**Socialist architecture in Mao’s model village: a case study of Qinyong Village in Ningbo

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**Abstract**

In the context of current drives for the renewal and conservation of rural Chinese villages, socialist villages developed under Mao Zedong’s tenure as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (1949-1976) seem have been marginalized. This research selects one of Mao’s model villages, Qinyong village in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, as a case study. Through historical and on-site research, this article articulates and analyses the transformation of the village landscape from the early socialist period to the latest renovation in 2014. Focusing in particular on the transformation of the village’s housing from the 1970s to the 1990s, the article tries to identify historical conditions of social, political and economic organization embedded in their physical forms. By juxtaposing the recent planning and renovation of the village with its past, the discussion of the village’s architectural heritage is intended to cast some light on key aspects of village preservation and revitalization in rural China.

**Introduction**

As a small village in the mountain ranges of north China’s Shanxi province, Dazhai actively responded to the Communist Party’s campaigns for land reform, agricultural collectivization, and People'[s](https://cn.bing.com/dict/search?q=s&FORM=BDVSP6&mkt=zh-cn) [commune](https://cn.bing.com/dict/search?q=commune&FORM=BDVSP6&mkt=zh-cn)s in the 1950s and 1960s. Led by the rural Party cadres, the villagers created high-yielding terraced farmland and built new houses out of barren hillsides through hard labour (Figure 1). Through transforming harsh nature and establishing a grass-roots democracy, Daizhai thus became an inspirational model for most poverty-stricken rural villages to become self-sufficient. In 1964, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, coined the slogan “In agriculture, learn from Dazhai,” calling for building Dazhai-type villages across the whole country. In the following years, about 15 million Chinese and thousands of foreigners (including numerous heads of state) visited Dazhai.[[1]](#endnote-1) Many rural villages, in response to the State’s call, followed the Dazhai development model. However, a significant political shift in 1978 emphasising modernization and a market economy saw Mao’s beloved model villages ridiculed by the subsequent Party leader Deng Xiaoping. Deng insisted on privatizing farm production. In order to ensure the campaign for agricultural decollectivization was successful, Deng had to destroy Dazhai as a model. He demanded journalists to write and criticize Dazhai-type villages as frauds for falsifying harvest reports and as symbols of ultra-leftist zeal.[[2]](#endnote-2)

Nonetheless, rural development has consistently been an important political agenda of the Party. A series of policy incentives were proposed in the Post-Mao era, for example, the call to “construct new socialist villages” in 2005, and the repeal of the agricultural tax in 2006. The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012 called for the “ecological and civil construction” of a beautiful China, emphasising the balanced development of urban and rural areas. The development scheme for villages, called “beautiful village” was essentially a village renewal initiative and was inaugurated shortly after the National Congress met. The schemes are funded by the government whose slogans urge the villages to promote ecological inhabitation, ecological environment, ecological economy and ecological culture, yet without clear definitions of what the term “ecological” means.[[3]](#endnote-3) On the other hand, the campaign for the historic preservation for rural villages and towns was formally started from 2002 as a supplement to urban conservation. The urbanization process, to some extent, has also made villages more attractive than before. Numerous urbanites enjoy touring and sojourning in the countryside as a major pastime, and many villages with their beautiful natural landscape, historic architecture, and cultural heritage, have grasped this opportunity and transformed themselves into popular tourist destinations.

Mao’s model villages, however, seem to have been marginalized in the current renewal and conservation fervour. They were highly praised as revolutionary models in Mao’s era, while being much criticized after his death in 1976.[[4]](#endnote-4) Their economic *raison d’etre* became obsolete long ago, after post-1978 modernization, while the aesthetics of their built environment is incomparable with historic villages from earlier periods. In a number of conservation regulations enacted by the central government for selecting historical and cultural villages, there is not one criterion referring to the model villages from the socialist period.[[5]](#endnote-5) The question thus arises: is there any heritage value embedded in the model villages’ fabric that has outlasted the dramatic political and economic reform period, and can that be brought forth and highlighted in the present?

This research is based on a case study of Qinyong village in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province (Figure 2). Emulating the model village of Dazhai, Qinyong village’s reputation was based on its landscape and housing that was produced in the socialist era and which has been maintained to the present. By focusing on the built environment as an outcome of village planning, architecture and associated social life, and through historical analysis combined with field surveys, this research articulates and analyses the transformation of the village housing forms from the 1970s to the 1990s. Also by situating the recent planning and renovation of the village in relation to its past, the discussion of village’s architectural heritage hopefully will cast some light on the important topics of village preservation and revitalization in rural China.

**Historic preservation for villages**

Regardless of wars and riots, famine and abundance, the settlement patterns and life of the rural villages largely remained constant throughout Imperial China and the following Republic-era. Predominantly relying on agriculture, poor peasants often lived in small huts, while rich landlords would live in courtyard houses. Facilitated by a series of active political movements, significant efforts towards restructuring rural settlements have been made since 1949, which, according to Ronald G. Knapp and Shen Dongqi, can be broadly divided into five periods: 1) the rehabilitation period (1949-1958); 2) the creation of the people’s communes and the subsequent adjustments period (1958-1964); 3) the popularization of the Dazhai model of development and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution period (1964-1978); 4) the period since the Thrid Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978, which led to the implementation of the responsibility system, the promotion of a commodity economy, and the dissolution of the commune structure itself (1978-1988); 5) the period since late 1988, representing a cooling off of “building fever”[[6]](#endnote-6) In the fifth period marked by Knapp and Shen above, there was also a rudimentary movement towards village conservation.

Due to the administrative hierarchy of provinces, cities, towns, and villages in China, the conservation for towns and villages is under the jurisdiction of cities. The imperative for the conservation of towns and villages was briefly addressed by the State Council of the People's Republic of China in 1986, in the notice publishing the list of the second cohort of “historic-cultural famous cities” (i.e. cities famous for their historic-cultural heritage, the first cohort was published in 1982).[[7]](#endnote-7) Only a few provinces responded to this call. Zhejiang province for example, actively conducted the selection process and formulated a list of 15 historically and culturally famous towns and four historic-cultural villages in 1991.[[8]](#endnote-8) In the 1980s and the 1990s, much energy was spent on establishing the conservation system for historic cities until, today, in the 21st century there are a number of regulations enacted promoting the conservation of historic villages. Hongcun and Xidi villages in Anhui Province, in particular, were listed as world heritage sites in 2000, based on the excellent preservation of their original settlement pattern and architectural form that can be dated back to the Ming-Qing dynasties (ca.1368– 1912). This largely triggered the village conservation movement in China.

In 2002, the Ministry of Construction and the Bureau of Cultural Relics published the *Selection Criteria of Historic-cultural Famous Villages (Towns) in China*. This regulation offers three criteria in the form of local guidelines for the nomination of historic villages (and towns) - i.e. original appearance, current scale, and valued characteristics. Each of the three criteria were elaborated so that “valued characteristics” for example, consisted of eight measures, namely regional culture, commerce, transport, ecology, revolutionary history, military history, architectural heritage, and ethnic characteristic. “Revolutionary history” refers to the pre-socialist period when the Party was struggling to seize power, rather than the socialist era itself.[[9]](#endnote-9) In 2003, there were 12 villages selected and published nationally as the first cohort of historic-cultural famous villages according to the eight criteria.

To make the evaluation process more manageable, a marking sheet, the *Index System for Evaluating Historic-Cultural Famous Towns and Villages in China* was formulated by the Ministry of Construction and the Bureau of Cultural Relics in 2004. The evaluation system actually consisted of different indexes possessing a total score of 100. These indexes were structured into two major parts: characteristic values (score of 70) and conservation measures (score of 30, a new component evaluating the current works done on conservation plan and management).[[10]](#endnote-10) In the following years (2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2014), another five cohorts of historic-cultural famous villages were publicized, bringing the total number to 276 villages. However, none of those villages on the lists was a Dazhai-type model village.

In parallel to the movement of village conservation, there appeared an alarming picture. In the pursuit of economic advancement, the fates of most villages often fall into two categories: to undertake a modernization process and to become small towns, or to be gradually abandoned. Although villages seem to be the last stronghold protecting Chinese traditions, it is reported that the number of villages declined dramatically from 3.6 million in 2000, to 2.7 million in 2010. During these ten years, almost 250 villages were disappearing every day.[[11]](#endnote-11) To stem the loss, the number of historic villages on the list was dramatically increased in every subsequent evaluation year, despite the selection criteria largely remaining unchanged.

Like the conservation system for historic cities, village conservation was also carried out at three different administrative levels, i.e., national, provincial, and municipal. There is a bottom-up selection process for historic-cultural villages to be nominated, firstly at municipal level, and then those shortlisted can be declared at provincial level, and possibly at national level. A special conservation fund was established by the State for the most important historic sites. Local governments also contribute a large amount of money to historic preservation. Mainly driven by tourism, many cities are energetically exploring diverse investment from local government, citizens, enterprises, and even foreign organizations for their conservation projects.[[12]](#endnote-12) Reported by the media in 2006, the city of Ningbo, where our case study located, is at the forefront of historic village conservation in China.[[13]](#endnote-13) Under the guidelines enacted by the central government, 10 villages were selected in 2005 as the first cohort of historic-cultural famous villages at Ningbo municipal level. The government also allocated a fund of 50,000 RMB (about 7,600 USD) to each village for preparing a conservation plan.[[14]](#endnote-14) All those listed villages have maintained a reasonable amount of historic architecture that can be traced back to the Ming and Qing dynasties, some even to the Tang and Song dynasties (ca. 618-1279).

In 2013, Qinyong village was registered for the competition of the second cohort of “Historic-Cultural Famous Villages in Ningbo”, organized by the municipal government. The competition was first via public voting against the criteria of “historical value, unique appearance, degree of originality preserved, scale of current historical architecture, and existing or potential value for tourism.”[[15]](#endnote-15) Based on this, the jury, consisting of urban planning and architecture experts, would then make the final decision. However, compared to other villages that exemplified the pre-modern landscape of the Jiangnan region (south of the lower reaches of the [Yangtze River](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yangtze_River)), Qinyong failed to make the final list. Indeed, like other model villages built during the Cultural Revolution, the issue of historic preservation for Qinyong becomes more complex and challenging. On the one hand, the row dwellings, the predominant architectural feature in Dazhai-type villages, to Knapp and Shen, “reflected in only limited ways the vernacular architectural traditions of the regions in which they are found.”[[16]](#endnote-16) On the other hand, there is a dilemma inherent in properly evaluating the heritage values of these politically charged model villages. As we have noted, the central government’s attitude toward model villages dramatically changed after Mao’s death. In light of the bias against Mao’s model villages in conservation terms, Qinyong serves as an excellent example for case study. To assess the value of the historic structures in Qinyong, the imperatives of scrutinizing the development history of Qinyong village under the socio-political context of “learn from Dazhai” seem to be undeniable.

**The Village development and planning**

Qinyong village is located in Yinzhou district, south-east Ningbo, about 20 kilometres away from the city centre (Figure 2). There are 595 households there today, with a total population of 1,287, including 120 migrants from other rural areas. The total area of the village is 6.6 square kilometres of which 5.5 square kilometres is mountainous and 0.54 square kilometres is farm land.[[17]](#endnote-17) The balance is the developed settlement which is surrounded by mountains. To the south of the village, there is Phoenix Mountain, beneath which runs a creek. Therefore, Qinyong village was originally known as “Feng Xia Xi” (凤下溪, Creek underneath Phoenix).[[18]](#endnote-18)

In late imperial China, there were no clear distinctions between rural and urban architecture.[[19]](#endnote-19) As elsewhere, there would be huts and shacks for the poor, and courtyard houses for the gentry in Qinyong village (see Figure 3). In the early 20th century, the majority of households in the village were under the common surname of “Wang”. In 1926, the clan of the Wang family built their ancestral hall, the complex consisting of two main buildings, each ten bays (column intervals) in width, sitting on a north-south axis, with the eastern and western side wings each being ten bays in width. In the centre, there was a theatre stage and the great hall; on the western side, there were three auxiliary buildings.[[20]](#endnote-20) This large-scale building complex reveals that like many other traditional villages, the ancestral hall was a central element of the whole village.

Despite a tortuous history from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, the economic model in rural China remained unchanged. So did the settlement pattern. In Qinyong Village, this is clearly evident in the fact that ancestral hall was built as late as 1926. Major changes, however, took place in the socialist era (1949-1978). There was a series of nationwide socialist actions that forcefully restructured the political and economic institutions of the village during Mao’s tenure as Communist Party Leader. For example, Land Reform Law, formulated by the central government on June 30 1950, abrogated ownership of land by landlords. Following the violent campaigns during 1950 to 1951, the ownership of the land was redistributed to landless peasants and owners of small plots, as well as to the landlords themselves. In July 1950, led by the Party cadres, under the banner of “unite the peasants, devote to land reform”, Qinyong village, without exception, had to undergo the reform. Land resources and properties were distributed equally to each village member.[[21]](#endnote-21)

The most revolutionary change of the village landscape occurred following the successive waves of collectivization, the Great Leap Forward (from 1958 to 1961), the Cultural Revolution (from 1966 to 1976), and the campaign of “Learn from Dazhai” (from 1964 to 1978). In 1970, the decision to change the mountain village’s former appearance was made with the vision of creating terraced fields on the mountain and altering the creek’s course in order to obtain irrigation for the farm fields. By 1973, 280 metres of the creek had been altered, and more than 40 mu (26,680 sqm) of terraced rice fields and 35 mu (23,310 sqm) of terraced tea fields had been created.[[22]](#endnote-22) Other than agriculture, all-round development including forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and side-occupations were mandated for Qinyong via the Dazhai-type village model.[[23]](#endnote-23) Under a humid subtropical climate, it yielded a total income of 1,106,811 RMB in 1974, 217 RMB per person.[[24]](#endnote-24) In 1975, with the support of higher-level government, site surveys and plans were conducted in Qinyong village to forge a blueprint for a “new rural village” (Figure 4).

Accordingly, a construction team for Qinyong village was established and the land behind the ancestral hall was levelled for new housing. The former dispersed settlement pattern of individual houses was to be demolished with the promise of allocating an enlarged dwelling for each household. In 1976, three rows of two-storey buildings were constructed, each containing 24 bays, together with three rows of single-storey buildings (each of 12 bays).[[25]](#endnote-25)

The first row of houses were built with fired bricks, formed using a traditional way of baking yellow mud (Figures 5, 3). Yet due to the small production scale of the existing single kiln and limited raw material (i.e. yellow mud), stone was quarried from the nearby mountains in 1977, replacing the bricks in the later construction activity (Figure 6).[[26]](#endnote-26) Using stone not only asserted a revolutionary break from the traditional building material, but also involved the arduous work of quarrying, transportation, and manual cutting by hand. Nevertheless, it echoed the spirit of “Learn from Dazhai”, that is, to quote Zhao and Woudstra, “self-reliance, hard work and collectivism exemplified by the huge manpower input and the willingness to bear hardship in order to transform nature.”[[27]](#endnote-27)

In the following years, the ancestral hall was demolished. New houses and other buildings (e.g. the Assembly Hall, the Guest House, and the Canteen of the Guest House) were developed following the row-housing model, which together drastically transformed the traditional village setting into a socialist landscape (Figure 7). As a model village, Qinyong received regular visitors, mostly peasants and cadres from the Zhejiang region, whose number increased to 300 to 500 persons per day by April 1978.[[28]](#endnote-28)

The layout of the reconstructed and expanded village was revolutionary and has been well maintained up until today (Figure 8). The land for the housing development was constrained by the foot of the mountain at north and the creek at south. The basic element is the identical row-houses, the majority of which are about 43 metres in length and 11 metres in width. They line up in perfectly parallel rows in an approximate east-west direction so that each housing unit essentially faces south, an ideal orientation for passive solar gain. The row housing blocks are repeatedly duplicated in an approximate north-south direction, forming a rigid grid. The geometrical straightness of the grid is its key feature and represents rational order and efficiency, in great contrast to the organic patterns of old villages. Although there is no direct influence from Western modernism, the socialist reform of the Qinyong village plan has adopted an identical geometry in their interpretation of modernism, with a similar purpose of rapidly moving forward by dissociating itself from the past. By favouring straightness over organic, the village layout also asserts man’s determination to conquer nature, a key principle advocated by the campaign of “In agriculture, learn from Dazhai”.[[29]](#endnote-29)

In his study of the settlement pattern of Dazhai, Chunlan Zhao observes that “there is a strong centralization and clear division between working and living space for the whole settlement based on the cooperation principle.”[[30]](#endnote-30) In a similar way, the 1970s’ plan of Qinyong village clearly shows a zoning strategy, with the concentration of the housing blocks to the east and the working areas to the west. Zhao also points out that there was an intriguing socio-spatial relationship between internal and external, rural and urban, local and foreign in the layout of Dazhai. Those divisions were spatially created and yet connected by the main street.[[31]](#endnote-31) Similarly, located at the southern margin of the village, the main street of Qinyong separates the village into internal and external realms. In fact the main street was formed by the completion of the final row of houses, and was the last element constructed. To the north of the main street, there was a large area for the living and working for the local villagers, denoting an internal space. Opposite the main street at the southern boundary, the Guest House and the Canteen of the Guest House were built, denoting an external space for the reception of outsiders (see Figures 4, 9).

The row-houses were equally divided into 12 units (defined by the structural interval of column bays) in most cases, or 9 units in some case (see the last column at east in Figure 4). Each household occupied one unit, with a total area of 85 square metres including a two-storey main living component and a one-storey auxiliary space (Figure 10). Within the living component, there are two rooms on the ground-floor, one for living and the other for kitchen and dining, and two bedrooms on the upper-floor. The one-storey auxiliary room is normally for mixed-use, consisting of pigpen, toilet, firewood storage, and occasionally including a kitchen. Judging from this layout, the row-house seems have resembled a humble English terrace where a row of identical houses share common side walls. However, this housing typology was not conceived by following the English terraced house model that underlined separation for individuality and unification for splendid appearance. Rather, it emulated the housing development in Mao’s revolutionary model village Dazhai, where each row-house was divided into identical units expressing the physical sameness and social equality of all inhabitants. In their monotonous duplication and rigid grid arrangement, these row-houses resembled army barracks. From 1958 onwards in some areas of the country, Ronald G. Knapp and Shen Dongqi point out a further militarization of the dwelling space: “men and women—even married couples—the old, the very young, and adolescents were forced to live in separate quarters.”[[32]](#endnote-32) And the commune members in model villages were required to act like soldiers, who had to “get up, eat, sleep, work, and discharge in unison.”[[33]](#endnote-33)

As militarized as army barracks, the identical row-houses, arranged in a rigid grid, exhibited a decentralized layout. Decentralization negates social hierarchy which seems to reflect the Maoist’s anti-bureaucratic strategy by directing the Party secretaries to participate in production labour.[[34]](#endnote-34) On the other hand, there was the so-called “militarization” of production and labour in the model villages. An entire commune was divided into a number of platoons, each led by a commune leader and often dedicated to a single task, such as weeding the cotton fields or killing sparrows (which were considered pests).[[35]](#endnote-35) Economically, organizing and operating a model village along military lines was, to borrow Huaiyin Li’s words, “to break the boundaries of different localities and to concentrate manpower and speed up tasks.”[[36]](#endnote-36) The sectionalized layout gave equal importance to each precinct and enabled a commune to form different platoons easily. There were indeed various forms of platoons within a commune, for example, “the youth skyrocket platoon,” “the adult leaping forward platoon,” and “women’s shock platoon.”[[37]](#endnote-37) The decentralized structure and equality also led to a consensual politics. This physical and political organization of a commune obtained, in Marc Blecher’s words, “political responsiveness in leadership and mass involvement in policy-making”.[[38]](#endnote-38) In this geometrically precise layout, egalitarianism as a dominant social ideology was revealed and reinforced through physical form.

As a result of the collectivization movements from the 1950s to the 1970s, egalitarianism became the pre-eminent social foundation for village life. It was manifested by equally sharing the land, the cost of construction, and the housing blocks themselves, though some large households might occupy more than one unit. In their survey of a number of model villages, Knapp and Shen offer similar remarks:

To conserve materials and space, new dwelling units in Dazhai-type villages were usually built to minimal uniform standards, with the same low height, the same depth, and the same length, which reflected the then popular ideal of egalitarianism.[[39]](#endnote-39)

Regardless of their overall homogeneity, nuances among the houses are discernible, particularly evident in the different ways of arranging the staircases. In the comparatively earlier housing blocks, there is a shared staircase serving three adjacent households (Figure 11). To access the ground and upper-floors within a housing unit, one has to resort to the common staircase. The emphasis of sharing domestic space among neighbours clearly springs from the communal life promoted by the collectivization movements. On the other hand, the middle unit is downsized in order to accommodate the staircase (see the typical unit in Type 2 Staircase in Figure 11). This perhaps also underlines the need to accommodate a smaller household, such as adult children, a young couple, or an elderly couple with no family, as an acknowledgement to practical reality.

In the earliest housing block, the architectural treatment of the staircases interestingly addressed equality by placing one flight of steps in the middle on the ground floor, then symmetrically placing two flights of steps, instead of one, on both sides of the common landing area up toward the first floor (Figure 12). For the second type of staircase, there are two flights of steps, instead of one, on both sides of the ground floor leading toward the common landing area, and then one central flight connecting the upper floor (Figure 13). The third type of staircase might be influenced by the layout of contemporary socialist houses in cities.[[40]](#endnote-40) It simply had two flights of steps, one for the ground floor the other for the upper floor, a common and yet asymmetrical layout (Figure 14).

These various solutions for the common staircase reveal the attempt to spatially reconcile the relationship among neighbours. As reported by a senior villager, the inhabitants were forced to shift their living arrangements from a lower density to a more concentrated pattern in the 1970s. The villagers were against such compact living, however, because residing too closely together might instil intrigue and conflict. The issue seems have been resolved in the final stage of the development. In the latest housing blocks which face the main street, there is an internal staircase connecting the ground-floor and the upper-floor within a unit (Figure 15). The common circulation areas were abandoned. This leads to a strictly identical setting for each housing unit in those blocks. If urban socialist housing was constructed under the principle of “massive, quick, good, and economic” advocated by Maoist leaders,[[41]](#endnote-41) then the tremendous effort spent on the varied treatments of the staircases in the village suggest that equality as a key principle of socialist politics could at least be aesthetically expressed.

Without exception, each household has a front yard (see Figures 16, 10), a two-storey living area, a back yard, and an auxiliary room. Even the village head’s house, which the authors have visited in 2015, is no different to other commoners’ houses in terms of both size and layout. The housing allocation in the village was in stark contrast to that in the cities where social hierarchy was legitimated by law. For example, the official regulation of public housing in the pre-reform era was classified as 42-45 square meters (m2) for workers, 45-50 m2 for low-level cadres, 60-70 m2 for cadres at the middle level, and 80-90 m2 for cadres at higher levels.[[42]](#endnote-42)

One critical task addressed by the state regarding rural collectivism at that time was how to place grassroots cadres under effective control.[[43]](#endnote-43) The equal distribution of houses firstly placed the village cadres on the same material level as ordinary members. Then there were a number of architectural configurations that intimately connected cadres' houses with their neighbours, thereby putting them under mutual surveillance. A third remarkable feature of this housing typology was precinct-scale connectedness. Not only were the front yards literally an open space traversing 12 (or 9) households in the same block, with further connections to neighbouring blocks (Figure 16), but the balconies on the upper floor of each household were originally built as one continuous space crossing all housing units (Figure 17). Furthermore, the back yards between the dwellings and auxiliary buildings formed a long rectangular and undivided open space which could be readily traversed by anyone choosing to do so (see Figure 5). In these well-connected circulation spaces, privacy, a sought-after condition promoted in English terraced house, was absent. Instead, communal life, enacted via these non-partitioned spaces, was fully encouraged thereby celebrating the collective spirit. Comments from Zhao and Woudstra on the housing layout in Dazhai, the model village upon which Qinyong was modelled, are noteworthy:

The lack of privacy provided by this arrangement further underlined that residents had nothing to hide from each other, with the lack of articulation of spaces and sense of openness suggesting equality and harmony.[[44]](#endnote-44)

As an institutional outcome of the “mass line” politics adopted by the state and applying to village life, the architectural configurations noted above seemed to have successfully addressed egalitarian collectivism in the Maoist era.[[45]](#endnote-45) Equality was not only manifested in housing architecture, but also in decision making processes, as Marc Blecher notes in his comments on consensual politics in rural communities: “A clear consensus could emerge because the issue was formulated in a highly egalitarian manner which made fine and potentially invidious distinctions unnecessary.”[[46]](#endnote-46) Equality in model villages was also manifested by their economic organization, for example by collective ownership of the means of production. A “self-assessment and public discussion” method was also introduced to distribute workloads and rewards fairly.[[47]](#endnote-47) By means of visual and physical connectedness, equality and mutual supervision, political and economic strategies were architecturally exercised.

However, economic growth of rural China under the Maoist collectivism largely stagnated until 1978. To explain the “failure” of collective agriculture, some scholars focus on the problem of work incentives at that time. Others attribute the problem to factors extrinsic to the collective system and therefore emphasized the detrimental effects of the state’s egalitarian policy.[[48]](#endnote-48) After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978, the most significant moment in Chinese modern history occurred. It shifted the Party's rural focus to socialist modernization and a household-based farming system was introduced to replace team production in rural China in the early 1980s. This shift towards villages not only restructured the political and economic system of the village, but also led to the further transformation of housing development from the 1980s onwards.

The change is evident in housing project built in the 1980s and the early 1990s. This phase was rather unplanned and took place on any available land that could be found in the village. Some housing blocks built late in this development period were even located outside the existing boundary of the village (see Figures 8, 18). Two blocks of land, one behind the Assembly Hall (built in 1978, see Figure 19) and the other located at the southern boundary of the village, were allocated to the new housing development in the 1980s. Each dwelling was larger than before. Rather than providing a long rectangular block and equally dividing it into housing units, the layout of these houses adopted a duplex setting. It is characterised by two households equally share one block of land, with a common wall in the middle. Between each block, there is a small lane that divides, and provides access to, two opposite households (Figures 19, 20). These houses were built using brick and cement, the prevailing modern construction method.

One critical feature of these houses, however, is the absence of communal space. In each housing unit, the yard between the accommodation component and auxiliary room is blocked by walls, which separates the house from the neighbour on one side and from the alley on the other side. Unlike the communal thoroughfare exhibited in the earlier houses, the yard now assumes a true sense of enclosure, thereby becoming a private courtyard. As the cross section shows in Figure 21, however, the courtyard could receive much more sunlight by locating the shorter auxiliary building to the south and the taller accommodation building on the north side of the block. This passive solar design also permits internalization of balconies. Connecting the bedrooms, the balconies are thus shifted from facing the public street in the previous setting to facing the internal courtyard.

Compared to the corridor-like yards in the earlier housing, there is a significant transformation of the courtyard in terms of its function and associated architectural treatment. The courtyard is not only a utility space for open-air drying of clothes and food preparation and for temporary storage, but also a pleasant place for leisure activity. It is often decorated with greenery and even the flooring is paved with tiles in some cases (Figure 22). In addition, unlike the houses from the 1970s whose entrances are directly facing the street, in these duplex blocks the entry doors of two units are consciously moved away from the street, and placed on the sides of the building, facing the alley (Figures 19, 20). The entry door connects to the courtyard instead of the living room. All these architectural efforts seem to have emphasised privacy and turned the yard into a domestic amenity serving a single household exclusively. In interviews, the residents expressed their satisfaction with these private courtyards, which block harsh winds and are more comfortable than the connected spaces in the 1970s housing. Judging by the gesture of enclosure and the centralized position of the courtyard, these newer houses resemble key features of a traditional courtyard house. Yet it would be more accurate to assert that this housing layout is the hybrid of a rural communal house of the socialist era and a courtyard house of the imperial period. Equalization and centralization are coexisting themes in the new layout, pertinently reflecting the political and economic transition from collectivism to de-collectivism in the 1980s.

It is through a selective case study of the 1980s housing that the intent and practice of having two bays as the internal division of a house is fully revealed, that is, to serve a stem family: one bay for a young couple with a baby, the other for the parents. In the case study, the internal division is architecturally manifested by a solid common wall without any fenestration (see the Unit 4 in Figure 20, and Figure 23). It seems that traditional family living patterns, i.e. co-residence of the parent and their adult children (and even grandchildren), are largely maintained in the countryside. In his pioneering study of a village in rural China, Fei Xiaotong found the number of stem or joint families remained almost static between 1936 and 1981.[[49]](#endnote-49) In the urban Chinese family today, most parents and children do not prefer co-residence but due to limited state support for social services and reduced housing opportunities, co-residence still remains common.[[50]](#endnote-50)

The 1970s houses demonstrated a rudimentary experiment of changing social relationships via spatial disposition, witnessing a triumph of vertical juxtaposition of spaces over horizontally codified hierarchy. By emphasising an absolute equality among the parents, adult children and other families, this simple yet effective housing scheme violently superseded traditional living patterns fabricated by pre-modern courtyard houses. The layout of the houses from the 1980s, however, reveals a conscious reconciliation of the relationship between the parents and adult children, which not only divides internal space equally into two halves, but also unites two partitioned spaces via an internal courtyard. In this sense, the housing layout suggests an ideal socio-spatial relationship between the younger couple and their parents that nowadays is still prevalent among most Chinese families in both urban and rural areas, i.e. to live close to one another yet separated: to be mutually inter-dependent yet self-reliant.

It is partially due to the effective layout of the houses and partially due to the relatively isolated location of the village that the socialist building fabric is well maintained. The housing development in Qinyong seems to be immune to the building boom occurring in most cities, where architects can utilize any possible form, both foreign and traditional, to assert their various statements. In a housing development built without an architect’s involvement, an indigenous approach emerges. In embracing the opportunity of relatively free expression in built form, the villagers seemed have looked backward, referring to the model of a traditional courtyard house. In the production of village form, a conscious pursuit of modernization is intertwined with a subconscious inheritance of the past. These mixed forces seem to be commonly reflected in many Chinese villages in the “transition” period, as Knapp observes:

There generally is no explicit rejection of the past in the “modernization” of Chinese villages, and one can often observe the inherent durability of traditional patterns, the past in the present landscape.[[51]](#endnote-51)

**From egalitarianism to individualism**

The housing transformation of Qinyong village illustrated above clearly witnesses both institutional and individual changes in rural China from the 1970s to the 1990s. The early egalitarian model community was a product of political forces and economic need. Without any aid from the outside, a collective economy was necessary so the villagers could share natural resources, to conquer nature and to become self-reliant as a community. Each member was thus bound to the community, devoting much time to arduous field work and leading a collective life. In his discussion of Dazhai, Mitch Meisner points out that “economic activity is the main field for building the necessary political unity and liberating the vital political motivation.”[[52]](#endnote-52) It is true that the collective practice of equality demanded by the economy also cultivated a sense of political democracy. Although the following example is from a rural village in Guangdong province, it suggests that a common political sense prevailed in model villages. As a male brigade cadre stated in 1968: “if people felt that their own share in a distribution [of some material good] was unfair in comparison with what other people were receiving, they would voice their opinions with the team committee.”[[53]](#endnote-53)

In the dominant purpose of achieving social consensus via equality, the housing architecture of Qinyong village fits well into the theory and practice of mass line politics. Moreover, the effort of making communal houses aesthetically appealing is also evident particularly in the 1970s project. For example, on the gable walls of the houses, there are two stone corbels or brackets with a curvilinear profile. The decorative motifs are reminiscent of clouds or foliage in the remaining pre-modern village building (Figures 24, 3). The prefabricated balustrades of the balconies are also nicely treated with a repetitive flower pattern (Figure 25). Whether this decorative motif was derived from traditional architecture or from the Art Deco movement remains unknown. Certain craftsmanship is also evident in the way of cutting and laying the stone blocks, and of making wooden windows and doors. The striving for a building aesthetic was seamlessly integrated into the political campaign of building a coherent rural community.

Nevertheless, the rise of the individualization of society is evident in rural China particularly from the 1990s onward, which, as Yunxiang Yan demonstrates, is largely dictated by consumerism, that is, to justify and assert one’s individual taste (or lifestyle) through consumption.[[54]](#endnote-54) This trend is also conspicuously manifested by the external and internal finishes of the houses in the village. For example, in the 1970s houses, partition walls were inserted later at both ground-floor portico area and upper-floor balcony area, blocking the connections between neighbouring units (see Figure 16). In response to our survey questions, a majority of people expressed their desire to install new partition walls in both the front and back yards to provide private spaces for their houses. However, they conveyed their concerns that it might not be possible to do so because the layout was forcefully imposed by the local Party. In addition, people have residual doubts about access if walls suddenly obstructed the open yards. In this sense, the village residents are habituated to their existing living patterns, appropriating those open yards for transversal movement.

As to external finishes, the villagers seem to have more freedom than their contemporary urbanites in treating their building facades. In many cases, the original stone facades have been gradually disguised by modern materials, such as ceramic tiles, stucco, and glass. There is a great variation in selecting even the same general type of building materials, for example ceramic tiles. Timber window frames are replaced by aluminium ones. The balconies in many households are completely enclosed by stucco walls and glazing (see Figure 16). Probably due to financial constraints, however, there is comparatively less external alteration of the auxiliary buildings, which largely retain their original flavour.

The main difference between the households is marked by their internal finishes, mainly resulting from their varied economic standings. Some households still maintain their original layout and there is not much evidence of finishing (see Figure 15), while others are lavishly finished to a modern fashionable standard (Figure 26). Interestingly, no matter how elaborately individual households upgraded their finishes, all the common staircases of the 1970s housing blocks remain untouched. Due to lack of maintenance, the original concrete staircases are decaying and there are no ceiling boards or tiles to conceal the rafters under the roof, revealing the original structure and material. Moreover, the windows of those staircases still have their original wooden frames, often in disrepair with the glazing broken (see Figures 12-14). All these dilapidated scenes somehow indicate the obsolescence of communal life in an individualized modern society.

**Discussion and conclusion**

The political shift in the 1980s to a great extent liberated individual households in the pursuit of economic advancement. There appeared an increasing difference in the housing quality and wealth of the villagers, though the social hierarchy was not as obvious as that of urbanites. However, in Qinyong unlike many other villages, there are no private households idiosyncratically expressing their individuality through particular architectural form. All the households largely remain in their original building layout, a concrete form established by the unique housing allocation system and the method of construction in the socialist era. In the process of modernization and individualization, the houses in each of the two phases embodied a dual theme where equality coincided with collectivism and individualism coincided with group. This, interestingly, manifests the political duality of democracy-centralism which was implicitly advocated by Mao and evident in the formation of many Dazhai-type villages in the socialist period.[[55]](#endnote-55)

Admittedly, Qinyong village, like many other rural villages, falls behind cities in achieving material and cultural richness. The houses of Qinyong were built with the purpose of detaching themselves from indigenous cultural and traditional value, because they denoted a revolutionary means of communal living and socialist philosophy. Unlike the plans of industrial communities from both England and France from the 18th to early 20th centuries that were often architecturally conceived, and imbued with Enlightenment ideologies, planning and housing in Chinese socialist villages were mass produced and quickly built without an architect. They seemed unable to offer inspiration, particularly to the modern Chinese. “In China’s countryside,” as Knapp observes, “there is generally little fascination for aged objects.” And he adds: “inherited village landscapes, that which has been ‘handed down,’ are all too often seen as a burden to be disposed of.”[[56]](#endnote-56) The numerous village renewal schemes under the banner of “beautiful village” focusing on building surfaces also verify that rural villages are mostly deprived of any aesthetic quality.

Most likely due to Qinyong village’s initiative in planning and construction of the “new rural village” in the 1970s and its achievements afterwards, Qinyong village was selected by the local government as a pilot project for the “beautiful village” scheme in 2013. This was rather a political response to the state’s call for ecological development of rural areas. Accordingly, “the Plan for Renovating Qinyong Village” was formulated by the municipal planning institute. Like many other village renewal projects in China, the new designs were done without any systematic evaluation of the village. Without any consideration for local ecology, the plan mainly touches upon the facades of the buildings, the open area at the village entrance, and the landscaping on the main street (see Figure 8). Construction works were completed in early 2015.

Since this cosmetic surgery, the village has obtained a new appearance as planned (Figure 27). New stucco and painting have been applied to the buildings, in grey and white, two major colours that characterize pre-modern architecture in the Jiangnan region (see Figures 16, 18). This not only disguises the original stone facades, but also buries the foliage patterns of the balconies (see Figure 16). With the consistent colour scheme and architectural treatment, uniformity is visually restored. The villagers are insensitive to the historic architecture, which they think is not functional and even limits their refurbishment initiatives. They are quite satisfied with the new cement floor evenly covering the old stone pavement in their front yards (see Figure 16).

After the renovation, an article entitled “Qinyong Village: the Elegant Stones Can Sing” appeared in the local newspaper (*Yinzhou Daily*) as headline news on January 4, 2015. Quite ironically, through the largely concealed stonework, the journalists passionately portray the village in picturesque terms:

Under the blue sky and white clouds, with stone walls, stone gate, stone houses, and stone streets, Qinyong village, an adamant world built in stone, assumes an ineffable softness in the embrace of the cyan mountains.[[57]](#endnote-57)

In September 2015, the selection process for the third cohort of “Historic-Cultural Famous Villages in Ningbo” took place. Any villages meeting at least one of the following four criteria, can register for nomination: 1) the village settlement has a long history, reflecting a traditional landscape of a particular historic period; 2) a concentration of historic architecture, with a total area of 2,500 sqm at least; 3) historic layout and appearance are largely intact; 4) an ethnic or folk culture that reflects vernacular characteristics.[[58]](#endnote-58)

Qinyong village was entered again for this third round. Without any specific relation to the above four criteria, Qinyong was, however, successfully included on the final list this time, together with 27 other villages. The third list of 28 historic-cultural famous villages in Ningbo was published at the end of 2015. Revealed by a municipal official from the Planning Bureau, the major reason given by the jury for accepting Qinyong on the list was that it contained a unique village landscape reflecting a special period (i.e. the Cultural Revolution era).[[59]](#endnote-59) This is an extremely unusual case in China, because there is no such regulation in historic preservation supporting the cultural legacy from the Cultural Revolution period.

The political dilemma of critically reviewing Mao’s achievement seems to be manifested by the renovation project. On the one hand, as noted above, the renewal has tried to eliminate the imprint of Mao’s revolutionary vision on village architecture; on the other hand, modern frescos have been created on the old theme of “Learn from Dazhai”, eulogizing the most glorious times of the village (Figure 28). This ambivalent attitude seems to be common in historic conservation projects, though the renovation scheme in Qinyong predominantly focused on revitalization rather than heritage conservation. Heritage preservation movements, according to Rodney Harrison’s view, not only manifest compensation for a ‘loss’ caused by industrialisation and urban growth, but also various political justifications of what shall be inherited.[[60]](#endnote-60)

Although there is no inherent link between the village beautification (or renewal scheme) in 2014 and its successful nomination for “Historic-Cultural Famous Villages” at municipal level in 2015, one cannot help thinking that physical disguise seems to be necessary political rhetoric for granting Qinyong an official entitlement in conservation, i.e. the cosmetic surgery applied to the village was instrumental in leading to the media’s praise of Qinyong and its qualification for future historic conservation. One also cannot help wondering what real value is embedded in the historic architecture of Qinyong.

In urban China, rapid economic growth has endowed the Chinese with a rich material life. At the same time, however, social polarization and political corruption prevail and even threaten the stability of the whole country. Considering these current social phenomena reported by numerous media outlets, the principles of equality and mutual supervision as the foundation of model village economy and politics in the socialist era, symbolized by architecture, still offer tremendous inspiration. Indeed, enacted as a *sermon in the stones,* the architecture of Qinyong village will continuously preach equality as the key principle in cultivating grassroots democracy and building a coherent rural community. We also should be mindful that behind the new stucco and fresh painting lie the rustic stones—the very building material that not only truthfully records the arduous work for self-reliance, but also monumentally manifests the collective faith and force in striving for the common good.

**Notes:**

1. Sheldon Weeks, “Learn from Dazhai,” reprinted from Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU)’s magazine *China Now* 72, June 1977, p. 2 [Online] Available at: http://sacu.org/learntachai.html [Accessed: 10 October 2015] [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. William Hinton, “Mao's Beloved Model Village,” *Time*, September 27, 1999 [Online] Available at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054307,00.html [Accessed: 10 March 2016] [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. For example, see Tang Yakai 唐亚凯 & Li Yongqin 李永勤, Development for Ecologic Agriculture, Construction for Beautiful Villages 发展生态农业，建设美丽乡村, *Economic Research Guide* 经济研究导, 2015, no.4, Serial No.258, pp.186-187. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. For this dramatic change, see Christopher L. Salter, Dazhai Village, Shanxi: A Model Landscape, in: *Chinese Landscapes: the Village as Place*, ed. Ronald G. Knapp (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), p. 208. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. For example, see “Selection Criteria of Historic-cultural Famous Villages (Towns) in China全国历史文化名镇(名村)评价标准,” *Urban Planning Newsreport*城市规划通讯, 2002, no.19, pp.3-4. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. For details, see Ronald G. Knapp and Shen Dongqi, Changing Village Landscapes, in: *Chinese Landscapes: the Village as Place*, pp. 47-72. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. #  “Notice of Publishing the List of the Second Cohort of Historic-cultural Famous Cities城乡建设环境保护部、文化部关于请公布第二批国家历史文化名城名单的报告,” *the Bulletin of the State Council of the People's Republic China* 中华人民共和国国务院公报, 1986, no.35, pp. 1075-1086.

 [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Zhao Yong 赵勇 & Wang Lin 王林, “Chapter 2: The Development of the Conservation Laws of Historic-Cultural Famous Cities 历史文化名城保护法制体系的演变, ” in: *Sweeping Winds and Rains: 30 Years of the Conservation for Historic-Cultural Famous Cities* 风雨如磐: 历史文化名城保护30年, ed. Chou Baoxing (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 2014), p.33. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. “Selection Criteria of Historic-cultural Famous Villages (Towns) in China全国历史文化名镇(名村)评价标准,” *Urban Planning Newsreport*城市规划通讯, 2002, no.19, pp.3-4. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. *Index System for Evaluating Historic-Cultural Famous Towns and Village in China*中国历史文化名镇名村评价指标体系, 2004 [Online] Available at: http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/lswj/tz/P020110228388248709469.doc [Accessed: 11 March 2016] [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Zhang Xiaode张孝德, “ Prosperity of villages leads to prosperity of China, a concrete law in the history of Chinese civilization 乡村兴则中国兴，这是中国文明史的铁律,” *people.cn* 人民网, June 19, 2013 [Online] Available at: http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0619/c207270-21896296.html [Accessed: 1 September 2015] [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Qiu Yue 邱跃 & Feng Feifei 冯斐菲, “Chapter 5: The Conservation Management for Historic-Cultural Famous Cities 历史文化名城保护管理实践,” in: *Sweeping Winds and Rains: 30 Years of the Conservation for Historic-Cultural Famous Cities*, pp.194-197. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Guo Jing 郭靖 & Wang Wei 王威, “Compiling conservation plan, developing tourist industry: Conservation for Historic-Cultural Famous Villages in Ningbo is at the forefront of the whole Country 编制保护规划 发展旅游产业:宁波历史文化名村保护走在全国前列,” *Ningbo Daily*, September 4 2006, p. A02. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. **“**Yinzhou Qinyong Village- a testimony of history鄞州勤勇村-历史的见证,” Ningbo Planning Bureau, Nov. 2013 [Online] Available at: http://www.nbplan.gov.cn/zhz/news/201311/n58186.html [Accessed: 28 September 2013] [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Ronald G. Knapp and Shen Dongqi, Changing Village Landscapes, in: *Chinese Landscapes: the Village as Place*, p. 60. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. These information are printed on the wall in the Qinyong village office, the former Assembly Hall.[Accessed: 6 September 2015] [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. The Editorial Committee of Qinyong village*, The Biography of Qinyong Village* (unpublished, printed in 1988), p.1. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Samuel Y. Liang, *Remaking China’s Great Cities: Space and Culture in urban Housing, Renewal, and Expansion* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), p.67. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. *The Biography of Qinyong Village*, p.3. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. *Ibid*, pp. 13-15. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. *Ibid*, pp. 31-32. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. See “Comrade Chen Yung-Kuei’s Report: at the Second National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agricultural”, *Peking Review*, no.2, January 7, 1977, p.17. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. *The Biography of Qinyong Village*, pp. 34-35. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. *Ibid*, p. 33. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. The reasons of change bricks to stone blocks was told by the senior members from the village committee via the meeting on 18th August 2015; for using stones as major building material in the 1970s was recorded in *The Biography of Qinyong Village*, p. 34. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Jijun Zhao and Jan Woudstra, ‘In Agriculture, Learn from Dazhai’: Mao Zedong’s revolutionary model village and the battle against nature, *Landscape Research*, 32:2, 2007, p. 199. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. *The Biography of Qinyong Village*, p. 34. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. See Jijun Zhao and Jan Woudstra, ‘In Agriculture, Learn from Dazhai’: Mao Zedong’s revolutionary model village and the battle against nature, *Landscape Research*, 32:2, 2007, pp. 171-205. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Chunlan Zhao, *Socio-spatial transformation in Mao's China: settlement planning and dwelling architecture revisited (1950s-1970s)*, PhD dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2007, ch.5, p. 252. [Online] Available at: http://www.kuleuven.be/doctoraatsverdediging/fiches/3E04/3E040894.htm [Accessed: 11 March 2016] [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. *Ibid*, pp. 252-256. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Ronald G. Knapp and Shen Dongqi, Changing Village Landscapes, in: *Chinese Landscapes: the Village as Place*, p. 52. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Cited in Huaiyin Li, *Village China under Socialism and Reform*: *A Micro-history, 1948-2008* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 85; see the original sources in Kang Jian 康健, *Huihuang de huanmie; renminggongshe jingshilu* 辉煌的幻灭-人民公社警世录 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1998), chapter 5, pp.263-325. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Mitch Meisner, The Mass Line in Practice, *Modern China*, 4:1, 1978, pp.33-34. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Huaiyin Li, *Village China under Socialism and Reform: A Micro-history, 1948-2008,* pp.84-85. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. *Ibid*, p.85. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. *Ibid*, pp.84-85. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Marc Blecher, Consensual Politics in Rural Chinese Communities: The Mass Line in Theory and Practice, *Modern China*, 5:1, 1979, p.123. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Ronald G. Knapp and Shen Dongqi, Changing Village Landscapes, p. 60. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. For socialist housing development in cities, see Samuel Y. Liang, *Remaking China’s Great Cities: Space and Culture in urban Housing, Renewal, and Expansion*, pp. 69-76. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Samuel Y. Liang, *Remaking China’s Great Cities: Space and Culture in urban Housing, Renewal, and Expansion*, p. 70. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Yang Lu杨鲁 & Wang Yukun王育琨, *Zhufang gaige: Lilun de fansi yu xianshi de xuanze*住房改革：理论的反思与现实的选择 (Tianjin：Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1992),p.78. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Huaiyin Li, *Village China under Socialism and Reform: A Micro-history, 1948-2008*, p.107. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Jijun Zhao and Jan Woudstra, ‘In Agriculture, Learn from Dazhai’: Mao Zedong’s revolutionary model village and the battle against nature, p. 185. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. The mass line, according to Marc Blecher, is a specific Chinese socialist theory of leadership, referring to leader-mass relations and policy-making in a highly egalitarian manner. For details see Marc Blecher, Consensual Politics in Rural Chinese Communities: The Mass Line in Theory and Practice, pp.105-126. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Marc Blecher, Consensual Politics in Rural Chinese Communities: The Mass Line in Theory and Practice, p.110. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Tang Tsou, March Blecher and Mitch Meisner, Organization, Growth, and Equality in Xiyang County: A Survey of Fourteen Brigades in Seven Communes (Part II), *Modern China*, vol.5, no.2, 1979, p.155. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Huaiyin Li, *Village China under Socialism and Reform: A Micro-history, 1948-2008*, p.185. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Fei Xiaotong 费孝通, On Changes in the Chinese Family Structure 论中国家庭结构的变动, *Tianjin Social Science*, 3, 1982, pp. 2-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. John R. Logan, Fuqin Bian and Yanjie Bian, Tradition and Change in the Urban Chinese Family: The Case of Living Arrangements, *Social Forces*, 76: 3, 1998, pp.851-882. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Ronald G. Knapp, Transition: Introductory Perspectives, in: *Chinese Landscapes: the Village as Place*, p. 191. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Mitch Meisner, The Mass Line in Practice, p.31. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Cited in Marc Blecher, Consensual Politics in Rural Chinese Communities: The Mass Line in Theory and Practice, p.112. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Yunxiang Yan, *The Individualization of Chinese society* (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. See Mitch Meisner, The Mass Line in Practice, pp.57-58. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. Ronald G. Knapp, Tradition: Introductory Perspectives, in: *Chinese Landscapes: the Village as Place*, p. 78. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Lin Youjuan林幼娟 & Shao Zhiming邵志明, “Qinyong Village: the Elegant Stones Can Sing勤勇村: 精美的石头会唱歌,” *Yinzhou Daily* 鄞州日报, Jan. 4, 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. *The Conservation Regulation for Historic-Cultural Famous Cities, Towns, and Villages in Ningbo*宁波市历史文化名城名镇名村保护条例, Feb. 2, 2015 [Online] Available at: The Conservation Academy of Historic and Cultural City of Ningbo’s official website http://lswhyjh.nbeyoo.com/ [Accessed: 11 March 2016] [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Telephone interview with Mr. Zhou Feng from Ningbo Planning Bureau on March 11 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Rodney Harrison, *Heritage: Critical Approaches* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.45, 107-110. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)