Guilty repair sustains cooperation, angry retaliation destroys it

Skatova, Anya; Ferguson, Eamonn; Leygue, Caroline; Spence, Alexa

Abstract

Sustained cooperative social interactions are key to successful outcomes in many real-world contexts (e.g., climate change and energy conservation). We explore the self-regulatory roles of anger and guilt, as well as prosocial or selfish social preferences in a repeated social dilemma game framed around shared electricity use at home. We explore the proposal that for sustained cooperation, guilty repair needs to override angry retaliation. We show that anger is damaging to cooperation as it leads to retaliation and an increase of defection, while, through guilt, cooperation is repaired resulting in higher levels of cooperation. We demonstrate a disconnect between the experience of anger and subsequent retaliation which is a function of participants’ social preferences. While there is no difference in reports of anger between prosocial and selfish individuals after finding out that others use more energy from the communal resource, prosocials are less likely to act on their anger and retaliate. Selfish individuals are motivated by anger to retaliate but not motivated by guilt to repair and contribute disproportionately to the breakdown of cooperation over repeated interactions. We suggest that guilt is a key emotion to appeal to when encouraging cooperation.

Citation

Skatova, A., Ferguson, E., Leygue, C., & Spence, A. (2017). Guilty repair sustains cooperation, angry retaliation destroys it. Scientific Reports, 7, doi:10.1038/srep46709

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 28, 2017
• Online Publication Date: Apr 27, 2017
• Publication Date: Apr 27, 2017
• Deposit Date: Sep 12, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Dec 20, 2018
• Journal: Scientific Reports
• Publisher: Nature Publishing Group
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 7
• Article Number: 46709
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/srep46709
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1121329
• Publisher URL: https://www.nature.com/articles/srep46709