The Role of Relatives in Plato’s Partition Argument, Republic 4, 436 B 9–439 C 9

Duncombe, Matthew

Abstract

In Republic IV (436b9-439c9), Socrates argues that the soul has parts. Some commentators object that his argument fails to show that the soul has more than one part. Other commentators worry that Socrates' argument entails that the soul has indefinitely many parts. This chapter argues that both problems arise if desire and rejection can relate to different objects. Socrates' discussion of relative terms at 438a7-d9 specifies that each relative, including desire and rejection, relates only to its own special object. Thus, the discussion of relatives helps Socrates avoid both problems.

Citation

Duncombe, M. (2015). The Role of Relatives in Plato’s Partition Argument, Republic 4, 436 B 9–439 C 9. In B. Inwood (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 48 (37-60). Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198735540.003.0002

• Acceptance Date: Apr 22, 2014
• Online Publication Date: Jun 4, 2015
• Publication Date: Jun 4, 2015
• Deposit Date: Sep 11, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Jan 28, 2019
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 48
• Pages: 37-60
• Series Title: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
• Series Number: 48
• Book Title: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 48
• Chapter Number: 2
• ISBN: 9780198735540
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198735540.003.0002
• Public URL: ancphil.lsa.umich.edu/-/downloads/osap/48-Duncombe.pdf
• Publisher URL: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735540.001.0001/acprof-9780198735540-chapter-2