nosenzo, D., & Sefton, M. (2015). Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders. Economics Letters, 130, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.021

We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited... Read More about Identifying social norms using coordination games: spectators vs. stakeholders.

Promoting cooperation: the distribution of reward and punishment power (2014)
Book Chapter
Nosenzo, D., & Sefton, M. (2014). Promoting cooperation: the distribution of reward and punishment power. In P. A. Van Lange, B. Rockenbach, & T. Yamagishi (Eds.), Reward and punishment in social dilemmas. Oxford University Press

Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups... Read More about Promoting cooperation: the distribution of reward and punishment power.

Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size (2013)
Journal Article
Nosenzo, D., Quercia, S., & Sefton, M. (2015). Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size. Experimental Economics, 18(1), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9382-8

We study the effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism games. As in previous experiments, we study four- and eight-person groups in high and low marginal per capita return (MPCR) conditions. We find a positive effect of... Read More about Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size.