A Defence of Lucretian Presentism

Tallant, Jonathan; Ingram, David

Abstract

© 2019 Australasian Journal of Philosophy. In this paper, we defend Lucretian Presentism (‘Lucretianism’). Although the view faces many objections and has proven unpopular with presentists, we rehabilitate Lucretianism and argue that none of the objections stick.

Citation

Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2020). A Defence of Lucretian Presentism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(4), 675-690. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697709

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Sep 30, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Jan 22, 2020
• Publication Date: Jan 22, 2020
• Deposit Date: Oct 1, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 23, 2021
• Journal: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0004-8402
• Electronic ISSN: 1471-6828
• Publisher: Routledge
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 98
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 675-690
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697709
• Keywords: presentism; truth-making; Lucretianism
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2728869
• Publisher URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697709
• Additional Information: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy on 22/01/2020, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697709