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Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that face-value. Case studies of each of these errors are presented, drawn from the writings of Shafer-Landau, Brink and McNaughton, and from recent work in experimental metaethics. The paper then considers weak presumptive arguments, according to which both realist and non-realist vindications of moral practice are possible, but the realist vindications are more natural. It is argued that there is no sense of ‘natural’ available that can make these arguments work. The conclusion is that all extant presumptive arguments for moral realism fail.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2012-06
Journal Analytic Philosophy
Electronic ISSN 2153-960X
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Not Peer Reviewed
Volume 53
Issue 2
Pages 158-179
APA6 Citation SINCLAIR, N. (2012). MORAL REALISM, FACE-VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS. Analytic Philosophy, 53(2), 158-179.
Keywords Meta-ethics; Moral realism; Moral expressivism; Presumptive Arguments for Realism
Publisher URL
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information This is a pre-submission draft of a paper which subsequently appeared, in revised form, as: Moral realism, face-values and presumptions. Analytic Philosophy 53(2), 158-179, June 2012. The definitive version is available at: http://onlinelibrary.wi...X.2012.00558.x/abstract


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