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Dual sourcing with price discovery

Alcalde, José; Dahm, Matthias

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Authors

José Alcalde

Matthias Dahm



Abstract

© 2019 Elsevier Inc. We consider a (standard) reverse auction for dual sourcing and propose to determine both the providers' shares and the reserve price endogenously, depending on the suppliers' bids. Our benchmark considers a two-stage game of complete information. After a first round of bidding, the two most competitive suppliers advance to the second stage and compete again with a refined reserve price, which is based on the lowest price of the excluded providers. We show that at the first stage providers reveal their costs truthfully. At the second stage suppliers balance a trade-off between increasing their share and raising their mark up. Surprisingly, when discarded suppliers are competitive enough, the procedure not only allows taking advantage of dual sourcing but also generates lower procurement expenditures than a standard auction for sole sourcing. We also consider extensions of the benchmark model, including to situations in which providers have private information about their costs.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 20, 2019
Online Publication Date Mar 27, 2019
Publication Date May 31, 2019
Deposit Date Apr 24, 2019
Publicly Available Date Sep 28, 2020
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Electronic ISSN 1090-2473
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 115
Pages 225-246
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.007
Keywords Economics and Econometrics; Finance
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1839499
Publisher URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825619300429?via%3Dihub

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