Colonial and Nationalist Truth Regimes: Empire, Europe and the Latter Foucault[1]

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When Did Governmentality Start?

As the introduction to this volume has made clear, south Asian studies have made rich use of Foucault's research, drawing at times extensively on the governmentality literature and, in fewer cases, on his governmentality lecture courses. The complexity of these courses, and their drawing upon earlier lectures and published material, raises the question 'when did governmentality start' in two senses: when did Foucault start articulating what governmentality is; and at what periods (and where) can we start talking about it?

Though the 1977-78 and 1978-79 courses constitute the commonly accepted 'governmentality lectures', the *Society must be Defended* lectures of 1975-76 introduced us to the concepts of biopolitics and sovereign power that would play a constitutive, if largely dropped, role in the later lectures, as would the research topics of war, race and nationalism that the lectures had focused on (see Elden 2016). It is possible to find traces in the earlier lectures of themes that would become central later on, such as confession and, even in his first lecture course of 1970-71, truth and knowledge in ancient Greece (Legg 2016a). Though his lectures in the 1980s would use the terminology of government more than governmentality, they were consistently explicit that they marked a history of governmentality.

In 1978 Foucault (2007, 108-09) had offered a threefold definition of governmentality (a type of power, the pre-eminence of governmental power over time and the governmentalisation of the state). The middle definition did not, however, prevent him devoting his last five years of lecturing to the classical European world, in which he located many of the (often disrupted and discontinuous) genealogies of western subjectivities and the governmentalities which forged them. The innovation in these lectures was the focus on the individual and its relationship of self to self (ethics). The last two courses would focus on the relationship of self and others (politics) and return to Foucault's longstanding interest in the role of philosophy through a study of the history of *parrhesia* (understood variously as fearless speech, or speaking truth to power) in four phases: the ancient emergence of discourses on political truth-telling in the second half of the fifth century BCE; the emergence of philosophical *parrhesia*, directed both as advice to the ruler (the Socratic-Platonic mode) or as condemnation of their folly (the Cynic mode) from the fifth to the fourth centuries BCE; the uptake of *parrhesia* in the Christian pastorate in ascetic practises of renunciation from the second century CE; and the eventual return of philosophical and public *parrhesia* from the 18th century, especially via Kantian critique (Foucault 2010, 340, 348, 350). Thus, while the early Christian world was covered in the 1979-80 and the 1983-84 lectures, the others largely concerned the Greco-Roman world. For South Asian scholars this presents challenges in terms of the less familiar historical context and period (although see Chatterjee 2013, for a counter-argument).

In this chapter I would like to argue that these lectures have much to offer us for, at least, three reasons. First, they present an incredibly rich resource for South Asian studies through their further elaboration of the already published and influential work on

governmentality. Second, the historical material allows Foucault to address themes of colonialism more than he did anywhere else. And, third, the new concepts he uses to explore governmentalities present striking tools with which to analyse South Asian governmentalities in new ways, two of which will be presented at the end of this chapter. Both of them focus on the politics of truth, which Foucault introduced explicitly in his 1979-80 lectures as the centre of his investigations into the means by which subjectivity was formed by self-other relations in the frame of broader (and political) governmentalities (Gordon 2015).

Truth in these studies is not the truth of fact (the opposite of false) or the Truth of philosophy (a metaphysical or logical problem). Truth here is something that one is asked or forced to relate to, to contemplate, to reveal, or to personify. For Frédéric Gros, Foucault does 'not look for the intrinsic forms which confer validity on true discourses, but examines the modes of being which true discourses entail for the subject who uses them' (Gros in Foucault 2011, 344). For Foucault here the truth is what one believes to be true and what one is willing to bind oneself to. The focus was, therefore, on truth practises situated within governmentalities that attempted to conduct conduct through crafting modes of subjectivity, from Christian inventions (such as baptism, penance, spiritual direction and confession, focused around the question 'tell me who you are'), to classical spiritual direction and the analysis of dreams, to the subject who would confront power with truth in fearless speech.

The four 'governmentality-truth' translated lecture courses already run to over 1500 pages so I will focus here on two courses, the 1979-80 lectures, which introduced his interest in the problem of truth, and the 1982-83 lectures, which introduced his study of

parrhesia, with some use of the framing 1970-71 lectures. The intervening lectures (*Subjectivity and Truth* and *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*) further explored ancient technologies of self, sex and subjectivity, the role of spiritual direction and questions of truth discourses, while the final lecture course (*The Courage of Truth*) continued the study of *alethurgy* (the manifestation of truth) and its effects on the subject via *parrhesia*. The review below will recap some of the ways Foucault explored historical contexts that resonate with postcolonial works on empires, 'eastern Others' and 'western Selves', before suggesting how applications of his research (namely to nationalist truth regimes and colonial truth extraction) might provoke new questions for studies of South Asian governmentalities.

Empire, Other, and Self

At best, empires featured in the periphery of Foucault's European vision in his previous works (see Legg 2007; Nichols 2010). But most of these studies operate in the shadow of Spivak's (1988 [2000]) condemnation of Foucault's ignorance of the effects of imperialism on Europe, and of his inability to acknowledge his role as intellectual in the production of the voices of the oppressed. The lecture courses will not overturn this impression completely, but they do provide ample material to suggest that Foucault was thinking, repeatedly, about empires and subjectivity.

Ancient Empires

Foucault's work on classical Europe and its Mediterranean world are, necessarily, saturated with references to colonies, empires and imperialism. Two thousand years, and vast differences in practise, separate the classical and modern forms of these terms, but

Foucault clearly (and problematically) provokes contemporary parallels in his deployment of these terms, as suggested below.

The sixth lecture of Foucault's first course at the Collège de France, on 27th January 1971, opened by studying a juridical text on Egyptian papyrus which had been preserved concerning 'Greek colonies' in Egypt (Foucault 2013, 72). In later lectures he examined the seventh to sixth century BCE development of Greek money-systems for taxation but also for commerce and relations with its colonies (Foucault, 118), just as colonisation was suggested as a response to agrarian crises in the same period (Foucault, 121-122). Empire here functions as more of a structural conditioning for the development of forms of measurement and, ultimately, a *nomos* that will take in the ordering of justice, money, insignia, and the stars. But in the later governmentality lectures, when Foucault returned to the classical world, empire became something much more constitutive of the relations between the various scales of the world and the self. Here, the advice given from a philosopher to a ruler (the second type of *parrhesia*, outlined above) was inseparable from both the work they did upon themselves *and* from their political geographical context:

> Basically, when the problem of government arises in the Imperial epoch as not only a problem of the government of the city, but also of the government of the entire Empire, and when this imperial government is in the hands of a sovereign whose wisdom is an absolutely fundamental element of political action, then the all-powerful sovereign will need to have at his disposal a *logos*, a reason, a rational way of saying and thinking things.
>
> (Foucault 2010, 136)

This advice, and the role in forming-the-self of the ruler, that the *parrhesiast* played operated in a complex relationship with democracy and legislated/constituted (*isēgoria*) freedoms. Foucault was explicit that *parrhesia* did *not* just operate in democracies and in public, but also operated in the royal courts of autocracies (Foucault 2010, 189). He dwelt at length on Plato's (largely unsuccessful) advice to the autocrat Dionysius in the 360s BCE, who he criticised for failing to effectively organise the distribution of power. It was not the tyranny or autocracy of Dionysius that was criticised. Rather it was the failures of his imperial and geographical governmentalities: attempting to run Sicily as a single city rather than as a plural empire (' . . . not having thought out properly, if you like, the dimensions and form of this new political unit which would be a sort of empire', Foucault, 265); and failing to establish relationships of friendship and trust. The latter were just as vital in autocratic monarchies as democracies; establishing allies amongst the vanquished rather than subjugating all. This was the question of indirect rule, which would be a topic of ongoing debate in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European empires (Mantena 2010; Legg 2014a). The aim was a system of federation and alliance, tying together collaborators and creating '. . . the possibility of an imperial type of government which rests on the cooperation and collaboration of a number of governors who transmit authority locally and on the spot'. (Foucault, 267). This is an image of empire as a network of cities, each linked to the metropolis (Foucault, 268).

This practical level of advice was also deployed by the *parrhesiast* in imperial democracies. In terms of democratic *parrhesia*, all had the right to speak (though only some should be listened to), risk was attached to that speech (though failure or condemnation), and certain speakers emerged to guide all others. In the 'good empire' of the Persian Cyrus

these emergent divisions were bound together through *philia* (friendship), allowing the whole empire to work on the basis of *eleutheria* (freedom of speech, Foucault, 204). Plato also referred to the Athenian model of empire, which had not attempted to create, in Foucault's words, 'what we would now call colonial settlements' (parts of Athens that were not on Athenian territory, Foucault 2010, 268). Rather, it conquered already populated but dominated towns and left power in the hands of those already exercising it (' . . . those who in our terms we would call, if you like, the "local elites", Foucault, 268), presenting Athenians as liberators while integrating the towns into their own empire. In the following centuries, in both the Hellenistic and the imperial Roman worlds, Foucault suggested that the key question remained that of geography and appropriate power relations, but this question was up-scaled from the city-state '…to a type of exercise of power which geographically, in terms of both space and population, must extend beyond these limits' (Foucault, 290). The Empire and the Prince (the monarch) were the political realities that would require the interventions of the *parrhesiast* for the next eight centuries (from the fifth century BCE to the second century CE) until the beginning of the end of the Roman Empire. These would form some of the many foundations of the European self, but the constitutive role of the non-European Other was also given a minor but important role at various significant points across the lecture courses.

The Tyrant, the East, the Other

> . . . I should like to recount an anecdote which is so beautiful that one trembles at the thought that it might be true. It gathers into a single figure all the constraints of discourse: those which limit its powers, those which master its aleatory appearances, those which carry out

> the selection among speaking subjects. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Shogun heard tell that the European's superiority in matters of navigation, commerce, politics, and military skill was due to their knowledge of mathematics. He desired to get hold of so precious a knowledge. As he had been told of an English sailor who possessed the secret of these miraculous discourses, he summoned him to his palace and kept him there. Alone with him, he took lessons. He learned mathematics. But the anecdote does not stop there: it has its European side too. The story has it that this English sailor, Will Adams, was an autodidact, a carpenter who had learnt geometry in the course of working in a shipyard. Should we see this story as the expression of one of the great myths of European culture? The universal communication of knowledge and the infinite free exchange of discourses in Europe, against the monopolised and secret knowledge or Oriental tyranny?
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> (Foucault 1970 [1981], 62)

The first non-European figure that recurs in Foucault's lectures is that of the tyrant; although it was followed (as below) by the non-European as model, as a figure of the past, as Other, and as a broader comparative frame for Foucault himself. The quotation above came from Foucault's inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, delivered on 2nd December 1970. The lecture addressed the 'Order of Discourse' and here William Adams represented the entrepreneurial, imperial subaltern while the Japanese Shogun featured as a desiring subject of the western imperial self, but also as a geographical and political limit case of

discourse.[2] The lectures over the following year detailed much closer forms of Eastern knowledge and practise which had an early and constitutive effect on ancient Europe. Emergent forms of Greek *krinein* (or justice, around the first half of the fifth century BCE) required particular forms of standardised knowledge to pass their judgements, both in terms of cosmology (days and dates, astronomy and climate) and theogony (the origins of gods and the world). Both of these forms of knowledge, Foucault (2013, 111) claimed, were widely acknowledged to have originated in the great empires of the Euphrates and the Near East, in the Hittites, the Assyrians and in Babylon. The political power of these empires required an administrative calendar, the raising of taxes and of ancestral genealogies of royal power. These Eastern models, Foucault (118) claimed, provided the Greeks with a model for knowledge, monetary measure and political form in the seventh to sixth century BCE. Eastern 'tyranny' was used to destroy aristocracies and found City-States but then disappeared. Although Plato would later cite the Persian empire of Cyrus as a model of good *parrhesia*, Foucault acknowledges that through the fifth century, in particular, 'Persia was for Greek thought the, as it were, repellent, negative example: the autocratic, violent regime, the large empire which subjugates others, etcetera' (Foucault 2010, 266). Money, Foucault suggested, had been used to tax during the tyrannous era, but then to enable trade and colonisation. The key Greek development was to separate knowledge from state power, on the Eastern model, and to set this knowledge to work on ordering the world of the everyday through the *nomos*.

The East was, therefore, here an example of state tyranny that was generative and learnt from, though swiftly democratised and its tyranny disabled. This also marked, for Foucault, the overcoming of an older, inner tyrannous figure, represented by Sophocles's

Oedipus Tyrannus (Oedipus the King). Blind to the signs of his birth surrounding him, Oedipus attempted to marshal emergent forms of knowledge and trial, but because of his position as ancient sovereign and tyrant he refused to listen, and ended his life in blinded exile. What disappears with Oedipus, Foucault reads Sophocles as suggesting, ' . . . is that old oriental form of the expert king (*roi savant*), of the king who controls, governs, pilots, and sets the city right with his knowledge, fending off disasters or plagues; more directly, it is the updated version that Greek 'tyranny' tried to give to this old form when it wanted to put the cities right by using, diverting, and often twisting the god's oracles; . . . ' (Foucault, 256). Having internalised and overcome, or at least made productive, Eastern tyrannies, they could now be posed as Other.

This process of othering would occasionally be that which Said (1978, 56) detected as a recurrent feature in the definition of the western conception of the orient, from the *Illiad* to Euripedes and after. Plato's advice to Dionysius stressed that the new empire of networked cities would prove its strength in struggling against a common enemy, namely the barbarians, and specifically the Carthaginians (Foucault 2010, 269). Uniting against the barbarians would allow Dionysius the younger to multiply the size of his father's empire.

When it came to speaking of other others to the European self, Foucault mixed conjecture, caution and acknowledgment of the limits of his scholarship. In analysing the role of the gods in Euripides's *Ion* he drew upon George Dumézil's (1982) Indo-European comparative research. This equated Apollo with the abstract ancient entity in Indian Vedic literature which represented voice, though Foucault (2010, 123) acknowledged he had not read the Vedic texts in question. Other comparative points were made more freely. Foucault analysed Ion's mother's (Creusa's) confrontation of Apollo, Ion's father, with the

shame of his (effectively) raping her. This founding act of what would later be termed *parresia* (here defined as turning against those in power) was compared to practises in the East. This verbal shaming of the powerful by the powerless was compared to the non-verbal ritual of the hunger strike in India, ' . . . the ritual act by which someone powerless emphasises in front of someone powerful that he who can do nothing has suffered the injustice of he who can do anything' (Foucault, 133). Some forms of Japanese suicide were said to have the same meaning, whereby the weak victim of an injustice invokes (the ultimate) agonistic discourse against the powerful.

The question of the non-European had also emerged, briefly, in his lectures on early Christianity and the subject's relationship to truth. Foucault stressed that the key question here was what happened when the subject approached Christian truth (the preparation for baptism) and when they departed from it (through sin). The question was not that of the experience of the state of truth, but the question of enlightenment posed by Buddhists (Foucault 1979-80 [2014], 186). Foucault acknowledged that Christians had not invented the relationship between subjectivity and truth, nor the practise of spiritual direction ('You find highly developed practises of direction in Chinese, Japanese, and Hindu civilizations', Foucault 2014, 232), nor the problem of conversion, which already existed in ancient cultures and in many other cultures (' . . . I do not want to make it into a universal', Foucault, 160).

These issues of universality and eastern difference emerged in interviews conducted in 1978, between the delivery of the *Security, Territory, Population* and the *Birth of Biopolitics* lectures, with a Buddhist priest and temple master in Japan (Foucault 1978 [2013]). On Japan itself Foucault seemed to vacillate between pseudo-orientalisms (the

Japanese people being more mysterious than other people, their culture harder to decode) and modern observations (Japan as re-maker, colonising the West). He acknowledged that his main interest was not Japan, but the history of western rationality and its limit. When speaking from the east back to the west, he was surer footed, and spoke of the European present in the context of its colonial past.

'Our Civilisation'

> It is true, European thought finds itself at a turning point. This turning point, on an historical scale, is nothing other than the end of imperialism. The crisis of Western thought is identical to the end of imperialism. This crisis has produced no supreme philosopher who excels in signifying that crisis. For Western thought in crisis expressed itself by discourses which can be very interesting, but which are neither specific not extraordinary. There is no philosopher who marks out this period. For it is the end of the era of Western philosophy. Thus, if philosophy of the future exists, it must be born outside of Europe or equally born in consequence of meetings and impacts between Europe and non-Europe.
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> (Foucault 1978 [2013], 113)

Here Foucault positioned Europe as a region of the world which depended for its identity on its empires, which had all mostly (formally) decolonised. While this presented challenges for Europe it also presented challenges for the world, due to the expansion of European (especially Marxist) visions of the world, social organisation, and ideological forms beyond their own particular province (Chakrabarty 2000):

> Europe finds itself in a defined region of the world and in a defined period. That said, it presents the specificity of creating a universal category which categorises the modern world. Europe is the birth place of universality. In this sense the crisis of Europe concerns the whole world. It is a crisis which influences different thoughts in all the countries of the world, as well as the general thought of the world.
>
> (Foucault, 114)

While refusing to universalise Christian conversion (characterised by an obsession with mortification), Foucault acknowledged that other cultures had their own specific forms of relating subjectivity to truth by their own forms of conversion, including trances, seizures by higher powers, awakenings, or dreams (Foucault 2014, 160). These forms were always, however, off-picture and served, at best, as a comparative means for questioning how '. . . the relations between the government of men [*sic*], the manifestation of truth in the form of subjectivity, and the salvation of each and all been established in *our civilization*?' (Foucault, 75, emphasis added) This term recurs throughout the later lectures: the early Christian thought of Tertullian is positioned as important in the 'history of our civilization' (Foucault, 144), relating to the injunction to 'tell me who you are', which 'is fundamental in Western civilization' (Foucault, 146); the development of penance marked an inflexion in ' . . . the relationships of subjectivity and truth, not only in Christianity, but in the whole of Western civilization' (Foucault, 194); the coupling of the verbalisation of sin with the guided exploration of oneself marked, for Foucault, the beginning of the development of the subjectivity of the Western man [*sic*] (Foucault, 225); and this obligation to tell the truth about oneself, it was suggested, had never ceased in Christian culture, nor, probably, in

western societies (Foucault, 311). While keeping subjectivity in sight, the later lectures focused more on politics and philosophy, but always with the west and the present in mind: Plato's advice regarding government was said to be important for the relations between philosophy and politics in Western thought (Foucault 2010, 280); the contribution of philosophers to political *parrhesia* was said to be constituent of philosophy and political practise in the West, and absolutely peculiar to it (Foucault, 289); this making of modern philosophy into a practise of public truth-telling, of veridiction, even of *parrhesia*, was very possibly unique to Western societies (Foucault, 349).

What we see, therefore, is that the governmentality lectures were constantly steering towards a present that was both a time and a place: modern Europe. There is, of course, nothing wrong with delimiting oneself to a region of study, especially when the region is Europe and the timespan stretches from archaic Greece to the 1980s. But the question of 'our' civilisation does raise the question of who was outside the 'our'; who was the 'their'? The Athenian demos did not include women, foreigners or slaves, and exclusions on the basis of gender, race and class obviously continue to fracture the hospitality of European 'civilisation'. There are also a series of subtle alignments between Foucault's self-positioning as an intellectual and the imperial subject of western history: 'what *we* would now call colonial settlements'; 'those who *in our terms* we would call, if you like, the "local elites"'; the idea that Indian hunger strikers and Japanese suicides equate to ancient *parrhesia*, but as non-verbal, non-arguing forms. The 'we' or the 'our' here are as much intellectual as they are imperial collectives, highlighting the inseparable imperial positioning of the European academy. But the lectures do little to settle the question of Foucault's

subject positioning with regard to Europe's modern colonial realities, even if he acknowledges its ancient past and its post-imperial legacies (also see Foucault 1979 [2015]).

Truth, Nationalism, and the Masses

Moving beyond the hints and traces of colonialism and imperialism in Foucault's material, what features of the later lectures might contribute to debates on South Asian governmentality? Before giving some examples of possible applications, certain parallels and intersections between dominant themes in South Asian studies and the governmentality lectures will be drawn out, namely, repenting or protesting bodies within political regimes of truth, and the problem of the masses or, perhaps, the subaltern.

In both the lectures on the ancient and the early Christian worlds Foucault returned to various disciplined, protesting or marked bodies as ways of tracing the different relationships between subjectivity and truth (in line with his previous studies of abnormal bodies within normative regimes, from the madman to the habitual criminal, from the hermaphrodite to the prostitute). Before the development of confession, the repenting Christian, who had sinned after baptism, would supposedly express their penitence through dramatic *exomologēsis,* living as an outcast, dressed in sackcloth and ashes, subject to fasting and theatrical, public expression of their sorrow. They lived as outcasts; a life of fasting, grovelling at the feet of priests, and calling for repentance (Foucault 2014, 210). If these lapsed souls were the exception, then the developing norm of Christianity was that of discipline. In preparation for baptism Tertuillian outlined the need for '*paenitantiae diciplina'*, the discipline of repentance (Foucault, 128). In *The Apostolic Tradition* (c.215 CE), Hippolytus also outlined the intensive ascetic practises that were required in preparation for baptism (prayer, fasting, vigils, kneeling) which would test the authenticity of faith.

These were the staging posts through which conversion, in its specifically Christian manifestation, emerged. Conversion posed the most challenging of questions: 'How to become other? How to cease being what one is? How, being what one is, can one become completely other? How, being in this world, to pass to another? How, being in error, to pass to the truth?' (Foucault 2014, 159). Before, and surviving the invention of, confession would be prayers, fasting and almsgiving as ways of seeking redemption from within Christianity (Foucault, 176).

While spiritual direction in the classical world, which Foucault described in his later lectures, was mostly psychogogical (the training of the mind), he also recounted the bodies and practises of parrhesiasts who did not just seek to influence the agora or the court. Opposing Plato's interpretation of Socrates, the Cynics connected truth telling and politics not through advising the ruler or the assembly, but through confrontation, derision, and mockery, from a position of defiant exteriority to societal and bodily norms (Foucault 2010, 286; also Foucault 2011; see Hardt 2010, for more on this 'militant life'). Diogenes (412/404-323 BCE) spoke truth to power from the position of naturalness, from his refusal of wealth, possessions and the laws of the city. *Parrhesia* could thus take on various modes of being, and while the *parrhesiast* (Foucault is talking about philosophers here) could state the truth in teaching, advising or proclaiming, it was through the *parrhesiast*'s life that they became agents of truth (Foucault 2010, 320).

The figure that obviously springs to mind here is Mohandas K Gandhi, as *Mahatma*. Various works have traced the philosophical origins of Gandhi's nonviolence, to, amongst others, Tolstoy, Jainism, Jesus Christ, the Bhagavad Gita and the suffragettes, but Richard Sorabji (2012) has drawn these connections back to the classical world in exploring the

connections between Gandhi and the Stoics. Shruti Kapilla (2011) has sketched out some of the relationships between Gandhi's conceptions of truth, evil and politics, with the object of truth being to expose inequality and to bring to the surface the infrastructures of an unequal world. While the methods of this exposition could be radical, they also drew upon ancient Indian traditions to mobilise forms of ascetic practise (Howard 2013) that created spaces and practises through which the colonial world could be renounced and an inner, Indian sovereignty be cultivated (Chatterjee 1993).

Leela Gandhi (2014) has most directly linked Gandhi's ascetic practises to Foucault's *parrhesia* lectures, through exploring the intensified ethical turn in late-colonial, transnational thought. Here self-cultivation was shown to depend on working on others, a tradition linking ancient Greek Cynicism and early Christian renunciation to the alternative care-of-selves of Sri Ramakrishna and Gandhi. Whilst, as seen above, Foucault had shown how what would become the Middle East shaped what would become Europe, India featured only as a distant comparison. Gandhi (23-25) draws on comments Foucault made elsewhere, however, to explore the 'fable' that Greek Cynicism was inflected by the influences of monastic and ascetic sects, which had resisted Alexander (the Great)'s Macedonian empire in India itself. The value of the connection for Gandhi is 'emblematic', but it further serves to remind us of the always-relational constitution of Europe, and the ancient traditions of alternative-care of self upon which MK Gandhi and others drew. While Leela Gandhi focuses on the ethics of self-fashioning, the question here is how the truth functioned in governmentalities serving both colonial and anticolonial regimes, which definitely do not map on to regimes solely of 'power' and 'resistance'.

For, as the subaltern studies collective have shown very forcefully, the nationalist elite, for many of whom Gandhi was the supreme spiritual director (or meta-*parrhesiast*), impressed their truth upon the masses with considerable disciplinary force (Chatterjee 1984, 185; Guha 1973 [2009]). In making clear the connections between truth-subject relations and governmentality (Legg 2016a), Foucault stressed that if we speak of political or penal regimes, why not speak of regimes of truth, as ' . . . the set of processes and institutions by which, under certain conditions and with certain effects, individuals are bound and obliged to make well-defined truth acts?' (Foucault 2014, 94). Why not speak of truth obligations like we speak of political or legal obligations? Whilst belief could not be enforced, the manifestation of truth acts could well be obliged; it is submitting to the truth which is the object of truth regimes (Foucault, 97).

Resistant truths themselves featured less in the lectures, if at all (although they featured more in the final lecture course). Rather, we are left with some comments regarding the effects on the subject of efforts to break the bond that binds one to power ('It is the movement of freeing oneself from power that should serve as revealer in the transformations of the subject and the relation the subject maintains with truth', Foucault 2014, 77), or on the positive and productive power of internal, ascetic discipline in preparing the Christian to fight Satan out of their very heart (Foucault, 131). At best we have traces of resisting subjects: those sinning after baptism, or pushing back the date of baptism to as late a date as possible, in the Christian period, for instance. It is possible, of course, to view *parrhesia itself* as resistance, of 'telling truth to power', although Foucault complicates this picture by showing the *parrhesiast* working as often to bravely counsel a leader on how to rule more efficiently than to challenge the nature of their government.

In what follows, examples from the late-colonial, interwar period will be used to explore how both nationalists and colonialists worked to produce their own truth regimes through governmentalities that targeted subjects and the spaces they inhabited, both of which were resisted by articulating different forms and expressions of truth. They will seek to complement already existing works which have engaged Foucault in terms of truth-as-objectivity and inquiries into alleged abuses of indentured labourers (Mongia 2004) and in terms of revolutionary nationalists' fearless belief in truth as a matter of taking sides, even of *parrhesia* (Moffat 2013, 189). The work below can only present brief insights into what were much wider and older governmentalities, and they will operate around two truth regimes: nationalist truth-force (satyagraha/discipline); and colonial truth-force (torture/interrogation). Though politically opposed, both regimes brought together disparate elements to compel truth effects and to conduct conduct.

Truth Regimes and Late-Colonial India

Nationalist Truth-Force: Disciplining the Masses

As suggested above, it is almost redundant to stress the centrality of notions of truth (*satya*) to Gandhi's politics (see his autobiography up to 1921, *Experiments with Truth*), and that of the Indian National Congress.[3] It is also not too difficult to show how the relationship of this conception of truth to self-hood (both of the individual and the national selves) was pressed into nationalist governmentalities that connected personal conduct to the independence struggle. As Gandhi wrote in *Hind Swaraj* (1909), 'true civilisation' (or *Sudharo*), which was the object of political self-rule, 'is that mode of conduct by which man [*sic*] does his duty. Performance of duty is the observance of morality. To observe morality is to discipline [*vash rakhavi*] our mind [. . .] and our senses' (translated by Skaria 2002, 965).

Satyagraha, or truth force, was a moral and universal mission, that could be temporally and often politically concretised in *ahimsa*, or nonviolence (Chatterjee 1984, 186).

Whilst Gandhi meticulously planned out spaces in which cadres could be trained in the discipline of satyagraha (see Skaria 2002, on the ashram), it was left to others to spread his politics of truth into the villages and cities of India. One early proposal gives us a sense of how this anticolonial nationalist regime of truth was imagined as a functioning governmentality. The proposal was made by Delhi-based barrister and aspiring nationalist Mohammad Asaf Ali in his 1921, 73-page book *Constructive Non-Cooperation*. Asaf Ali had been born and educated in Delhi and had trained in England as a lawyer before returning to India to practise law. He became politicised by the Khilafat, pan-Islamist movement after the Great War and went on to be one of the leading Muslim Congress nationalists in Delhi, a member of the Constitutive Assembly, and India's first ambassador to the USA after independence (Raghavan and Asaf Ali 1994).

Published during Gandhi and Congress's non-cooperation movement of 1920-22, Asaf Ali's book denied that his proposals aimed at the subversion of reputable government. Rather, they were 'an attempt at non-violent, non-co-operative self-organisation by easy instalments of practical but tentative steps, without coming into violent or any collision with "the Government established by law in British India"' (Asaf Ali 1921, i). The book laid out, in five chapters, a plan for a rival but interior state within the state that could prepare Indians for self-government. The chapters concerned a Grand *Panchayat* (council), justice, peace and order, education and finance and some speculative conclusions.

Asaf Ali's explicit aim was to create a model state based on the 'natural unit' of the town or village, much, he suggested, as had been the republics of Ancient Greece, although

the model was definitely that of the village panchayats of India (Asaf Ali 1921, 7). He dismissed accusations that such plans were Bolshevik, or behoven to the 'decree of the mob', while he condemned Indian legislators willing to cooperate with the British government. The scalar sovereignty of the state was accepted (linking the sovereign, the state and the subject) but a parallel institutional structure was proposed (the Grand Panchayat, Sub-Panchayats and the *Sevak*, or voluntary worker). The latter were necessary because while the highly centralised 'nervous centre' of the colonial state was fully active, the (local) extremities were cold and dying of 'gradual atrophy' (Asaf Ali, 14). The panchayats would allow each locality to be 'self-reliant, vigilant and progressive, [and to] reassume the control of its own affairs and be sovereign within its own spheres' (Asaf Ali, 14; with clear resonances to arguments about the inner sovereign cultivations of nationalism in Chatterjee 1993). This clearly chimed with the dyarchy reforms of the 1919 Government of India Act, which had divided and devolved certain powers to provincial governments, although the mechanisms of the Act were the very subject of non-cooperation at the time (Legg 2016b). But Asaf Ali wanted the whole ethos, not just the structure, of the state to change; to a state that served, not ruled, its people.

This ethos, however, ran firmly against the identities of the population and the techne proposed to govern them in the rest of the book. While there was some mention of a mobile and active citizenship, the population was mostly defined well within the terms of elite, nationalist, subalternist discourse. On the opening page Gandhi was described as having sounded the non-cooperation clarion call to the:

> . . . struggling and disorganized, hunted and vanquished bands of the Indian people . . . His voice has sent a thrill of hope throughout the length and

> breadth of India and has served to awaken the slumbering manhood of our country, dispelling the hypnotic spell of national diffidence through which Indian character has been carefully prevented from attaining its full stature.
>
> (Asaf Ali 1921, 1)

Asaf Ali occasionally classed himself with the supine masses, suggesting that 'We have long suffered from the suppression of initiative, and our body politic has become alarmingly anaemic and liable [to] atrophy. We require to arrest our deepening torpor, and dispel all the mephitic vapours which induce in us a sense of helplessness and unfitness' (Asaf Ali 1921, 52). So the masses, of which Asaf Ali may have been (perhaps, previously, before awakening) a part, were slumbering, but due to the hypnotism or noxious vapours of a hunting and orientalising colonialism. When 'she' was awakened the Indian people would move 'at lightning speed' (Asaf Ali, 9). And therein lay the problem; how to govern this waking mass? Gandhi had, of course, already supplied the answer, and the means: '. . . everything should be done to bring moral and social pressure to bear of [*sic*] our own people to live up to a higher standard of *Truth*, *Simplicity*, and *Peace*' (Asaf Ali, 49 emphasis in original).

The Truth (capitalised) recurred in key passages throughout the work. One's loyalty was stressed, early on, to be to the '. . . Absolute Truth first and to everything else afterwards' (Asaf Ali 1921, 5-6). Justice was defined as human relations (elsewhere defined as man's conduct) in the most harmonious poise, which could be realised '. . . by the strictest observance of moral values, and therefore demands the most scrupulous adherence to Truth' (Asaf Ali, 37). In a highly centralised state this strict observance of morals was impossible, so it had to be local panchayats who would administer conduct via

their Sevaks, who would be trained in extreme discipline (Asaf Ali, 61). Order was said to be the essential feature of progressive society, and each panchayat was charged with training a body of volunteers to deal with internal disorder (presumably from the recently awakened subaltern masses). They would undertake military training, not in preparation for fighting, but to '… discipline the mind of the solider, to make him conform to a rigid course of conduct which knows *no wavering and no fear*' (Asaf Ali, 54, original emphasis; on the importance of martiality in Gandhian thought see Misra 2014). They would be trained if possible by ex-military or police men and the volunteers would be rigorously selected on the basis of their literacy, local knowledge and family distinctions

The truth-subject relations manufactured through such disciplinary practises would be administered through re-imagined local geographies. Every town and village was believed to be a natural unit (a view shared by Gandhi and imperial federalists such as Lionel Curtis alike, see Legg 2016b, 51) but it had an obligation to the state to observe uniformity of procedure. Much of Asaf Ali's book was spent describing how panchayats could represent and work with their populations in all their specificity, with elected representatives assembling at ever larger scales, until at the highest scale Congress would coordinate this state within a state (Asaf Ali 1921, 70). Unlike Gandhi's steadfast commitment to village India, Asaf Ali (1921, 50) believed that this 'experiment should only be very carefully and temporarily tried in big towns', while the villages could experiment with simpler forms of guilds and panchayats. These tests would be played out in the Non-Cooperation movement of the early 1920s and more fully in the Civil Disobedience movements of the early 1930s. Here the mass engagement with these ethical injunctions was widely acknowledged, although the subjects produced were ethnographically variegated (see P. Chatterjee, this

volume) and the spaces over which they played out were riven by divisions regarding the social and political (Banerjee, this volume) and the geographies of care (I. Chatterjee, this volume).

Asaf Ali's book stands as an early ethical coding of geographical space in the name of an emerging nationalist governmentality that returned obsessively to the politics of truth. It concluded with one of what would become Asaf Ali's trademark rhetorical flourishes, linking the geography of towns and cities, via Truth, to the global and spiritual leadership to which the individual discipline (of the masses) could lead the country: 'India is yet to achieve her highest destiny. She reappears on the virgin summit of the Himalayas enthroned on Justice with a golden nimbus of Truth around her head. She points the only way to her children and to the rest of the world; the only way to *Dharma*' (Asaf Ali 1921, 73).

Colonial Truth-Force: Interrogating Torture

> Interrogation is but one process in the collection of information and has been aptly defined as the art of making a suspect *tell the truth* against all his inclinations to lie… No matter how good an agent may be, he seldom reaches the same standard of *truthfulness* nor is he likely to possess the same extent of knowledge, as a suspect who has made up his mind to confess. An interrogator can only be successful if he has an instinctive understanding of human psychology and infinite patience. Popular belief that the inducement applied is invariably something in the shape of ingenious physical torture, is sheer nonsense. Any statements secured by such means would contain many more false admissions than *truth* and would certainly not

> withstand the test of time. The reputation of the Fort interrogations for the *truth* is due to the patience of the interrogator compared with that of the prisoner (emphasis added).[4]

This justification of interrogation was supplied by H.D. Bhanot, of the Punjab Civil Secretariat, to Richard Totttenham, the Home Member of the Government of India, on June 1st 1945, in a note explaining the history of the Lahore Fort Interrogation Centre. This was part of ongoing investigations into accusations of torture at the forts of both Lahore and Delhi, Mughal Palace complexes which were used as military bases in both cities. The question of torture strikes to the violent core of ongoing debates about the nature of both British and Mughal rule (see Heath this volume). But the knowledge politics at play in the question of interrogation bring a heightened sense of the psychological and the affective to this microcosm of colonial alethurgy (for a situation of torture within liberal governmentalities, not states of exception, see Krasmann 2010, although the question of truth production is only addressed briefly).

Foucault himself had famously cast public torture as an outdated relic of ancient sovereignties but one that survived into modern penal regimes (Foucault 1975 [1977], 21); part one of *Discipline and Punish* was entitled 'torture', addressing the body and the scaffold (although on the complicated meaning of 'supplice' here see Elden 2017, 144). This work built on earlier lectures which had: suggested that 'a whole history could be written of the relationships between truth and torture' (Foucault 2013, 85); briefly situated practises of water torture and branding (Foucault 2006, 105); and considered the role of torture as a form of avowal (verbal acts of binding oneself to truth in relation to another) in the Inquisition during which it functioned as a truth *test* (Foucault 2014, 204; drawing from

Foucault 1973 [2001], 50). This was a relic of an ancient mode of justice in which one had to prove one's self by ordeal, but torture here was regulated, authorised and delimited, and evidence extracted under torture had to be repeated under testimony. Despite reappearing in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, the process declined amidst the formal legal codes and juridical systems of the eighteenth century, although it clearly continued in unregulated forms, at times of pressing need and in perpetually new and evolving forms, both within and without Europe.

During the Second World War the Red Fort at Delhi had been adapted to include an interrogation centre. This was inspired by the 20-year history of the Lahore Fort Interrogation Centre which, the note cited above recounted, had been established to deal with a 'practically uninterrupted series of important revolutionary conspiracies and plots against the State which have been successfully uncovered and investigated from the Fort cells since'.[5] Gandhi had recently criticised activities at the Fort, tapping into a criticism throughout the war period. What he couldn't have known was that there had been similar debates within the government following a conference of CID officers in Lucknow in November 1942. They recommended the wider use of interrogation methods and Tottenham (at this time an Additional Undersecretary to the Home Department) suggested, on 14th April 1943, that provincial governments consider the matter, without encouraging the extortion of information from detainees by dubious methods.[6] A note on file on 18th May acknowledged that the Punjab government had been criticised in some quarters, and that circulating treatises on the matter would be irrelevant as the process depended on the interrogator's knowledge of human nature allowing them to 'pitch unerringly on the weak spots in the subjects' armour'; advice would be useless if the interrogator did not 'have their

own knack'. Most provinces replied to Tottenham's circular saying they were satisfied with their facilities though Bombay reported that it had sent 'fifth columnists' (working for/with Japan) to the CSDIC (Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, at the Red Ford in Delhi, see below) in the past.

Tottenham clearly felt this was inadequate and formally addressed provincial governments on 30th August 1943, in the context of the ongoing Congress-led Quit India mass movement. He recommended the advantages of 'scientific interrogation' by trained staff in separate accommodation, and included a note from the Intelligence Bureau supporting his recommendations. It suggested that interrogation should supplement the three normal means of securing intelligence (secret agents, surveillance and censorship) and stressed the difference between torture ('not an interrogator[']s weapon') and a psychological method depending on expert technique, detailed knowledge of the interrogator, and ideal conditions, namely, concentration (interrogation with patience and without respite) and seclusion (a space free of interruptions, which might affect the mood sought by the officer). This could help produce what the Bureau defined as the 'intimate' and 'political knowledge' which it was the purpose of the CID to extract: 'The knowledge which is required is the colour, shape and make-up of each fragment of the political mosaic'.[7] The Bureau report contained many of the phrases that were recycled in the Lahore note which opened this section: making the suspect tell the truth against the inclination to lie; that physical torture was disallowed not on moral grounds but on the unreliability of evidence; the psychological outwitting of the detainee; and that no agent could produce material of such benefit 'compared to the subject persuaded to make truthful disclosures'.[8]

However, Maurice Hallet, Governor of the United Provinces, replied on 10th September suggesting that Tottenham's letter was the most dangerous thing he had ever seen emanating from the Home Department. Hallet felt Tottenham was endorsing the 'third degree methods' of physical torture, as used by old sub-inspectors in rural police stations and which the government was striving to eliminate, while the scientific interrogation as described appeared to him as 'mental torture'. The Home Member, Reginald Maxwell, replied on 22nd September dismissing Hallet's letter as a misconstrued, sensationalist antithesis of what was being proposed, which would deploy the neglected field of psychology in interrogation, as it was being deployed in other areas of human activity.

Interrogation methods, therefore, continued to be used at Lahore and were certainly used at Delhi. The Red Fort's CSDIC was the Indian node of an international network run by various British coordinated intelligence agencies, stretching from the UK, through Europe to the Middle East and South Asia (Clayton 1993, 179). They were used to interrogate detainees, defectors and prisoners of war; for Delhi this mostly meant Japanese soldiers captured following the invasion of Burma and some members of the Indian National Army (INA, which had attempted to invade India under Subhas Chandra Bose, with Japanese support, in 1944). However, disturbing reports began to emerge of nationalist prisoners being subjected to extreme treatment in these detention centres. A *New Statesman* letter in July 1945 accused the British of placing sadists above the law, as had Germany, and that Indian prison camps witnessed physical torture that bore comparison with Nazi concentration camps at Buchenwald and Belson.[9] While these accusations did not merit much response from the central government, a furore over the Red Fort in late 1945 did.

On 10th October 1945 Gandhi wrote to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy expressing concern over the treatment of Sheel Bhadra Yajee, Member of the Legislative Assembly for Patna and Vice-President of the (Bose affiliated) All India Forward Bloc. He forwarded Yajee's account (which was reported in the press across the country) of his four months at the Red Fort in 1943 under the control of Military Authorities. It described a 10 by 10 foot cell without natural light, infested by insects, without reading or writing materials, edible food, or a bed fit to sleep on; he described his time as ' . . . living in a burning hell and a land of living death'.[10] After 45 days of solitary confinement he suggested that 'relentless and merciless' interrogation had been started by a large host of Intelligence Department staff, who '. . . tried to extort information of their own imagination from our benumbed brains'.[11] They sought information on Congress sabotages, his 15 months in the political underground, Japanese collaborators and Bose's activities.

Yajee's most politically troubling suggestion was that the Red Fort was meant for military prisoners and that he, and his two colleagues, were the only political prisoners (although the potential Japanese connections complicated this claim). The Intelligence Bureau confirmed that Yajee had been arrested on 31st May 1943 in Bombay for his Forward Bloc activities. Local authorities had interrogated him and then passed him to the CSDIC (as their reply to Tottenham had suggested they would). Various reports confirmed that Yajee's cell was worse than that for class A political prisoners but better than those or ordinary convicts. His interrogation and isolation were confirmed and most of his accusations were refuted on point of fact.

However, in October 1945, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau discouraged the prosecution of those publishing Yajee's account for fear of further publicising the fact that

he had been in solitary confinement for so long, and because it was felt his accusations were not extravagantly 'wide of the truth'. On 30th October John Thorne, as Home Member, agreed that some refutation of Yajee's account should be issued, but felt that there 'are features of the case that are disturbing', namely: his transfer to Delhi without a valid order under the Defence of India Act; the conditions of his incarceration; his solitary conferment for nearly four months; and his persistent examinations by officers.[12] As such, Thorne conducted an unannounced inspection of the CSDIC on 9th November, though with the cooperation of the War Department. During what we could call this 'tour as inspection' he found the cells to be as the Intelligence Bureau had described them.

Meanwhile, however, another accusation had been passed on by Gandhi to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy on 25th November 1945. A young man, Prabhudayal Vidyarthi, who had been working with Gandhi since 1935, had been arrested in 1942 and recently discharged. He told Gandhi that he had been tortured in the Red Fort, as had one Dr Lohia. A report in the *Hindustan Times* on 4th November reported Vidyarthi's account of his torture in the Fort, including two forms of electric shock (one nozzle onto his little finger and another involving a cylindrical piece being rolled over body causing burning sensation) and being made to stand on an ice box until he couldn't breathe. The article title combined the associations of sovereign authority and power of the Mughal Palace with the expert knowledge of the new science of interrogation and the practises of the old rural sub-inspector: 'SCIENTIFIC TORTURE IN RED FORT'.[13]

Gandhi received a reply requesting him to send Vidyarthi to Delhi, all expenses paid, so he instructed him to go and stay with his son, Devadas Gandhi, at the Hindustan Times office in Connaught Place (Gandhi 1994, volume 89, 16). Due to the sensitivities of the case

Vidyarthi received an exceptional degree of attention; both he and Devadas Gandhi were given a personal tour of the Red Fort by Thorne, the Home Member himself. Thorne believed Vidyarthi when he said he had seen the barracks and his 'torture chamber' before, though he speculated that he could have visited the Fort on another occasion such as the INA trials.[14] Vidyarthi claimed the latter contained an ice box and other instruments of torture, described as a cylinder with a wooden handle and a series of appliances like thimbles that were fitted to the fingers. If the impression so far had been that Thorne was interrogating the interrogators in the Fort, the object of the tour was very quickly revealed. He broke off his report of what we could call this 'tour as interrogation' with the following:

> It is fair to make an observation here in respect of Prabhudayal's [Vidyarthi's] general demeanour. On entering into the Fort he conveyed the impression of some furtiveness but rather more of resolution and determination. This continued until he had made his identification of the torture chamber. From this point onwards nervousness became apparent. He swallowed much more frequently and his eyes darted here and there affording signs of distress. His hands from this time onwards were hardly ever still and he was continually plucking at his clothes and his person. He did not lose control but his growing concern was obvious from his behaviour and was not one of innocence but of general apprehension.[15]

Having not found the exact room he had described, his nervousness continued and the realisation that he had failed 'was written clearly on his face' (an example of 'folk wisdom' that supposedly allowed deception to be detected through reading the body; see Rejali

2007, 466). Had he been questioned at this time Thorne felt sure he would have admitted he was lying.

Though Thorne had found Yajee's treatment at the CSDIC disturbing, he seemed to relish his role as interrogator on the spot of Gandhi's young disciple and clearly felt he 'had the knack' for scientific interrogation. He gave six concluding points in recapping his visit, many of which correlated directly with the principles of scientific interrogation outlined above. Having started off with assurance, Vidyarthi became reckless and made 'inconsistent' identifications, he then became nervous and cautious but still kept 'making slips'. Thorne displayed the required 'concentration' of interrogation even if without the 'seclusion' or a private interrogation space, but this was the point. The Fort itself became both witness and evidence in the case mounted against Vidyarthi. At no point was it considered that it was the affective geography of the Fort that was making Vidyarthi nervous, whether as intimidating stage or as a trigger of traumatic memories of genuine torture (electrotorture with a storage battery had been documented in the Andaman Islands as far back as 1912, Rejali 2007, 193). Thorne met Devdas Gandhi two days later, who admitted the flaws in Vidyarthi's account, and again on 2nd March when he reported Devdas agreeing that the story was probably a fabrication.

The Red Fort incident was resolved, it seems, by two of the highest representatives in the land of the colonial and anti-colonial nationalist establishments, in favour of the Government of India. But the incident also exposed the ever-fractured nature of the state's apparatus, stringing together fragments of ancient techniques (solitary confinement), modern science (psychology), states of exception (war-emergency), possible violence (stress

and electro-torture) and the affective reading of a possibly tortured body by a member of a government dependent on but constantly wary of the power of the military.[16]

Whilst exposing and challenging this apparatus and its practises, Gandhi's Congress also had its own truth regime that was increasingly fractured by 'the now deeply embedded practises of governmental classification of populations by religion, caste, ethnicity, language . . . ' (P. Chatterjee, this volume). Discipline was central to keeping the awakened masses in line, not by the discipline of direct interrogation (concentration, seclusion), but by training the body and tutoring the mind into knowing how to respond nationally to the truth-command 'tell me who you are'.

These truth-regimes were variants broader colonial and nationalist governmentalities, which Foucault insisted could be analysed through the way that truth-tellings by others (veridiction) enable us to be governed (governmentality) through relationship to self (and subjectivity). Such projects intersect with already studied projects to count and calculate the population, to visualise and stimulate the economy, to learn and craft the boundary between the state and civil society, and to imagine a state attuned to the bodies and desires of its people. I hope the foregoing attempts to summarise and apply Foucault's turn to truth can provide some ways in which studies of South Asian governmentalities might complement existing work on the calculations and consequences of the 'true' and 'false' with explorations of the shared, practised governmentalities that commanded 'tell me who you are' and which were responded to with variously acquiescent, Cynical, obedient or militant truth-choices.

[1] I am indebted to David Arnold, Colin Gordon, Deana Heath, Greg Hollin, Darius Rejali and the participants of the 'Foucault, Political Life and History' workshop held in London in February, 2016, for their comments on drafts of this chapter.

[2] The Oxford English Dictionary describes the Shogun as 'The hereditary commander-in-chief of the Japanese army, until 1867 the virtual ruler of Japan'. Will[iam] Adams was, indeed, the first Englishman to reach Japan, arriving in 1600 on board a stricken Dutch ship that had been destined for the Dutch East Indies. He was summoned to the (later) Shogun Tokuhawa leyasu and came to advise him on how to build a modern navy, becoming in the process one of the few western Samurai. His exploits inspired James Clavell's (1975) novel, Shogun, and a 1990 Broadway musical of the same name.

[3] See the essays by Max Cooper at http://www.satyagrahafoundation.org/author/maxcooper/.

[4] National Archives of India (NA)/1945/Home Poll(I)/44/28/45

[5] NA/1945/Home Poll(I)/44/28/45

[6] NA/1943/Home Poll(I)/44/2/43

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] NA/1945/Home Poll(I)/44/17/45

[10] NA/1945/Home Poll(I)/44/28/45

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] NA/1945/Home Poll(I)/44/28/45

[14] NA/1945/Home Poll(I)/44/28/45

[15] NA/1945/Home Poll(I)/44/28/45

[16] I am indebted to Darius Rejali for his comments on these points.

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