Explaining moral knowledge

Leibowitz, Uri D.

Abstract

In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge.
First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to
show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood
as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior
to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments
are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge
of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are careful to keep separate the
various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation
of the fact that (e.g.,) Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult
to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge
of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral
scepticism.

Citation

Leibowitz, U. D. (2014). Explaining moral knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 11(1), https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681012

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2014
• Deposit Date: Apr 10, 2014
• Publicly Available Date: Apr 10, 2014
• Journal: Journal of Moral Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 1740-4681
• Electronic ISSN: 1740-4681
• Publisher: Brill Academic Publishers
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 11
• Issue: 1
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681012
• Keywords: Particularism, Generalism, Principles, Moral knowledge, Moral epistemology
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/999083
• Publisher URL: http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-4681012