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Ontic Injustice

Jenkins, Katharine

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Authors

Katharine Jenkins



Abstract

In this paper, I identify a distinctive form of injustice – ‘ontic injustice – in which an individual is wronged by the very fact of being socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind. To be a member of a certain social kind is, at least in part, to be subject to certain social constraints and enablements, and these constraints and enablements can be wrongful to the individual who is subjected to them, in the sense that they inflict a moral injury. The concept of ontic injustice is valuable in three main ways: it draws our attention to the role played by social kinds in enacting wrongful constraints and enablements; it clarifies our options for developing accounts of the ontology of particular social kinds, such as gender kinds; and – along with the related concept of ‘ontic oppression’ – it helps us to understand and respond to oppression.

Citation

Jenkins, K. (2020). Ontic Injustice. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 6(2), 188-205. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.27

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 10, 2019
Online Publication Date Jun 23, 2020
Publication Date 2020
Deposit Date Jun 25, 2020
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Print ISSN 2053-4477
Electronic ISSN 2053-4485
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 6
Issue 2
Pages 188-205
DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.27
Keywords Social Construction, Injustice, Moral Injury, Social Kinds, Gender Kinds
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2300186
Publisher URL https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/ontic-injustice/828248F30105C2B6D46ABD158B817A21#

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