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Expressivist Explanations

Sinclair, Neil

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Authors

NEIL SINCLAIR neil.sinclair@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor of Philosophy



Abstract

In this paper I argue that the common practice of employing moral predicates as explaining phrases can be accommodated on an expressivist account of moral practice. This account does not treat moral explanations as in any way second-rate or derivative, since it subsumes moral explanations under the general theory of program explanations (as defended by Jackson and Pettit). It follows that the phenomenon of moral explanations cannot be used to adjudicate the debate between expressivism and its rivals.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jan 1, 2012
Deposit Date Apr 26, 2012
Publicly Available Date Apr 26, 2012
Journal Journal of Moral Philosophy
Print ISSN 1740-4681
Electronic ISSN 1745-5243
Publisher Brill Academic Publishers
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 9
Issue 2
Pages 147-177
DOI https://doi.org/10.1163/174552412x625745
Keywords Expressivism; Moral explanation; Program explanation
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1009315
Publisher URL http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/jmp/2012/00000009/00000002/art00003

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