Accepted version of

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Published in India Review (2017).

Formal citation is:

Adeney, K. (2017). "Does ethnofederalism explain the success of Indian federalism?" India Review 16(1): 125-148 DOI: 10.1080/14736489.2017.1279933

Does ethnofederalism explain the success of Indian federalism?

Ethnofederalism has been contested as a solution for diverse societies as seen recently in Nepal (where federalism has been accepted, but the design and number of units remains heavily contested) and Myanmar (where ethnic minority demands for increasing federalization have had to take a back seat to the demands for increasing democracy). It remains a heavily contested subject in Sri Lanka. Concerns are expressed that ethnofederalism will increase pressures for secession and/or lead to increased violence, through increasing a sense of separateness of the people living within that territory, providing resources for political entrepreneurs to mobilize groups against the center and will lead to the persecution of minorities within the ethnofederal units. India is an example of a federation that appears to demonstrate that ethnofederalism decreases rather than increases conflict through its successful reorganization of states along linguistic lines. However, a group-level analysis reveals a more diverse picture. India has simultaneously been *both* a success and a failure at conflict management.

In terms of population, India is the world's largest multinational federation. It contains a large number of sizeable religious, linguistic, caste and tribal groups, plus many regional divisions. It is not unique in its diversity. However, it was one of the few decolonizing states that purposively incorporated that diversity into its constitution through territorial recognition *and* territorial redesign. Most other decolonizing states saw the politics of territorial recognition as divisive and as a threat to their territorial integrity (e.g. Pakistan and Ceylon).

Through the process of linguistic reorganization, India became what is known in the political science literature as an ethnofederation, where at least one unit of the federation is associated purposively with an "ethnic" category. Ethnofederalism has received a bad press; both in the policy world, from statesmen working on constitution formation in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Nepal and Myanmar, and in academia. In 1972 Eric Nordlinger[ii] went so far as to exclude it from his list of conflict regulation devices. In the wake of the dissolution of the socialist federations, many authors[iii] argued that ethnofederal institutions had

entrenched identity politics and provided the institutional resources for elites to oppose the center.

Many authors have discussed the dangers (or otherwise) of ethnofederalism but few have analyzed India over time in detail.[iv] Those that have done so used qualitative arguments only. This article provides a rigorous assessment of the Indian experience since independence, deploying a group level quantitative analysis, using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset.[v] In the literature on ethnofederal design, India is generally regarded as a success.[vi] Is this correct? This group level analysis, supplemented by qualitative assessments, reveals that while ethnofederal institutions *have* promoted stability in India, territorial redesign has increased conflict when groups are intermixed or autonomy has been downgraded. These findings are significant as the process of territorial redesign continues apace in India: the 29th state of the Indian Union, Telangana, was created in 2014. This has provided further encouragement for longstanding demands for the creation of states such as Gorkhaland (from West Bengal) and Vidarbha (from Maharashtra). These findings are also important as other regimes, many at an early stage of democratization, are currently experimenting with ethnofederal design e.g. Nepal. The lessons from the Indian experience should inform the constitutional reconstruction process in other divided societies considering federalization such as the Philippines and Myanmar.

The "dangers" of ethnofederalism

Scholars and practitioners have been wary of recommending the territorial recognition of territorially concentrated groups. The creation of governing institutions that coincide with the boundaries of a group, creating a "homeland" for a group within the borders of an existing state, is assumed to pose a threat to the unity of the wider state. Thus, in states with multiple territorially concentrated groups, many politicians have either rejected the federal arrangement, as happened in Afghanistan in 2004, or have sought to deliberately cross cut group boundaries with internal governing institutions in what Liam Anderson terms "anti-ethnic" federalism.[vii] In the case of Iraq a mixed solution was adopted, with the Kurds subdivided between three governorates, with important areas such as Kirkuk left outside the control of the Kurdish Regional Government.

Despite these concerns, over half of the federations existing today intentionally associate "*at least one* constituent territorial governance unit […] with a specific ethnic category."[viii] This is Henry Hale's definition of an ethnofederation, which we adopt. As this article will demonstrate, although the arguments made against the adoption of ethnofederal institutions appear persuasive, they rest on assumptions about the *operation* of these ethnofederations. There are 27 federations in the world today.[ix] 14 of these are ethnofederal by Hale's definition, just over half.[x]

Table One: Federations in 2016.[xi]

	Name of state	**Ethnofederal**
1	Argentina	
2	Australia	
3	Austria	
4	Belgium	Yes
5	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Yes
6	Brazil	
7	Canada	Yes
8	Comoros	
9	Ethiopia	Yes
10	Germany	
11	India	Yes
12	Iraq (in transition)	Yes
13	Malaysia	Yes
14	Mexico	
15	Micronesia	
16	Nepal	Yes
17	Nigeria	Yes
18	Pakistan	Yes
19	Russia	Yes
20	St Kitts and Nevis	
21	South Africa	Yes
22	Spain	Yes
23	Sudan	
24	Switzerland	Yes
25	UAE	
26	USA	
27	Venezuela	

Historically, as Table Two demonstrates, ethnofederations are more prone to failure than non-ethnofederal ones. 15 ethnofederations have failed compared to only eight non-ethnic federations. Failure is defined either by a move to a unitary state (often through the takeover of the state by a military ruler; such as Nigeria in 1983) or the breakup of a state e.g. Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan in 1971.

Table Two: Failed federations

Ethnofederations	**Territorial separation**	**That became unitary**
	Mali Federation, 1960	Indonesia, 1950
	Malaysia, 1965	Pakistan, 1958
	Pakistan, 1971	Burma, 1962
	USSR, 1991	Nigeria, 1966
	Yugoslavia, 1991	Cameroon, 1972
	Czechoslovakia, 1992	Pakistan, 1977
	Senegambia, 1989	Nigeria, 1983
	FRY, Serbia Montenegro, 2006	Papua New Guinea, 1995
	Sudan, 2011	
	9	**8**
Non-ethnic federations	**Territorial separation**	**That became unitary**
	Arab Federation (Iraq & Jordan), 1958	Ethiopia, 1962
	United Arab Republic (Egypt & Syria), 1961	Libya, 1963
	West Indies Federation, 1962	Uganda, 1967
	Central African Federation, 1963	Congo, 1969
	4	**4**

Although we are dealing with a small number of observations, the picture is even more striking when we note that several of the failures of the non-ethnic federations are of very short-term mergers, borne out of decolonization, e.g. the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) and the Arab Federation (1958). These data illustrate that the concerns of those who argue ethnofederal institutions are dangerous (usually from the point of view of maintaining territorial integrity) have a case to answer, and make India's "success" all the more striking. As will be outlined below however, their arguments rest on particular assumptions about the nature of identity politics and do not take adequate account of the ways in which different institutional structures within the ethnofederal form can accommodate diversity while ameliorating separatist pressures.

Ethnofederalism encourages a sense of separateness

Those opposed to the creation of ethnofederal structures express concern that these structures will increase the desire for secession. They argue that autonomous institutions will promote

the identity of the dominant group around which the borders have been drawn e.g. through promoting a group's language and culture. This was the reason that Nehru was concerned about acceding to demands for linguistically homogeneous units. Authors making this argument argue that it is in the interests of local elites to increase this sense of separateness. They do so by choosing the language(s) in which the unit operates and educates its children and university students, changing the curriculum to promote "their" group's heroes and version of history (thus influencing the next generation), as well as using the local media to depict "their" version of contemporary events e.g. the Cauvery water dispute between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka in South India. Such control can solidify the boundaries of the group. By encouraging this sense of separateness, increasing the distinction between "us" and "them" (whether the "them" is a neighboring unit or is the center) ethnofederal institutions also increase the "group's cohesion and *willingness* to act."[xii] As Philip Roeder argues; "(e)thnofederal . . . institutions tend to create or to keep alive conflicts in which the issue is not simply about rights of different ethnic communities within a common-state, but whether the communities even belong in a common-state at all."[xiii]

Ethnofederalism increases the resources with which to effect secession

The second argument made by those concerned about ethnofederalism is that it provides territorially concentrated groups with increased institutional resources. These include a democratically elected legislature and chief minister, allowing them to lobby for more resources and/or reject central legislation.[xiv] So, in Svante Cornell's words, "establishing political institutions increases the *capacity* of that group to act" and also formalizes rules for succession, helping ensure that a "national struggle" could withstand a change in leadership."[xv] Thus, a Chief Minister of a state can legitimately claim a democratic mandate to oppose central policies, as Mamata Banerjee (Chief Minister of West Bengal) did in relation to the water sharing treaty in 2011. The creation of a homogeneous unit can also give an ethnically defined elite (assuming that people vote along ethnic lines) control of governing structures, including security institutions.

As well as providing increased institutional resources, Dawn Brancati argues that regional parties are strengthened by territorial autonomy.[xvi] This increases the secessionist group's mobilization capacity: "regional parties increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that favors certain groups

over others, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism."[xvii] Thus, the Parti Québécois in Canada secured a mandate in 1994 to hold a secessionist referendum. Even those well disposed to ethnofederations (under certain conditions) note that it "seems clear that [they] make it easier for groups to secede should they want to do so."[xviii]

Relations between groups within ethnically defined units are likely to be poor.

The third argument made against ethnofederalism as a means of managing relations between groups, is that relations between groups *within* ethnically defined units are likely to be poor. Concerns are raised that the creation of ethnic homelands will lead to minorities inevitably being victimized. This can be for two reasons. Either they are discriminated against by the adoption of "ethnic" languages/cultures that they do not share, as some Anglophones have argued in Quebec. Or, they are marginalized by the discourse that has increased the perception of "us" versus "them." This marginalization can result in violence against a group, which may not be prevented (indeed, it may even be encouraged) by the homeland's control over local law enforcement, as was seen in the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002.[xix] This can be the case for local minorities who are a member of a nationally dominant group, or minorities who are "twice cursed" by being a minority in a federal unit and in the state as a whole. Relations between groups within ethnically "homogenous" units may also be strained by the existence of (often) significant minorities – whose numbers may well be increased through migration.

Limitations of these arguments against ethnofederalism

These three arguments are not without merit. However, they rest on the assumption that the institutional recognition of an identity through the creation of ethnic homelands will lead to an increase in the salience of that identity *and* that this increase will lead to secessionist pressures. Such an assumption is misplaced. The particular *form* of the ethnofederal system is relevant in explaining its success or failure, including the importance of power sharing arrangements, whether formal or informal. Also relevant is the *timing* of the implementation of ethnofederal arrangements as well as the particular demographics of these units.[xx]

It is impossible to deny that redesigning internal state boundaries to create institutional "homelands" for territorially concentrated groups grants these groups significant institutional resources. These resources are multiple. First, the creation of a linguistically homogeneous

area creates an electoral territory within which political parties can win a mandate for their political program. The opponents of ethnofederalism have claimed that this political program is likely to oppose the center. However, this is not necessarily the case. As "[t]erritory can be seen as a primary guarantor of two fundamental human needs, identity and security,"[xxi] creating an ethnofederal unit is an important affirmation of the "worth" of a group's identity. It also gives that group security, especially if the powers that are devolved to that unit concern control over education and culture. In Lars-Erik Cederman et al.'s words, "the territorial nature of such provisions contributes to satisfying the group's concern about guaranteeing its physical security as well as the survival of its ethnonationalist identity."[xxii] Therefore, "[i]f the security of the ethnic group (as they define it) is promoted within a multi-ethnic state, the motivation to secede is diminished."[xxiii] Identity conflicts are often the result of a security dilemma,[xxiv] and increasing security through creating an ethnofederal unit reduces the political salience of an identity. This does not mean that the importance of the identity reduces, but it provides the conditions for different identities to co-exist as they are not in direct competition with each other. [xxv] This has been the case in India.

Rather than leading to political balkanization and the breakup of the country, the reorganization solidified support for the Indian state and the Indian nation as attested by the strength of feelings across the country on the "Only National", "More National" or "Equally National and Regional" scale.[xxvi] Although the importance of language did not diminish, the creation of linguistic states changed the focus of political parties.[xxvii] The party system in many of the states traditionally seen as anti-center fractionalized. Tamils are the oft-cited example in support of this argument.[xxviii] The trajectory of these regional parties has not been to oppose the Indian Union as authors such as Brancati would predict. After the creation of Tamil Nadu the DMK (opposed to upper caste northern Hindi domination), split into a plethora of Tamil regional parties, with a focus on capturing the state for its patronage.[xxix] As Adeney notes, "the multiplication of parties [in the states of India] has generally been indicative of federal stability because political parties have tended to not base their platforms on mobilizing against the center."[xxx]

Therefore there is no *necessary* relationship between increasing institutional resources and a *desire* for secession. Not only is secession never the easy option,[xxxi] but a rallying cry for secession will only be successful if the group feels its identity and interests are *not* protected within the ethnonational unit. If we accept the instrumentalist position that identities are

situational and subject to mobilization by elites[xxxii] then ethnofederal institutions create the conditions where it is *not* in elite interests to pursue secession. Elites need a *motivation* to pursue secessionism (and of course, the population needs to be motivated to respond to them). This motivation is more likely to arise if they do not have the opportunities to have their interests protected: whether these interests are defined in terms of the patronage that state power allows them to capture or in terms of cultural promotion. The Tamil Nadu example is a good example of both. When these opportunities are absent, conflict is likely to result.

The experience of ethnofederalism in India

Calls for the reorganization of units along ethnofederal criteria preceded the departure of the British.[xxxiii] In 1920 the Congress Party committed itself to the reorganization of the political map along linguistic lines and re-organized its internal party structure on this basis.[xxxiv] After the violence of partition however, Prime Minister Nehru expressed concerns that India would be Balkanized through such reorganization.[xxxv][xxxvi] He was forced to concede the demand under pressure from within and outside Congress.[xxxvii] The initial reorganizations in the mid 1950s and 1960s were therefore on the basis of language. The reorganizations that followed in the Northeast of the country were more on the basis of tribal identity than language. However, they must also be understood as ethnofederal. Most recent reorganizations such as those in 2000 were a complex mixture of identity, caste, tribal and developmental politics.[xxxviii] The creation of Telangana in 2014 was also a complex mix of the politics of dialect (rather than language) and historical developmental grievances.[xxxix]

16 of the 29 units existing in India today were created along ethnofederal lines.[xl] In addition to these 16, as Table Three makes clear, a linguistic group dominates the majority of India's states. Although the more recent reorganizations have been for more developmental and political reasons, using a country level analysis India must be understood as an ethnofederation.

Table Three: Reorganizations of Indian states after 1956

State	Date	Border change	ENLG	ENRG	Largest linguistic group	Largest religious group
Andhra Pradesh	2014	Y	1.25	1.20	89% (Telugu)	91.1%
	1956	Y	1.28	1.27	88% (Telugu)	88.4%
Arunachal Pradesh	1987	N	10.3	3.38	19.9% (Nissi/Dafla)	37%
Assam	1972	Y	2.51	1.70	60% (Assamese)	72.5%
	1966	Y	2.51	1.77	60% (Assamese)	71%
	1956	N	1.82	1.74	71% (Assamese)	71.3%
Bihar	2000	Y	1.76	1.39	73.1% (Hindi)	69.2%
	1956	Y	2.10	1.36	64% (Hindi)	84.7%
Chhattisgarh	2000	Y	1.44	1.11	82.7% (Hindi)	89.6%
Goa	1987	Y	2.59	1.95	51.2% (Konkani)	65%
Gujarat	1960	N	1.11	1.25	95% (Gujarati)	89%
Haryana	1966	Y	1.24	1.25	89% (Hindi)	89.2%
Himachel Pradesh	1966	Y	1.31	1.08	87% (Hindi)	96.1%
Jammu and Kashmir	1956	N	1.85	1.83	66% (Kashmiri)	68.3% [M]
Jharkhand	2000	Y	2.69	1.97	57.7% (Hindi)	68.6%
Karnataka	1956	Y	1.93	1.30	70% (Kannada)	87.3%
Kerala	1956	Y	1.09	2.24	96% (Malayalam)	60.8%
Madhya Pradesh	2000	Y	1.30	1.20	87.3% (Hindi)	91.1%
	1956	Y	1.23	1.13	90% (Hindi)	94%
Maharashtra	1960	Y	1.48	1.45	82% (Marathi)	82.2%
Manipur	1972	N	2.42	2.35	63% (Manipuri)	58.9%
Meghalaya	1972	Y	3.11	2.82	45% (Khasi)	47% [C]
Mizoram	1972	Y	1.77	1.33	73% (Bengali)	86.1% [C]
Nagaland	1966	Y	11.25	1.99	14% (Ao)	66.8% [C]
Odisha	1956	N	1.14	1.05	94% (Oriya)	97.6%
Punjab	1966	Y	1.49	1.98	79% (Punjabi)	60.2% [S]
Rajasthan	1956	Y	1.30	1.23	87% (Hindi)	90%
Sikkim	1975	N	2.29	1.77	64% (Gorkhali)	68.9%
Tamil Nadu	1956	Y	1.40	1.23	84% (Tamil)	89.9%
Telangana	2014	Y	1.62	1.32	77% (Telugu)	89%
Tripura	1972	N	1.9	1.24	69% (Bengali)	89.6%
Uttarkhand	2000	Y	1.28	1.36	88% (Hindi)	85%
Uttar Pradesh	2000	Y	1.19	1.46	91.3% (Hindi)	80.6%
	1956	N	1.27	1.35	88% (Hindi)	84.7%
West Bengal	1956	Y	1.22	1.51	90% (Bengali)	78.8%

Notes:
Linguistic and religious data have been taken from the census that was held after the reorganization of the state in question. The only exception to this are Assam, Meghalaya and Mizoram, the data for which were taken from the 1971 census, broken down into the new states.
"Hindi" refers to the category of "Hindi/Hindustani"
ENLG and ENRG refer to the "Effective" number of Linguistic and Religious Groups within a state rather than the absolute number of groups. This formula minimizes the importance of miniscule groups. [xli]

However, when assessing the success of ethnofederations, it makes more sense to adopt a *group level* approach rather than a countrywide one. A group level approach focuses on the relationships that different groups have with the central government. This is empirically more rigorous than an approach that assumes that all groups will be equally satisfied (or dissatisfied) with the institutional structures of the state, and also allows for that fact that "the state is not an ethnically neutral institution but is an active agent of political exclusion that generates these conflicts."[xlii] The data in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset[xliii] codes the extent and nature of group access to central power, whether that group has experienced territorial autonomy, and whether that group has been in conflict with the center or another group.

Although India is normally seen as a success in ethnofederal terms, it has only managed to maintain its territorial integrity through the use of extreme force in areas of its periphery, including Punjab, Kashmir and the Northeastern states. All of these, with the exception of Kashmir, were reorganized along "ethnic" lines. Is the conflict in these areas related to the failure of ethnofederal institutions? In the rest of this article we address this question. We do so using the Ethnic Power Relations and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD), building on the work of Cederman et al who test a number of hypotheses concerning the success (or otherwise) of ethnofederalism.[xliv] We confine our analysis to the South Asian data to assess the responsibility of ethnofederalism for territorial conflict in India.[xlv] We noted above that ethnofederalism can promote incentives to work within the existing state, and can encourage the development of dual loyalties. However, as Cederman et al. set out, such an outcome may also require power sharing at the center.[xlvi] This is because "[ethno]federations in ethnically divided societies can help to promote autonomy and security for different communities, but not if they institutionalize majoritarian forms of government, as they all too easily can do."[xlvii] We do so through posing two hypotheses.

H1. Violent conflict in India has occurred in states that are not ethnofederal.

H2. Violent conflict in India has occurred with groups that have been excluded from power sharing at the center

H1. ***Violent conflict in India has occurred in states that are not ethnofederal.***

To assess H1 we utilize two variables. The first of these is the measure of homogeneity or heterogeneity in the states of India. These data are collated from the relevant Indian censuses. The second is the existence of territorial civil conflict, collected from the ACD Dataset, which has been mapped onto the EPR dataset.[xlviii] We include all those *internal* conflicts that are related to territory.[xlix] We acknowledge the limitations of this database, which records as "conflicts" only those conflicts that have above 25 "battle-related" deaths in a given year. This database also does not take into account other forms of violence, such as missing persons. Although this data has limitations, it does reveal the conflict zones within India and their approximate start of conflict. Violent conflicts have emerged in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and in several (although not all) of the states of the Northeast as Table Four demonstrates.

As can be seen in Table Four, the majority of the states having experienced conflict are extremely heterogeneous. As Deiwiks has argued, "regions can be ethnofederal to varying degrees."[l] The States Reorganization Commission of 1955 defined homogeneity as the presence of over 70 percent of one linguistic group. As Table Three demonstrates, 12 out of the 29 states have less than 70 percent homogeneity on either linguistic or religious lines. Two of the Northeastern states (Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya) lack a majority on either linguistic or religious lines and Nagaland lacks a linguistic majority. The Northeastern states are additionally factionalized along tribal lines. Brendan O'Leary has argued that a *Staatsvolk* is important for federal stability. He defines a *Staatsvolk* as in existence when "the politically effective number of cultural groups must be less than 2 on the index of the effective number of ethnic groups"[li] (ENLG and ENRG in Table Three). Such a *Staatsvolk* is either "demographically [or] electorally dominant" and has "the ability simply to dominate the [unit] through its numbers, or instead to be generous – because it does not feel threatened."[lii] Looking at these data we can see that Assam (from which Nagaland and Mizoram were carved out from in 1966 and 1972 respectively), has had consistently higher than 2 ENLG. This therefore makes it less likely that the Assamese would be magnanimous, and indeed, the concession of Nagaland and Mizoram was made by Delhi rather than Guwahati.

Table Four. Data on violent conflict taken from the ACD Database

Dates of violent conflict	Territory	Scale	Cumulative intensity	ENLG	ENRG	Type of conflict
1955-1959, 1961-1968	Nagaland	Minor	Yes	2.92	2.08	Secessionist
1966-1968	Mizoram	Minor	No	2.51*	1.78	Secessionist
1979-1988	Tripura	Minor	No	1.90	1.24	Sons of the soil
1979-1992, 1997, 1999-2004	Tripura	Minor	No	1.90*	1.24*	Sons of the soil
1979-1988, 1995-96, 1998-2000	Manipur	Minor	No	2.42	2.35	Secessionist/Inter-ethnic
1981-1993	Punjab	War in 1988, 1990-92	Yes, from 1987	1.34*	1.98*	Secessionist
1983-1990, 1994-2010	Assam	Minor	Yes, from 2008	2.51	1.70	Inter-ethnic
1984 -	Kashmir	War in 2000, 2002-05	Yes, from 1992	2.72	1.90	Secessionist
1989-1990	Bodoland	Minor	No	2.51	1.70	Inter-ethnic
1992-1997, 2000	Nagaland	Minor	Yes	11.25	1.99	Inter-ethnic
1993-1997	Kukiland (Manipur)	Minor	No	2.42	2.35	Inter-ethnic
1993 ------, 1999-2000	Manipur	Minor	No	2.42	2.35	Inter-ethnic
1994, 1996-1999, 2001-2004	Bodoland	Minor	No	2.51❦	1.70	Inter-ethnic
2000-2008	Islamic State (Manipur)	Minor	No	2.34❦	2.88	Inter-ethnic
2003-2009	Manipur	Minor	Yes, 2009	2.34❦	2.88	Inter-ethnic
2009-2010	Bodoland	Minor	No	2.37❦	1.93	Inter-ethnic
2010-2012, 2014 -	Garoland (Meghalaya)	Minor	No	2.77❦	1.90	Inter-ethnic
2013-	Bodoland	Minor	No	2.37❦	1.93	Inter-ethnic

Notes:
Data on conflict taken from the ACD Database.

End date is given when a conflict year is followed by at least one year of conflict inactivity; it lists the date that violence stopped, *although this may differ from peace agreements*. The intensity variable is coded into two. "Minor" is defined as between 25-999 battle related deaths in one year. "War" is defined as at least 1,000 battle related deaths in one year. "Cumulative intensity" is defined as a conflict that has reached 1,000 battle related deaths since it started.

Data for ENLG and ENRG taken from the census for the state in which the territory resided at the point the conflict started e.g. from Assam for Nagaland in 1951, unless * Data taken from 1981 census, ❦ Data taken from 51st Report of Linguistic Minorities

Looking at the case of Nagaland (where conflict diminished but then continued), the ENLG was 11.25 in the new state – reinforcing the lack of *de facto* control over regional autonomy by one group. In contrast, the state of Mizoram, created as a Union Territory in 1972 with an ENLG of 1.77, has been much more stable.[liii] Tripura ostensibly looks like an exception to this rule. However, its inter-ethnic conflict is a "sons of the soil" one: its conflict primarily

caused by an influx of migrants from Bangladesh. Most of the migrants spoke Bengali, the majority language, and therefore the ENLG score cannot capture the dynamic of the Scheduled Tribes' (STs) privileges being threatened.

Turning to other conflict zones, Paul Brass argued that the reorganization of the Punjab was so "imperfect" that it "has never been completed."[liv] The state was only reorganized after the demand was re-couched in linguistic rather than religious terms (and it is significant that it was conceded only *after* the death of its implacable opponent, Jawaharlal Nehru). Thus, in the 1971 census Sikhs comprised only 60.2 percent of the reorganized Punjab's population. The influx of predominantly Hindu Hindi speaking migrants in the 1970s as a result of the Green Revolution created a *perception* of a threat to this demographic balance.[lv] Although the religious balance had not significantly changed between the 1971 and 1981 censuses and Punjabi speakers had *increased* from 79 percent to 85 percent of the state's population, the influx of "agricultural laborers, who were, of course, generally both non-Punjabi and non-Sikh" as well as "well-trained" Punjabis having to emigrate to get jobs, posited a "threat to the continuity of the Sikh cultural community … in Punjab."[lvi] This demographic threat was compounded by the centralization of the Indira Gandhi government, as will be discussed in more detail below.

Those units that retain high levels of diversity fail to achieve many of the benefits of ethnofederalism such as increasing the security of the group vis-à-vis the center and promoting the national self-determination of a group within a unified multinational state. This is a recommendation for the creation of as homogeneous units as possible. This is borne out in Northeast India. As James Manor observed, "its heterogeneities tend to go so far that they also undermine the politics of bargaining and with it the prospect for political stability. Accommodations tend not to hold in lands crisscrossed by so many multifarious tensions."[lvii] The continuing existence of sub-state diversity, despite "ethno-federal" reorganizations draws attention to the importance of investigating sub-state solutions for the territorial recognition of diversity where groups are not large enough to create states around, as has been adopted with partial success in Tripura, where the creation of an Autonomous District Council under the Sixth Schedule has gone some way to ameliorating the demand for a separate state for the indigenous tribes of Tripura. The concession of the Bodoland Territorial Council has been less successful in Assam, because of the continuing high levels of diversity within its borders – including a *majority of non-Bodos*.[lviii]

H2. ***Violent conflict in India has occurred with groups that have been excluded from power sharing at the center***

To assess this hypothesis we utilize three variables. The first of these is the "group-level data on ethnic groups' access to executive power" described by Cederman et al.[lix] This covers all "politically relevant ethnic groups" and/or those "directly discriminated against by the government." This variable in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset is split into three: 1. A group rules alone; 2. Shares power; or 3. Is excluded from executive power. The second variable is also taken from Cederman et al; the existence of "territorial power sharing by ethnic groups." The third variable is the existence of armed conflict, collected from the ACD, as described when assessing H1.[lx]

In 2015 Cederman et al. found that "the conflict-reducing impact of full inclusion through central power-sharing is especially strong, but regional autonomy also has a pacifying effect vis-à-vis exclusion."[lxi] Their finding questions the arguments of authors such as Roeder who caution against the adoption of ethnofederal institutions. But does this conclusion also apply to India? In the South Asian portion of the dataset we find confirmation for Cederman et al.'s H1, that included groups *are* less likely to rebel than those that are excluded (Model 1, Table 5, -2.032***). We are however, unable to confirm their H2, that territorial autonomy *in the absence of central power sharing* will lead to less conflict than those groups that are completely excluded (Model 1, Table 5, 0.311). There is no statistically significant difference in the onset of conflict between groups that had territorial autonomy and those that did not. Territorial autonomy is neither correlated with the onset of conflict or its absence in South Asia compared to those groups that possessed neither territorial autonomy nor access to central power. Territorial autonomy thus seems to neither increase nor decrease the potential for conflict in South Asia.

Table Five: Effect of Inclusion and Autonomy on Conflict Onset in South Asia

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
inclusion	-2.032***	-2.507***	
	(0.263)	(0.439)	
inclautonomy			-1.766*
			(1.002)
autonomy	0.311	0.202	0.435
	(0.563)	(1.220)	(1.438)
postwar	-1.144***	-1.449**	-1.238
	(0.243)	(0.718)	(0.902)
inclusionxpostwar		1.950***	
		(0.717)	
inclautxpostwar			1.384
			(1.115)
autonomyxpostwar		0.366	0.138
		(1.265)	(1.453)
groupsize	-4.739	-3.743	-10.01**
	(4.983)	(4.589)	(3.954)
groupsize2	11.85	11.19	26.02***
	(7.737)	(7.995)	(6.954)
excl_groups_count	-0.0653	-0.0617	-0.0601
	(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.122)
federal	0.559	0.439	0.170
	(0.375)	(0.381)	(0.460)
log_gdp_lagged	0.384**	0.314***	0.351***
	(0.154)	(0.107)	(0.0871)
log_population_lagged	0.600**	0.687**	0.564*
	(0.245)	(0.271)	(0.337)
ongoing_conflict	0.284	0.265	0.374
	(0.563)	(0.514)	(0.497)
peaceyears	-0.0335**	-0.0261	-0.0220
	(0.0146)	(0.0195)	(0.0174)
Constant	-17.33***	-18.55***	-16.30**
	(3.875)	(4.542)	(5.931)
Wald test			
B(incl)=B(aut)	28.49***	9.37***	
B(incl)+B(inclxpw=)0		1.240	
B(aut)+B(autxpw)=0		2.290	
B(incl)+B(inclxpw)=B(aut)+B(autxpw)		43.77***	
B(incl&aut)+B(incl&autxpw)=0			1.080
B(incl&aut)+B(incl&autxpw)=B(aut)+B(autxpw)			320.8***
Observations	2,087	2,087	1,674

Notes:
Dependent variable: onset of conflict [binomial 0/1].
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Notes: Models estimated using logistic regression. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
Variables "inclusion with autonomy", "downgraded from autonomy", and the interaction variable "inclusion without autonomy x postwar" from Cederman et al.'s analysis omitted due to collinearity.

However, Model 3 in Table Five demonstrates that autonomy *when combined with central power sharing* significantly reduces the chances of an onset of conflict (-1.766*). This confirms the qualitative assessments made of the Indian case; where the Congress' national reach ensured that the overwhelming majority of linguistic groups (after the reorganization of states) were represented within the party and hence the government. After the decline of the Congress, the rise of regionally based parties (whether or not they were defined by a regional agenda) and the need for coalitions including these parties to form governments at the center (at least until 2014) has maintained the regional diversity of Indian cabinets, especially with regard to maintaining the North-South balance.[lxii] In addition to the representation in governing institutions at the center, an important element of the Indian success has been the three language formula, providing India's multiple linguistic minorities with the institutional recognition of their language, including the right to sit government exams in that language.[lxiii]

Central power sharing is therefore important, although all groups do not seek it as control of the unit confers more opportunities to distribute patronage.[lxiv] When a group had autonomy but did *not* have central power sharing, then the chance of future conflict could not be accurately predicted – meaning that it was neither more nor less likely (Model 3, Table 5, 0.435). These data indicate that territorial autonomy without central power sharing is ineffective at preventing conflict, although it does not provoke *more* conflict. Why might regional autonomy in the absence of power sharing be more dangerous in the South Asian environment than in the wider dataset? There are a number of possible explanations, which we address below.

Firstly, although groups may have been given territorial autonomy,[lxv] "secession and violence in the territory of many failed federations followed directly from attempts by certain groups to centralize these federations."[lxvi] Cederman et al. therefore posit a relationship between the downgrading of autonomy and the onset of conflict. Downgrading from autonomy is described by Cederman et al. as a situation when groups experience centralization, defined as a decline in regional autonomy within the previous two years.[lxvii] We widen their definition to define the "downgrading" more widely – including groups experiencing centralization within the last five or ten years as shown in Models 5 and 6 in Table Six.

Table Six: Effect of downgrading of autonomy and conflict onset in South Asia.

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
VARIABLES	Downgraded 2yrs	Downgraded 5yrs	Downgraded 10yrs
inclautonomy	-1.726	-1.443	-1.518
	(1.130)	(0.931)	(0.984)
autonomy	0.386	0.612	0.547
	(1.486)	(1.389)	(1.417)
postwar	-1.337	-1.278*	-1.425*
	(0.862)	(0.725)	(0.806)
inclautxpostwar	1.426	1.376	1.510
	(1.156)	(0.895)	(0.997)
autonomyxpostwar	0.208	0.207	0.332
	(1.450)	(1.277)	(1.341)
downgradedfromautonomy	-	1.919***	1.373***
		(0.434)	(0.323)
other_downgraded	2.333**	2.357**	2.367**
	(1.076)	(0.981)	(1.003)
groupsize	-14.07**	-14.09**	-14.19**
	(6.826)	(6.791)	(6.811)
groupsize2	34.73***	34.16***	34.44***
	(13.05)	(12.78)	(12.87)
excl_groups_count	0.0114	-0.160	-0.114
	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.124)
federal	-0.325	0.0215	-0.0652
	(0.510)	(0.488)	(0.494)
ln_gdp_lagged	0.327**	0.301***	0.319***
	(0.133)	(0.0874)	(0.0915)
log_population_lagged	0.694	0.678*	0.679*
	(0.464)	(0.347)	(0.373)
ongoing_conflict	0.352	0.299	0.298
	(0.520)	(0.502)	(0.510)
peaceyears	-0.0201	-0.0211	-0.0211
	(0.0184)	(0.0131)	(0.0139)
			(0.323)
Constant	-18.69**	-17.74***	-17.98***
	(7.941)	(6.109)	(6.588)
Observations	1,663	1,674	1,674

a) Robust standard errors in parentheses
b) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Cederman et al. found confirmation that there was a relationship between the *removal* of autonomy and the onset of conflict.[lxviii] Using the South Asia dataset shown in Table Six, in which we adapt Cederman et al.'s model, we find a statistically significant relationship between the loss of autonomy over the past five or ten years and an increase in the onset of conflict.[lxix] This relationship is significant at the one percent significance level.

Qualitative assessments of the conflicts in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and most of the Northeastern states demonstrate why this is the case.[lxx] Many (although not all) of these so-called "peripheral" states of India have experienced a disproportionate amount of President's Rule being applied to them. As Adeney has analyzed, using data on the number of days a State/UT has spent under President's Rule (when the central government has suspended the State legislature), out of the top five States, three are in the "peripheral" regions, with Punjab topping the list.[lxxi] Many (although not all) of the Northeastern states have similarly been the subject of extended periods of President's Rule.[lxxii] President's Rule (Article 356) can be applied when "a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution." Although it is not unusual for federations to contain emergency provisions, India has been exceptional for the politicized use of the provision.[lxxiii]

Although demands for further autonomy were made after the reorganization of the Punjab, the majority of these demands concerned "tradable" issues such as the redrawing of the state's borders, the location of the state capital and access over river waters. Secessionist violence only emerged when Indira Gandhi, after being re-elected at the center in 1980, imposed President's Rule on the state, and called new elections. Pursuing short-term political considerations, she patronized a Sikh preacher, Bhindranwale, to undermine her political opponents, the moderate Sikh political party. The increase in violence and calls for the creation of Khalistan promoted the attack on the Golden Temple by the army in 1984, precipitating a well-analyzed road of events culminating in the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the revenge killings of 3000 Sikhs. As James Manor argues, "[t]he ghastly crisis that gripped … Punjab …. could plainly have been avoided. It would never have occurred if leaders in New Delhi had not insisted on meddling".[lxxiv] Levels of violence only reduced in the 1990s after long periods of President's Rule, failed negotiations, and extensive army and police operations in the state. Subsequently, as analyzed by Gurharpal Singh, the Akali Dal have become partners within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) of the Hindu Nationalist BJP in the central government, increasing their stake in the system.[lxxv]

Although the situation of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be equated with the other States of the Indian Union, as Paul Brass analyzed, the case of Kashmir demonstrates a remarkably similar trajectory.[lxxvi] Integrated into India on contested terms, its special status under Article 370 of the Indian constitution has gradually been whittled away to an extent that it is virtually

meaningless. Disquiet with the Indian Union only boiled over into armed conflict in 1988, after the rigging of the 1987 state election.[lxxvii] As Sumantra Bose analyzed, the commitment of Nehru to democracy in Kashmir was superseded by the need to maintain a stable state. "Kashmir's democratic aspirations were thus callously sacrificed at the alter of the 'nation' to which Kashmiris were expected to be loyal."[lxxviii] What is significant is that Kashmir, subject to electoral manipulation during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, took until the late 1980s to develop into an insurgency.[lxxix] The rigging of the 1987 election confirmed for many the impossibility of effecting change within the "system" and (partially supported from Pakistan) a serious conflict erupted, resulting in the deaths of between 40-75K people since 1992.[lxxx]

Although not a technical element of a downgrading of autonomy as measured by Cederman et al., the willingness of the center to intervene using high levels of force in the "peripheral' States must also be considered. The periphery of India has been treated differently from the mainstream in this regard, with the willingness of New Delhi to securitize responses in these areas through the use of mechanisms such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).[lxxxi] Although this has been covered in depth elsewhere, a contemporary example illustrates the point. The reaction of New Delhi to the Patidar/Patel protests in the summer of 2015 saw increasingly violent protests in the state of Gujarat.[lxxxii] Around 10 people lost their lives, many at the hands of police bullets. Although the army was deployed in Gujarat, the situation is incomparable to the state's response in Kashmir a year later, when people took to the streets to protest against the killing of a popular secessionist leader, Burhan Wani. The Indian state responded with the use of pellet guns, which, within six months were estimated to have killed nearly 100 people and injured a further 6000 – almost 1000 of these suffering injuries to their eyes.[lxxxiii] Many were innocent bystanders; several of the victims have been under ten.

The areas of India that have experienced violent conflict are all border regions, and overwhelmingly (although not exclusively) those with a non-Hindu majority. One obvious counter argument to the point that the conflicts are the result of institutional design and patterns of governance within India, is the involvement of outside forces in the promotion of conflict. It is widely accepted that Pakistan has played a role in the Kashmir conflict, and has had a hand in fomenting other movements against India.[lxxxiv] Cross border support has also been forthcoming from tribes across the India-Myanmar border and allegations have been made about Chinese support for some of the groups in the Northeast fighting the Indian state.

This support from outside actors obviously has a role in explaining some of the logistical support and the resources provided to the groups. But the fact that there were many missed opportunities to accommodate the demands of the groups in the Punjab and Kashmir demonstrates that, rather than having been caused by ethnofederal concessions, violent conflict is "related to the fact that these states have been treated differently from the rest of the Union"[lxxxv] and their effective autonomy has been *reduced* rather than increased.

Conclusion and lessons for other federations

"It is simply wrong to claim, as Snyder and others do, that [ethno]federations are unworkable."[lxxxvi] Federations differ in design and the argument in this article is that the success or otherwise of a particular federal system in terms of managing diversity depends on its design, regardless of whether it is an ethnofederation. The question as Grigoryan has posed it is "what makes ethnofederal bargains stable or unstable?"[lxxxvii] Through rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis, this article has reached the following conclusions.

This article has demonstrated that ethnofederalism has not caused conflict in India. Where ethnofederalism has been conceded, the overall story is one of accommodation rather than an increase in secessionist pressures. This is because it has promoted security and a belief that the interests of the group are valued and protected by the wider state. Nowhere is this more evident in the fact that political parties promoting ethno-linguistic interests have mobilized not only in defense of their state but are also seeking central power, to capture it for their interests. The states of India that have continued to experience violent conflict after reorganization have been those in which sizeable pockets of diversity remain e.g. Nagaland and Assam, and it must be questioned whether they can even be termed to be "ethnofederal."

However, although many of these areas that have experienced conflict cannot be said to be ethnofederal units, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that autonomy *combined with access to central powe*r has significantly reduced the chances of an onset of conflict in those areas that are ethnofederal and were organized on linguistic lines. This point is worth reiterating because India has had an informal tradition of maintaining a north-south balance in governing institutions. This was during the Congress era but maintained during the era of coalition politics. The rise of the BJP may replicate the era of Congress dominance (it is too soon to say whether 2014 was an aberration) but the current basis of its support and the

northern domination of Modi's cabinet, demonstrate the dangers.[lxxxviii] Taken with the promotion of Hindi, not unique to Modi's government, but given a renewed lease of life since his election, the stage may be set for north-south tensions. As noted, the three-language formula was an important component of ethnofederal success in India, and a threat to its existence will be seen as an attempt to centralize.

Another danger that policy makers need to be alert to in ethnofederal systems is that of inter-ethnic conflict within ethnofederal units. Conflict between groups is not confined to federal states; some of the most violent conflict in the last 30 years has been between groups in unitary states e.g. Rwanda. There is therefore no necessary connection between persecution and the creation of ethnofederal units. It is however plausible to argue that ethnonational federal units with control over cultural and linguistic policy are more likely to repress minorities who do not share the ethnonational characteristic. Even though there may well be mechanisms by which the central government can secure minority rights in a federal system, it is easier for the center to intervene to protect minorities in a unitary system where the responsibility for law and order resides at the center. Even though federal systems provide for emergency intervention in the case of breakdown of law and order, such intervention depends on a) defining the situation as serious enough to warrant an intervention and b) the center being *willing* to intervene (as it notoriously was not during the Gujarat pogrom of 2002).[lxxxix] In addition, although constitutional provisions exist to protect both linguistic and religious minorities in India e.g. Article 350A-requiring states to "provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother-tongue at the primary state of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups", evidence exists in India that this has been ineffective. The most recent report from the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities in India notes that "gross negligence has been shown in implementation of the Scheme of Safeguards for the Linguistic Minorities. Often the linguistic minorities are (sic) felt marginalized in their own land."[xc] Although the center may have the *de jure* power to intervene, in practice it may fail to do so.

It is this argument with which policymakers should be most concerned. It is not hard to see why. Increasing the rights of an "in" group does not necessarily have to lead to the persecution of an "out" group (or groups). However, the tendency to prioritize the rights of "sons of the soil" may well increase conflict between groups as the identification of state/provincial institutions with a particular group's identity leads to the codification of that

identity. One of the states with high levels of conflict, Assam, failed to even respond to the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities.[xci] Therefore, the design of internal borders requires careful management. As Deiwiks' demonstrates, when "homogeneous" units remain relatively heterogeneous, the dangers of conflict are high. This is both in terms of failing to increase the control of the unit by the dominant group within that territory (who, as we see with the Bodos in the area of the Bodoland Territorial Council may not even be in a majority) and also in the potential targeting of minority communities within that territory.[xcii] Although this is not an argument against ethnofederalism – indeed it is an argument for higher levels of homogeneity – we must be alert to the fact that high levels of homogeneity may be difficult to achieve, either because of population intermixing or subsequent migration into the area. For this reason, ethnofederal solutions may be problematic and sub-state autonomy solutions may well be more appropriate.

In terms of South Asia federal reform, the demands for "ethnic" provinces, such as in the Seraiki and Hazara parts of Pakistan, in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka and in the Madhesi regions of Nepal, should not be feared, they likely to *increase* rather than decrease affinity with the central state. However, this comes with a caveat: such autonomy should be part of a wider accommodation of groups within central power structures. It will not be sufficient to focus on majoritarian democratization of these states. The representative nature of this democratization will be vitally important for continuing the federalization process in Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. In addition, policy makers should concentrate on making the units as homogeneous as possible, and resist the temptation to "dilute" the groups through intermixing. Such a policy is likely to increase conflict, both internally within that unit, as well as with the center.

[i] I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Fanni Toth with the statistical calculations in this article. I received insightful comments and suggestions for revisions on an earlier version of this article by the editors of this special issue, as well as the two anonymous referees. This article is an outcome of the Leverhulme Trust's "Continuity and Change in Indian Federalism" project and earlier versions of this article were presented at the December 2015 Bristol Workshop of that project, as well as at the PSA Annual Conference in April 2016, and the Centre for Multilevel Federalism in Delhi, October 2016. The article has been much improved by the help acknowledged above, but all errors remain my responsibility.

[ii] Eric Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Harvard: Harvard University, 1972).

[iii] Philip Roeder, "Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms," *Regional and Federal Studies* Vol. 19, No. 2 (2009), pp 203-19; Valerie Bunce and Stephen Watts, "Managing Diversity and Sustaining Democracy: Ethnofederal versus Unitary States in the postsocialist world," *National Council for Eurasian and East European Research* (2005); Valerie Bunce "Federalism, Nationalism, and Secession: The Communist and Postcommunist Experience," in Ugo Amoretti and Valerie Bunce eds., *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp. 417-40; Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co, 2000).

[iv] Katharine Adeney *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Bethany Lacina, "The Problem of Political Stability in Northeast India: Local Ethnic Autocracy and the Rule of Law," *Asian Survey* Vol. 49, No. 6 (2009), pp. 998-1020; Louise Tillin, "*Remapping India: new states and their political origins*" (London: Hurst, 2013).

[v] Manuel Vogt, et al. "Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Dataset Family," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 59, No. 7 (2015), pp. 1327-42.

[vi] Atul Kohli, "Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-Determination Movements in India," *The Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 56, No. 2 (1997), pp. 325-44; James Manor, "Ethnicity and Politics in India," *International Affairs* Vol. 72, No. 1 (1996), pp. 459-75; Adeney *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation*; Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan and Yogendra Yadav, *Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011).

[vii] Liam Anderson, "Ethnofederalism: The Worst Form of Institutional Arrangement...?" *International Security* Vol. 39, No.1, (2014), pp.165-204.

[viii] Henry Hale, "Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse," *World Politics* Vol. 56, No 2 (2004), pp. 165-93. Others have termed this a plurinational federalism e.g. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Must Pluri-national Federations Fail?" *Ethnopolitics* Vol. 8, No. 1 (2009), pp. 5-25. I adopt the term ethnofederalism as it has been more widely used within the literature.

[ix] This is disputed; some countries such as Spain and South Africa are not formally federations but are classified as such by the Forum of Federations.

[x] The term "ethnofederal" conceals important differences however. Some ethnofederations have just one unit that corresponds to the borders of a group e.g. Quebec in Canada; others have multiple ethnofederal units, e.g. India and Nigeria. Still others divide at least some of the groups between multiple units e.g. Canada, India, Nigeria and Iraq.

[xi] These are all the ones listed on the Forum of Federations website although some (such as Spain and South Africa) are not formally federations. Accessible via www.forumfed.org (last accessed March 16 2016) with the addition of St Kitts and Nevis, the Federated States of

Micronesia and Comoros, all of which are also federal states.
[xii] Svante Cornell, "Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective," *World Politics* Vol. 54, No. 2 (2002), p. 252.
[xiii] Roeder, "Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement."
[xiv] Arman Grigoryan "Ethnofederalism, separatism, and conflict: what have we learned from the Soviet and Yugoslav experiences?" *International Political Science Review* Vol. 55, No. 5 (2012), pp.520-38.
[xv] Cornell, "Autonomy."
[xvi] Dawn Brancati, "Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?" *International Organization* Vol. 60, No. 3 (2006), pp. 651-85.
[xvii] Brancati, "Decentralization," p. 653.
[xviii] McGarry and O'Leary, "Pluri-national federations," p. 6
[xix] Steven Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
[xx] Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, Andreas Schadel and Julian Wucherpfennig, "Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 109, No. 2 (2015), pp. 354-70; Christa Deiwiks, "Ethnofederalism - a slippery slope towards secessionist conflict," ETH Zurich, PhD Thesis (2011); Lacina "Periphery."
[xxi] Hurst Hannum, *Procedural Aspects of International Law: Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights* (2nd Edition) (Philadelphia: University of Pennslyvania Press, 1996).
[xxii] Cederman et al., "Territorial Autonomy."
[xxiii] Adeney, "Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation," p.19.
[xxiv] Stuart Kauffman, "Ethnic Conflict," in Paul Williams, ed., *Security Studies: An Introduction* (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2008), pp. 201-15.
[xxv] Luis Moreno, "Decentralisation in Britain and Spain: The cases of Scotland and Catalonia," University of Edinburgh. PhD Thesis (1986).
[xxvi] SDSA, *State of Democracy in South Asia* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 256.
[xxvii] Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 617.
[xxviii] Subrata Mitra, "Sub-national movements in South Asia: Identity, Collective Action and Political Protest," in Subrata Mitra and Alison Lewis eds., *Subnational Movements in South Asia* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 14-41; Kohli "Can Democracies Accommodate," James Manor, "Making Federalism Work," *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 9, No. 3 (1998), pp. 21-35.
[xxix] Andrew Wyatt, *Party System Change in South India: Political Entrepreneurs, Patterns and Processes* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
[xxx] Adeney, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation," p. 129.
[xxxi] Even in democratic states where the costs of secession are likely to be less (in terms of bloodshed) electorates are conservative in their choice of secession. Stephane Dion, "Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec," *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 26, No, 2 (1996), pp. 269-83, as demonstrated by the 2014 Scottish referendum result. I would like to thank Brendan O'Leary for bringing this article to my attention.
[xxxii] Paul Brass, *Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity Among the Muslims of South Asia* (London Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Curzon Press: Humanities Press, 1979).
[xxxiii] See Adeney, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict," Chapters 2 and 3 for a discussion of this.
[xxxiv] Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress 1885-1935* (Madras: Working

Committee of the Congress, 1935), p. 250. Nehru commented in 1955 that a one-unit federation would be ideal." Joan Bondurant, *Regionalism versus Provincialism: A Study in the Problems of Indian National Unity* (Berkeley: University of California, 1958), p. 56.

[xxxvi] Selig Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).
[xxxvii] Adeney, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation," p.129.
[xxxviii] Tillin, *Remapping India;* Emma Mawdsley, "Redrawing the body politic: Federalism, Regionalism and the Creation of New States in India," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002), pp. 34-54.
[xxxix] Harihar Bhattacharyya, K K Suan Hausing and Jhumpa Mukherjee, "Indian Federalism at the Crossroads: Limits of the Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict," *India Review* Vol. X, No. X (2017), pp. xx-xx [to add page numbers when pagination is known].
[xl] The states of Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh. Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachel Pradesh, Jharkhand (because of the long standing tribal agitation for a separate state), Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Odisha, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. We exclude the states of Manipur and Tripura, which were Princely States and did not have their borders changed.
[xli] See Brendan O'Leary, "An iron law of nationalism and federation: a (neo-Diceyian) theory of the necessity of a federal Staatsvolk, and of consociational rescue," *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 7, No. 3 (2001), p. 285.
[xlii] Cederman et al., "Territorial autonomy," p. 89.
[xliii] Vogt et al., "Integrating Data."
[xliv] Cederman et al., "Territorial autonomy."
[xlv] Although the dataset features 1,292 observations on India, because the dependent variable is the onset of conflict, there are too few cases (18) where there is an onset of conflict to analyse the relationship between the variables. Hence the decision to include all the cases in South Asia. It must be noted however, that there are limitations in doing this, partially because one of the variables we analyse, inclusion in central power making, is problematic to assess across states with varying types of, and degrees of, democracy.
[xlvi] Cederman et al., "Territorial autonomy," p. 354.
[xlvii] Adeney, *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation*, p.180.
[xlviii] Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 39, No. 5 (2004), pp.615-37
[xlix] Therefore we exclude conflicts such as the 1962 war between India and China. We also exclude those conflicts that are coded as relating to conflict over "incompatibility expressed in terms of government."
[l] Deiwiks, "Ethnofedederalism – a slippery slope," p. 4.
[li] O'Leary, "An iron law," p. 288.
[lii] O'Leary, "An iron law," p. 285.
[liii] Although conflict continued until 1986 when New Delhi agreed to upgrade Mizoram to become the 23rd state of India, thus creating de jure regional autonomy.
[liv] Paul Brass, *The Politics of India Since Independence* (New Delhi and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 194.
[lv] Murray Leaf, "The Punjab Crisis," *Asian Survey* Vol. 25, No. 5 (1985), pp. 475-498.
[lvi] Leaf, "The Punjab crisis," p. 489.
[lvii] Manor, "Making Federalism Work," p. 33.
[lviii] Bhattacharyya et al., "Indian Federalism at the Crossroads," p.x.
[lix] Cederman et al., "Territorial Autonomy," p. 360.

[lx] Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict."
[lxi] Cederman et al., "Territorial Autonomy," p. 362.
[lxii] Niraja Jayal, *Representing India: Ethnic Diversity and the Governance of Public Institutions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), p.149.
[lxiii] Robert Hardgrave, "India: The dilemmas of diversity," *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 4, No. 4 (1993), pp.54-68.
[lxiv] Wyatt, *Party System Change in South India.*
[lxv] McGarry and O'Leary "Pluri-national federations."
[lxvi] McGarry and O'Leary "Pluri-national federations.", p. 11
[lxvii] Cederman et al, "Territorial Autonomy," p. 364.
[lxviii] The "other downgraded" variable only takes into account loss of political power *if* there is no loss of autonomy.
[lxix] Although we do not find support for this hypothesis for groups that experienced a loss of autonomy within the previous *two years* (the timeframe used by Cederman et al.), when we expand this to a five and a 10 year period, we find significant positive support for an increase in the onset of conflict.
[lxx] Sumantra Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997); Gurharpal Singh, *Ethnic Conflict in India* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 2000).
[lxxi] Adeney, *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, p.116.
[lxxii] Using data from up to 2005, Tripura, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh are at the lower end of the table in terms of both the number of times President's Rule had been imposed, and the duration of its application.
[lxxiii] The Bommai judgment of 1994 has mitigated the use of Article 356 for political reasons, although its imposition in Arunachal Pradesh in December 2015 was widely perceived to be a politicized intervention (and was struck down by the Supreme Court).
[lxxiv] Manor, "Making Federalism Work," pp. 26-7.
[lxxv] Singh, *Ethnic Conflict*.
[lxxvi] Brass, *Politics of India.*
[lxxvii] Bose, *Challenge in Kashmir* p. 46.
[lxxviii] Bose, *Challenge in Kashmir*, p. 40.
[lxxix] Sumit Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilisation and Institutional Decay," *International Security* Vol. 21, No. 2 (1996), pp. 76-107; Manor. "Ethnicity and Politics."
[lxxx] Data compiled from various datasheets available at the South Asian Terrorism Portal Available at http://www.satp.org/. This website reports death estimates at the lower end of the spectrum and a more realistic estimate (for the duration of the conflict since the late 1980s) is 75K.
[lxxxi] Singh, *Ethnic Conflict in India*; Steven Wilkinson, "Which group identities lead to most violence? Evidence from India," in Stathis Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro and Tarel Masoud eds., *Order, Conflict and Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) pp. 271-300. Also see Adeney, *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation, pp.113-122.*
[lxxxii] Al Jazeera, "Indian army deployed to riot-hit areas of Gujarat, " *Al Jazeera,* August 27, 2015. Accessible via www.aljazeera.com.
[lxxxiii] Mirza Waheed, "India's crackdown in Kashmir: is this the world's first mass blinding?" *The Guardian*, November 8, 2016. www.theguardian.com
[lxxxiv] Christine Fair, *Fighting until the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
[lxxxv] Adeney, *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, p. 120.

[lxxxvi] McGarry and O'Leary, "Pluri-national federations," p. 13.
[lxxxvii] Grigoryan, "Ethnofederalism," p. 14.
[lxxxviii] Katharine Adeney, "A Move to Majoritarian Nationalism? Challenges of representation in South Asia," *Representation* Vol. 50, No. 1 (2015), pp.7-21.
[lxxxix] Such as the unwillingness of the BJP's coalition partners to push for President's Rule to be applied in Gujarat in 2002 – for fear of increasing the precedent of its use.
[xc] Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities, *51st Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities in India*," Government of India. Available at http://nclm.nic.in p. 201
[xci] Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities, *51st Report*, p. 75.
[xcii] Deiwiks, "Ethnofederalism –a slippery slope", p. 5.