

1 **True cowmen and commercial farmers: Exploring vets' and dairy farmers' contrasting views of**
2 **'good farming' in relation to biosecurity**

3 **Abstract**

4 Responsibility for biosecurity in UK farming is being devolved from government to industry, with a
5 greater emphasis on the veterinarian (vet)-farmer relationship. Although social science has shown
6 that care for animals is part of 'good farming', the British dairy sector sees a need to improve
7 biosecurity. This research uses the good farmer concept to compare how vets and dairy farmers
8 define good farming for biosecurity based on qualitative interviews with 28 vets and 15 dairy
9 farmers in England. The results revealed two conflicting 'good farmer' identities: the large,
10 commercial farmer who has the economic capital to invest in biosecurity and veterinary services;
11 and the self-sufficient stock keeper whose cultural and social capital lead them to manage herd
12 health independently. These identities reflect changing 'rules of the game', following Bourdieu's use
13 of the term, and increasing penetration of vets' cultural capital into the sector. They involve
14 different constructions of risk which need to be recognised within debates about good biosecurity.

15 **Introduction**

16 Biosecurity is defined as a set of practices that stop the spread of disease onto or out of an area
17 where farm animals are present (Defra et al., 2004). Biosecurity encompasses all disease challenges
18 farmers face including endemic diseases such as bovine tuberculosis, exotic disease threats such as
19 foot and mouth disease and ongoing, prevalent problems on farms such as lameness and mastitis
20 (Brennan & Christley, 2012). There is a perception within the industry that biosecurity in the dairy
21 sector is not optimal and could be improved (Brennan & Christley, 2013; Cook, 2013). Improving
22 biosecurity in the dairy sector is seen as a key priority for the industry and government, and since
23 the 2004 Animal Health and Welfare strategy (Defra et al., 2004) the UK government has devolved
24 more responsibility for biosecurity to industry, with an emphasis on the relationship between the vet
25 and farmer (Enticott, 2014).

26 Similarly to dairy sectors in other developed countries, cost increases, fluctuating milk prices,
27 removal of production subsidies and lack of farmer succession have led to a dramatic decline in the
28 number of UK dairy farms – from over 30,000 in 1995 to just over 13,000 in 2015 (The Andersons
29 Centre, 2013). These challenges to the dairy sector have had knock on impacts on the farm animal
30 veterinary profession in the UK with fewer dairy farm clients and a reduced demand for veterinary
31 services among those which remain, as farmers adjust to economic pressures (Lowe, 2009). The farm
32 animal veterinary profession has also been impacted upon by its reduced role within government
33 (Enticott et al., 2011), and competition for advisory services from nutritionists and consultants
34 (Ruston et al., 2016). The farm animal veterinary profession is trying to move from the "test and
35 treat" model of curing individual sick cows to a "predict and prevent" model where they act as
36 disease prevention consultants on farm (Atkinson, 2010; Lowe, 2009; Orpin & Sibley, 2014; Van der
37 Leek, 2015). While the veterinary profession has at other times in its history attempted to move to a
38 preventive model of health intervention (Woods, 2013), a preventive approach is currently seen as
39 ensuring the finance viability of the profession and improve the health and productivity of farm
40 animals in the UK (Lowe, 2009).

41 Research on the influence of external actors on farmers has shown that farmers are likely to be
42 influenced by advisors if their advisors' input is considered to be credible, salient and the actors to
43 have legitimacy (Eastwood et al., 2017; Ingram et al., 2016; Prager et al., 2017; Sutherland et al.,
44 2013). The use of psycho-social models such as theory of planned behaviour and social identity
45 theory shows that farmers are more likely to be influenced by "in group" members rather than "out
46 group" members such as urban populations (Fielding et al., 2008). Studies have shown that farmers
47 use their vet as their primary source of information and advice on animal health (Garforth et al.,

48 2013; Gunn et al., 2008) and that there is a high level of trust between vets and farmers (Ruston et
49 al., 2016). Vets can be seen to have a hybrid identity as in and out group members, connected to the
50 farming community, but also outside of it which makes them ideal interpreters and translators of
51 farming policy and biosecurity objectives to farmers (Enticott, 2012). However, there are also
52 tensions and challenges within the vet-farmer relationship. Vets express frustration that they cannot
53 interact with farmers enough to improve biosecurity, farmers do not take their advice, and
54 biosecurity should be a greater priority for the dairy sector (Shortall et al., 2016). Vets can have
55 different roles within government, industry and private practice (Escobar & Demeritt, 2017); this
56 paper focuses on the vet-farmer relationship within private practice.

57 Although social science research into farmers' biosecurity practices is limited (Naylor et al., 2016),
58 recent research has identified the importance of the cultural meanings farmers bring to biosecurity
59 practices (Shortall et al., 2016). Despite research suggesting low levels of uptake of biosecurity
60 measures (Brennan and Christley, 2012), previous social science research has shown that taking care
61 of animals' health and welfare is seen as a key part of good farming identity (Burton, 2004; Butler &
62 Holloway, 2015; Gray, 1998; Haggerty et al., 2009; Naylor et al., 2016; Sutherland, 2013; Wilkie,
63 2005) and biosecurity (Higgins et al., 2016). This research is thus at odds with the veterinary
64 epidemiology literature, which consistently identifies a disconnection between farmer practices and
65 biosecurity standards advocated by industry, vets and government bodies (Derks et al., 2012; Gunn
66 et al., 2008; Hall & Wapenaar, 2012; Heffernan et al., 2008; Pritchard et al., 2015).

67 We assess these inconsistencies through use of the "good farmer" construct. Proponents of the
68 good farming concept argue that farmers gain social standing through adherence to locally
69 recognised symbols and performances of 'good farming' practice (Sutherland and Darnhofer, 2012),
70 which influence a range of behaviour, including biosecurity (Naylor et al., 2016). In this paper, we
71 contrast farmers' perceptions with the definitions of good farming practices held by vets in private
72 practice and assess the role of livestock vets in the evolution of good farming identity.

73 **Conceptualising 'good farming'**

74 Assessments of 'good farming' commonly draw on Bourdieu's concepts of capital (Burton et al.,
75 2008; Butler & Holloway, 2015; Haggerty et al., 2009; Sutherland, 2013; Sutherland & Darnhofer,
76 2012). Bourdieu's work explores power dynamics within society and how power and social order are
77 reproduced and transformed (Bourdieu, 1984). Bourdieu introduces the concept of habitus, which is
78 a socialised body that is both influenced by the structures of the world around it and also interprets
79 and processes these structures in a way that allows for individual autonomy (Holt, 2008). The
80 concept of the habitus can be used to understand a single person's trajectory or that of a group
81 through Bourdieu's concept of a class habitus (Bourdieu, 1984). The concept of habitus can be seen
82 as a tool for exploring the social world and a way of asking questions of data which allows for an
83 exploration of individuality and structures acting on individuals and groups (Reay, 2004).

84 For Bourdieu, the habitus exists within a field of social structures which is governed by 'rules of the
85 game'. These rules are internalised within the habitus and govern responses within the field. Change
86 comes about when a habitus enters a new social field, or a different part of a social field and the
87 rules of the game the person has internalised do not match the new external rules of the game they
88 experience (Reay, 2004). According to Bourdieu (1998) this leads to a divided self, struggling to
89 adapt to new rules of the game and assimilate different identities.

90 The field within which a habitus develops is conceptualised as a competitive arena where people vie
91 for different kinds of capital. According to Bourdieu (1986) capital is accumulated through labour
92 and comes in the form of economic capital – material and financial property; social capital –
93 networks of connection with other people; and cultural capital – signs of prestige and status.
94 Cultural capital can exist in different forms: in institutionalised form such as educational

95 qualifications, in objectified form of high status goods, and in embodied form in skills and mental
96 dispositions acquired over time which are visible to others (Bourdieu, 1986). Critically, these types of
97 capital are exchangeable to various degrees – economic capital can be exchanged for cultural or
98 social capital (e.g. utilised to develop skills or gain access to particular social groups). Capital acts as a
99 conservative force in the world; capital has the potential to produce profits and to reproduce itself,
100 meaning that not all outcomes are equally likely in the social world – those with capital are likely to
101 produce more capital, those without must invest more labour to produce capital (Bourdieu, 1986).

102 Using Bourdieu’s theory, farmers will strive to be good farmers according to the rules of the game
103 and accumulate different kinds of capital within the field of agriculture (Sutherland and Darnhofer,
104 2012). Much of the early good farming literature argued that farmers are resistant to change – that
105 cultural capital ensures that things stay the same, because farmers get both economic and cultural
106 value out of performing actions which are symbolic of being a good farmer (e.g. Burton, 2004;
107 Burton et al., 2008). More recent literature has argued that good farming standards can and do
108 change, but it takes time. The cultural capital inherent in good farming leads to a degree of inertia,
109 but when farmers are challenged in some way (particularly if practices are no longer profitable),
110 then farmers will change their activities and renegotiate associated good farming standards
111 (Sutherland, 2013; Sutherland and Darnhofer, 2012). Sutherland (2013) argues that commercial
112 farmers’ cultural capital reflects Bourdieu’s (1984) conception of the ‘taste of necessity’ – to remain
113 a commercial farmer, the farm must be commercially viable; symbols of good farming therefore
114 embody evidence of a viable farm. In addition, farms within different geographic regions,
115 agricultural sectors and production markets such as organic and conventional have been shown to
116 have different ideals of good farming (Sutherland, 2013). Previous studies have shown how good
117 farming is associated with economic capital in the form of agricultural machinery and equipment
118 (Butler & Holloway, 2015); social capital in the form of social ties and mutual obligations between
119 farmers (Flanigan & Sutherland, 2016; Sutherland & Burton, 2011), cultural capital in the form of
120 prestigious skills, knowledge, experience and symbols of good farming such as a tidy fields and well-
121 kept livestock (Burton, 2004; Butler & Holloway, 2015; Haggerty et al., 2009; Naylor et al., 2016;
122 Sutherland, 2013) and farmers’ agricultural pedigree and connection to a farming family (Burton,
123 2004).

124 **Good farming and biosecurity**

125 A small number of studies have used the good farming concept in relation to animal disease. These
126 studies have shown that good farming is exemplified through the cultural capital embodied in stock
127 keeping skills: having the skills to assess the health and welfare of an animal by eye (Naylor et al.,
128 2016; Burton, 2008; Butler & Holloway, 2015; Haggerty et al., 2009). Good farming is also
129 exemplified in the objectified cultural capital in healthy and profitable animals (Wilkie, 2005; Naylor,
130 2016), and high standards of animal welfare (Haggerty et al., 2009). The condition of a farmer’s
131 livestock can be ‘read’ by other farmers through visual signs of health and vitality such as a shiny
132 coat, bright eyes and alertness and energy in movement to assess the farmer’s level of skill as a stock
133 keeper (Burton et al., 2008). Naylor et al. (2016) carried out a study on good farming in relation to
134 exotic diseases and identify three good farmer ideals: stock keeping skills and care for the animals;
135 being a good neighbour and not causing biosecurity problems for the sector – in terms of buying and
136 selling animals with care and culling animals when they pose a risk to other farmers; and the good
137 public facing farmer who has a reputation for biosecurity.

138 The changing ‘rules of the game’ addressed here primarily relate to economic duress and
139 intensification. Wilkie (2005) argues that the role and importance of the stock keeper has changed
140 with the industrialisation and intensification of agriculture; larger herd sizes mean that farmers may
141 not be able to get to know their animals individually. The result is a change from “husbandry to
142 industry” (Wilkie, 2005 p.216). This change has been highlighted in recent literature on

143 mechanisation: Butler & Holloway (2015) showed how adopting automatic milking systems could
144 change the farmer's understanding of good farming, with practices of judging animals by eye being
145 partly or wholly replaced with the use of data to monitor health and wellbeing. Naylor et al. (2016)
146 found understandings of good farming divided along the same lines in different sectors. In poultry
147 and pig systems good farming consists of monitoring certain key performance indicators such as
148 mortality rates and water intake, whereas in the cattle and sheep sectors good farming was
149 identified as tacit skills and knowledge that allowed farmers to assess health and welfare by eye.
150 Hansen (2014) shows how mechanised dairy production systems mean that workers need not have
151 skill or experience working with animals. Haggerty et al. (2009) also found tensions within the notion
152 of good farming in pastoral sheep production in New Zealand, with progressive ideas of intensifying
153 production through increasing stocking density conflicting with some farmers' traditional views of
154 caring for sheep to ensure their health and welfare.

155 Differing views of good farming between the different livestock systems mean that the dairy sector
156 in the UK is a particularly useful arena in which to explore notions of good farming, as it can still be
157 seen as a diverse sector: the changing rules of the game have led to average farm size increasing and
158 increases in intensity¹. However the sector is still made up of a variety of production systems and
159 ownership structures as farmers have responded in different ways to the changing rules of the game
160 (The Andersons Centre, 2013).

161 This paper extends the concept of good farming to explore how a non-farmer group, private vets,
162 understand and influence understanding of good farming in relation to routine biosecurity,
163 contrasting the perspectives of vets and farmers. Naylor et al. (2016) include vets in their study using
164 the good farmer concept, but in relation to a specific area of biosecurity: the management of exotic
165 disease and more than half of those vets worked in government institutions rather than in regular
166 contact with farmer clients. Good farming is a concept based on both individual and group norms – it
167 is based on the farmer's own preferences and it is also an ideal which draws on and applies to the
168 whole farming community. The same can be seen to be true of vets' views of good farming. Farm
169 animal vets are deeply embedded in the farming milieu, with both theoretical and experiential
170 knowledge of farming systems (Enticott, 2012). As actors in the farming field, who provide advice
171 and assistance to farmers, they express and reinforce the 'rules of the game'. Their differing
172 experience, knowledge and priorities may lead them to assess the farming rules of the game and the
173 ideal of good farming for biosecurity differently to farmers.

174 The paper addresses the following questions: how do vets and farmers understand good farming in
175 relation to biosecurity? What kinds of social, economic and cultural capital exchange are associated
176 with different ideals of good farming for biosecurity? How have these different conceptions of good
177 farming come about within the farming and veterinary professions, (within the context of changing
178 and challenging rules of the game)? What are the implications for the future development of the
179 vet/farmer relationship?

180 **Methods**

181 Qualitative interviews were carried out with 28 farm animal vets and 15 of their farmer clients in
182 2014. Purposive sampling was used to access a range of different views on biosecurity (Bryman,
183 2001). Vets from practices with a Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) farm animal
184 accreditation were chosen. The RCVS are the statutory body that regulate the vet profession. Farm
185 animal accreditation is a voluntary scheme which sets and assesses standards for vet practices in
186 relation to provision of farm animal veterinary services. We contend that practices, and the vets
187 working for them, which were proactive and obtained this accreditation, would have an interest in
188 and knowledge of farm animal biosecurity. In order to gain access to farmer interviewees and
189 explore the vet-farmer relationship, a number of vets were asked to suggest two farmers for
190 interview: one that they thought of as a good farmer for the purposes of biosecurity and one that

191 they thought was not as good. Demographic details of the interviewees are shown in table 1. The
192 interviewees have been given a pseudonym in the results below, with the letter 'F' for farmer or 'V'
193 for vet following their name.

194 The interviews were carried out by author 3 over a four month period in 2014 across England, with
195 the highest proportion taking place in the midlands but also across the North East, North West,
196 South East and South West. The majority of interviews were conducted in person, with a small
197 number conducted over the phone and lasted between 40 and 75 minutes. The interviews followed
198 a semi structured interview guide. Vets were asked about the nature of their practice and dairy farm
199 clients, the types of services they provided and their views on biosecurity, the future of the dairy
200 sector and the veterinary profession. Farmers were asked about their relationship with their vet, and
201 their views on biosecurity and the future of the dairy sector. Vets and farmers were not asked
202 directly what they thought constituted 'good biosecurity' or what made for a good farmer for the
203 purposes of biosecurity, but rather these constructions emerged from the interviews. Interviews
204 were audio recorded and transcribed by a third party. Ethical approval for the study was obtained
205 from the School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, University of Nottingham.

206 Data was analysed by author 1 using NVIVO 11 qualitative analysis software. The data was analysed
207 using thematic analysis (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996) with one set of themes focussing on types of
208 farms and farmers, for example, large farms, small farms, farmers interested in animals, commercial
209 farmers etc., in order to deconstruct how vets and farmers talked about different farmers and farm
210 types in relation to biosecurity. During this coding process patterns were observed in the data which
211 were then analysed using the good farmer concepts.

212 **Cultural capital of the good stock keeper farmer habitus**

213 Consistent with previous studies (Burton et al., 2008; Haggerty et al., 2009; Higgins et al., 2016;
214 Naylor et al., 2016), many of the farmers interviewed discussed good farming for biosecurity in
215 terms of the cultural capital of good stock keeping skills and knowledge of the animals. For these
216 farmers, watching the animals and knowing the animals well was a biosecurity practice in itself.

217 Claire (f): As daft as it sounds, you get your dominant ones; they're always there first at the
218 door to come in to be milked. The first three, the same ones every time. Now, if that sequence
219 altered, you're thinking, 'Well, come on then, what's happening here?'

220 Visual assessments were sometimes trusted to the point that they are seen to make other forms of
221 testing an animal redundant:

222 Bill (f): I have a little philosophy which is completely wrong but it's mine; if you think an
223 animal's wrong, it is wrong, it is ill. So, there's no point in taking its temperature because it is
224 ill... I'm not going to treat it any differently so why would I bother taking its temperature? I can
225 see it [the animal] is not right.

226 Here, taking the step of formally measuring a cow's temperature is perceived as duplicating what
227 the farmer can already judge by eye, and therefore extraneous to managing the animal's health.

228 Some five of the vets interviewed praised stock keeping abilities in farmers and judged stock keeping
229 skills as a way of assessing good farming ability.

230 Neil (v): We have got people that are true cow men, they love their cows and you get that with
231 their mannerisms [...] if I went to a farm I have never been to before I could pick up cues as to
232 what they would be like but I just observe it, what was going on.

233 The distinction is contingent on scale. In the words of Dan (v):

234 Dan (v): When you have got a smaller farm quite often they are family farms and because you
235 have got a lower number of animals they will know their cows better.

236 Phillip (f) gave the example of 1500 cow dairy farm he'd visited where:

237 Phillip (f): [...] there was no feel for the animals at all. They were there, they might as well of
238 been a car factory making cars. They were there to produce milk. No feeling whatsoever.

239 This view reflects concern about the changing role of farmers from "husbandry to industry" (Wilkie,
240 2005 p.216) and resonates with views that the mechanisation and upscaling of dairy farming leads to
241 a de-skilled farmer habitus: farmers who do not have the opportunity to develop or exercise the
242 traditional good farming stock keeping skills (Butler and Holloway, 2015). Thus according to these
243 farmers and vets, it is more difficult for farmers who have responded to the changing rules of the
244 game by upscaling and mechanising their farm to be seen as "good farmers".

245 The increasing intensity of dairy production was also seen by some as being opposed to the good
246 farmer habitus because the conditions the farm creates make it difficult for cows to thrive.

247 Emily (f): Risk as well because there's definitely, cows are under a lot more pressure now than
248 they used to be because these diseases were obviously always around but they become more
249 of a problem when cows are under more pressure and I suppose when you've got larger
250 groups in smaller places and that sort of thing.

251 Haggerty et al. (2009) showed how this view was also held by sheep farmers in New Zealand; good
252 livestock farming involved maintaining conditions where animals could thrive, which was seen as
253 incompatible with intensive farming.

254 However, other vets pointed out the limits of good stockmanship and visual skills in assessing
255 animals, particularly in relation to diagnosis:

256 William (v): You can have farmers that you've been going to for years and years and years and
257 then they suddenly say to you well, when you've done the assessment they say well nobody
258 told me that markets were going to be a problem. I think there was a premise that the animal
259 that looked healthy would be healthy and it's not until you appreciate that for the majority of
260 cattle diseases most of them are in a carrier state or a later state and they appear healthy and
261 then carry disease through the herd.

262 Here the embodied cultural capital skill of visually assessing animals is seen as flawed because a
263 disease may be present but not manifest itself in symptoms. In William's example, the health status
264 of the animal did not become problematic until the point of sale. This view is linked to the desired
265 change within the veterinary profession of moving biosecurity from a curative model of 'testing and
266 treating' diseases already present to 'predicting and preventing' disease threats to the herd (Sibley,
267 2010). The farmers' cultural capital of visual skills may be seen to be appropriate for the 'test and
268 treat' model where animals are sick and exhibiting symptoms, but disease threats in the 'predict and
269 prevent' model involve assessing animals that carry disease but may not yet exhibit symptoms, and
270 disease risks which should be mitigated before they pose a threat to the farmers' herd.

271 **Cultural and economic capital of the large, commercial farmer habitus**

272 The changing rules of the game that have pushed farmers to get bigger and increase production was
273 seen by many vets, and to a lesser extent some farmers, as bringing about a farmer habitus that was
274 more conducive to good biosecurity, than the traditional, good stock keeper farmer habitus.

275 Linda (v): We've already gone through the downsizing of the dairy industry around here. The
276 ones that are here are in it to stay and they've invested heavily in it but because of that they've

277 upped their management and they're quite in control of what they're doing so there's less for
278 us to do.

279 Linda drew attention to reason for herd expansion – retaining viability in order to stay in the
280 industry. An economic capital investment in increased herd size created more risks that made
281 managing biosecurity a bigger priority, meaning they were more likely to listen to the vet's advice.

282 Oliver (v): Different input to sort farms out because they are big enterprises with a lot of
283 money riding on them.

284 William (v) describes vets' role in disease prevention:

285 William (v): It's a preventative health system we provide for farmers to help keep their herds
286 healthy and obviously we provide an emergency service alongside that if things go wrong, but
287 really the thrust of our business is all about interacting with farmers to optimise their health
288 productivity and prosperity really.

289 When asked why there is now a preventive approach to animal disease and if it was not needed in
290 the past, vet Jim replies:

291 Jim (v): Well, I won't say we didn't need it. It just wasn't quite as used as much with the
292 intensification of agriculture. The bigger they get then the potential for catastrophe also
293 becomes bigger.

294 Because of this, vets perceived larger farmers as also being more likely to have protocols in place for
295 implementing biosecurity. The financial viability of these farms also meant that the farmers could
296 afford to invest both in vet services and in their own equipment, to reduce biosecurity risks.

297 Linda (v): Yes and the other thing we have is oral fluid pumpsⁱⁱ. So our big dairy farms will have
298 their own pump. Because that is something that did worry us. That there might be spread of
299 disease on the pumps because they're quite difficult to clean. [...] Big farms... can sort of justify
300 the, the expense of it really.

301 Larger farms were also seen to be able to afford the extra labour needed to implement biosecurity
302 measures. Thus, increasing the economic viability of the farm through expansion allows, and
303 necessitates, financial and time investment in biosecurity.

304 In contrast, smaller farms were seen as not having the financial resources to invest in veterinary
305 disease prevention advisory services, which the vets saw as a key part of good biosecurity.

306 Robert (v): The smallest herd would be probably be 80 to 100. But then you have less input, or
307 less regular input on that sort. Yes, I think its economics really. Those kind of size farms are the
308 ones that just carry doing what they've always done. They may well have fertility visits, but not
309 as regularly.

310 Although bigger farms were seen as making greater use of the vet's biosecurity services, some vets
311 and farmers also framed larger, more intensive farms in negative terms in relation to biosecurity.
312 Increasing herd size is associated with a risk to the farmer of introducing disease and risk to the
313 industry of spreading disease around the country.

314 Interviewer: Is there any reason for the increase [in disease prevalence] do you think?

315 Frank (v): Undoubtedly, more movements of cattle around this country because there aren't
316 the local economies that there used to be, that's probably it. [...] When I have a client looking
317 for replacements, he's often got to go a lot further away and out of the area. And some of
318 these diseases are, like Johnesⁱⁱⁱ, it's a lot more widespread than it used to be and it's very
319 difficult sometimes to know that a place might have it, if you're not looking for it.

320 Here the reference scale for good farming for biosecurity was widened from the individual farm to the
321 dairy sector and the consolidation of farms is not seen as good for the biosecurity of the sector as a
322 whole. The industry-wide risk of a more mobile livestock industry was described in a report on the
323 emergence of foot and mouth disease where it was stated that scale of livestock movements took
324 people in the farming industry by surprise following the outbreak (Anderson, 2002) and has been
325 analysed as a 'normal accident' (Perrow, 1999) waiting to happen in such a complex system (Law,
326 2006). Measures such as greater tracking of animal movements have been put in place to mitigate
327 these risks (Duckett, 2014), but traded animals are imbued with risks. At the same time, there is
328 considerable prestige in purchasing high quality livestock – the cultural capital associated with
329 correctly identifying high quality animals, and the explicit display of economic capital in the purchase
330 price. The good farmer as profitable farmer is evident in the transaction. This is explored further in
331 the social capital section.

332 While the vets saw regular contact with farmers as an essential part of good biosecurity and
333 therefore saw regular clients as good farmers for biosecurity, some farmers expressed the opposite
334 view. Their identification of disease diagnosis and treatment skills as part of good farming meant
335 that a farmer who was overly reliant on the vet was a bad farmer:

336 Phillip (f): It's not just the vets, some of the people looking after cows have become far too
337 reliant on the vets and they're not capable of doing their own jobs. If a dairy farmer can't deal
338 with ninety nine percent of what's wrong with a dairy herd then they shouldn't be looking
339 after them.

340 Thus, this farmer does not wish to build the same type of social capital with the vets as the vets
341 prefer, but rather the cultural capital of status as a good farmer is prioritised over developing social
342 capital with the vet. This is further explored in the next section.

343 A summary of the types of capital held by the 'commercial farmer' habitus and the 'good stock
344 keeper' habitus are outlined in table 2 and 3 below.

345 **The social capital costs of biosecurity for the good stock keeper habitus**

346 Social capital in farming consists of webs of social networks and relations of mutual obligation built
347 up over time (Sutherland & Burton, 2011). Social capital is seen as important for rural development,
348 contributing to economic capital and making farmers more resilient in the face of disease threats
349 (Naylor & Courtney, 2014). Acts of maintaining social capital with other farmers were seen by the
350 vets as examples of the traditional farmer habitus and incompatible with good biosecurity, as social
351 interaction also brings the risk of disease transmission (Nerlich & Wright, 2006). Similarly to
352 assessing disease status visually, an animal's disease status was also assessed by farmers based on
353 social ties with the animal's owner. Some vets deplored this practice and called for rigorous, test
354 based methods of disease assessment.

355 Liz (v): We looked at how the disease had been brought into the farm which had been through
356 the purchase of a bull which the farmer thought would be absolutely fine because he was
357 buying it off his brother-in-law, so it would be no problem. So, in a way he'd ignored previous
358 advice that, as a naive herd^{iv}, he needed to be extremely careful about his buying-in policy. He
359 ignored that advice and bought the animal and brought the disease onto farm, so then we
360 were able to accurately discuss the fact that being a member of the family doesn't mean you
361 haven't got a disease.

362 Livestock markets where farmers come together to buy and sell animals were seen by vets as a key
363 example of farmers' sociability conflicting with good biosecurity.

364 Ben (v): And historical, you know it might be traditional, I've got a big client and his dad just
365 loves going to market and buying cows and calves. And he just won't stop however much you
366 talk to him. However much his son wants to be a bit more biosecure.

367 This is framed in terms of the older farmer habitus grounded in tradition conflicting with the newer
368 farmer habitus which involves a better understanding of biosecurity.

369 Thus here, vets state that the farmer's trust in and kinship connection with the seller farm, key parts
370 of social capital in farming, is used as a proxy for knowledge of the animal's disease status. Vets
371 worked to separate this connection in the farmer's mind between the seller farmer and the reality of
372 animal disease. This connection between the seller farmer and knowledge of the animal's disease
373 status may be built on the moral dimensions of animal disease. The idea exists within agriculture
374 that 'only bad farmers get diseases' (Heffernan et al., 2008)^v. Thus, disease status may not only be
375 used to assess how good a farmer is, but the reverse may also be true: someone thought of as a
376 good farmer is not likely to have or sell diseased animals. Having the cultural capital of a good
377 reputation is part of being a good farmer (Sutherland and Darnhofer, 2012) so cultural capital can be
378 used to assess disease status, accessed through social capital networks built on trust and familiarity.

379 Because good farming is generally seen as associated with maintaining healthy livestock and a clean
380 farm (Burton, 2004; Sutherland & Darnhofer, 2012) vets stated that some farmers were unwilling to
381 discuss biosecurity with other farmers. Biosecurity was an awkward and difficult subject and risked
382 insinuating that they thought the other farmer was not a good farmer.

383 Greg (v): They could never face the fear of offending them but it's true, it's real. I have cattle of
384 my own and I find it very difficult when you start talking about disease status when you go to
385 buy animals. You sometimes feel awkward insinuating they have disease; it's something that a
386 lot of people will not do.

387 Farmers may rely on social connections and visual assessment rather than risk damaging their own
388 social capital by offending a farmer by asking about animal disease. There is seen to be farmer
389 etiquette relating to disclosing disease information when selling animals. Farmer Luke states this is
390 good practice but not all farmers adhere to it.

391 Luke (f): [...] we are quite open with the fact that we have sold in the cattle in the past, or
392 breeding stock, to other farmers and we have openly told them that we have Johne's. [...] A lot
393 of farmers wouldn't tell you that and that has become because of the stigma attached to it. [...] I
394 don't also want to be labelled with a label of saying that I have sold an infected animal down
395 the road.

396 According to farmers there is a need to carry out certain biosecurity practices to maintain one's
397 social capital in the farming community. Animal disease exists for farmers in a complex web of social
398 norms and interactions which, though understandable to the vet are nevertheless frustrating and at
399 times counterproductive.

400 Part of farming cultural capital is one's origins in a farming family and kinship connections with
401 farming (Burton, 2004; Burton et al., 2012). Interestingly, because of the importance he placed on
402 business skills rather than on the traditional farming skills and knowledge passed down, Oliver cited
403 origin outside of farming as a signifier of a good farmer for the purposes of biosecurity.

404 Oliver (v): Speaking to people who work down the south west area, there's a bit more, it's a bit
405 more lucrative, there are people coming into farming who have done a previous career, or who
406 are just a lot more business minded, and they will generally be better at seeking professional
407 advice and also having other enterprises on the go as well.

408 The idea of being a progressive farmer that is able to adapt to changing circumstances and remain in
409 business is seen as part of good farming (Sutherland et al., 2012).

410 **Formation of social capital between commercial farmers and vets**

411 The 'commercial farmer' habitus was more clearly lodged in objectified veterinary cultural capital.
412 Recent research has demonstrated that social capital can be established in formal, paid interactions
413 (Flanigan and Sutherland, 2016), and formalising exchange can reduce associated risks (Sutherland
414 and Burton, 2011). Fisher (2013) argues that the social relationship between vets and farmers is
415 transformed into social capital through the longevity, consistency and regularity of contact, as well
416 as trust between the partners. Vets' descriptions of their desired relationship with farmer clients
417 accords with this framework and for many vets, it was the larger, more commercially oriented
418 farmers who were able and willing to have this type of relationship with the vet. Relationships with
419 commercial farmers are valued because they are seen to understand the need to use the vet as a
420 disease prevention consultant rather than to treat individual sick animals: i.e. part of vets' desired
421 move from a "test and treat" to a "predict and prevent" model of veterinary intervention. As both
422 the farm animal veterinary profession and the dairy profession are seen to be facing existential
423 challenges, vets value relationships with farmers who have shared goal of staying in business, rather
424 than staying in farming until they retire or change job.

425 Robert (v): Well, it's obviously the larger herds that you have a closer association with and
426 more regular visits to. And you know, a closer relationship with, and they're the people that
427 will take your advice and in general will act on it. The more dynamic, go ahead, you know,
428 larger units really.

429 Social capital is about networks which allow access to resources. Vet's scientific and economic
430 knowledge of disease is a type of embodied and objectified cultural capital which they have
431 obtained through their veterinary education. If the farmer engages the vet's services when buying in
432 animals their understanding of disease thus changes. Within the farming field it is understood
433 through stock keeping cultural and social capital connections with farmers i.e. healthy looking
434 animals and animals owned by farmers with a good reputation and with whom one has close ties are
435 unlikely to be diseased. Within the veterinary field disease is understood through the lens of
436 economic and scientific cultural capital: disease is understood in terms of tests and results produced
437 in laboratories and has economic consequences on the farm (Law & Mol, 2011). This requires a
438 transformation of social and cultural capital and according to many of the vets it is the 'commercial
439 farmers' who are developing the cultural, economic and social capital to do this.

440 **Discussion and conclusion**

441 The paper has demonstrated the divergent definitions of 'good farming' in relation to biosecurity
442 The clear distinctions between the two good farming ideals is indicative of the capital exchanges
443 which occur when farmers negotiate the changing rules of the game. Different forms of cultural
444 capital are privileged in the two positions. Both farmers and vets contrasted the cultural capital of
445 stock keeping skills with the more 'hard-nosed' commercial farmer habitus. However, the
446 'commercial' farmer identity is more directly influenced by the objectified cultural capital of
447 veterinary expertise. The findings have also demonstrated the cultural and social capital costs
448 farmers may face in accumulating economic capital under current 'rules of the game'.

449 This study accords with Naylor et al.'s (2016) findings of three good farmer ideals in relation to
450 biosecurity of stock keeping skills and care for the animals; being a good neighbour and not causing
451 biosecurity problems for the sector; and the good public facing farmer who has a good reputation
452 for biosecurity. This study elaborates on those findings by showing the contested nature of stock
453 keeping skills as part of good farming, and the different interpretations of what it means to be a

454 responsible neighbour and public facing farmer who does not create risks for the sector. Risk is
455 constructed in different ways in relation to the types of capital held by the good stock keeper and
456 the commercial farmer. According to vets who value the commercial farmer habitus, stock keeping
457 practices of judging an animal by eye, basing buying in decision on social connections with farmers,
458 and socialising with other farmers in an agricultural context are risky practices which allow the
459 spread of disease. On the other hand, some farmers and vets frame the commercial farmer habitus
460 with increased milk production that compromise the cow's immune system, leading to greater
461 animal movement through buying in animals and consolidating the sector within regions and on
462 large farms as increasing the disease risks the sector faces.

463 Previous research has suggested the financial pressure dairy farmers are under is a limiting factor on
464 improving biosecurity (Alarcon et al., 2014; Derks et al., 2012; Ellis-Iversen et al., 2010; Gunn et al.,
465 2008; Sayers et al., 2013). Findings suggest that this plays out differently depending on herd size:
466 financial pressure increases the risks associated with animal acquisition and production intensity,
467 but also the impetus for larger-scale farmers to seek and implement veterinary advice. This also
468 leads them to develop a closer relationship with the vet and use him or her as a disease prevention
469 consultant (formalised social capital). Here a self-reinforcing circle is created where the returns from
470 invested economic capital mean more economic capital and labour is available to invest in
471 biosecurity. Closer contact with the vet leads the farmer to integrate the cultural value placed by
472 vets on scientific understanding of disease into the farmer's own habitus, meaning her or she is
473 more likely to take the vet's advice (cultural capital). From the vet's point of view these are the
474 farmers that are likely to stay in business and support vets' change in role to disease advisory
475 consultants, meaning that work is put into maintaining these relationships (social capital).

476 By emphasising the preventative veterinary model as ideal, veterinarians implicitly devalue the
477 husbandry skills of farmers. The idea of good biosecurity as embodied by the commercial farmer
478 habitus does not recognise the farmers' embodied skill and biosecurity practices of care for animals
479 (Higgins et al., 2016). This may explain the view described in the introduction within veterinary
480 epidemiology literature that improvements in biosecurity is required in the dairy sector (Brennan &
481 Christley, 2013; Cook, 2013). In vets' accounts of good biosecurity, farmers who sweep away all the
482 complicated social norms and social relationships around animal disease are good farmers. But this
483 requires a significant cost for farmers. Their identity as good stock keepers or their skills in assessing
484 animals and judging disease by eye are not recognised, they have to forgo social contact in a farming
485 context at events such as livestock markets and they have to renegotiate social relationships with
486 other farmers to discuss the difficult subject of animal disease.

487 The vet is the gatekeeper for animal health networks relating to disease testing, government and
488 industry biosecurity rules and regulations, animal disease certification schemes and medications. In
489 the veterinary field animal disease is understood as a scientific object: in the clinical veterinary field
490 disease can be seen through visual signs in the animals, in the laboratory it can be seen through the
491 tests demonstrating the presence of a pathogen, and in veterinary epidemiology disease is manifest
492 through patterns of disease transmission in populations (Law & Mol, 2011). In the veterinary field
493 animal disease is also understood through an economic lens: the move from the 'test and treat' to
494 'predict and prevent' model involves a change in focus from the individual cow to the herd as a
495 whole and the significance of disease changes from the welfare of each cow to the productivity of
496 the whole herd manifest through production and profitability metrics (Barkema et al., 2015). Farm
497 management and economics is part of veterinary training and there are calls for this to become a
498 bigger component if vets are to move to the role of consultants (Lowe, 2009).

499 According to vets, the farmers' pre-existing cultural capital of business skills may contribute to their
500 development of a commercial farmer habitus. This is the case if for instance they are new entrants
501 to the farming sector and bring these skills with them from outside the field of farming, as reported

502 by the vet Oliver. If these cultural capital business skills are activated, the process of change from the
503 good stock keeper farmer habitus to the commercial farmer habitus is facilitated by a change in
504 cultural and social capital.

505 Further research could usefully assess the vet habitus, which can be seen to be socialised in and
506 operate within the farming field and the scientific field of animal disease simultaneously. Vets must
507 have in depth knowledge of farming practice and business in order to be taken seriously by farmers:
508 just as vets have their own ways of judging a good farmer, farmers do not respect vets who do not
509 know how to interact with animals or who do not understand the minutia of livestock farming
510 practice (Kaler & Green, 2013). Vets regularly come from a farming background: Adam (2015) found
511 that vets who stay in farm animal work are significantly more likely to come from a farming
512 background. Thus many farm animal vets come from the same field as farmers, are raised in the
513 same milieu and exposed to the same rules of the game growing up. Thus this can be seen to
514 account for overlaps in how farmers and vets assess cultural capital around good farming for
515 biosecurity in terms of good stock keeping skills and a clean farm. There are is also variation within
516 the farm animal veterinary profession and vets' willingness and ability to move towards a
517 consultancy role which vets identified as more appealing to the commercial farmer habitus (Ruston
518 et al., 2016). And though it did not emerge strongly in these interviews, previous research has shown
519 how a large part of the vet's job, similar to that of the farmer, involves practices of care: care for the
520 animals, care for the farmer and care for themselves (Law, 2008).

521 The 'commercial farmer' and 'good stock keeper' constructions of good farming for biosecurity in
522 the dairy sector draw on different assumptions and responses to the changing rules of the game.
523 The rules of the game in the dairy sector in the UK are increasing the size and productivity of dairy
524 farms, as well as the cows spending more time indoors (March et al., 2014), mirroring intensification
525 in other countries with a developed agricultural sector (Hansen, 2014). More research could be
526 undertaken on how other influential industry and government actors conceptualise good farming for
527 biosecurity going forward. As the process of intensification of dairy farming continues, there is a
528 danger that debates around biosecurity coalesce on the skills, social networks and economic capital
529 of the commercial farmer habitus as good farming for biosecurity and the idea of the traditional
530 stock keeper farmer habitus as a danger to biosecurity, ignoring the different ways risk is
531 constructed in the two accounts of good farming.

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ⁱ In this paper the term “intensive” agriculture is used to refer to systems with high levels of inputs and outputs per unit of land (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017).

ⁱⁱ An oral fluid pump is a device used to insert liquids into a cows’ stomach. It can be used to administer liquid medications.

ⁱⁱⁱ Johne’s is a chronic and degenerative livestock disease.

^{iv} A naïve herd is a disease free herd. This may refer to all endemic diseases or a herd might be “naïve” in relation to a particular disease.

^v Though not all studies have found that animal disease is stigmatised and seen as a sign of bad farming. Farmers also stress the extent to which disease is outside of their control and the role luck plays in contracting disease (Enticott, 2008, 2016). This may depend on the nature of the disease and the context farmers are operating within. A detailed study of the conditions under which stigma is associated with disease is beyond the scope of this research, but within this study discussing animal disease was seen as having implications for farmers’ social and cultural capital.