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All Outputs (9)

Network explanations and explanatory directionality (2020)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (2020). Network explanations and explanatory directionality. Philosophical Transactions B: Biological Sciences, 375(1796), https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0318

Network explanations raise foundational questions about the nature of scientific explanation. The challenge discussed in this article comes from the fact that network explanations are often thought to be non-causal, i.e. they do not describe the dyna... Read More about Network explanations and explanatory directionality.

When Are Structural Equation Models Apt? Causation versus Grounding (2018)
Book Chapter
Jansson, L. (2018). When Are Structural Equation Models Apt? Causation versus Grounding. Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations (250-266). Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198777946.003.0013

While much about the notion of ground in contemporary metaphysics is contested, there is large agreement that ground is closely connected to a certain kind of explanation. Recently, Jonathan Schaffer and Alastair Wilson have argued that ground is a r... Read More about When Are Structural Equation Models Apt? Causation versus Grounding.

Explanatory abstractions (2017)
Journal Article
Jansson, L., & Saatsi, J. (2019). Explanatory abstractions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70(3), 817–844. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx016

A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations explai... Read More about Explanatory abstractions.

Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence (2016)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (in press). Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence. Erkenntnis, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9802-1

The notions of ground and ontological dependence have made a prominent resurgence in much of contemporary metaphysics. However, objections have been raised. On the one hand, objections have been raised to the need for distinctively metaphysical notio... Read More about Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence.

Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better (2016)
Journal Article
Jansson, L., & Tallant, J. (2017). Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(3), 781–803. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axv064

Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories... Read More about Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better.

Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience” (2016)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (2016). Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 53, 45-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.12.002

Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements. Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion o... Read More about Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”.

Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated (2015)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (2015). Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated. Journal of Philosophy, 112(11), https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20151121138

The problem of explanatory non-symmetries provides the strongest reason to abandon the view that laws can figure in explanations without causal underpinnings. I argue that this problem can be overcome. The solution that I propose starts from noticing... Read More about Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated.

Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement (2014)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (2014). Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 81(3), https://doi.org/10.1086/676687

When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third... Read More about Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement.