Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity

Clot-Figueras, Irma; Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto; Kujal, Praveen

Abstract

We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes.

Citation

Clot-Figueras, I., Hernan-Gonzalez, R., & Kujal, P. (2016). Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity. Economics Letters, 147, 168-170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.019

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Aug 19, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Sep 6, 2016
• Publication Date: Oct 31, 2016
• Deposit Date: Feb 8, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Feb 8, 2017
• Journal: Economics Letters
• Print ISSN: 0165-1765
• Electronic ISSN: 0165-1765
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 147
• Pages: 168-170
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.019
• Keywords: Investment Game, Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Trust, trustworthiness
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/820291
• Publisher URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516303123
• Additional Information: This article is maintained by: Elsevier; Article Title: Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity; Journal Title: Economics Letters; CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.019; Content Type: article; Copyright: © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.