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Signaling about norms: socialization under strategic uncertainty

Adriani, Fabrizio; Sonderegger, Silvia

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Authors

Fabrizio Adriani



Abstract

We consider a signaling model where adults possess information about the dominant social norm. Children want to conform to whatever norm is dominant but, lacking accurate information, take the observed behavior of their parent as representative. We show that this causes a signaling distortion in adult behavior, even in the absence of conflicts of interest. Parents adopt attitudes that encourage their children to behave in a socially safe way, i.e. the way that would be optimal under maximum uncertainty about the prevailing social norm. We discuss applications to sexual attitudes, collective reputation, and trust.

Citation

Adriani, F., & Sonderegger, S. (2018). Signaling about norms: socialization under strategic uncertainty. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 120(3), 685-716. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12240

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Oct 23, 2016
Online Publication Date Feb 28, 2017
Publication Date Jul 30, 2018
Deposit Date Nov 21, 2016
Publicly Available Date Mar 1, 2019
Journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Print ISSN 0347-0520
Electronic ISSN 1467-9442
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 120
Issue 3
Pages 685-716
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12240
Keywords signaling, Social Norms, Cultural Transmission, Complementarities, Conformity
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/822104
Publisher URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12240/full
Additional Information This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Adriani, F. and Sonderegger, S. (2017), Signaling about Norms: Socialization under Strategic Uncertainty. Scand. J. of Economics. Accepted Author Manuscript, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12240. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

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