@article { , title = {Climate change mitigation with technology spillovers}, abstract = {We explore the implications of an increase in clean technology spillovers between developed and developing countries. We build a game of abatements in which players are linked with technology spillovers determined by an initial choice of absorptive capacities by developing countries. We show that, within a non-cooperative framework, the response of clean technology investments in developed countries to an increase in cross-country technology spillovers is ambiguous. If the marginal benefits of these additional abatements are not sufficiently high, developed countries have a strategic incentive to decrease investments. Such a strategic response jeopardizes the initial effects of an increase in technology spillovers on climate change mitigation and decreases the incentives for developing countries to enhance their absorptive capacities.}, doi = {10.1007/s10640-017-0170-3}, eissn = {1573-1502}, issn = {0924-6460}, issue = {2}, journal = {Environmental and Resource Economics}, pages = {507–527}, publicationstatus = {Published}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, url = {https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/872186}, volume = {71}, keyword = {Climate change, Cross-country spillovers, Abatements, Technology investments}, year = {2018}, author = {Foucart, Renaud and Garsous, Grégoire} }