

# 6 Voice of America Chinese-dialect broadcasting and the Chinese cultural Cold War, 1949–1953<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

For those of us who study the Chinese cultural Cold War, Voice of America (VOA) is a regular if tangential component of historical accounts of this conflict. In its 1950s heyday, VOA triumphantly declared that “Chinese people living everywhere throughout the world are deeply familiar with the words “*Meiguo zhi yin* [Voice of America]”.<sup>2</sup> And given the frequency with which this broadcaster appears in histories of American Cold War encounters with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as in anecdotes about clandestine radio listening on the Chinese mainland,<sup>3</sup> we might be forgiven for believing such braggadocio.<sup>4</sup>

However, despite the central role of VOA in the story of Sino-American relations (and the prominence of China in histories of VOA), we still know remarkably little about the nature of VOA broadcasting to China – or in Chinese – at the height of the Cold War. What little research *has* been published on VOA’s engagement with China has emphasized this broadcaster’s place within wider American strategies either to undermine Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authority (or, perhaps more importantly, CCP links with the Soviet Union) or to project a positive image of the United States to Chinese listeners. Lu Xun’s important work on this topic, which places VOA at the very heart of US propaganda initiatives designed to challenge a young PRC, is representative. As Lu has shown, United States Information Service (USIS) staff based in Hong Kong combined overtly political news reports with musical programming, radio dramas and book discussions. Such “propaganda was incorporated as imperceptibly as possible” into VOA broadcasts in Chinese.<sup>5</sup> In contrast, Ellen D. Wu’s study of “America’s Chinese” and their contributions to VOA in the early 1950s has shed important light on the agency of Chinese American intellectuals such as Betty Lee Sung who were recruited to work for this broadcaster. In addition, Wu highlights the tendency of VOA to adopt (to reference Christina Klein) a “Cold War Orientalist” approach to its Chinese American talent,<sup>6</sup> and to continue to assume links between the Chinese American community and their supposed “homeland” in east Asia.<sup>7</sup>

Both of these studies are important. However, in their focus on broadcasts to the PRC, and on Chinese American agency, they leave a number of key issues untouched. For instance, these accounts provide only a limited view of VOA’s



Figure 6.1 Staged photograph of three unidentified Voice of America announcers, possibly in Washington, DC, circa 1954 (Courtesy of the Central News Agency, Taipei).

attempts to win over listeners amongst overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, despite (as I will show below) the significance of such listeners to VOA planners. They also tend to gloss over the nuanced yet crucial differences that developed between different dialect-based “services” or “desks” that operated parallel to each other, despite all coming under VOA’s Chinese Branch (sometimes given as the “Chinese Section”) – itself a sub-section of this broadcaster’s Far East Division.

A focus on VOA’s intentions towards the “overseas Chinese” – and its attempts to court such audiences by broadcasting in dialects that were still spoken widely in communities throughout Southeast Asia in the 1950s – is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it helps to move the discussions that energize this very book – i.e., the battle for influence amongst “overseas Chinese” communities in Asia in the early Cold War – beyond a national register, enabling us to explore how contestations over “Chineseness” reverberated at the provincial or regional level as well. As I have argued elsewhere, for example, shifting Cantonese, Teochew or Hokkien identities were just as important throughout Southeast Asia in the immediate post-1949 era as were evolving notions of “Chineseness”, and such regional identities represented fertile ground for Cold War rivalries.<sup>8</sup> At present, however, we still know relatively little about “how . . . provincial forms of Chinese cultural production [were able to] become realms of Cold War contestation”,<sup>9</sup> despite a small yet expanding scholarship on regional identities – Phillip B. Guingona’s

notion of the transnational “*Minqiao*” (Hokkien overseas) and “Hokkien nationalism”, for instance – that are too often overlooked in the larger story of the Chinese diaspora.<sup>10</sup> Broadcasting offers a suitable medium through which to explore such questions precisely because it is sonic; while a book or magazine could be read by any literate person who was educated in Chinese, listening actively to a radio programme (particularly one which involved analysis of current affairs) required comprehension in a particular spoken language (be that Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkien or anything else).

Secondly, VOA Chinese-dialect broadcasting helps us to unpack another topic that is discussed at length in other chapters in this volume – the crucial role of American-financed organizations in the Chinese cultural Cold War. To be sure, the “new China” of Mao Zedong on the mainland and the Nationalist China of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan were both key players in the ideological and strategic battles for prominence in various diasporic communities in the 1950s. Yet so too was the United States. VOA – alongside the Asia Foundation, the Union Press (Youlian chubanshe) and the other US-financed or -backed organizations – was a key component in America’s “psychological war” against the PRC and its sympathizers in the wider region.<sup>11</sup> Despite being an American institution, however, VOA employed a significant staff of Chinese translators, producers and presenters in the United States, and emerged (in large part due to this staff) as an influential purveyor of news and entertainment. Given the increasing prominence of US-supported groups who worked with the written word to build an “empire of information” in Asia,<sup>12</sup> it is only right that we recognize the regional (and even international) importance of American broadcasters in the Chinese cultural Cold War as well.

An examination of VOA’s work in Chinese-dialect broadcasting can also complicate emerging research on VOA itself, especially with regard to this broadcaster’s operations in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. The role of this institution in the “Americanization” or “Westernization” of its target countries (e.g., in “shaping Western Europe’s culture, economy, and politics”), has been a common focus in much of the research thus far.<sup>13</sup> Without contradicting this extant scholarship, the current chapter complicates such findings by suggesting that VOA’s Chinese-dialect broadcasting, while certainly fitting into broader attempts to propagate “American values” or positive news about American society, also sought to use distinctly Chinese modes of cultural expression to excite nativist sentiments, often as a means of convincing diasporic listeners to question both the longevity and validity of Chinese communism.

This chapter is based primarily on VOA broadcast scripts that are now held at the Philadelphia office of the United States’ National Archives and Records Administration. These scripts were produced at VOA’s New York offices between 1949 and 1953. This was a period when VOA “experienced its most spectacular growth in both programming and facilities”.<sup>14</sup> It was also a period that coincided with the Korean War (1950–1953) and the bloodiest phase of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960). In the United States, these years heralded the emergence of the pro-Chiang Kai-shek “China Lobby” and the presidency of Harry Truman,

plagued as it was by debates about who had “lost China”.<sup>15</sup> All of this is reflected in the material that was produced in the early 1950s, as VOA broadcasts were dominated by news and “pointed political analysis”, with the broadcaster’s tone “hardening”.<sup>16</sup>

Nonetheless, this was a time when VOA began to experiment with broadcasting in new languages while seeking to win over new audiences, including amongst the “overseas Chinese”. This is hardly surprising for, as Meredith Oyen has shown, in these pre-Bandung years, the State Department and other US agencies displayed an acute interest in “overseas Chinese” affairs.<sup>17</sup> Yet it also had wider consequences. VOA’s foray into Cantonese, “Amoy” (i.e., Hokkien) and “Swatow” (i.e., Teochew) programming occurred precisely as many Asian languages were themselves developing and changing in tandem with the rapid geo-political shifts that were experienced in the wake of the end of World War II and the dissolution of various pre-war empires.<sup>18</sup>

The VOA broadcast scripts cover all manner of content, from musical programmes to news features. In addition, they contain information about the production processes that were adopted and the editorial decisions that were made within VOA’s Chinese Branch. They even provide some answers to the question that Xiaojue Wang has recently posed: “What did the Cold War sound like on the air?”<sup>19</sup> For example, many of the scripts include handwritten notes, seemingly written by producers for the sake of announcers, on how to deliver certain content or even how to pronounce certain words or phrases. As a result, and given that few archival recordings of these broadcasts appear to have survived,<sup>20</sup> the scripts represent the closest thing we have to actual VOA programmes in various forms of Chinese.

Above all, however, the scripts provide a window onto the ways in which the American and Chinese (American) staff who collectively designed and recorded VOA broadcasts in Chinese dialects sought to marry American Cold War cultural policy with a “China literacy” that sections of the US military and intelligence community had developed in the latter stages of World War II. The result was a far more complex set of Chinese-dialect broadcasts than we might expect from an organization that has long been associated with anti-communist propaganda.

### **VOA’s Chinese Branch**

VOA was established during World War II with the intention of spreading American news and media to various countries all over the world. Originally attached to the War Office in 1942, it was taken over by the State Department in 1945, thus being directly linked to American public diplomacy in the immediate post-war years. Headquartered in New York, but using transmitting stations at various locations around the world, VOA began targeting the Soviet Union in 1947, and “quickly became the nation’s ideological arm of anticommunism, seeking to win allies at the same time that it tried to discredit the Soviet Union and other communist nations”.<sup>21</sup> By the early 1950s, VOA had become one of the preeminent instruments of American overseas propaganda, broadcasting to a global audience

in various languages. Uniquely, it targeted non-elite listeners “in a manner Americans hoped would appeal to local customs and ideals”,<sup>22</sup> thus providing a direct link between the US Government and local populations in parts of the world where a physical American presence was often limited.

From even before the founding of the PRC, VOA had been sourcing and producing Chinese-language content at the office of USIS in Hong Kong – an institution that is also explored in Kenny K. K. Ng’s Chapter 5 – collating such material in New York and broadcasting it into China via transmitters in Manila and Honolulu (and, for a short time, via local stations in Hong Kong).<sup>23</sup> All VOA broadcasts to China were initially in English and Mandarin, with Cantonese broadcasts starting only in August 1949, just weeks before the establishment of the PRC.<sup>24</sup> The initial focus on the use of Mandarin by VOA’s Chinese Branch reflected a desire to appeal to a broad, national-level audience on the China mainland; the decision to start Cantonese broadcasting reflected the practicalities of access to Hong Kong, and therefore to recently arrived refugees from neighbouring Guangdong Province.<sup>25</sup> Despite efforts to jam reception of VOA all over China, CCP campaigns designed to denigrate clandestine listeners and the introduction of punitive measures against PRC citizens caught tuning in to VOA broadcasts, USIS and its allies noted with some satisfaction in 1950 that “ordinary people in Guangzhou all had a good impression of VOA”, partly because its Cantonese broadcasts were incomprehensible to north Chinese communist cadres in the city.<sup>26</sup>

Despite the fact that mainland China would remain the main emphasis of VOA’s Chinese broadcasting over the course of the Cold War,<sup>27</sup> there was also a clearly diasporic angle to the introduction of Cantonese broadcasts in 1949. Although Mandarin broadcasts were designed primarily with PRC listeners in mind, VOA prepared its broadcasts in Cantonese for both mainland Chinese *and* audiences outside of the PRC.<sup>28</sup> This would set the template for broadcasting in other Chinese “splinter languages”<sup>29</sup> that were introduced by VOA from 1951 onwards. It was in that year that the Chinese Branch began its Amoy and Swatow Services, while occasionally also producing broadcasts in Hakka (*Kejiahua*) and in Shanghainese (*Huyu*). While the latter were almost exclusively designed for mainland listeners in the Lower Yangtze delta (or listeners of Shanghainese background in places such as Hong Kong), the addition of the Amoy and Swatow Services reflected a desire to address audiences in Southeast Asia and, indeed, in other parts of the world. It was with some satisfaction that VOA executives noted in 1952, for instance, that “All [VOA] Chinese broadcasts also reach the powerful and wealthy overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, Philippines, and Latin-America [*sic*]”.<sup>30</sup>

In the eyes of American officials, broadcasts in Cantonese, Hokkien and Teochew were necessary precisely because they catered to (and had the potential to influence) diasporic Chinese listeners. Indeed, for the CIA, there was something about the socio-political status of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia that seemed to fit perfectly with radio as a medium. Writing in April 1953, one

unnamed CIA operative, assessing US radio broadcasting in Asia more generally, argued that

[o]f all the targets of Southeast Asia accessible by radio, they [i.e., the overseas Chinese] may be said to be one of the most logical. A group of some 9.6 million, they can be reached by programs in a minimum of dialects. They are likely to be able to afford radios. As a race-conscious group, and as a minority, they lend themselves to community radio devices.<sup>31</sup>

Such reasoning may explain why VOA actually dedicated more of its programming to Chinese dialects than to languages that enjoyed (quasi-) “national” status in east and Southeast Asia in the 1950s. By 1953, VOA was broadcasting three hours per day in Mandarin, ninety minutes per day in Cantonese (i.e., more than that broadcast in Korean), and thirty minutes each day in Hokkien and Teochew, making these latter two dialects equal (in terms of broadcast time) to Malay, Burmese, Indonesian, Thai and Vietnamese. Later in the same decade, and after VOA broadcasting in a number of regional languages such as Malay and Thai was dropped, Cantonese and Hokkien broadcasting continued.<sup>32</sup>

If diasporic audiences were more likely to have access to radio receivers, however, and perhaps even more likely to listen as a community to radio broadcasts, this did not guarantee that they were inclined to accept the VOA message. As VOA executives argued in 1952, “Our [i.e., the Chinese Branch of VOA’s] actual listening audience amongst the overseas Chinese is probably greater than our listening audience on the mainland”.<sup>33</sup> Yet such a vast listenership only meant that VOA had to target its content to a group which it characterized as suffering from divided loyalties and a lack of political engagement:

In our broadcasts to the overseas Chinese, we have attempted to inspire anti-Communist unity, support for local free government, and a sense of belonging in the ranks of anti-Communist fighters. The [VOA Chinese] branch recognizes that among overseas Chinese, who tend to have an apathetic interest in the Cold War as such, special propaganda treatment is required. A straight diet of hard hitting anti-Communist propaganda is not enough; they must also be told why it is in their interests to sympathize with and support the efforts of free countries.<sup>34</sup>

For American broadcasters, the significance of such an “apathetic” group was threefold. Firstly, in the early 1950s, there was an anxiety that many overseas Chinese communities, regardless of where they were based, owed their allegiances to China itself. Secondly, there was a fear (common to both US and Nationalist Chinese officials on Taiwan) that the CCP would seek to use overseas Chinese communities as a “fifth column” in Southeast Asia<sup>35</sup> – a fear that was only heightened by conflicts such as the Malayan Emergency.<sup>36</sup> Finally, there was the long-held belief that the “overseas Chinese” represented communities of an “unusually

strong economic position in Southeast Asian countries” and that they therefore had the potential to shape the region in ways that far outweighed their actual size.<sup>37</sup> As VOA executives themselves put it in 1953: “the overseas Chinese, such as those in Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia, are commercial leaders of the area and hence are extremely influential elements in the population”.<sup>38</sup> Winning the loyalty of this group was therefore a priority for VOA executives.

VOA was certainly not the only broadcaster to target the overseas Chinese in this period, however. An entire ecosystem of often highly politicized broadcasting in Chinese dialects rapidly developed after 1949. VOA operated alongside forms of American radio propaganda such as Radio Free Asia, which was attached to the Asia Foundation and which operated from 1951 to 1953.<sup>39</sup> The Psychological Warfare Section of the UN Command also broadcast in Mandarin and Cantonese in the early 1950s,<sup>40</sup> while Manila-based American Christian broadcasters produced evangelical radio programmes specifically for Chinese audiences at the same time.<sup>41</sup> The BBC, together with local government-run stations in Hong Kong, also broadcast in Cantonese for local audiences and listeners on the mainland,<sup>42</sup> while state-run broadcasters in India and Indochina also broadcast in Mandarin and Cantonese.<sup>43</sup> Later in the decade, Radio Australia would begin a regular Chinese service specifically targeted at overseas Chinese listeners in Southeast Asia (see Figure 6.2), while Radio Malaya (which maintained a close relationship with VOA and the BBC) produced its own content in more Chinese dialects than arguably any other broadcaster, producing programmes in Hakka, Cantonese, Teochew, Hokkien, Fuzhou and Hainanese.<sup>44</sup> In addition, a range of Taipei-based broadcasters were active. These included the Central Broadcasting Corporation (*Zhongyang guangbotai*) – which smothered the PRC with anti-communist news and information from July 1949 onwards, doing so in Mandarin but also in many of the same dialects that VOA would later use (such as Hokkien, Teochew and Shanghainese)<sup>45</sup> – and military radio which sought to appeal to overseas Chinese listeners as well.<sup>46</sup> All of this occurred alongside the efforts of Radio Peking, and the Fujian-based, People’s Liberation Army-affiliated Voice of the Strait (*Haixia zhi sheng*), which broadcast to Taiwan and Southeast Asia in Hokkien as soon as it started operations in 1958.<sup>47</sup>

Despite the almost complete lack of scholarship on the place of Chinese-dialect broadcasting in VOA’s wider work then, it is clear that this American broadcaster represented but one voice in a cacophony of political, faith-based, entertainment and military broadcasting right across the region and beyond, all of which would target mainland *and* diasporic Chinese listeners in a range of languages and dialects.

### **Crafting a “Chinese” voice**

In the early 1950s, VOA’s Chinese Branch was reliant on a range of sources for its content. Many of the scripts that were used by the Chinese Branch in New York were themselves compiled in the United States (both “in house” at VOA, and by external writers who were employed per script).<sup>48</sup> While Ellen Wu is correct in



Figure 6.2 Miss Tan Gek Siam (right) and Mrs Grace Young select records for Radio Australia's Mandarin Service, 1957 (from the collection of the National Archives of Australia, NAA: A1501, A858/2).

pointing out the important role played by Chinese Americans such as Betty Lee Sung in drafting scripts, content was often taken directly from American newspapers such as the *New York Times* or provided by the State Department.<sup>49</sup> In other cases, scripts were written in Hong Kong via USIS, which employed a number of Chinese *émigré* intellectuals for precisely this role.<sup>50</sup> VOA also drew on wider



USIS networks throughout the region when it came to compiling content for the Chinese Branch. For instance, there were plans for interviews with communist defectors in Malaya to be transcribed by staff at the USIS office in Kuala Lumpur for VOA broadcasts.<sup>51</sup> And USIS staff in Taipei supplied “VOA with taped recordings of outstanding local events”.<sup>52</sup>

Nonetheless, VOA’s head office in New York remained the nerve centre for the production, editing and production of the Chinese Branch’s work. Management of the Chinese Branch, and of specific units (or “desks”) within this, was dominated by American men, most of whom could claim a connection to China through academic training or military service. Indeed, VOA made a point of stressing that it was predominantly white American men who oversaw Asian staff right across its Far East Division: “Without exception, each unit and branch chief [in the Far East Division] and the Division chief is an American citizen (Caucasian) who has served in the Far East. With one exception, unit chiefs have served in the countries to which they are assigned”.<sup>53</sup>

The Chinese Branch was nominally directed by Horace H. F. Jayne – a scholar and curator of Asian antiquities who had served on the Commission for the Preservation and Protection of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas following the end of World War II, and who resigned from his post as Vice Director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in April 1949 to take up his new role at VOA.<sup>54</sup> Under Jayne served “service chiefs”, such as John Bottorff, who managed the Mandarin Service from 1950 through until the middle of the decade. A former intelligence officer, Bottorff had studied Chinese at Cornell University and had also spent time at Yenching University (Yanjing daxue) in what is now Beijing prior to 1949.<sup>55</sup> Other managers included James Lanigan – a figure who, as we shall see below, would manage VOA’s Swatow Service. A Fordham and Columbia graduate, Lanigan had worked in Chinese community radio in New York prior to World War II and would later serve as a Chinese Affairs officer at a number of American embassies in Southeast Asia.<sup>56</sup> Another example was Arthur Hart Burling, a former employee of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, one-time Shanghai resident, and avid collector of Chinese antiquities. Burling would write scripts for the Chinese Branch, and would manage the Amoy Service for a number of years.<sup>57</sup>

To be sure, this division of labour at VOA’s Chinese Branch would soon change. From 1954 onwards, for example, the Cantonese and Amoy Services were managed (if only in an “acting” capacity) by a former army translator and VOA announcer called Harold C. Dorn. Dorn may well have been a New York-born American citizen and World War II veteran, but he was also a Chinese American (though there is virtually nothing in the VOA files to suggest his ancestry); his appointment as manager of one of the key “services” at the Chinese Branch thus marked a distinct break from the “Caucasian” management that VOA executives had argued for in 1953.<sup>58</sup>

Men such as Bottorff, Lanigan, Burling and Dorn oversaw the production, writing and editing of scripts from VOA offices in New York (and, from 1954 onwards, Washington, DC). They also managed teams of Chinese announcers (or “cast”),

with the Chinese Branch employing around forty-five such staff in total. Few of these announcers necessarily had a background in broadcasting. Indeed, many were students who had come to the United States from China or Southeast Asia in the 1940s and who were unable to return to China following the communist



*Figure 6.3* Mort Presting during his time at radio stations KOMO and KJR (Seattle), circa 1940s (Courtesy of John Schneider and Christopher Mael).

revolution of 1949.<sup>59</sup> What all seem to have had in common was a disdain of communism; many were also chosen due to their “good voices”. As Mort Presting – a regional production supervisor for Far East broadcasts at VOA in 1950, and yet another individual to whom we shall return later in this chapter – explained to *The New Yorker* in 1950: “We had to scout around for people with good voices who could translate intelligently as well as idiomatically. They aren’t easy to find”.<sup>60</sup>

VOA sourced many of its New York-based Chinese “cast” from amongst the Chinese student cohort at the two universities from which a number of its managers had also graduated, i.e., Fordham and Columbia. A regular presenter with the VOA Amoy Service in the early 1950s, for example, was Sheng-Hwa Hong.<sup>61</sup> A published historian,<sup>62</sup> Hong was both a translator and announcer for VOA from the late 1940s through until 1954, while also working as a language instructor for State Department employees. After being naturalized as an American citizen in 1953, Hong would serve for USIS in Vietnam and Hong Kong in later years.<sup>63</sup> Kew Chan (also a Fordham and Columbia alumnus) served as a translator and presenter for VOA’s Cantonese Service and gave “many years of service” to the broadcaster; like Hong, the Hong Kong-born Chan was granted US citizenship with the help of his VOA superiors in the mid-1950s.<sup>64</sup> The Wesleyan College graduate Mary Euyang Loh – the scion of a well-connected Shanghai family who would later marry the VOA executive Raymond Swing and rise to become chief of VOA’s Asian feed programme – was the preferred choice for Shanghaiese broadcasts in the early 1950s.<sup>65</sup>

VOA’s Chinese Branch was thus home to a significant body of Chinese students cum translators and announcers (most of whom joined the broadcaster before they acquired US citizenship), and a team of “China-literate” American managers, all of whom had a personal interest in and knowledge of China prior to 1949.

## **Dialect broadcasting**

All of the services offered by this team at VOA’s Chinese Branch broadcast a similar combination of daily programmes in the early 1950s, including news reports (abridged selections of regional news compiled as eight-minute segments); “foot-notes” (extended analyses, often of life in the communist world, which could last for up to thirty minutes); “commentaries” (thirty-minute editorial programmes covering current affairs); and musical programmes (which, in this early period, were dominated by American content, ranging from American folk music to Bing Crosby songs).

To be sure, a good deal of VOA broadcasting in this period served as a platform for promoting the United States, via “Americana” (i.e., features on the institutions, culture, arts and music of the United States) as well as more political content which sought to project a positive view of the United States, especially on questions of race relations and immigration. Ellen D. Wu notes that this was done partially by focusing on news of the achievements of successful Chinese Americans;<sup>66</sup> the much celebrated story of “American Mother of 1952” Toy Len Goon – a “model Chinese American woman” – was turned into a VOA feature

that was later broadcast by the Mandarin, Cantonese, Amoy and Swatow Services, for instance.<sup>67</sup> There were also VOA broadcasts in various dialects (catering to overseas Chinese listeners) which illustrated the contributions of the Chinese to American life even while claiming that the “lingering memory of China” still burned “in their hearts”.<sup>68</sup> However, this was only part of the story. Features discussing “The Phantom American Negro” by conservative journalists such as George Schuyler were also translated into Chinese and broadcast via the Mandarin, Amoy and Swatow Services.<sup>69</sup> Selling Cold War America to China and the Chinese diaspora meant dealing head-on with socialist criticism of racism in the United States – an issue that, as Meredith Oyen shows, continued to be seen as a potential threat to America’s image abroad.<sup>70</sup>

For the most part, however, the Chinese Branch designed much of its content, especially when it came to news and current affairs, around developments in Asia, from news of the conflict in Korea to information about internal developments in the PRC. Moreover, a good deal of this content was replicated across all services on the same day. Indeed, it appears that the scripts themselves were passed between different dialect desks,<sup>71</sup> with specific instructions that news reports should be “identical” regardless of the dialect in which they were broadcast.<sup>72</sup> In 1951, for example, the regular “Hong Kong Report” (*Xianggang jianbao*) – an eight-minute segment that was compiled in English before being translated into Chinese and which included “a digest of our special reports from Hong Kong, containing information of interest to our listeners throughout the Far East. . . [based on] . . . reliable sources in Hong Kong and nearby countries” – was broadcast by the Mandarin, Cantonese and Amoy Services alike.<sup>73</sup> Such reports were one of the main ways in which VOA informed listeners outside the PRC of (usually unhappy) political and social developments behind the “Bamboo Curtain”.

Significantly, however, even when working from a master script for a regular feature of this sort, it is clear that differences *did* develop between the different dialect desks – something that only becomes evident once we start to examine the broadcast scripts themselves. News relating specifically to developments in Shanghai, for example, was sometimes marked “not for Cantonese” on the master scripts (while still being broadcast in Mandarin),<sup>74</sup> suggesting a process of editing out content that was deemed unlikely to appeal to listeners in Guangzhou or Hong Kong, or amongst Cantonese speakers elsewhere. And for the “Hong Kong Report” broadcast on 30 April 1951, the Amoy and Swatow Services stressed news specific to Fujian and eastern Guangdong – in this case reports of the People’s Liberation Army “planting mines along the South China Coast, especially around Amoy and Swatow”.<sup>75</sup> In other cases, entire sections of reports, originally drafted for use across all dialect services, would be edited for reasons which may have reflected a perceived bias amongst specific listening communities. A script written by Mary Euyang Loh in 1951 on the fate of Christian colleges in China following 1949 was edited when it arrived at the Amoy Desk, for example, so that references to such colleges’ contributions to the education of Chinese women, and negative depictions of the Buddhist priesthood and the imperial Chinese civil service, were removed when it was broadcast to Hokkien listeners.<sup>76</sup>

While provincially specific content might be edited out of broadcasts in one dialect, newsworthy items could also be added when these were deemed relevant to other potential audiences. “Attention Amoy and Swatow Desks” was the call in February 1951 when items of news relating to the Malayan Chinese Association (i.e., the government-aligned organization that had been created in 1949 to assist British colonial resettlement programmes in Malaya) reached VOA producers in New York.<sup>77</sup> Similarly, reports specific to current affairs in Indonesia were habitually translated for the Amoy Desk (but not, for example, for the Cantonese Desk) suggesting a very deliberate attempt to target Hokkien-speaking communities in that country,<sup>78</sup> while the Amoy Desk made use of reliably anti-communist editorials from the Jakarta-based Chinese-language newspaper the *Thien Sung Yit Po* (*Tiansheng ribao*) when detailing the apparent ideological dishonesty of Chinese communism.<sup>79</sup>

In other words, editorial decisions made by specific dialect desks in New York – recorded in redactions, omissions, additions or comments scribbled in the margins of the broadcast scripts – suggest a sensitivity to the perceived regional specificities of Cantonese-, Hokkien- and Teochew-listening audiences. In part, this reflected an assumption that China-based and diasporic listeners would share an interest in news about developments in China itself (and specifically in the *qiaoxiang* – i.e., the towns and counties in which diasporic communities could claim ancestry) but also (and conversely) that diasporic news in parts of Southeast Asia would be both familiar and appealing to specific communities (according to dialect) on the mainland (perhaps due to familial ties in the region). This meant underlining links between diasporic communities in Southeast Asia and China. It also involved enhancing apparent differences between specific dialect-based audiences (e.g., by propagating a more conservative version of reports through the Amoy Desk). Thus, while VOA’s Chinese Branch was supposedly replicating the same message of anti-communism and American exceptionalism across different dialect-based services, desks were making subtle editorial decisions that led to the development of different content across the branch. This can perhaps best be illustrated by observing in some detail the broadcast scripts that were developed for one particular VOA service that operated between 1951 and 1953 – the Swatow Service.

### **“This Swatow program is your program!”: VOA Teochew broadcasting**

In the wider story of VOA broadcasting, the Swatow Service is but a minor footnote. It started in tandem with the introduction of Portuguese broadcasting by VOA in Europe,<sup>80</sup> and it was shut down in 1953. When the then VOA Programmes Chief Alfred Puhan was questioned in Congress about his employer’s operations in 1953, he had to be asked to spell out the word “Swatow” – evidence, perhaps, of how little concern there was about the service in Washington.<sup>81</sup> Nonetheless, the Swatow Service provides us with a clear picture of how VOA sought to appeal to specific, dialect-based audiences (in both the PRC and in Southeast Asia), and

how the broadcaster's staff imagined – and even tried to invent – a transnational but dialect-bound community of listeners. The Swatow Service was managed by James Lanigan, with input from colleagues such as Mort Presting. It had on staff a “cast” of presenters such as Margaret Liu, Chester H. Sung and Raymond Chan, and producers such as Hubbert P. Tsai.<sup>82</sup>

The “Swatow Opening Show” was broadcast on 15 March 1951, with the script for the show being developed by Presting, and translated and presented by members of the Swatow cast. From the outset, there was a clear attempt to distinguish this new service from other services offered by the Chinese Branch and to foster a sense of intimacy with listeners: “Thank you for letting us into your homes and shops” read the desk’s announcers, all of whom identified themselves to listeners by name. Indeed, the announcers even appear to have sought to enhance this sense of intimacy by tweaking their scripts; more direct forms of address in the original Chinese script (e.g., “*nin*” as the plural form of “you”, for example) were replaced by more inclusive terms (e.g., “*dajia*” or “everyone”). “This Swatow program is your program”, claimed the announcers: “Tell us what you want to hear”.<sup>83</sup>

What is perhaps most remarkable about this programme is just how, at first, so little overtly political content it included (in contrast to a good deal of other VOA content in the spring of 1951). While almost all non-musical content in other dialects up until this time was abundantly anti-communist in nature, there was little to give the Swatow show much of a Cold War “feel” at its inception, presaging, perhaps, VOA’s post-1953 shift away from unsubtle propaganda and towards more entertainment-laden programming.

What the opening show lacked in political content, however, it made up for in parochial pride. VOA did not simply claim to be “proud to greet its listeners in the Chau Chiu [*sic*] dialect” (a group it referred to in the script as “*Chaozhouhua tingzhong*”, or the “Teochew listenership”), but also tried to align itself to claims of Teochew exceptionalism and antiquity, lauding the dialect itself (which in the Chinese translation of the script it referred to as a “*yuyan*” or language), as well as the people who spoke it. “This dialect [i.e., Teochew] is one of the oldest in all China” wrote Presting in the English script for the opening show (from which the Chinese version of the script was derived), and “even the present day customs of the Swatow people reflect the traditions and culture of old China”.

More provocatively, the show invoked the memory of Ming-era pirate Limahong (Lin Feng) “a man from Chao chou [*sic*] who sailed against the Spanish, defeated them and established a foothold for China on the [Philippine] islands”. As recent historical scholarship has shown, the figure of Limahong is indeed largely associated with the Chaozhou region of China – though archival evidence about his actual origins remains scant. Fighting against both the Ming and Spanish authorities in the Philippines, Limahong and his crew raided ports and towns in Fujian, Hainan and the Philippines from the late 1560s through until the 1570s, even sacking Manila in 1574.<sup>84</sup> More significantly for our current discussion, however, Limahong was interpreted both as a distinctly *Chinese* hero, and as a swashbuckling figure in Philippine history in the twentieth century,<sup>85</sup> thus making him malleable enough for VOA executives who were seeking to appeal both to

clandestine PRC listeners in eastern Guangdong and to Teochew-speaking (and -listening) communities in Southeast Asia.

Strikingly, such content veered very close to the language of anti-imperialism that was prevalent in the PRC at this time, especially in its references to the expulsion of a European power from Asia. Indeed, it is ironic that Teochew programmes from VOA, which celebrated a supposedly anti-colonial hero who had taken Manila from the Spanish, were being broadcast throughout Asia thanks to American access to transmission facilities in Manila itself. This may even suggest an attempt on the part of VOA to co-opt broader anti-colonial sentiment into the service of American propaganda. Rather than propagate a “voice of America”, the Swatow Service announced itself to the world as a voice of Teochew nativism.

Some of the content of the Swatow Opening Show proved too parochial even for some VOA executives. A handwritten and unattributed note in the margin of the programme notes – and reading “somewhat charged” – suggests that such content was viewed as potentially problematic. Nonetheless, it appears that American executives such as Mort Presting and James Lanigan in New York may have been unaware of the more politicized ways in which Limahong was described by their Teochew-speaking staff. Limahong was described in the Chinese-language version of the script with reference to a term that was being frequently used in this same era to reference Chiang Kai-shek (i.e., “*lingxiu*”, or “leader”).

Similarly, the English and Chinese versions of the scripts offer insights into divergent views at the Swatow Desk on VOA’s potential audience. Here is the original English script from which the Chinese staff emphasized imagined listeners in the PRC who would potentially benefit from the start of this new service:

We salute all our friends in the Chao [*sic*] district, in Swatow, Tahao, Chao An and in every Swatow speaking community on the mainland. We greet also all our Swatow friends in South East Asia, particularly the large communities in Thailand.

When the text was translated into Chinese, however, the imagined geography of VOA’s Teochew-listening audience was significantly broadened to include Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam and Burma, suggesting a keener awareness of the distribution of dialect-specific communities on the part of VOA announcers than on the part of management.

Perhaps more importantly, the Swatow Service sought to develop its own types of programming distinct from PRC-focused news, Americana features and anti-Soviet stories (all of which it also continued to broadcast, just as the Mandarin, Cantonese and Amoy Services did). It did this by exploiting the art of Chaozhou street storytelling (*jianggu*), a form that would eventually emerge as a major source of entertainment for radio audiences in Southeast Asia later in the decade<sup>86</sup> and which was also being experimented with at this same time by other broadcasters such as Radio Malaya and Rediffusion.<sup>87</sup>

VOA began experimenting with this form in April 1952, with a broadcast based on a folk story/morality play under the title “The Gratitude of the Snake”/“She

bao en". Written originally in English for the Swatow Desk by James Lanigan, this was a folk tale – one which drew on a genre of Buddhist-inspired stories involving nonviolence towards snakes and karmic retribution<sup>88</sup> – about a young scholar who is saved by a snake that he has cared for since childhood while traveling to the capital to take the imperial examinations.<sup>89</sup> Ironically, the scripts list the “Swatow storyteller” as James Lanigan himself, although the story was read by an announcer listed as Wing Liang, and listeners all over the world were invited to write to VOA in New York to request written versions of the story to be sent to them. The announcer clearly found elements of the story, once it had been translated into Chinese, challenging to read in Teochew, for the script is full of annotations, in Romanized script, noting how certain characters should be pronounced in the dialect.<sup>90</sup>

There is little in the “Gratitude of the Snake” that makes it overtly (or even allegorically) political. Stories of karmic retribution were part of traditions that predated the Cold War, and their use in Chinese folklore were by no means unique to the anti-communist bloc. However, by deploying tropes such as the scholar and his thankful snake, and reviving them in the form of *jianggu*, VOA was presenting itself a preserver of local traditions and forms of Teochew cultural expression (despite the fact that, in this case, the story had been re-written by an American official) even while its news broadcasts highlighted the CCP’s supposed tendency to attack these same traditions and beliefs. What was most important here, however, was the form itself (rather than the story that was revised through it). Indeed, the evolution of the *jianggu* form at the Swatow Desk would suggest that the key issue was attracting a socially conservative listenership to VOA, rather than celebrating supposedly “traditional” Teochew folk stories.

While early instalments of the “Swatow Storyteller” had regaled listeners with stories of serpentine gratitude, the show had, by late 1952, moved into quite different territory. Towards the end of the year, Lanigan crafted a multipart script for broadcast under the title “The Spanish General”. This *jianggu* broadcast, also recorded by Wing Liang, and produced by Hubbert P. Tsai, was based not on a traditional folk tale. Rather, it was derived from a recently published autobiographical novel entitled *El Campesino: Life and Death in Soviet Russia* by Valentín González. Published in 1952, this book told the story of a Spanish Republican military leader who moved to the Soviet Union in 1939 following the victory of Francisco Franco’s forces in the Spanish Civil War, only to regret his decision after being sent to work in Soviet gulags. Books such as this were regular fodder for USIS in the 1950s and were often translated into Chinese for use in American propaganda through the wider Books in Translation Program – a programme through which various works of literature that encouraged anti-communist sentiment were distributed internationally.<sup>91</sup> With the aid of “Spanish music” and lively *jianggu* storytelling, however, even an entirely non-Chinese story such as this one could be transformed into Teochew content for the VOA Swatow Desk. It could be married to regional forms of Chinese performance traditions in the hope that an ideological message could be made more palatable to a trans-Asian “Swatow listenership”.<sup>92</sup>



## **Conclusion: provincial “voices” in the Chinese cultural Cold War**

VOA’s Swatow Service was discontinued in 1953 – a cut that was made in tandem with the decision to discontinue VOA broadcasts in a range of languages at the same time, from Malay to Portuguese.<sup>93</sup> Yet the Amoy Service continued until 1963, while the Cantonese (and Mandarin) Service continues even today.<sup>94</sup> Even without Swatow broadcasting after 1953, therefore, VOA established itself as an important “voice” in the Chinese cultural Cold War, with numerous Chinese *émigré* intellectuals – from the author Maria Yen (Yan Guilai) to the stars of the Amoy-dialect film industry<sup>95</sup> – all passing through its doors at some stage.

By examining the ways in which each of VOA’s Chinese-dialect services developed according to quite different notions of what a transnational “Amoy” or “Swatow” audience might expect or need, we can garner a sense of the ways in which VOA tried to appeal to diasporic (and coastal PRC) audiences, as well as how VOA itself played a role in shaping diasporic identities in the early Cold War. This is important for any consideration of contested notions of Chineseness, not simply because it highlights the roles of decidedly non-Chinese actors in such developments, but also because it complicates the very terms we use – including “Chineseness”. If listeners to VOA Swatow broadcasts in early 1950s Bangkok, Hong Kong or Shantou heard something different (in both form and content) to listeners of VOA Amoy broadcasts in Penang, Manila or Xiamen, for example, how did such differences influence the development (or decline) of distinct cultural affinities based around shared dialects? And did VOA’s attempts to exploit regional parochialism or nativism perhaps even strengthen new forms of regional identity?

In addition, broadcasting as a medium forces us to consider not just content but sound. In light of recent research on radio in the early PRC which has stressed the importance of pronunciation, the sociology of *putonghua* (Mandarin), and the centrality of sound to state broadcasters – e.g., the development of a standard Chinese “communist radio voice” in the very same period in which VOA was experimenting with Cantonese, Hokkien and Teochew “radio voices” – it is imperative that we bring questions of dialect back into debates about the Chinese cultural Cold War.<sup>96</sup> Future research may go some way further in determining what a “pro-American”, Cold War Cantonese, Amoy or Teochew voice sounded like, for example.

In considering such questions, we should acknowledge the importance of dialects that were mutually unintelligible yet which circulated throughout the region via not just radio but also via recorded music, cinema, and performing and dramatic arts (many of which were also unique to specific regions of coastal China). As I have argued elsewhere:

we need to consider how imagined “Fujians” (or, for that matter, imagined Chaozhou or Guangzhou) – and not simply rival visions of China – were being continually created, re-created, and circulated throughout East and Southeast Asia during the 1950s. . . . We also need to consider how

provincial-level discussions about cultural heritage played a crucial role in this same [Cold War] conflict.<sup>97</sup>

With this in mind, Xiaojue Wang's argument about radio broadcasts playing a role in the "identity formation of a newly emergent and consolidated Sinophone



Figure 6.4 Poster advertising VOA Hokkien Service in Taiwan. Produced by USIA, 1950–1955 (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD; file no. 306-PPA-244).

community that cannot be contained within ideological parameters” is only partially correct.<sup>98</sup> VOA – together with a host of other broadcasters that operated across Asia in the 1950s, broadcasting in a range of languages – contributed to the creation and sustenance of dialect-based forms of “cultural identity” (e.g., a “Teochew listenership”) that were in a constant state of flux as broadcasters defined and redefined what it meant to “sound” and “be” Cantonese, Hokkien or Teochew; adopted and reformed provincial-based forms of cultural expression for new purposes; and created new canons and pantheons based on what they expected imagined audiences wanted to hear. The fact that such efforts involved not just the translation of news and comment in various dialects, but also the revival and celebration of regionally based media, genres and stories suggests the existence of a complex set of overlapping dynamics that notions such as “Chineseness” – or, for that matter, “the Sinophone” – do not adequately address.

## Notes

- 1 Research for this chapter was made possible through the COTCA Project and received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (Grant Number 682081).
- 2 “Meiguo zhi yin” [Voice of America], *Zhongguo yi yue* (Taipei) 292 (November 1955): 15.
- 3 See, for instance, He Liyi (with Claire Anne Chik), *Mr China’s Son: A Villager’s Life* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 305.
- 4 China is also a key feature of institutional histories of VOA. Alan Heil’s authoritative book, for instance, starts with the story of VOA’s role in reporting on the events of June 1989 in Beijing. See Alan L. Heil, Jr., *Voice of America: A History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
- 5 Lu Xun, “The American Cold War in Hong Kong, 1949–1960: Intelligence and Propaganda”, in *Hong Kong in the Cold War*, ed. Priscilla Roberts and John M. Carroll (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 132.
- 6 Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: California University Press, 2003).
- 7 Ellen D. Wu, “‘America’s Chinese’: Anti-Communism, Citizenship, and Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War”, *Pacific Historical Review* 77, no. 3 (2008): 391–422.
- 8 Jeremy E. Taylor, “Lychees and Mirrors: Local Opera, Cinema, and Diaspora in the Chinese Cultural Cold War”, *Twentieth-Century China* 43, no. 2 (2018): 163–80.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 165.
- 10 Phillip B. Guingona, “A Ghost and His Apparition Roam the South China Sea: Limahong and the Dream of a Hokkien Nation”, *Translocal Chinese: East Asian Perspectives* 11 (2017): 90–124.
- 11 Guo Yonghu, “Soft Containment: US Psychological Warfare Against China in the 1950s and 1960s”, in *Going Soft? The US and China go Global*, ed. Priscilla Roberts (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 141–58.
- 12 Shuang Shen, “Empire of Information: The Asia Foundation’s Network and Chinese-Language Cultural Production in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia”, *American Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (2017): 589–610.
- 13 Linda Risso, “Radio Wars: Broadcasting in the Cold War”, *Cold War History* 13, no. 2 (2013): 147.
- 14 Robert William Pirsein, *The Voice of America: An History of the International Broadcasting of the United States Government, 1940–1962* (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 199.

- 15 Jeff Blackwell, “The ‘China Lobby’: Influences on U.S.-China Foreign Policy in the Post War Period, 1949–1954”, *Forum Journal of History* 2, no. 1 (2010): 43–58.
- 16 Pirsein, *The Voice of America*, 203.
- 17 Meredith Oyen, “Communism, Containment and the Chinese Overseas”, in *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds*, ed. Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu and Michael Szonyi (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 59–93.
- 18 On VOA’s role in “modernizing” Asian languages in the early 1950s, see Ernest Maas, “New Languages for the New Asia”, *The Modern Language Journal* 35, no. 3 (March 1951): 187–92.
- 19 Xiaojue Wang, “Radio Culture in Cold War Hong Kong”, *Interventions* 20, no. 8 (2018): 1156.
- 20 Some recordings of news and “American hour” broadcasts in Mandarin and Cantonese from the late 1940s are available at the Library of Congress. However, I am not aware of any recordings of VOA broadcasts in Hokkien, Teochew or Shanghainese that have survived.
- 21 David E. Krugler, *The Voice of America and Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945–1953* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 1.
- 22 Deborah Kisatsky, “Voice of America and Iran, 1949–1953”, *Intelligence and National Security* 14, no. 3 (1999): 163.
- 23 Chi-kwan Mark, *Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations 1949–1957* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 37–38.
- 24 “Voice of America: Augmented broadcasts to the Far East”, *South China Morning Post*, 2 August 1949, 12.
- 25 Lu, “The American Cold War in Hong Kong, 1949–1960”.
- 26 Shi Song, “Meiguo zhi yin zai Guangzhou” [Voice of America in Guangzhou], *Hua-qiao ribao* (Hong Kong), 9 October 1950.
- 27 On-line interview with former VOA Chinese Branch employee, 8 January 2021.
- 28 On this distinction between PRC audiences and diasporic audiences (and the importance of dialect broadcasting for the latter), see Xu Mu, “Meiguo zhi yin de Huayu guangbo” [Voice of America’s Chinese Broadcasting], *Guangbo zazhi* (Taipei) 185 (October 1960): 5.
- 29 Foy D. Kohler, “Voice of America”, *Naval War College Information Service for Officers* 3, no. 9 (1951): 1–20.
- 30 *Overseas Information Programs of the United States: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session [Eighty-third Congress, First Session] on Overseas Information Programs of the United States*, Volume 5, Parts 1–2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), 1311.
- 31 Central Intelligence Agency, “Memorandum for Special Assistant to the President; International Radio Broadcasting by Radio Free Asia”, 1 April 1953, accessed 12 December 2020, [www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0000846953.pdf](http://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000846953.pdf)
- 32 Pirsein, *The Voice of America*.
- 33 *Overseas Information Programs of the United States*, 1324.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 1324–25.
- 35 This was a topic of VOA dialect programmes, in fact, such as Arthur H. Burling, “Political Commentary: The Mask has been Torn Off”, 10 July 1951; “Chinese – Amoy – Commentary”, Box 163; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts, 1948–1954; USIA, Record Group 306; National Archives, Philadelphia (hereafter, all broadcast scripts cited from Record Group 306 at the National Archives, Philadelphia, will be listed simply as “VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP”). This programme warned against CCP agents that had been “sent to all parts of the world where there are large groups of Overseas Chinese”.
- 36 On such fears with regards to PRC influence in Malaya, see Jeremy E. Taylor, “‘Not a Particularly Happy Expression’: ‘Malayanization’ and the China Threat in Britain’s

- Late-Colonial Southeast Asian Territories”, *Journal of Asian Studies* 78, no. 4 (2019): 789–808.
- 37 Central Intelligence Group, “Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia”, 2 December 1946, accessed 12 December 2020, [www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-01617A002800100004-6.pdf](http://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-01617A002800100004-6.pdf).
- 38 *Overseas Information Programs of the United States*, 1308.
- 39 Robert Blum, “The Work of the Asia Foundation”, *Pacific Affairs* 29, no. 1 (1956): 47.
- 40 *Overseas Information Programs of the United States*, 1323.
- 41 Russell P. Skelchy, “The Afterlife of Colonial Radio in Christian Missionary Broadcasting of the Philippines”, *South East Asia Research* 28, no. 3 (2020): 344–62.
- 42 Wang, “Radio Culture in Cold War Hong Kong”.
- 43 *Overseas Information Programs of the United States*, 1324.
- 44 Central Intelligence Agency, “Memorandum for Special Assistant to the President”.
- 45 Gary D. Rawnsley, “Taiwan’s Propaganda Cold War: The Offshore Islands Crises of 1954 and 1958”, *Intelligence and National Security* 14, no. 4 (1999): 82–101.
- 46 Song Naihan, “Ziyou Zhongguo de guangbo shiye” [The Broadcast Industry in Free China], *Guangbo zazhi* (Taipei) 7, no. 2 (July 1954): 3–5.
- 47 This broadcaster still exists. Details of its history can be found here: [www.vos.com.cn/about/introduction.shtml](http://www.vos.com.cn/about/introduction.shtml). I thank M. Paulina Hartono for bringing this broadcaster to my attention.
- 48 On-line interview with former VOA Chinese Branch employee, 8 January 2021.
- 49 See, for example, “Communist Letter Writing”, 15 March 1951; “Chinese – Amoy – Commentary: Communist Letter Writing”, Box 156; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 50 Such scripts and their Hong Kong-based authors are listed in *Overseas Information Programs of the United States*, 949.
- 51 Jack A. Gertz to J. N. McHugh (USIS, Kuala Lumpur), 11 July 1952; “Voice of America”, 1957/0673531; PR 948/1949; Arkib Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.
- 52 United States Information Service (Taipei Office), *The Voice of America* (Taipei: USIS, c. 1952), no page numbers.
- 53 *Overseas Information Programs of the United States*, 1311.
- 54 “Resignation of Horace H. F. Jayne as Vice Director of the Metropolitan Museum”, Metropolitan Museum of Art News Release, 14 April 1949, accessed 19 January 2021, <https://libmma.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16028coll12/id/325>.
- 55 “Expert in Chinese Joins Air Firm”, *South China Sunday Post*, 8 September 1963, 9; “John Bottorff”, *Las Vegas Review*, 17 August 2008, B6.
- 56 Brief biographical details about Lanigan can be found in “James J. Lanigan and John J. Dillon Named to Public Relations Posts for International Symposium on Wireless Communications”, *Business Wire* (New York), 6 May 1991, 1.
- 57 Department of State, *Biographic Register of the Department of State* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1953), 30; see also Judith and Arthur Hart Burling, “Collecting in Wartime Shanghai”, *Art and Architecture Archive*, 1 August 1944, 49–51. Other details regarding Burling and his colleagues were provided via an on-line interview with former VOA Chinese Branch employee, 8 January 2021.
- 58 Dorn was born in New York in 1909 to Guangdong-born parents. He worked in the postal service prior to World War II and commenced employment with VOA in 1950 as a translator and announcer. Such details are listed in Department of State, *The Biographic Register* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1969), 107. While such publications make no mention of Dorn’s wartime service, he is listed as being a second lieutenant and army interpreter in “Surrender of Hongkong: Delegates for Ceremony at Government House”, *South China Morning Post*, 12 September 1945, 1.
- 59 On-line interview with former VOA Chinese Branch employee, 8 January 2021.

- 60 “Korean Voices”, *The New Yorker*, 15 July 1950, 15–16. Presting was being interviewed in this instance about the Korean Desk of VOA, though Presting would go on two years later to play an important role in the introduction of Teochew broadcasting by VOA.
- 61 I have not been able to ascertain the Chinese names of most of these presenters; in VOA documentation, all are referred to only by their English names.
- 62 Carl Glick and Hong Sheng-Hwa, *Swords of Silence: Chinese Secret Societies – Past and Present* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947).
- 63 “Joining USIS Here”, *South China Morning Post*, 26 January 1965, 7; see also Department of State, *The Biographic Register, 1966* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1966), 248.
- 64 Biographical details about Kew Chan are included in documents relating to his application for US citizenship in 1956 (including a reference from the previously-mentioned Harold C. Dorn). See “Report 861: 85th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives: Kew Chan (Chan Kew), Nancy Tsui Mei (Leung) Chan, and Cecilia (Oi Fan) Chan”, 23 July 1957.
- 65 Harry Gilroy, “Raymond Swing, at 77, looks Back”, *New York Times*, 21 March 1964, 15.
- 66 Wu, “America’s Chinese”.
- 67 On the wider Toy Len Goon story, see Chiou-Ling Yeh, “‘A Sage of Democracy’: Toy Len Goon, American Mother of the Year, and the Cultural Cold War”, *Pacific Historical Review* 81, no. 3 (2012): 432–61.
- 68 This particular description is taken from a script accredited to Betty Lee Sung: “Chinese Activities”, 11 November 1951; “Amoy – Roundup of Chinese Activities”, Box 171; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 69 “Chinese – The Phantom American Negro”, 23 August 1952; Box 276; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 70 Meredith B. Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 130–31.
- 71 As was the case for other broadcasters that operated in Chinese-dialect broadcasting. On this, see Chan Kwok-bun and Yung Sai-shing, “Chinese Entertainment, Ethnicity and Pleasure”, *Visual Anthropology* 18 (2005): 126.
- 72 For instructions to keep the contents of news reports identical across the different services under the Chinese Branch, see Untitled Broadcast Schedule, 8 September 1951; “Chinese – misc”, Box 173; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 73 “Hong Kong Report”, 19 February 1951; “Chinese – feature – Hong Kong Report”, Box 155; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 “Feature”, 20 April 1951; “Swatow – feature”, Box 158; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 76 Mary Euyang Loh, “The Scene Changes”, 11 October 1951; “Amoy – Commentary – The Scene Changes”, Box 169; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 77 Untitled note, 19 February 1951; “Chinese – News”, Box 155; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 78 “News”, 1 March 1952; “Chinese (Amoy) US-Indonesia relations”, Box 261; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 79 “Overseas Chinese Press Content”, 15 August 1952; “Chinese (A) – News and Features”, Box 275; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP. On the political proclivities of this newspaper, see Chang-yao Hoon, “‘A Hundred Flowers Bloom’: The Re-emergence of the Chinese Press in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, in *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce*, ed. Wanning Sun (London: Routledge, 2006), 91–118 (esp. 95).

- 80 Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin* 24, no. 600 (January 1951): 502.
- 81 *Overseas Information Programs of the United States*, 396.
- 82 I have been unable to find any biographical details for most of these individuals.
- 83 The details on the Swatow Opening Show which are cited in this and following paragraphs are drawn from “Swatow Opening Show”, 15 March 1951; “Swatow – Opening”, Box 156; and “Swatow Closing Announcement”, 15 March 1951; “Salute to Shatow” [*sic*], Box 156; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 84 J. Travis Schutz, “Limahong’s Pirates, Ming Mariners, and Early Sino-Spanish Relations: The Pangasinan Campaign of 1575 and Global History from Below”, *Philippine Studies* 67, no. 3–4 (2019): 315–42.
- 85 On the various interpretations of this figure in mid-twentieth-century China and the Philippines, see Guingona, “A Ghost and His Apparition Roam the South China Sea”, esp. 116–17.
- 86 Fiona Tan, “Chinese Street Storytellers”, Singapore Infopedia, 29 July 2014, accessed 12 December 2020, [http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/INFOPEDIA/articles/SIP\\_2014-07-29\\_093914.html](http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/INFOPEDIA/articles/SIP_2014-07-29_093914.html)
- 87 Chan and Yung, “Chinese Entertainment, Ethnicity and Pleasure”.
- 88 On this trope, see Haiyu Chen, “The Road to Redemption: Killing Snakes in Medieval Chinese Buddhism”, *Religions* 10, no. 247 (2019): rel10040247.
- 89 James Lanigan, “Swatow Storyteller”, 7 April 1952; “Chinese (S) – Storyteller”, Box 269; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 90 *Ibid.*
- 91 On this programme, see Greg Barnhisel, “Cold Warriors of the Book: American Book Programs in the 1950s”, *Book History* 13 (2010): 185–217.
- 92 “The Spanish General, Part 13”, 7 October 1952; “Swatow Commentary: The Spanish General #13”, Box 280; VOA Broadcast Master Scripts; RG 306; NAP.
- 93 “‘Voice’ Cuts Back Global Programs”, *New York Times*, 24 May 1953, 1.
- 94 “VOA Languages”. Undated factsheet: [www.VOAnews.com](http://www.VOAnews.com): <https://docs.voanews.eu/en-US-INSIDE/2019/08/01/5b24dbec-c11e-450e-b795-2a7d85cbb75e.pdf>.
- 95 On this, see Jeremy E. Taylor, *Rethinking Transnational Chinese Cinemas: The Amoy-dialect Film Industry in Cold War Asia* (London: Routledge, 2011), 106.
- 96 On the “radio voice” in the early PRC, see M. Paulina Hartono, “‘A Good Communist Style’: Sounding Like a Communist in Twentieth-Century China”, *Representations* 151, no. 1 (2020): 26–50.
- 97 Taylor, “Lychees and Mirrors”, 180.
- 98 Wang, “Radio Culture in Cold War Hong Kong”, 1159.