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Standing united or falling divided? High stakes bargaining in a TV game show

van Dolder, Dennie; van den Assem, Martijn J.; Camerer, Colin F.; Thaler, Richard H.

Authors

Dennie van Dolder

Martijn J. van den Assem

Colin F. Camerer

Richard H. Thaler



Abstract

We examine high stakes three-person bargaining in a game show where contestants bargain over a large money amount that is split into three unequal shares. We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, and take home larger amounts. Contestants who announce that they will not back down do well relative to others, but they do not secure larger absolute amounts and they harm others. There is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little evidence that demographic characteristics matter.

Citation

van Dolder, D., van den Assem, M. J., Camerer, C. F., & Thaler, R. H. (2015). Standing united or falling divided? High stakes bargaining in a TV game show. American Economic Review, 105(5), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2344422

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date May 1, 2015
Deposit Date Nov 17, 2015
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal American Economic Review
Print ISSN 0002-8282
Electronic ISSN 0002-8282
Publisher American Economic Association
Peer Reviewed Not Peer Reviewed
Volume 105
Issue 5
DOI https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2344422
Keywords bargaining, negotiation, game show, natural experiment, equity theory, moral property rights, entitlements, fairness, concessions, first-mover advantage
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/984044
Publisher URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344422

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