Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Affirmative action through extra prizes

Dahm, Matthias; Esteve-González, Patricia

Authors

Matthias Dahm matthias.dahm@nottingham.ac.uk

Patricia Esteve-González p.esteve-gonzalez@lancaster.ac.uk



Abstract

Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Contestants differ in ability and agents with relatively low ability belong to a disadvantaged minority. All contestants compete for the main prize, but only disadvantaged agents can win the extra prize. We show that an extra prize is a powerful tool to ensure participation of disadvantaged agents. Moreover, for intermediate levels of the disadvantage of the minority, introducing an extra prize increases total equilibrium effort compared to a standard contest. Thus, even a contest designer not interested in affirmative action might establish an extra prize in order to enhance competition.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Sep 30, 2018
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Electronic ISSN 0167-2681
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 153
Pages 123-142
APA6 Citation Dahm, M., & Esteve-González, P. (2018). Affirmative action through extra prizes. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 153, 123-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.016
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.016
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf

Files

DahmEsteveExtraPrizes.pdf (519 Kb)
PDF

Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





You might also like



Downloadable Citations

;