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From one to many central plans: drug advertising inspections and intra-national protectionism in China

Eberhardt, Markus; Wang, Zheng; Yu, Zhihong

Authors

Zheng Wang z.wang@hull.ac.uk

Zhihong Yu zhihong.yu@nottingham.ac.uk



Abstract

This paper provides the first micro-level evidence for the existence and patterns of intra-national protectionism in China. We demonstrate that drug advertising inspections are used by provincial governments to discriminate against firms from outside the province. We further reveal systematic patterns in the degree of discrimination across firms: those from neighboring areas, those from regions with more economic links to the destination province, those from provinces with stronger presence in the market, and those with political ties to “allied” provincial governments are less likely to be targeted. Our findings highlight the unique politico-economic structure in China and confirm that giving local governments strong incentives to compete with each other may exacerbate the market distortions inherent in a partially reformed economy.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Aug 31, 2016
Journal Journal of Comparative Economics
Print ISSN 0147-5967
Electronic ISSN 0147-5967
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 44
Issue 3
APA6 Citation Eberhardt, M., Wang, Z., & Yu, Z. (2016). From one to many central plans: drug advertising inspections and intra-national protectionism in China. Journal of Comparative Economics, 44(3), doi:10.1016/j.jce.2015.10.012
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2015.10.012
Keywords Intra-national protectionism; Drug advertising; China
Publisher URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596715000943
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0





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