

## **Gendered archetypes of wartime occupation: 'New women' in occupied north China, 1937-1940.**

### **Introduction**

The release of Ang Lee's film *Lust, Caution* in 2007 passed without fanfare in North America, Europe and Australasia. In China, however, the release of a feature film detailing the love affair between a 'modern girl' of 1940s Shanghai and a high-ranking official in a pro-Japanese puppet government—and based on a novella by an author (Eileen Chang) who had herself often been accused of acting as a 'cultural traitor' during the Japanese occupation of China—ignited significant controversy. Many of the subsequent and often heated debates focused not purely on the nuanced depictions of Chinese 'traitors' in the film, but on the convergence of questions of national loyalty and explicit sexual content, the latter leading to sections of the film being heavily edited prior to exhibition in Chinese cinemas.<sup>1</sup>

At the heart of such controversies lay a number of potential challenges in the film to both state-sponsored narratives and popular memories of the Japanese occupation of China. Chief amongst these was the moral choices made in the film by the central character of Wang Jiazhi, a female Chinese Resistance spy who enters into an intense, sexual relationship with a 'collaborator,' eventually betraying the Resistance to save the object of her affection. As Stephanie Hemelryk Donald has suggested, this character represented not so much a real individual (despite being inspired by one) as a 'persona' that represented 'a failure of Chinese patriotism.' So sensitive was this aspect of the film that Tang Wei, the actress who played this role—in contrast to her male co-star—was temporarily banned from filmmaking in China after the film's release.<sup>2</sup>

The role of women in resisting or collaborating with the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese war (1937-45) has emerged as a lively realm of enquiry in recent years—well before the release of *Lust, Caution* brought such questions into the mainstream of popular culture. Within this field, the 'scape-goating' of individual female 'collaborators' has inspired a number of worthwhile scholarly forays.<sup>3</sup> Written in a

biographical mode, and focusing on well-documented cases of individual women—including figures such as Zheng Pingru, who inspired the Wang Jiazhi character of *Lust, Caution*—such scholarship has highlighted the complex interplay between gender and 'collaboration' in wartime China. Historians working in this mode, such as Luo Juirong<sup>4</sup> and Yun Xia,<sup>5</sup> have helped to overturn an earlier tendency to view collaboration (as Timothy Brook has phrased it) as a 'male temptation.'<sup>6</sup> They have also highlighted the extent to which the very language in which the 'salacious histories' of collaboration have been written up until recently has been entirely gendered. Government and public reactions to the release of *Lust, Caution* point to the continuing hegemony of such discourses in China today.

However, while our understanding of the *behavior* of individual women under occupation and the gendered historiography of 'collaboration' in China has improved as a result of such scholarship, there is still a good deal we do not know about the *use* of women by collaborationist authorities themselves. To what extent did the various 'puppet regimes' which existed in China in the period between 1937 and 1945 deliberately seek to either appeal to women, or use women as a vehicle for appealing to potential male supporters? How were Chinese women re-imagined under occupation, and how did 'collaborationist' regimes themselves exploit gender as a means of selling their political agendas? And what are the wider ramifications of Chinese cases for the emerging field of 'collaborationist studies' more generally?

These are the questions I will address in this paper. I will do this by analyzing the representation of Chinese women in the visual culture of the first large-scale 'puppet regime' to be established south of the Great Wall following the Japanese invasion of China in 1937: the Provisional Government of the Republic of China (*Zhonghua minguo linshi zhengfu*) (PGROC). Heeding the calls that James A. Cook and others have made for historians of China to '...engage in critical analysis of *image-making* as a force in shaping historical dynamics,'<sup>7</sup> this paper interrogates the visual record that this regime left to posterity. Specifically, it will involve the analysis of PGROC poster art, pamphlets, and

other forms of visual media which are readily available outside the People's Republic of China, but which have hitherto been overlooked by many scholars. It is hoped that this 'visual history' approach—in which the pictorial texts produced by this regime are given precedence over the written sources which have hitherto dominated the above-mentioned biographical studies of individual female 'collaborators' and the archive-driven 'collaborator trial' scholarship—will provide entirely new perspectives on the nature of early wartime collaborationism in China.

While it is acknowledged that the collections sourced for this study do not represent the totality of visual culture produced under the PGROC,<sup>8</sup> the consistencies in these images (drawn from institutionally disparate collections) *can* shed light on how this regime imagined and depicted Chinese women, and in some cases sought to appeal to them. In the handful of studies of this regime's propaganda which *have* been published on the basis of such material in the past, race tends to have been premised over gender.<sup>9</sup> As I will show, however, gender was as crucial a thread in the official PGROC narrative as was race, and the regime's visual culture was awash with often conflicting though remarkably regular messages about the role of women in an occupied China in particular.

The visual depictions of women under the PGROC deserves our attention for a number of reasons. Firstly, despite the acknowledged idiosyncrasies of this regime, and indeed the uniqueness of *all* 'puppet regimes' which were created in the twentieth century, it is my contention that PGROC deployment of gendered archetypes helps shed light on the place of gender in 'collaborationist nationalism' more generally. The archetypes I explore below represented a particular time and place, but the parallels that emerge with archetypes emerging under 'puppet regimes' in other often quite distant contexts suggest continuities and convergences that need to be explored further. In other words, while this article looks specifically at the role of one (of many) wartime collaborationist regimes in China, it is my hope that it will represent the first step towards a more comparative study which will be of interest not merely to historians of China, but which might help remedy the scarcity of comparative studies of European and Asian experiences of

collaboration.<sup>10</sup> The PGROC may well have been different from the regimes which preceded and subsumed it in Japanese-occupied China, but it was also entailed remarkably similar imaginings of women to those we find in other occupation contexts. In light of recent and ongoing cases of occupation around the world today, these are issues that remain highly pertinent.

### **Female archetypes of collaboration**

As a field of scholarly enquiry, the representation of women by collaborationist China remains in its infancy, with only the important work of Nicole Huang having addressed the fundamental redefinition of the urban Chinese woman that occurred under Japanese occupation, and the replacement of the much-documented 'modern girl' (*modeng nülang*) of 1930s Shanghai print culture with 'pan-Asian' beauties and quasi-historical '*shini*' (lit., 'graceful ladies') in the occupation print media.<sup>11</sup> The sheer lack of analysis beyond that conducted by Huang, however, puts the historiography of wartime China at odds with that of occupied Europe, and especially wartime France.<sup>12</sup> As historians of Vichy have stressed, for instance, the entire debate around the nature of the German occupation has often been framed in a gendered fashion, presenting French wartime collaboration either as an act of 'feminine sexual betrayal' or as a 'feminized moment of weakness in which the French nation "got into bed with the Germans"'.<sup>13</sup> For others, the 'crisis of masculinity' that accompanied the military defeat of 1940 continued to pervade Vichy political culture, with what Luc Capdevila has termed a 'metadiscourse' of 'virility' and 'maleness' permeating all levels of public discussion in Vichy France (and much of the postwar historiography of this regime).<sup>14</sup>

In the case of wartime France, this tendency to articulate collaboration in a gendered manner was, in part, the result of the message that Vichy itself projected. Miranda Pollard, for instance, has demonstrated how the 'radically patriarchal restoration' witnessed in wartime France was central to Vichy ideology, with French collaborators justifying a shift in social attitudes towards women within a framework of what she refers to as 'anti-eroticism' and 'natalist-familialism,' because they believed that the capitulation

of 1940 had resulted from a combination of low population growth and sexual promiscuity in the pre-war years. Occupied France needed young mothers to produce the next generation of Frenchmen, but also women who would be willing to do so within a completely desexualized public sphere.<sup>15</sup>

Francine Muel-Dreyfus goes even further in suggesting that the very transformation of the image of French women under Vichy, achieved through the mobilization of older, pre-war symbols of motherhood, was one of the central pillars of the Vichy project. The invention of what she calls the 'Vichy mother'—a self-sacrificing and unadorned figure who was celebrated through state-sponsored rituals—was equal in importance to the creation of a personality cult around the patriarchal figure of Marshall Pétain himself.<sup>16</sup> All of this was reflected in the depiction of women in Vichy propaganda, much of which bears a striking resonance with the celebration of gendered archetypes in occupied China (to be explored below). Idealized Vichy women were often presented in the absence of French male spouses, for instance, but in the embrace of male children, their sexuality maternalized, and their maternity valorized. They were not necessarily docile, however, as publicity campaigns, institutionalized through the celebration of Mother's Day, both depicted and encouraged Vichy women to be politically aware and active. In other words, the Vichy mother embraced wartime modernity *as well as* conservative prewar social values.

The historiography of Vichy has provided us with the most prolific scholarship on the creation of gendered collaborationist archetypes (hence my use of this literature as a point of departure for this study). WWII France is certainly not the only context in which we find such figures emerging, however. Michael Kim reminds us that the 'the reinvention of the New Woman' was central to the aesthetics of collaboration in late colonial Korea in the early 1940s, for example, this figure being deployed to inspire a dedication to modesty, austerity, and self-driven responsibility in Japanese-controlled Korea, doing so in traditional Korean attire while embracing the 'newness' that total war in East Asia presaged.<sup>17</sup> In wartime Slovenia, too, groups which collaborated with the

Axis powers developed a '...conflicted image of the ideal Slovene woman, one that fluctuated between a passive, domesticated woman and an anti-Communist activist.'<sup>18</sup>

What the prevalence of such figures hints at is something common to the experience of wartime occupation which leads to the creation of certain types of female archetypes, in spite of the cultural, political and even temporal gaps between vastly different collaborationist regimes. One recurring feature, for instance, is the tendency on the part of early post-occupation regimes to turn to female archetypes as symbols of maternal stability at a time of upheaval. Indeed, while many collaborationist regimes seem to struggle with existentialist questions about the failure of male national elites to defend against foreign invasion, such regimes appear to find solace in the notion of women as the mothers of a new, stronger and more morally upright generation of an occupied people. The '...placing [of] women's reproductive nature and duty into the broader terms of warfare' is, of course, something also commonly practiced by resistance movements under occupation.<sup>19</sup> However, collaborationist cults of motherhood are ones from which fathers are often expunged, or in which mothers are presented as the harbingers of sexual and eventually social union between occupying forces and occupied populations.

Secondly, the very context of foreign occupation, in which local male populations are either imprisoned, killed, conscripted or simply not trusted with any responsibility by an occupying force, leads to a situation in which, rhetorically—if not practically—space develops for new ideas about women's potential contributions to society. This goes beyond the production of 'Rosie the Riveter'-type tropes (common to many societies at war), for it involves the development of new symbols of womanhood not simply in the *absence* of fighting-age men, but *alongside* the denigration and humiliation of such men. One sees this in the development of the new 'types' of women that Nicole Huang has identified in Shanghai print culture, but examples are equally evident in experiments with female roles in Vichy cinema of the sort explored by Carrie Tarr.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, for any collaborationist regime, the enemy is not, by definition, the

foreign occupier—an external force violating territorial integrity. Rather, it is a group of recalcitrant compatriots who refuse to surrender to that foreign force. This in itself turns the gendered rhetoric of female victimhood—so common to resistance propaganda in so many contexts—on its head, for it makes the very notion of conflating territorial and sexual conquest problematic. While a collaborationist administration can certainly manufacture images of women suffering sexual violence at the hands of resistance fighters (or even present resisters as stooges of some foreign force), it is far more difficult to work metaphors of, for example, 'ravished women' into narratives of national liberation—as resistance movements often do.<sup>21</sup> Collaborationist nationalism also puts a quite different 'spin' on Gayatri Spivak's equation of occupation representing 'white men saving brown women from brown men'—cited in recent studies of women under occupation in a variety of contexts<sup>22</sup>—for it often seems to grant symbolic agency to female archetypes while downplaying notions of female victimhood.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, occupation by its very nature is 'new'—it marks a departure from that which came before it, and pre-war social ills which collaborationist regimes blame for military defeat. Yet collaborationist regimes are also eager to underline their nationalist credentials (i.e., their legitimacy in the eyes of an occupied population), and sometimes do this by adopting what they deem to be traditional notions of society, the family, and moral behavior. Herein lies the 'new'/tradition binary that we see emerging in a number of cases of collaborationism, and which seems to influence many collaborationist representations of women. 'New times' call for 'new women,' but they equally call for women who can restore past glories and traditions to a society which, under occupation, has suffered the ultimate humiliation.

### **Tradition and the 'New Order' in occupied north China**

The PGROC came into existence in December 1937 as the result of a compromise between Japan's North China Area Army, the Kwantung Army, and anti-Nationalist Chinese elites in the region who had expressed a willingness to work with the Japanese in the months following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937). While the

semi-autonomous Kwantung Army had been keen to create a separate 'north China' (Hua Bei) state in the 1930s, those Chinese who were willing to collaborate with the Japanese preferred instead to retain the illusion of a unified China, hence the creation of this temporary and nominally Chinese administration under Japanese tutelage, and the adoption of nomenclature (i.e., 'provisional government') derived from the 1911 revolution.

Despite the national pretensions of its title, this regime stretched only over sections of north China. It encompassed the city of Beiping/Beijing (arguably the 'best educated' of cities in China at the time, and the birthplace of the 'New Culture' and May 4th Movements in the 1910s and 1920s) as well as major urban and cosmopolitan centers like Tianjin and Qingdao. In addition, however, it claimed ownership over some the poorest sections of the north China plain, as well as some of the most fiercely contested counties in the provinces of Shanxi and Hebei.<sup>24</sup> This diverse mix of constituencies would shape how the regime defined itself, and the messages it tried to sell.

The PGROC was led by 'disgruntled ex-officials' of the Beiyang regime<sup>25</sup> (which had ruled in north China from 1916 to the foundation of a unified Chinese Republic in Nanjing in 1928), as well as by defectors from the Nationalist government who had chosen to side against Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. Its figurehead was the uncharismatic former Minister of Finance Wang Kemin, who was known more for the glamour of his consort than for his leadership qualities.<sup>26</sup> It also retained amongst its staff officials who had served in the Beiyang regime prior to the invasion, while in key ministries, Japanese advisors maintained significant control.<sup>27</sup> Despite some autonomy in terms of taxation and revenue, it was beholden to the North China Area Army for its very existence, and was not viewed in north China itself as being genuinely independent.<sup>28</sup> Its propaganda apparatus, despite being staffed by Chinese cadres, was ultimately guided by the Japanese.<sup>29</sup>

Nonetheless, the story that Wang Kemin and his courtiers attempted to tell about their regime, and the symbols of nationhood that they chose to adopt, reflected the age



and background of the Chinese men who supported the regime's founding, and whose careers had generally peaked during the warlord years.<sup>30</sup> The PGROC adopted the five-colored flag of the early Republic, for instance, while vehemently rejecting Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of the People' (the ideological basis of Chinese Republicanism in Nanjing). It re-established Beijing (having the city revert to this toponym from its Republican-era 'Beiping') as the national capital, and sought to counter what it saw as negative Western influence of the sort associated with the treaty ports. Its rhetoric ranged from anti-communist and anti-Kuomintang vitriol to slogans lauding peace and the promise of 'living safely and enjoying one's work' (*anjū leyē*) under Japanese domination.

In many areas of its operations, the regime was reliant upon Japanese precedents. This was certainly the case for propaganda, where institutional models of mobilization, such as the Xinminhui (New People's Association) were borrowed unashamedly from the quasi-state of Manchukuo (created and largely governed by the Kwantung Army).<sup>31</sup> As a result of the unattributed nature of almost all of the visual propaganda produced either by or in support of the PGROC, it remains virtually impossible to draw a clear line between propaganda produced by the Japanese military, and that produced by Chinese employees of the PGROC and its affiliate organizations.<sup>32</sup> Thus, while there existed significant differences of opinion between Wang Kemin and his Japanese backers behind the scenes,<sup>33</sup> little of this was aired in public.

Despite all this, the PGROC was publicly adamant about its Chinese credentials. In trying to justify its very existence as a *Chinese* government (rather than merely a client state), the regime presented itself as a protector of a specific set of Chinese cultural traits. It lauded a pre-Opium War China, when the '...people's lives, thinking and culture had all been good,<sup>34</sup> and suggested that its role was to resurrect those social institutions which it perceived to have been threatened by modernity, both from abroad and in its May 4th manifestations.<sup>35</sup> Under an ideological system referred to as the *Wangdao/ōdō* (Kingly Way)—another import from Manchukuo—the PGROC promoted a return to

pre-Republican ideals of Confucianism, and put the 'Chinese family' at the heart of its ethos. As one contemporary American observer of the regime put it, the PGROC aimed:

...to make the social customs of an agricultural society, strong family ties, acceptance of authority of the head of the family and the head of the village, reverence for Confucianism, and observation of...religious ceremonies the basis of control.<sup>36</sup>

Concurrently, however, this regime encouraged acceptance of a 'New Order in East Asia' (*Dong Ya xin zhidu/Tōa shin chitsujō*) under Japanese leadership. Indeed, much of the rhetoric of the regime was based around 'newness,' and great store was put into exhorting sections of the population, including educated urban women, to become active in the 'new' occupation politics. This 'ideological cleavage,' as Lincoln Li has described it—i.e., encouraging a return to Confucian 'tradition' while at the same promoting 'the new'—would plague the propaganda efforts of this regime, and would manifest itself in competition between different sections of the 'puppet government.'

On one side was the Xinminhui, under the management of former Nationalist propagandist Miao Bin, but responsible for activities which involved significant contributions from women, including '...propaganda, food rationing, social services and surveillance of teachers and students.'<sup>37</sup> The Xinminhui promoted the image of a dynamic, forward-looking north China via 'new' propaganda techniques such as mobile dramatic troupes, newspapers and public meetings. It also called openly for the 'liberation' (*jiefang*) of women in China, and argued that the replacement of polygamy with monogamy (*yi fu yi qi zhiyi*)—a system that 'all civilized societies' practiced—was preferable for China under the 'New Order.'<sup>38</sup> The Xinminhui spoke directly to literate Chinese women via its organizational newspaper, the *Xinminbao*, which included a regular supplement for female readers entitled '*Mingzhu*' (Pearl). (Figure 1)

In contrast, there were the ministries within the PGROC, which enforced social policies that it believed would promote the restitution of Chinese 'tradition.'<sup>39</sup> The aim,

as John Hunter Boyle has explained it, was to emphasize '...a passive citizenry absorbing the lessons of moral example provided by the ruler as a means of warding off the infection of Western materialism, liberalism and communism...'<sup>40</sup>

A further source of contradiction was that the PGROC sought to sell its bifurcated message to two distinct constituencies: (i) The rural male gentry on the north China plain, who the PGROC believed had the potential to determine the longevity of this regime, and whose loyalty was believed to be more easily won (given communist support amongst the peasantry);<sup>41</sup> and (ii) an educated and cosmopolitan population of urban men and women (especially students) in Beijing, and in other cities along the railway lines which the PGROC controlled. In this regard, the regime's approach differed from earlier efforts by the North China Area Army which had purposefully courted the peasantry as it moved through rural areas in 1937. As George Taylor, one of the first Western scholars to analyze the PGROC noted in 1940, the 'gaudily colored pictures of northern peasants [which had] dominated posters designed to portray....the blessings of the new order' disappeared as soon as the PGROC was established, with such figures replaced almost immediately by a new set of visual icons catering to very different social *milieus*.<sup>42</sup>

Propaganda designed to convert both these groups, and celebrating both 'newness' and tradition, all put women at the centre of the regime's propaganda. Indeed, female icons were a staple part of the visual narrative of this regime from its very outset, while the mobilization of women represented an important part of the regime's quotidian activities. A radiant female colossus in flowing robes—looking remarkably Greco-Roman in conception, despite East Asian facial features—was deployed to mark the regime's official adoption of the rhetoric of a 'New Order in East Asia,' for example. Standing on a globe and worshipped by a group of pan-Asian schoolchildren, the non-attributed figure appeared under the term 'cornerstone of peace' (*heping zhi jishi*) in one of Beijing's most widely circulated newspapers in March 1939.<sup>43</sup>

As part of the PGROC's system of political control, women's 'propaganda teams' (*funü xuanfuban/bu*) were established in Beijing, while specific sections of the state, such

as the police, claimed their own 'women's goodwill divisions' (*funü weiventuan*) which were tasked with soliciting public support for the regime's security efforts.<sup>44</sup> (Figure 2) The PGROC sponsored journals and other publications aimed at literate women,<sup>45</sup> and it cultivated, within strict limits, a body of work by female Chinese authors.<sup>46</sup>

Much of this has been hitherto overlooked. David Nelson Rowe, who was present in north China at the creation of the PGROC, for example, noted a marked lack of textual references to 'the family,' or to the duties of spouses, parents, and children, in the regime's propaganda. Instead, Rowe argued that most propaganda in occupied north China called on the people to recognize the inevitability of a Japanese victory, to reject communism and the Chinese Nationalists, to uphold the new government of Wang Kemin, and to embrace Pan-Asian unity.<sup>47</sup> The visual fashion in which such messages were expressed was highly gendered, however. In calling on its citizens to defend the 'new government,' (*xin zhengfu*) for instance, the PGROC created highly gendered ideals of an occupied Chinese citizenry which drew on both Chinese and other Asian precedents; and accompanying its textual attacks on the Chinese communists were visual messages about the potential for women to either resist or aid the spread of this ideology.

Above all, however, the PGROC would oversee the creation of a number of repetitive female archetypes to which its artists would regularly return when glorifying the regime. These archetypes were intertextual, emerging not only in propaganda art, but also—as we shall see below—in other forms of wartime cultural production, from cinema to photojournalism.

The most frequent of these was one which I refer to as the 'PGROC new woman.' This is a label that I have derived from the PGROC itself, for although it never titled its propaganda in such a fashion, the regime did use the phrase 'new woman' in the very institutions it created, such as the New Women's Society (*Xin Funü She*) which it established in Beijing in 1939.<sup>48</sup> Like almost all Chinese governments throughout the twentieth century, the PGROC wrote frequently of its role in awakening 'new women' (*xin nüxing* / *xinxing funü*), and the language (if not the imagery) deployed by the PGROC

looks remarkably similar to twentieth-century authoritarian Chinese regimes which came before and after it.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, it fell into a well-studied pattern whereby male Chinese elites defined then called upon female archetypes to reinforce the 'nationalist project of state building.'<sup>50</sup> Nonetheless, this archetype became a constant feature of PGROC propaganda which centered around the rhetoric of the 'New Order'—so much so that the visual culture of early collaborationist China cannot be fully understood without considering it.

### **From modern girls to new women**

As Madeleine Yue Dong has noted, the much celebrated 'modern girl' of pre-war Shanghai popular culture had a fraught history under Japanese occupation. The case of Zheng Pingru—an individual associated with the 'modern girl' image who, in working for the Chinese resistance, inspired the plot Eileen Chang's *Lust, Caution* (with which I started this analysis)—sullied the very notion of 'modern girls' under the collaborationist government of Wang Jingwei in the 1940s.<sup>51</sup> Well prior to this, however, male collaborators had tended to look unfavorably upon a 'type' so closely associated with what they perceived as treaty port decadence. Indeed, it is noteworthy that for the PGROC, the 'new woman' (which I shall explore in some depth below) owed far more to the normative celebrations of Chinese womanhood encouraged by conservative elements in Republican China prior to 1937, than to the *laissez-faire* cultural attitudes associated with the 'modern girls' of urban commercial culture.

Like the mid-Republican-era 'new woman' who, as Hsiao-pei Yen reminds us, had been championed under the auspices of the New Life Movement in Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing at the expense of the 'modern girl',<sup>52</sup> the PGROC's 'new woman' was always shown adhering to a strict set of vestimentary norms which set her distinctly apart from earlier imagery. These included low hemlines, long sleeves, and a distinct lack of cosmetics and jewelry. She was virtually always depicted in a cheongsam (and never in Western dress), but unlike the cheongsams associated with the 'modern girl' of prewar poster art and cinema,<sup>53</sup> these were rarely form-fitting, invariably plain or monochrome

in design (often of indanthrene blue, crimson or green hue) and never revealed significant amounts of flesh.<sup>54</sup> On the rare occasions when her feet were included in images, she wore plain cotton shoes (rather than stilettos—a shoe which was ridiculed in the PGROC press).<sup>55</sup> The PGROC's 'new woman' was also groomed conservatively, adhering to the New Life disdain for the bob and the perm,<sup>56</sup> wearing her hair instead in a bun, coil, or fringe. In sum, this figure had a distinctly Republican-era provenance, but one which rejected the overt eroticism and glamour of pre-war Shanghai commercial culture, adhering instead to an aesthetic regime remarkably similar to that enshrined in the New Life Movement of the mid 1930s, despite the PGROC's expressions of loathing for Chiang Kai-shek's brand of Republican nationalism (Figure 3). While this 'new woman' was often shown to be in good physical health and smiling—her face was always visible, though she tended not to stare directly at the viewer—she was not necessarily seductive. Indeed, the effect of her austere clothing regime and her lack of accoutrements, and of only the most rudimentary pictorial references to her body, was to desexualize her.

This 'new woman' did not exist in isolation. Images of north Chinese 'beauties' (*meiren*) were also reproduced in large quantity for Japanese consumption in the same period. Japanese-language pictorials which celebrated this realm of conquest, such as *Kita Shina* (given the English title of *The North China*), included photography of north Chinese women in form-hugging and elaborately designed cheongsams at famous Beijing landmarks. Such figures were shown commonly in placid, non-aggressive, but alluring poses, strolling in pairs or small groups down streets or through gardens, or admiring the view over occupied cities and towns. They were commonly pictured from behind (unlike the 'PGROC new woman,' whose face was regularly visible), as objects of a male and specifically Japanese gaze.<sup>57</sup> (Figure 4).

Despite the distinction between the PGROC 'new woman' and the sexualized Chinese 'beauties' marketed to Japanese readers, it is clear that the 'new woman' archetype evolved out of gendered iconography used in early wartime Japanese military

propaganda. Indeed, Japanese propaganda printed prior to the founding of the PGROC (but for an occupied Chinese audience) betrayed a rather confused manipulation of gendered imagery. Early prototypes of the 'new woman' were used on handbills and pamphlets distributed in Beijing in 1937, for example. These depicted a figure who lay somewhere in the middle of the 'modern girl-new woman' spectrum—welcoming Japanese troops, encouraging other Chinese to collaborate, or celebrating the peace that occupation supposedly promised. (Figure 5) Importantly, such figures retained much of the adornment and glamour associated with pre-1937 depictions of Chinese 'beauties' in the Japanese commonwealth (and references to 'modern girl' imagery in Chinese commercial art), complete with form-fitting cheongsam, permed hair, and jewelry. At the same time, however, they pointed to the potential for young Chinese women to become involved in the politics of collaboration.

This early 'pre-PGROC new woman' figure did not entirely disappear with the founding of Wang Kemin's regime, either, for she was used in advertising material for state-backed enterprises such as the PGROC's Federal Reserve Bank (Zhonghua Lianhe Zhunbei Yinhang), founded in March 1938. Indeed, north Chinese savers were encouraged to take up a new PGROC-backed currency in this period with the aid of a highly sexualized 'modern girl' figure, dressed in form-fitting floral cheongsam and reclining in a pose typical of pre-war commercial print culture.<sup>58</sup> Such figures also survived in PGROC propaganda which spoke to a broader audience in the early occupation period. (Figure 6)

In much PGROC visual culture, however, it was the 'new woman' who dominated the regime's iconography. She appeared with a remarkable level of consistency in terms of clothing, adornment, pose, hairstyle and framing. In many depictions she either held or was pictured in close proximity to the five-colored flag of the PGROC, dispelling any ambiguities about her political proclivities (and referencing Manchukuo antecedents).<sup>59</sup> Significantly, she was commonly pictured at the very center of such posters and leaflets, and when not, the stark color of her clothing would have the effect of drawing the

viewer's gaze to her.

There were other unique elements to this archetype which reflected the 'ideological cleavage' that had plagued the regime's message from December 1937 onwards. And significantly, it is these features which provide intriguing parallels with other collaborationist archetypes, such as the Vichy Mother. The most noticeable similarity between the two was the overt references to motherhood and daughterhood. These were made in the PGROC case either through corporeal connections between the 'new woman' and (particularly male) children, for this figure was regularly shown embracing or standing next to a male child. Yet they were also present in depictions of this figure engaged in ancestor worship or accompanying children in religious observances, and in references to the 'new woman' aiding the elderly (Figures 7 and 8).

Markedly, however, this 'new woman' (like the Vichy Mother) was rarely shown in the presence of husbands, potential Chinese male suitors, or fighting-age Chinese males. Indeed, in most of the posters and pamphlets which employ this figure, no young Chinese men are depicted. One might speculate about the extent to which the male figureheads of the PGROC, and particularly Wang Kemin, acted as surrogate patriarchs in this visual culture: it was surely more than coincidence that one hagiographic essay on Wang (complete with official portrait) appeared alongside a 3-page, illustrated feature on 'Chinese female students' in a Japanese-produced, Chinese-language pictorial in 1939.<sup>60</sup> Either way, it was certainly the case that few actual depictions of patriarchal figures or husbands were included in poster depictions of the PGROC's 'new women.' Like the 'sexless maternalism' of Pollard's Vichy woman, the 'new woman' was deployed as a potent symbol of occupied China precisely because she was untainted by young Chinese men (i.e., potential resisters), and could be imagined as rearing a new generation of male East Asian children who would welcome Sino-Japanese cooperation in some distant future.

None of this is to suggest that PGROC iconography was devoid of Chinese male figures. An entire (though very different) study might be dedicated to the equally



ubiquitous 'PGROC male student' in his *changpao* (long scholar's gown) and skullcap, which was found in equal abundance in PGROC poster art, often depicted waving the five-colored flag, shouting at rallies or chasing the PGROC's enemies from north China. Indeed, it is significant that exhibitions of PGROC propaganda organized in Japan in this period (and specifically for Japanese audiences) focused *not* on female archetypes but primarily on these male figures: PGROC poster art displayed as part of the China Incident Holy War Exposition in Japan in late 1938, for example, appears hardly to have included images of Chinese women at all.<sup>61</sup> What the rarity of images showing young 'new couples' does demonstrate, however, is a pictorial segregation of male and female archetypes in PGROC iconography.

Like Pollard's and Muel-Dreyfus' Vichy Mother, the PGROC 'new woman' guided the vulnerable to safety by convincing them of the benefits of collaboration. She shepherded others (especially children and the elderly) towards some bright and peaceful future promised by occupation, rather than following patriarchal guidance. (Figure 9) She 'bought into' the roles of young mother and pious daughter that PGROC Confucianism demanded.

This 'new woman' thus appears to have been used to appeal directly to Chinese women themselves. In Beijing, where a significant and politically active population of female students existed, she was employed to mobilize women through pro-collaboration civic groups. Insofar as this archetype dressed and was depicted as behaving in the manner of a Republican student, we might even assume that her primary purpose was to challenge anti-Japanese sentiment amongst Beijing's significant population of educated young women at the time, for countering student nationalism exercised the PGROC and the Japanese for much of the 1937-40 period.<sup>62</sup> Rather than advising educated young women to return to their homes then, the PGROC encouraged them to take to the streets, to engage in campaigns and to celebrate the birth of the 'New Order' by chasing Chiang Kai-shek from China—as her predecessors had done to warlords some years earlier. In other words, she was a highly complex role model which reflected the

contradictions inherent in the ideology espoused by the PGROC. She was given a conservative and austere appearance, and was pictured fulfilling 'traditional' roles mother and pious daughter; at the same time, however, she was politically active and self-driven, inheriting many of the same traits that her pre-war Beijing student sisters had claimed in the spirit of the May 4th Movement.

There is, nonetheless, evidence to suggest that the PGROC 'new woman,' could also be utilized as a figure of desire, and that she was also certainly consumed by a male audience as an object of desire. Indeed, this is precisely what this regime sought to achieve in 1939 via its media infrastructure, and specifically the North China Film Company (Huabei Dianying Gufen Gongsi). While the Manchurian-born Japanese actress and singer Li Xianglan/Yamaguchi Yoshiko—assumed by audiences all over Asia at the time to be Chinese—has inspired a significant amount of scholarship about Japanese depictions of occupied China for a 'homefront' audience during World War II, this celebrity's role in a feature film partly produced by the North China Film Company, and exhibited both in Japan and China itself, is largely overlooked. *Nessa no chikai / Resha de Shijian (Vow in the Desert)* was a commercially successful movie which included Li/Yamaguchi playing the very role of a PGROC 'new woman,' in a story about Japanese efforts to forge modern infrastructure projects in an occupied north China. The film lifted this archetype from the two-dimensional media she had inhabited beforehand, and transformed her into an active, speaking (and singing) figure to be consumed by cinema-goers in Tokyo and Beijing alike. The main female protagonist of the film was clearly packaged as an object of desire (Yamaguchi/Li was already established as a pan-Asian sex symbol on account of the success of a number of her earlier films), and though austere in dress and behavior in this feature, she embodied a highly sexualized interpretation of the 'PGROC new woman.' Indeed, as with almost all of the wartime films that Yamaguchi made, the character eventually marries a male Japanese protagonist in a formulaic narrative about Sino-Japanese amity.<sup>63</sup> If the two dimensional 'new woman' had inhabited visual spaces in which spouses were absent, cinematic

interpretations of the same figure suggested a future in which suitable *Japanese* husbands could be found. The celluloid 'new woman' demonstrated that such archetypes could be consumed by male audiences as much as they could be used to stir Chinese women into political action.

### **The new woman's rural past**

Despite her ubiquity, the 'new woman' was not the only archetype to appear in PGROC propaganda. In poster art produced for a rural male audience in occupied north China, for instance, frugally dressed peasant women (in plain cotton *shanku* rather than cheongsams) were pictured next to husbands; their role as mother and spouse was emphasized in the textual accompaniment to such imagery, which spoke of women 'following the wishes of their husbands.' (Figure 10) These imagined rural women differed from their urban contemporaries in other key respects: they were generally only depicted in domestic scenes, and in poses or activities which suggested little agency. Rural wives and daughters were also mentioned with some regularity in textual propaganda aimed at the literate rural elite, in which women were listed, alongside livestock and grain, as assets that the Chinese communists would despoil if they were allowed to take control of the area. '[Your] young women are being forced to join the comfort corps, and their chastity is being taken away as they fool around with soldiers...' warned one leaflet distributed to 'village elders' in 1939, for instance.<sup>64</sup>

As with the PGROC 'new woman,' however, such rural archetypes could also be transformed into three-dimensional figures. The 1938 propaganda film *Tōyō no heiwa michi/ Dongyang heping zhi lu* (Road to Peace in the Orient), starring the then relatively unknown Chinese actress Bai Guang,<sup>65</sup> told the story of a demure Chinese peasant wife and her husband who escape the turmoil of war and flee for the safety of Japanese-occupied regions of the country.<sup>66</sup> The film was lauded, significantly, in the *Xinminbao*,<sup>67</sup> and in advertising for the film, it was a smiling Bai Guang, in headscarf and padded cotton, who was fore-grounded over her male co-star.<sup>68</sup>

Where the peasant girl archetype was important, however, was in providing a 'back

story' to the 'new woman,' much as Li Xianglan's character in *Vow in the Desert* had provided an imagined future. Indeed, despite the very real differences in appearance and context of these two figures, it is noteworthy that they sometimes overlapped or morphed into one another in PGROC propaganda.

We can find one example of this in a quasi-biographical leaflet of unclear provenance which was produced some time in or around 1939, and which tells the story of one almost certainly hypothetical woman called Wan Ruyu. The story, written in the voice of Ruyu herself, tells of rustic bliss in a Shanxi village which is disrupted by the arrival of communist anti-Japanese resistance forces. The communists ask for money, poison Ruyu's father (after accusing him of being a landlord and a capitalist), rape her sister, and lay waste to their village, leaving her no choice but to leave her birthplace and escape to the PGROC capital:

I am a country girl who has only received a junior high school education. I come from a village called Xihecun, in Wutai County in the province of Shanxi. My village has already been turned into hell under the heel of the communists, and because our hometown has been turned into a living hell, I have taken my younger brother of six years old, and abandoning the family business, fled along with my mother to the radiant city of Beijing.<sup>69</sup>

Such an account—sourced from a collection of Japanese military ephemera—needs to be understood in its proper context. From January 1939 onwards, the Japanese were engaged in a brutal campaign in rural north China aimed at defeating resistance beyond the cities controlled by the PGROC.<sup>70</sup> Propaganda of this sort was clearly designed to undermine support for such resistance amongst the rural population (and especially the gentry). Moreover, stories of this sort were common in the canon of propaganda produced in occupied north China. In his classic work on occupation literature, Edward Gunn Jr. has noted that stories appearing in the north China press '...frequently centered on a rural village and its struggle with [communist] guerillas,' and commonly detailed

rape and other atrocities supposedly committed by anti-Japanese resistance fighters. Importantly, Gunn also notes that such stories—like the one cited above—often featured young female protagonists who witnessed the martyrdom of their (collaborationist) fathers.<sup>71</sup>

While the veracity of such stories is hardly credible, they do help to provide a clear characterization of the female archetypes that PGROC propagandists constructed. In the case of Wan Ruyu, we find a semi-literate daughter of rural merchants (her father is described as the owner of a village grain store) who is loyal to her native place. She is a desexualized figure—so much so that she is even exempted from the sexual violence visited upon her sister. Importantly, however, she is decisive, independent, and politically aware, for while she never opposes patriarchy, the circumstances of occupation demand that she acts in the absence of male leadership. She knows a communist when she sees one, having witnessed the murder of her father at their hands. And she leads the remnants of her family (namely her elderly mother and prepubescent brother) to seek safety within the walls of occupied Beijing (now 'radiant' by virtue of its occupation)—i.e., to become a 'PGROC new woman' in the symbolic and political center of occupied north China.

Wan Ruyu's 'peasant girl' story therefore aligns with the visual narrative of the PGROC 'new woman' which was being told through poster art at the same time (indeed, the cartoon-like portrait of the fictitious Wan Ruyu on the pamphlet's cover shows her adopting many 'new woman' traits). She is educated and political, but she is also chaste, pious, and attached to a male child (in this case her brother). Just as importantly, however, the story suggests an imagined link between the young and educated 'PGROC new woman' of occupied Beijing, and the rural girl of the quintessential Shanxi village, thus attempting to 'square the circle' between the bifurcated rhetoric of Confucian tradition and the 'New Order.' (Figure 11)

## **Conclusion**

As Prasenjit Duara has argued, the concept of women as the 'the soul of

tradition-within-modernity' was common to many forms of conservative Chinese nationalism in the first decades of the twentieth century.<sup>72</sup> This grew out of deep-rooted notions about 'female behavior...[being]...the measure of social morality,' and the use of women as moral exemplars (both positive and negative) in Chinese literary history.<sup>73</sup> Despite May 4th attacks on patriarchy, the notion that women embodied all that was 'pure' about Chinese civilization, or that women could be employed as 'signifiers' for wider social conditions, continued to be expressed in diverse forms of twentieth-century Chinese nationalism.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, the survival of such notions into the present day partly explains the hostility amongst sections of Chinese society to the film *Last, Caution* in 2007, for any text which employs a female signifier to *question* the validity of concepts such as 'treason' (rather than to signify the rights and wrongs of any behavior under occupation) is by its very nature subversive.<sup>75</sup>

In its packaging of 'new women' as the 'soul of tradition-within-modernity,' then, the PGROC was not particularly remarkable, and as I have suggested above, gendered archetypes employed by this regime were reminiscent of figures celebrated under the preceding Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek, which the PGROC professed to loathe. What *is* remarkable, however, is the extent to which this Chinese 'new woman' shared a good deal in common with other collaborationist figures developed in quite different parts of the world, particularly—as I have stressed throughout this paper—in Vichy France. In other words, rather than simply tracing the provenance of the PGROC 'new woman' to pre-war China, and by connection anchoring her to a specifically Chinese story about modernity, gender and war, the parallels that emerge between this figure and archetypes in other contexts should prompt us to consider what she tells us about the uses of gender in collaborationist nationalism more generally. In doing so, we need not necessarily succumb to the temptation of creating a 'catch-all' model of gendered archetypes under collaboration. We may, however, find a means of moving beyond narrowly national or regional particularities when seeking to explain the prominence of recurring themes and characteristics under very different regimes.

One issue that the PGROC 'new woman' highlights, for example, is the difficulty that collaborationist ideologues face in claiming a primeval link to the civilization of the societies they claim to represent while at the same time acknowledging the novelty of the wartime context. In the case of the PGROC this was particularly pronounced precisely because this regime based its existence on the claim that *modern* Chinese nationalism of the sort found in the treaty ports had ruined China, and that a return to older Confucian norms was needed. At the same time, however, it found itself speaking to some of the most well-informed urban women in China, and it recognized that this group had the potential to assist (or undermine) the regime in its efforts to introduce the 'New Order.' The PGROC new woman—like her Vichy, and other, collaborationist sisters—was an incongruous by-product of this compromise.

The PGROC 'new woman' also helps to broaden findings made by gender historians of Vichy about the 'sexless maternalism' of depictions of French women in WWII France. The de-sexualization of collaborationist archetypes, and the segregation of male and female figures in collaborationist propaganda that we see in Vichy and occupied north China, suggest that there is something fundamentally different about collaborationist gendering of the nation. As I have suggested, this reflects the difficulty of reconciling a context in which the status of fighting-age men becomes far more sensitive, and in which women are thus called upon to play a far more active role in occupation politics—and in some cases even presented as the mothers of a new generation of subservient occupied peoples.

It is the 'visual history' approach that helps to make such messages apparent, for by analyzing visual texts, we are able to get beyond debates (that have shaped the field this far) about the choices made by individual women who served collaborationist regimes. Instead, we can begin to detect similarities, convergences and continuities in the symbols and icons adopted by regimes across national and temporal borders. Future research may go further in teasing out the pictorial similarities that emerged in cognate regimes by extending this approach even further, and perhaps testing the application of these

observations beyond the examples that have been explored in this paper.

In March 1940, the PGROC was officially disbanded with the creation of Wang Jingwei's 'Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China.' It is this latter regime, immortalized in films such as *Lust, Caution*, which remains to this day the epitome of the occupation 'puppet state' in China. While a certain degree of autonomy was retained in areas formerly governed by the PGROC, the national pretensions that Wang Kemin's regime has once entertained were no longer tenable. This lack of longevity probably helps explain why this regime has remained so understudied in the historiography of wartime China thus far. In its reinvention of the 'new woman,' its attempts to enlist urban Chinese women into its 'New Order' agenda, and in the extensive ephemera it left to posterity, this otherwise unremarkable regime has the potential to tell us much about the uses of gender in occupied China and beyond.

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<sup>1</sup> The film's reception has itself inspired substantial scholarship. For example, see Leo Oufan Lee, 'Ang Lee's *Lust, Caution* and its Reception,' *boundary 2*, 35:3 (2008), pp. 223-238.

<sup>2</sup> Stephanie Hemelryk Donald, 'Tang Wei: Sex, the City and the Scapegoat in *Lust, Caution*,' *Theory, Culture & Society*, 27:4 (2010), pp. 46-68.

<sup>3</sup> I borrow the term 'scapegoat' in this context from Charles D. Musgrove, 'Cheering the Traitor: The Post-War Trial of Chen Bijun, April 1946,' *Twentieth Century China*, 30:2 (2005), pp. 3-27.

<sup>4</sup> Luo Jiurong, *Ta de shenpan: jindai Zhongguo guozu yu xingbie yiyixia de zhongban zhibian* [Her trials: Contextualizing loyalty and disloyalty in modern China from the gendered nationalist perspective] (Academia Sinica, 2013).

<sup>5</sup> Yun Xia, 'Engendering contempt for collaborators: Anti-*Hanjian* discourse following the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945,' *Journal of Women's History*, 25:1 (Spring 2013), pp. 111-134.

<sup>6</sup> Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Harvard University Press,



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2005), pp. 23-26.

<sup>7</sup> James A. Cook, Joshua Goldstein, Matthew D. Johnson and Sigrid Schmalzer, 'Introduction,' in James A. Cook, et al. (eds), *Visualizing Modern China: Image, History and Memory, 1750-Present* (Lexington Books, 2014), p. 3. Italics in the original text.

<sup>8</sup> In the summer of 1939 alone, the regime produced over 25,000 leaflets, 6,000 posters and 600 pamphlets. Lincoln Li, *The Japanese Army in North China, 1937-1941: Problems of Political and Economic Control* (Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 113.

<sup>9</sup> Recent examples include Yang Xiaojuan, 'Wei Xinminhui zai Huabei lunxuanqu de nuhua xuanchuan,' [The enslaving propaganda of the Xinminhui in Occupied North China] *Hebei Shibfan Daxue Xuebao*, 31:2 (March 2008), pp. 121-125; Zhang Shaoqian, 'Combat and Collaboration: The Clash of Propaganda Prints between the Chinese Guomindang and the Japanese Empire in the 1930s–1940s,' *Transcultural studies*, 1 (2014), pp. 95-133.

<sup>10</sup> A point noted in Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'Collaboration in comparative perspective,' *European Review of History-Revue européenne d'histoire*, 15:2 (April 2008), pp. 109-111.

<sup>11</sup> Nicole Huang, *Women, War, Domesticity: Shanghai Literature and Popular Culture of the 1940s* (Brill, 2005). See also Jeremy E. Taylor, 'Cartoons and collaboration in wartime China: The mobilization of Chinese cartoonists Japanese occupation,' *Modern China*, 41:4 (2015), pp. 406-435.

<sup>12</sup> See, for instance, the special issue of *Modern & Contemporary France* 7.1 (1999), entitled 'Gendering the occupation of France.'

<sup>13</sup> Alison M. Moore, 'History, memory and trauma in photography of the *tondues*: Visuality of the Vichy past through the silent image of women,' *Gender and History*, 17:3 (2005), p. 658.

<sup>14</sup> Luc Capdevila, 'The quest for masculinity in a defeated France, 1940-1945,' *Contemporary European History*, 10:3 (2001), pp. 423-445.

<sup>15</sup> Miranda Pollard, *Reign of Virtue: Mobilizing Gender in Vichy France* (University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 42-57.

<sup>16</sup> Fracine Muel-Dreyfus, *Vichy and the Eternal Feminine: A Contribution to a Political Sociology of Gender*, trans. Kathleen A. Johnson (Duke University Press, 2001).

<sup>17</sup> Michael Kim, 'The aesthetics of total mobilization in the visual culture of late colonial Korea,'

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*Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8:3-4 (2007), pp. 483-502.

<sup>18</sup> Gregor Kranjc, ' "Long live our honest girls": The Image of Women in Slovene Anti-Communist Propaganda 1942-1945,' *Journal of Women's History*, 18:1 (Spring 2006), p. 59.

<sup>19</sup> Anna-Esther Younes, 'A gendered movement for liberation: Hamas's women's movement and nation building in contemporary Palestine,' *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 3:1 (January 2010), p. 31

<sup>20</sup> Carrie Tarr, 'Wilful women in French cinema under the German occupation,' in *Women and Representation* (WIE, 1995), pp. 75-91.

<sup>21</sup> On this point, see Louise Edwards, 'Drawing Sexual Violence in Wartime China: Anti-Japanese Propaganda Cartoons,' *Journal of Asian Studies*, 72:3 (2013), pp. 563-586.

<sup>22</sup> Nadjie Al-Ali & Nicola Pratt, *What kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq* (University of California Press, 2009), pp. 82-83.

<sup>23</sup> In contrast to anti-collaborationist historiography in China, for instance, which grants little agency to actual female 'collaborators'. on this see, Yun Xia, op. cit.

<sup>24</sup> On this, see Feng Chongyi and David S. Goodman (eds), *North China at War: The Social Ecology of Revolution, 1937-1945* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

<sup>25</sup> As some contemporary Western observers defined them. See *Japan's Puppets on the China Stage* (The American Information Committee in Shanghai, 1939), p. 10.

<sup>26</sup> John Hunter Boyle, *China and Japan at War: 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 89.

<sup>27</sup> The most comprehensive study of this regime can be found in Zhang Tongle, *Hua-Bei lunxuanqu Rimei zhengquan yanjiu* [Puppet regimes in Japanese-occupied north China] (Sanlian Shudian, 2012).

<sup>28</sup> Indeed, John Hunter Boyle (op. cit., p. 90) suggests that this regime (unlike subsequent collaborationist governments in China) did not even pretend to claim any popular legitimacy.

<sup>29</sup> Lincoln Li, op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>30</sup> Boyle, op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>31</sup> The most thorough analysis in English of the propaganda of this regime can be found in Lincoln Li, op. cit., pp. 91-121.

<sup>32</sup> Indeed many studies do not make this distinction, and assume that PGROC propaganda is synonymous

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with Japanese military propaganda. See, for instance, Zhang Shaoqian, op. cit.

<sup>33</sup> Documented in Timothy Brook, 'The creation of the Reformed Government in Central China, 1938,' in David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu (eds.), *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation* (Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 92-99.

<sup>34</sup> 'Ri-Man-Hua xielie: Jianshe Dong Ya xinzhixu,' [Cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China: Building a New Order in East Asia] Undated pamphlet. British Museum, Japanese Collections: 2006, 0117, 0.1-109 (25).

<sup>35</sup> *Zhonghua minguo linsbi zhengfu er zhou nian jinian* [A commemoration of the 2nd anniversary of the PGROC] (Beijing, 1939).

<sup>36</sup> George E. Taylor, *The Struggle for North China* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p. 79.

<sup>37</sup> Lillian M. Li, Alison J. Dray-Novoy and Haili Kong, *Beijing: From Imperial Capital to Olympic City* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). p. 167.

<sup>38</sup> Onuma Kikuo, *Xinmin zhuyi zhi lilun ji qi zhanlun* (The theory of the Xinmin and its introduction) (Da Dong Ya wenhua yuanjiuhui, 1944), pp. 212-213.

<sup>39</sup> Lincoln Li, op. cit., pp. 113-115.

<sup>40</sup> Boyle, op. cit., p. 92.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>42</sup> George E. Taylor, *Japanese-sponsored regime in North China* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939), p. 50.

<sup>43</sup> Namely *Shibao* March 3, 1939, p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> *Shibao*, March 16, 1939, p. 1

<sup>45</sup> George E. Taylor, op. cit., p. 50

<sup>46</sup> You Youji, 'Dongbei, Huabei lunxuanqu nüxing wenxue de shenmei qibian,' [Changes to women's literature in occupied North and Northeast China] *Ningde Shizhuan Xuebao*, 32 (1995), pp. 44-49.

<sup>47</sup> David Nelson Rowe, 'Japanese propaganda in North China, 1937-1938,' *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 3:4 (1939), pp. 564-580.

<sup>48</sup> A Hua, 'Cong Zhongguo funü yundong tandao Beijing de Xin Funü she' [From the Chinese women's movement to the Beijing New Women's Society], *Huawen Daban Meiri (Kabun Osaka Mainichi)*, 3.5 (1939): 16.

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- <sup>49</sup> See, for instance, 'Xin nüxing zhi juexing!' [The awakening of the new woman!] *Shibao*, February 28, 1939, p. 1
- <sup>50</sup> Louise Edwards, 'Policing the modern women in Republican Shanghai,' *Modern China*, 26:2 (April 2000), p. 117.
- <sup>51</sup> Madeleine Y. Dong, 'Who is afraid of the Chinese modern girl?,' in Alys Eve Weinbaum, *et al* (eds), *The Modern Girl Around the World: Consumption, modernity and globalization* (Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 197-198.
- <sup>52</sup> Hsiao-pei Yen, 'Body politics, modernity and national salvation: The modern girl and the New Life Movement,' *Asian Studies Review*, 29 (June 2005), pp. 165-186.
- <sup>53</sup> Su Xujun, 'Qipao liubian,' [The evolution of the *qipao*], in Luo Mairui (ed), *Qili shidai: Yin ren, yi shi, xin fengshang* [*Qipao: Memory, modernity and fashion*] (Furen Daxue & Guoli Taiwan Bowuguan, 2013), pp. 65-74.
- <sup>54</sup> Antonia Finnane, *Changing Clothes in China: Fashion, History, Nation* (Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 172-174.
- <sup>55</sup> 'Gaogenxie shi qianwei to xiangzheng,' [High heeled shoes are symbols of power] *Shibao*, January 20, 1939. The article was accompanied by a cartoon lampooning a Chinese scholar kowtowing to a giant stiletto.
- <sup>56</sup> Paul J. Bailey, *Gender and Education in China: Gender Discourses and Women's Schooling in the early Twentieth Century* (Routledge, 2007), p. 100.
- <sup>57</sup> A number of these images were reproduced in Zhao Xiaodi, 'Yushi jujin de qipao,' [The cheongsam through time] *Lao zhaopian* [Old Photographs], 67 (2009).
- <sup>58</sup> Such imagery can be found amongst the leaflets and photographs in The Hoover Institution Archives: David Nelson Rowe Papers, 78064, Box 1.
- <sup>59</sup> On images of Chinese women with national flags in Manchukuo, see Barak Kushner, *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), p. 125.
- <sup>60</sup> The two articles, entitled 'shiren yuedan: Wang Kemin' [Monthly person in the news: Wang Kemin] and 'Zhongguo nüxuesheng' [Chinese female students] appeared in *Huawen Daba Meiri* (*Kabun Osaka Mainichi*) 2:5 (January 1939).

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- <sup>61</sup> See *Shina jiben seisen bakurankai taikan* (Guide to the China Incident Holy War Exposition) (Asahi Shimbun, 1938), p. 49.
- <sup>62</sup> Lincoln Li, op cit.
- <sup>63</sup> Details about the film are taken from Chikako Nagayama, 'Race as technology and blurred national boundaries in Japanese imperialism: *Nessa no chikai/Vow in the Desert*', *Transnational Cinemas* 3.2 (2012): 211-230.
- <sup>64</sup> 'Gao Huabei nongcun anju de fulaomen,' [A message to the village elders living in safety in North China] Unattributed leaflet. British Museum, Japanese Collections: 2006, 0117, 0.1-109.
- <sup>65</sup> Ironically, after the war, Bai Guang would become known for her sultry renditions of thoroughly urban and cosmopolitan *shidaiqu* (modern Shanghai popular songs) in Hong Kong.
- <sup>66</sup> Michael Baskett, *The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), pp. 73-77.
- <sup>67</sup> 'Dongyang Heping Zhi Lu teji,' (Special issue on *Road to Peace in the Orient*) *Xinminbao*, April 9, 1938, p. 5
- <sup>68</sup> It is surely significant that the commercial failure of this film (which showcased the PGROC's peasant girl archetype) in both Japan and China led directly, according to Shelley Stephenson, to the employment of Yamaguchi Yoshiko / Li Xianglan by Japanese-controlled film studios, and hence to the making of the above-mentioned *Vow in the Desert*. See Shelley Stephenson, 'A star by any other name: The (after) lives of Li Xianglan,' *Quarterly Review of Film and Video*, 19.1 (2002): 5.
- <sup>69</sup> Anon, *Chibuo biji: Gongfei jishi xiaoshuo* [A record of the Red Peril: A novel recording the deeds of the Communist bandits] (no publication details or date). British Museum, Japanese Collections: 2006, 0117, 0.1-109.
- <sup>70</sup> Zhang Xianwen, *Zhonghua minguoshi: disan juan* (A history of Republican China: Volume 3) (Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe, 1985), pp. 530-532.
- <sup>71</sup> Edward Gunn, Jr, *Unwelcome Muse: Chinese literature in Shanghai and Peking, 1937-1945* (Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 35.
- <sup>72</sup> Prasenjit Duara, 'The regime of authenticity: timelessness, gender and national history in modern China,' *History and Theory*, 37:3 (2002), p. 300.
- <sup>73</sup> Carolyn T. Brown, 'Woman as trope: Gender and power in Lu Xun's "Soap",' in Tani E. Barlow (ed),

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*Gender Politics in Modern China: Writing and Feminism* (Duke University Press, 1993), p. 77.

<sup>74</sup> On the prolonged May 4th deployment of women as 'signifiers' in modern Chinese literature and film, see Dai Jinhua, 'Invisible Women: Contemporary Chinese cinema and women's film,' (trans. Mayfair Yang), *positions*, 3:1 (1995), pp. 255-280.

<sup>75</sup> On these wider issues, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr, '*Hanjian* (Traitor)! Collaboration and retribution in wartime Shanghai,' in Wen-hsin Yeh (ed), *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond* (University of California Press, 2000), pp. 298-341.