Tariffs, technology licensing and adoption

Chen, Hsiu-Li; Hwang, Hong; Mukherjee, Arijit; Shih, Pei-Cyuan

Abstract

This paper develops a two-country Cournot duopoly model to investigate the implications of international technology licensing. It is shown that if the tariff imposed by the domestic country is high, it is optimal for the foreign firm to adopt an inferior technology for its production when it licenses its most advanced technology to the domestic firm. Such a licensing arrangement may improve welfare of the two countries.

Citation

Chen, H., Hwang, H., Mukherjee, A., & Shih, P. (2016). Tariffs, technology licensing and adoption. International Review of Economics and Finance, 43, 234-240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2016.02.012

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Oct 2, 2015
• Online Publication Date: Feb 15, 2016
• Publication Date: May 30, 2016
• Deposit Date: Dec 9, 2018
• Journal: International Review of Economics & Finance
• Print ISSN: 1059-0560
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 43
• Pages: 234-240
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2016.02.012
• Keywords: Economics and Econometrics; Finance
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1394346
• Publisher URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056016000289?via%3Dihub