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All Outputs (5)

Coercive trade policy (2019)
Journal Article
Anesi, V., & Facchini, G. (2019). Coercive trade policy. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(3), 225-256. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170085

Coercion is used by one government (the sender") to influence the trade practices of another (the target"). We build a two-country trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally or channeled through a “weak" international organization wi... Read More about Coercive trade policy.

Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games (2018)
Journal Article
Anesi, V., & Duggan, J. (2018). Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games. Theoretical Economics, 13(2), 505-525. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2215

The paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equi... Read More about Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games.

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players (2016)
Journal Article
Anesi, V., & Duggan, J. (2017). Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players. Games and Economic Behavior, 103, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.010

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: ass... Read More about Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players.

Bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default (2015)
Journal Article
Anesi, V., & Seidmann, D. J. (2015). Bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default. Review of Economic Studies, 82(3), 825-867. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv009

© The Author 2015. Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing c... Read More about Bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default.

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda (2014)
Journal Article
Anesi, V., & Seidmann, D. J. (2014). Bargaining over an endogenous agenda. Theoretical Economics, 9(2), https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1318

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then impl... Read More about Bargaining over an endogenous agenda.