JTM 15-033: Supplementary on line material

## **Appendix S5: Air transport: study characteristics**

Author (Year)	Study details	Outcome detail	Limitations			
	Influenza					
Retrospective cohort studies and reviews investigating in-flight transmission						
Catala (2012)[32]	Mexico – Barcelona flight with 6 cases aboard in a group travelling together	AR within group: 14.1% (12.1-16.1%). AR in rest of plane: 0 AR in contacts post arrival 13.2% (9/68 tested positive)	Only persons reporting symptoms were tested, mild cases could have been missed. Group behaviours are thought to increase risk of transmission, not necessarily transmitted inflight.			
Zhang (2013)[22]	Three flights as part of a trip. One index case aboard	AR on the full trip: 13% AR on short leg: 0% Social contacts (n40) 7.5%	Other sources of infection not included			
Han (2009)[59]	Symptomatic case took three flights and was part of a tour group on arrival	No transmission noted on flight 1 and 2. One persons infected on flight 3. 30% AR in tour group	Recall bias. Unclear whether cases were lab confirmed			
Foxwell (2011)[16]	Two flights with 2 and 1 symptomatic passengers aboard.	Flight 1: Transmission confirmed to 2 passengers. 1.4% AR within 2 row Flight 2: Transmission confirmed to 1 passenger	None identified			
Kim (2010)[17]	Long haul flight with 1 index case, 418 passengers	<ul><li>1 passenger infected in-flight</li><li>1 social contact infected post arrival</li></ul>	No statement on follow up time of passengers.			
Baker (2009)[18]	13 hour flight with 9 confirmed and 3 suspected cases aboard.	Transmission confirmed to 2 passengers and possible to another 1; AR 1.9% in rear or plane; 3.5% within 2 rows of index cases.	Infection possible prior to boarding in one case. Recall bias. Incomplete laboratory testing.			

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Young (2013)[20]	Long haul flight with 6 potentially infectious		•		Length of follow up not mentioned, cases could have been missed. Other sources of injection not	
(2013)[20]	persons aboard	-			excluded in all cases.	
	persons abourd		rt and transmission risk	CAC	rided in an eases.	
Neatherlin	Two short haul flights with		Transmission suspected to 4 passengers (AR of ILI 2.4%)		ner exposures were not excluded.	
(2000)[21]	1 index case on each	ILI 2.49			nited lab confirmation.	
					Recall bias	
Ooi Long haul flight with 1		Transmission to 6 passengers suspected - AR in			w proportion of passengers followed up.	
(2010)[24]	index case	economy 4.7%.Risk of infection 22.9time higher in economy then the rest of the plane		Oth	ner sources of infection not excluded.	
(p<0.001).						
Marsden (2003)[23]	Domestic Australian flight with 75 passengers & one		ission suspected to 15 (20%) gers, 9 were seated within 2 rows, 14		b confirmation not performed, other exposures excluded.	
(2003)[23]	index case	within 5 rows of index case.		пос	not excluded.	
Moser	52 passengers on a		R; this increase significantly with time	Elic	ght had no ventilation, in modern aircrafts	
(1979)[25]	grounded plane with no		the aeroplane; <1hr 53%; >3hrs 86%		ntilation is required if aircraft is grounded for	
(1777)[23]	ventilation for 3 hours.	spent on the acropiane, \land 1111 35%, \rangle 3118 80%			>30 minutes	
	One index case aboard			, ,	· ····································	
Adlhoch &	Systematic review of 15		Risk of transmission was noted in studie	es l	Limitations of included studies were recall	
Leitmeyer	retrospective cohorts studies		but limited conclusions could be drawn	1	bias, selection bias, restricted laboratory	
(2014) [9]					testing and the inability to exclude other	
					sources of infection.	
Leder &	Review of in-flight transmission		Limited transmission of influenza occur		This review was not systematic and did not	
Newman	various pathogens, 3 studies	on	when ventilation systems are fully		look into the strengths and weaknesses of	
(2005)[8]	influenza identified.		functional		included studies. Limited conclusions were	
		· c	T: '. 1. '. C: CI		drawn.	
Mangili &	8		Limited transmission of influenza occur		This review was not systematic and did not	
Gendreau (2005)[6]	various pathogen, 3 studies of influenza identified.	)II	when ventilation systems are fully functional		look into the strengths and weaknesses of included studies. Limited conclusions were	
(2003)[0]	imiuciiza identified.		Tuncuonal		drawn.	
		Modelli	ing studies investigating in-flight transr			
		Modelli	ing bradies investigating in-ingir transi	111331	IVII	

Guputa (2012)[5]	Modelled the dispersion on of respiratory pathogens in an aircraft cabin.	Risk highest for passengers close to index case & in window seats. Quanta release of 103/hour could result in 3/20 persons infected and 5226/hour could result in 20/20	Model was not validated with real life cases.
Wagner (2011)[27]	Studied air flow in aircraft cabins to look at pathogen transmission.	Transmission is theoretically confined to cabin with index case. Higher levels of transmission in economy cabin and longer flight duration.	Assumes air contamination is uniform & doesn't account for transmission by large droplets.
Wan (2009)[26]	Used aerosol dispersion data to study the risk of transmission in an aircraft cabin	There is risk of pathogen transmission if seated directly in front or in front and to the side of an index case. The risk for all other passengers is very low. The risk of transmission via contaminated seats is $<5.57 \times 10^{-6}$ for all passengers.	Estimated the transfer of pathogens onto hands and the frequency of hands touching mucus membranes.
Guputa (2011)[28]	Used CFD to model the dispersion of aerosol droplets in an aircraft cabin	Passengers in window seats at highest risk of infection from coughing as well as that one row in-front and behind index case. Risk of infection proportional to quanta inhaled	Assumes all droplets are the same size and passengers constantly have closed mouths. Cannot quantify transmission risk as passengers' tolerance dose is unknown.
		Transmission in airport terminals	
Quan (2013)[36]	Modelling transmission of pathogen from infectious terminal workers	Each worker can infect can infect 28.7 people in departures and in 16.7 in arrivals. 1528 infections possible a day in departures & 1528 in arrivals.	Does not describe data sources therefore reliability of results unknown
		cansmission at destination post air travel	
Brownstein (2006)[33]	Studied the correlation between passenger arrivals in the USA and time to the peak of pneumonia and influenza deaths.	Relationship between domestic air travel volumes and influenza spread Is strongly correlated: $r^2$ =-0.69 (p=0.021); with international travel International association: $r$ = -0.66, (p=0.027).	Uses P&I deaths as a proxy for influenza transmission

Khan (2009)[35]	leaving Mexico in A(H1N1) arrivals had influenza imported.  pandemic studied in relation to cases of influenza in destination countries  arrivals had influenza imported.  Countries with >1400 arrivals had a significantly higher risk of infection		2008 air travel data used as a proxy for 2009		
Merler (2012)[34]	travel data studied in relation to yearly pa		timing of influenza peak and ssenger arrivals is strongly dr=-0.59 (p=0.001)	No information of data sources therefore reliability of results unknown.	
			SARS-CoV		
		Retro	ospective cohort studies		
Breugelmans (2004)[60]	Investigation of in-flight transmission long haul & 7 short haul flights with a symptomatic case on board		10 persons reported symptoms, none tested positive	Selection bias due to difficulties in contacting passengers	
Olsen (2003)[49]	Three short haul flights investigated for inflight transmission		16 confirmed, 5 probable, 1 suspected case identified from on flight, none from others. Relative risk of infection higher (2.9 times seated within close proximity to index case		
Vogt (2006)[52]	Seven flights inbound to USA investigated (5 with symptomatic passengers aboard, 2 pre-symptomatic)		4 passengers reported symptoms, tested negative 1 refused to test	3 None noted	
Wilder- Smith (2006)[51]	Seven flights inbound Singapore, 3 wi symptomatic passengers, 4 with pre- symptomatic	th	Transmission to 1 air stewardess noted	Cases could have been missed as self-reporting of symptoms was required.	
Modelling study					
Mazumdar (2011)[57]	CFD modelling of SARS-CoV disperant an aircraft cabin	rsion in	A moving person can increase the distance that virus particles dispet to 7 rows from index case,		
MERS-CoV					
		Retr	cospective cohort study		

HPA (2013)[54]	1index case on a long haul flight Contact tracing of flight passengers(two rows either side) and social contacts performed. flight passengers n=11/20; household contacts n=20, hospital visitors n=13 & healthcare workers n=59	No flight contacts were confirmed positive. 2 social/hospital contacts confirmed positive	Limited number of passengers were contacted.
		Modelling study	
Coburn & Blower (2014)[53]	Modelling of possible transmission on aeroplanes.	Cross-infection can occur and is related to quanta release/hour and flight duration. Higher number of secondary cases in economy than first class	Model assumptions and suitability not explored.