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CHAPTER 4

Gendered and Generational Archetypes

The role of women in resisting or "collaborating" with the Japanese in wartime China is a lively realm of inquiry, and the topic has already inspired a significant literature. The important contributions of scholars such as Liu Jiurong and Yun Xia have highlighted the gendered ways in which "collaboration" was and continues to be condemned by its critics.[1] While our understanding of the gendered discourse of collaboration has improved as a result of such scholarship, however, there have been far fewer attempts to address gendered archetypes that developed, or were imposed, under occupation. Nicole Huang's analysis of the image of urban Chinese women in wartime Shanghai's print culture is one of the few examples we have of scholarship that seriously addresses such questions.[2]

Contrast this lack of research to the rich literature on gender in the historiography of occupation in modern Europe and the Middle East. On wartime France, scholars such as Francine Muel-Dreyfus have suggested that the transformation of the image of French women under occupation, achieved through the mobilization of older, prewar icons of motherhood, was one of the central pillars of the Vichy project; the "Vichy mother" was equal in importance to the creation of the personality cult around Marshal Pétain.[3] Similarly, gender historians have shown how American occupation authorities and their allies in Iraq in the early 2000s sought to grant agency to women through the creation of new female archetypes, as a means of downplaying notions of female victimhood.[4]

This chapter draws on such scholarly innovations from other contexts as it traces the recycling of older gendered archetypes and the invention of new ones—both male and female—under the RNG. The RNG encouraged new debates about gender and the role of both women and men following its return in 1940. Such debates were not limited to the written word, however. They found their way into imagery and iconography. Gendered archetypes served not simply to provide normative messages about how men and women might behave in Wang Jingwei's China; they also became outlets

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through which various individuals, groups, and institutions could promote sometimes conflicting agendas about what a future, post-war China—and Chinese people—might become.

New Women and Modern Girls

The redefinition of gender roles—and especially the role of women—under Japan's new order had been central to the propaganda programs of a number of client regimes in China prior to 1940. In many cases, however, this meant, not the creation of entirely new roles for women, but the reinforcement of existing ideas that had developed all over East Asia in the decade or more prior to 1937. As Prasenjit Duara notes of the region as a whole, "The advent of war brought women out of the home in increasing numbers to fulfill the goals of the wartime state [in Japan, China, and Manchukuo]. But the fundamental conceptions of women and strategies for directing their role in society appear to have not so much changed as intensified, extended, and expanded to deal with new circumstances."[5] One such figure that was "intensified, extended, and expanded" in wartime China was the "new woman" (*xin nüxing*). As Louise Edwards has shown, the new woman first emerged during the May Fourth period as a reformist challenge to traditional conceptions of Chinese womanhood and was imagined as being "politically aware, patriotic, independent, and educated." Yet the same figure could also be used by the advertising industry for entirely commercial purposes, being presented in the 1920s and 1930s as "glamorous, fashionable, desirable, and available." The tension between these two understandings of the new woman—between "substance and superficiality"—would mirror wider debates about China's modernization throughout the Republican period and would remain unresolved at the time of the Japanese invasion in 1937.[6]

Duara's suggestion that war intensified archetypes such as the new woman is supported by evidence left by regimes like the PGROC. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, for example, the Xinminhui embraced one particular interpretation of the prewar Chinese new woman that had been promoted by conservative Chinese nationalists through the New Life Movement (Xin shenghuo yundong), introduced under Chiang Kai-shek.[7] By calling on New Life ideas, the Xinminhui also set itself apart from Manchukuo, where, as Norman Smith has demonstrated, the "new woman" was generally frowned upon in official discourse in favor of other, more conservative archetypes, such as the "good wife, wise mother" (*liangqi xianmu*).[8] The Xinminhui called openly for the liberation (*jiefang*) of women, opposed

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polygamy, and sought to involve young educated women in propaganda activities.[9] It also manufactured an occupation archetype that I have described as the "PGROC new woman."[10]

In east China, the Daminhui articulated quite different notions of gender. This organization inherited far more conservative ideas about the role of women directly from Manchukuo. For example, the Daminhui celebrated the role of women in occupation nation-building but did so within the bounds of Manchukuo formulae.[11] This Daminhui creation looked almost identical to her Manchukuo sister, and her contributions to "new China" were measured by her willingness to resist "communist" notions of female agency.[12]

Despite the differences between the "PGROC new woman" and variations of the "good wife, wise mother" adopted by the Daminhui, these two pre-RNG occupation archetypes looked remarkably similar. Both adhered to a set of vestimentary norms that were of pre-occupation provenance. They were depicted in occupation print culture and calendar art (*yuefenpai*) in cheongsams that were austere and monochrome in design. They lacked cosmetics and jewelry, and both were groomed conservatively. While both figures were often shown to be in good physical health—their faces were always visible, though they tended not to stare directly at the viewer—they were not seductive.[13]

There was a competitor to such Xinminhui and Daminhui notions of womanhood, however. The Japanese military and Japanese news agencies maintained their own views about what Chinese women under occupation should look like. Such views often differed markedly from those expressed by Chinese collaborators, fitting more closely with an "imperial strategy to rhetorically and symbolically feminize—and thereby emasculate—the colonial subject," through what E. Taylor Atkins and others have referred to as the colonial gaze.[14] From the very start of the occupation, photographs and posters of unnamed *guniang/kūnyan* (young women) were reproduced in significant quantity,[15] with Japanese-language pictorials such as *Dōmei gurafu* featuring sexualized photographs of Chinese women in this mode, often "on location" at famous Chinese landmarks. Such photographic material found parallels in the wistful images of Chinese "modern girls" in the cartoons of the Shanghai-based *Tairiku shinpō*.[16] Others were featured in poster art and broadsides celebrating Japanese success (figure 4.1).

The *guniang/kūnyan* of the Japanese gaze overlapped with figures created in the advertising industry for a decidedly male, Chinese audience. This included a prewar archetype that had inhabited the medium of calendar art in the cities of China's coast and that Tani Barlow has identified as the

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Figure 4.1. Undated (circa 1937) propaganda leaflet showing a "new woman" with a male child welcoming Japanese soldiers in north China. © The Trustees of the British Museum.

"sexy modern girl."[17] For Chinese intellectuals of both the Left and the Right, the modern girl in this guise "contained all of the vices of modernity that were believed to bring forth moral degeneration and hinder China's national salvation."[18] As Hsiao-pei Yen has explained: "She [i.e., the sexy modern girl] symbolised the commoditisation of modernity, without the political features of modernity that a truly enlightened woman would have. She was the enemy of nationalism and a threat to China's nation-building."[19]

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Some scholars have suggested that this modern girl of prewar provenance enjoyed a fraught history under Japanese occupation. In Madeleine Y. Dong's view, for example, the much publicized case of Zheng Pingru—an individual associated with the modern girl image who, in working for the resistance, inspired the plot of Eileen Chang's *Lust, Caution*—sullied the very notion of the modern girl in the RNG and led to this figure being frowned upon under Wang Jingwei.[20] Given the prominence of literati culture under this regime, it might also be assumed that an archetype associated so closely with commercialism would not be welcomed in RNG China.

In examining the visual record, however, it is clear that this is not the entire story. The modern girl played a number of roles before, during, and after the *huandu*. For example, as had been the case prior to the war, the sexy modern girl could be invoked by the commercial sector simply for marketing purposes. The addition of an alluring modern girl to posters, calendars, or newspaper advertisements could help to project a business-as-usual message. This was something that both Japanese and Chinese firms were keen to underline after the *huandu*. Newspapers (and, of course, periodicals like the *Kabun*) were full of advertisements that made use of the modern girl image to sell cigarettes, cosmetics, and (most importantly) pharmaceuticals in 1940.[21]

In other cases, real-life celebrities reprised the role of the sexy modern girl in print advertising. Li Xianglan—that "enduring symbol of the Chinese culture produced within Japanese-occupied Manchuria"[22]—had played *kūnyan*-esque characters as well as PGROC new women for Japanese cinema audiences prior to the *huandu*.[23] In addition, she had been a frequent feature of pictorial propaganda built around the notion of the "harmony of the five races" (*gozoku kyōwa*) in Manchukuo.[24] She had also been made the face of marketing campaigns for Japanese brands such as Shiseido.[25] Such flexibility may explain why Li was chosen to play the role of "modern girl" in advertising that conflated occupation policies and consumption in the lead-up to the RNG's return. Posing in a tight, short-sleeved cheongsam as she applied eyedrops, Li Xianglan was pictured regularly in print advertisements for the Japanese pharmaceutical firm Rohto in 1939 and 1940 that blurred the boundaries between marketing and political communications (figure 4.2).

Li Xianglan's emergence as the quintessential modern girl in commercial advertising—promoting cosmetics, eyedrops, and occupation itself—underlines the importance of Japanese news agencies in the circulation of this archetype. Indeed, it was Mainichi, through its flagship *Kabun*, that took the opportunity presented by the signing of the Treaty concerning Basic Relations in November 1940 to craft a new, south China modern girl

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Figure 4.2. *Kabun* advertisement (1940) featuring Li Xianglan applying Rohto eye drops. Courtesy of Rohto Pharmaceutical Company.

who would sell the occupation to the Chinese reading public. The result was Li Huizhen. Li may never have been a real person, but she was presented by Mainichi as a nineteen-year old, Guangzhou-based journalist when she was first featured in a staged photo shoot designed by the *Kabun* as a "movie on paper" (*zhishang gongying*) at the start of 1941.[26] Her image would appear again in various occupation outlets over the following months (figure 4.3), often in association with the phrase "*Zhong-Ri tixi*"

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Figure 4.3. Cover image of Dōmei-published *Huanan huabao* (South China graphic), 1941, featuring Li Huizhen (*left*) and a Japanese companion. Courtesy of the East Asia Library, Stanford University.

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(Sino-Japanese mutual assistance), a slogan that had been common in the Daminhui and Xinminhui lexicons.[27]

Dressed in a sleeveless cheongsam and high heels and wearing her hair in a style reminiscent of Li Xianglan, Li Huizhen was a composite of modern girls who had been featured in 1930s calendar art and *huandu*-era medicinal advertising. Pictured alongside a kimono-clad woman by the name of Nobukuni Tamiyo, however, Li was every bit the symbol of the *occupied* modern girl. The photo shoot depicted Li showing Nobukuni prominent sites in Guangzhou that spoke to RNG sensibilities, such as the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (Zhongshan jiniantang) and the city's bund on the Pearl River. The two were photographed next to a wall adorned with a mural of a plump Chinese child and slogans extolling the leadership of Wang Jingwei.

At first glance, there is nothing remarkable about Li Huizhen. In invoking her only in the presence of her Japanese peer, however, the *Kabun* was attempting to graft the basic elements of the sexy modern girl of 1930s print culture onto a genre of propaganda art first developed in Manchukuo in conjunction with the aforementioned *gozoku kyōwa* (harmony of the five races) idea. Images of Chinese and Japanese women enjoying leisurely pursuits in each other's company had been experimented with in occupied Nanjing prior to the *huandu*, most noticeably under the Daminhui.[28] In reviving this trope through Li Huizhen, however, the *Kabun* was suggesting that the Chinese modern girl could have a stake in occupation and that "Sino-Japanese mutual assistance" could be made appealing and glamorous. This was a predictable trajectory for this archetype to follow under occupation. If, as Ellen Johnston Laing has shown, the modern girl could be used to "sell happiness" in 1930s Shanghai,[29] then she could just as easily be employed to sell "Sino-Japanese cooperation" in 1940s Guangzhou.

If modern girls could be invented by Japanese news agencies, however, they could just as easily be appropriated from other spheres. This is precisely what occurred with one female celebrity who would eventually become the unofficial face of the RNG in its modern girl incarnation—Nancy Chan (Chen Yunshang). In the historiography of Chinese cinema, much is made of the sudden rise of this actor by virtue of her lead role in the 1939 Bu Wancang–directed film *Mulan congjun* (Hua Mulan joins the army). This movie was commercially successful in Shanghai because of its allegorical criticism of the Japanese invasion, for it revived the historical fable of Hua Mulan, a female warrior who secretly joins an army to help repel a

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foreign force.[30] As Poshek Fu has pointed out, Chan achieved stardom as the embodiment of resistance via her role in this film.[31] This film also helped Chan establish an extra-diegetic public persona as a "thoroughly 'modern' girl: athletic, vital, and 'Western.' "[32]

Much less commented upon, however, is the extent to which Chan was so easily transformed into a feature of occupation visual culture and, indeed, propaganda.[33] Within a month of the RNG's return, the occupation press was remarking on this "chaste bird of peace" (*heping de zhen qin*), whose "mind used to be full of anti-Japanese thoughts" but who "has now completely changed into a star who believes in supporting peace and the new central government."[34] In this early post-*huandu* period, Chan was transformed from a "south China star" (*Nanguo xiaoxing*) into an "East Asian" celebrity.[35] And as her fame rose, so too did her attraction as a potential mascot for the RNG. Her place in the pantheon of occupation celebrities would be confirmed when she was recruited into the Japanese-backed China United Productions (CUP) in April 1942.[36] Within two years, Chan had eclipsed Li Xianglan as the most lauded modern girl in the occupation culture industry, her face gracing some of the most blatantly pro-occupation pictorials,[37] but also numerous film magazines. Chan's transformation from a symbol of patriotic resistance into a mascot of occupation underlined just how easy it was for existing archetypes to be given entirely new significance under occupation. Nothing had changed in the manner of Chan's appearance pre- and post-*huandu*. Through association with the CUP, however, Chan had become an entirely acceptable modern girl for RNG China (figure 4.4).

Nancy Chan was one of many female celebrities whose glamour portraits were featured on the covers of film magazines published in Shanghai *and* occupied Nanjing (as well as other cities in the RNG realm), for the modern girl remained a central feature of commercial filmmaking.[38] This helps explain why Chinese graphic artists associated with the RNG were able to make names for themselves by experimenting with imagery derived from Shanghai film culture. Dong Tianye, for example, specialized in caricatures of movie stars like Nancy Chan for the occupation press from 1942 onward. Incorporating photomontage techniques that had been developed by a number of prewar Chinese cartoonists, Dong's illustrations (appearing in many of the same movie-themed magazines that featured photography of Nancy Chan) were composed of a photo-realist, oversized likeness of a female star's face set atop a caricatured representation of the sexy modern girl's body.[39] Other artists experimented extensively with more-generic modern girl imagery. When he was not teaching at the Central Propaganda

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Figure 4.4. Cover image of film magazine *Mingxing huabao* 2 (January 1943), featuring a portrait of Nancy Chan. From the Paul Kendel Fonoroff Collection for Chinese Film Studies. Courtesy of the C. V. Starr East Asian Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Institute (CPI), for example, Cao Hanmei produced graceful line drawings of modern girls to accompany serialized fiction in the *Kabun*.[40] Ma Wu and his Japanese peer Miura Noa filled dozens of regime-sponsored pictorials with bawdy and voyeuristic images of modern girls. Such examples show how the occupation modern girl could not simply provide an overt propagandistic message but could also be deployed as a highly sexualized, comic, or supposedly apolitical distraction for an occupied male gaze.[41]

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Over the course of 1942, however, the significance of the modern girl in occupied China's print culture began to shift. The overtly sexual (*seqing*) depictions of this figure became a topic of discord in the creative industries.[42] With the mobilization of female students through the NCM, it became difficult to justify escapist or sexualized depictions of Chinese women more generally. Photographs of Li Huizhen strolling breezily through Guangzhou had fitted perfectly well with calls for peace in late 1940. By late 1942, however, such imagery contradicted the new focus on austerity, activism, and May Fourth nationalism demanded under the NCM. How could a figure formerly revered as either a symbol of peace, treaty port glamour, or escapism be sustained in an RNG that was lamenting the persistence of compradors?[43] In directives published by the CNA, modern girls were criticized for having wasted resources on luxury clothing and cosmetics at a time when they should have been contributing to nation-building. "What does it take for a woman to be called beautiful?" asked an anonymous CNA cadre. "Does she need high heels, a perm, face powder, and curved hips to be beautiful?" For the CNA, beauty lay not in the accoutrements of the modern girl but in the role that occupied China's women could play in defending the nation and increasing levels of industrial production.[44]

This is not to suggest that the modern girl simply disappeared in the face of NCM nationalism, however. On the contrary, if this figure had proven malleable enough to be used in promotion of diverse understandings of occupation in earlier months and years, she could also be worked into the new realities of a post–Pearl Harbor China. Attempts were made by illustrators affiliated with the CCA, for example, to politicize the modern girl so that she might be reimagined as an RNG combatant. In late 1942, for example, Dong Tianye reinvented his modern girl muse—Nancy Chan—in a newly belligerent and decidedly NCM light. In a comic strip published in *Chinese cartoons,* Dong depicted Chan as apprehending and subsequently punching a bomb-throwing resistance agent on the rooftops of Shanghai.[45] Captioned "Exterminate villains" (*pumie qunchou*), a cartoon by Shi Ping in the same journal shows a modern girl (who bears a striking resemblance to Li Lihua) killing ghost-shaped "terrorists" with an insecticide sprayer (figure 4.5). The image directly references early 1930s advertising imagery in China for the iconic Flit gun.[46] In such an iteration, the modern girl could serve as a nostalgic—and perhaps ironic—referent to prewar print culture, while still being presented as a loyal subject of the Wang regime. The modern girl could even be transformed into a mascot of Rural Pacification. In a series of print advertisements produced by the Japanese

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Figure 4.5. A modern girl helps rid Shanghai of (anti-RNG) “terrorists.” Shi Ping, “Pumie qunchou” [Exterminate villains], *Zhongguo manhua* [Chinese cartoons] 1 (September 1942): 7. Courtesy of Shanghai Library.

pharmaceutical company Jintan in May 1944, for example, a lithographic portrait of a smiling modern girl—indistinguishable from any number of modern girls drawn from prewar calendar art—was superimposed with an exhortation to “rapidly unite for Rural Pacification” (*su tuanjie, da qingxiang*) in an advertisement for Jintan household medicines.[47]

If artists working in media such as cartoons tried to reinvent their muses in the context of the Axis turn, however, those working in other

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media simply expunged them. The development of woodcuts and photojournalism in occupied China, for example, largely followed the trajectory already set early in the war in areas outside Japanese control by choosing *not* to explore the frivolous modern girl after 1942. In her place were revived representations of Chinese women that fitted better with the needs of an RNG at war. In the context of Rural Pacification, for example, images of austere working women and female peasants were favored (notwithstanding the interventions of Japanese pharmaceutical companies). Such imagery drew on depictions of new women that had filled the pages of Xinminhui and Daminhui publications earlier in the occupation, yet it also betrayed a common heritage in the leftist woodcut movement of the prewar years. Just as the prewar exponents of this form had consciously sought to differentiate their craft from the garish, mass-produced commercialism of advertising art,[48] so too did RNG woodcut specialists speak to a rural (albeit "pacified") audience far removed from the stylized modern girls that had exercised their peers in Shanghai's newspapers.

This post–Pearl Harbor period also witnessed the rise of the "graceful beauty" (*shinü*) that Nicole Huang has identified as a common feature of wartime print culture in Shanghai. Paintings of "Pan-Asian" Chinese women "wearing either everyday costumes or dramatic clothing," were invoked in this period largely at the expense of the modern girl. Huang explains: "As the Japanese took control of the International Settlement in December 1941 . . . both the enigmatic 'modern girl' and the transnational presence of Hollywood images on the covers of Shanghai's pictorial publications disappeared. Instead. . . . Pan-Asian images dominated the visual culture of occupied Shanghai."[49] Where Shanghai magazine covers had once featured lithographic images of glamorous modern girls à la Li Huizhen or Nancy Chan, they now included images of "graceful aristocratic ladies" produced using the "stylistic traits of traditional figure painting." Such imagery was often produced by female Chinese artists themselves, who did this as a means of "conveying a distinct 'Chinese-ness' within the context of a 'Greater East Asia.'"[50] As modern girls became harder to justify in the context of the Pacific War then, Chinese artists explored new ways of carving out gendered archetypes of occupation that were acceptable to Pan-Asian sensitivities yet could still express a distinctly Chinese vision.

Nevertheless, the modern girl refused to disappear. On the contrary, even as she was being purged from sections of the print media, she was revived in an increasingly escapist commercial Chinese cinema. The creation of the CUP under Japanese leadership in the spring of 1942 and the formation of the China

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United Motion Picture Company (CUMP) in the following year, may well have heralded a cinema that was supposedly Pan-Asian in outlook. The 1943 movie *Eternity* (*Wanshi liufang*)—a film that starred those quintessential modern girls of occupation Li Xianglan and Nancy Chan depicted in a *shinü* mode and that described Chinese resistance to British imperialism during the First Opium War—is often mentioned in studies of occupation-era cinema.[51] *Eternity* was the exception rather than the rule, however, for many of the dozens of films produced in late-war Shanghai featured Chinese celebrities reprising modern girl roles, even when these roles were entirely at odds with official RNG discourse. "If the themes of some films were antiforeign," Edward Gunn Jr. noted in *Unwelcome Muse,* "the life style portrayed in most movies was not." Escapist films featuring the likes of Nancy Chan and Li Lihua—together with pictorials that celebrated these stars by including stills from such movies—provided a space in which the modern girl could thrive.[52] In such cases, she could continue do what she had done for advertising campaigns in the early *huandu* period: serve as an apolitical and escapist figure removed from occupation politics.

Roar, China!

Occupied Nanjing is perhaps the last place one would have expected people to appreciate a Soviet stage play. This is precisely what they did, however, when a production of Sergei Tret'iakov's mid-1920s drama *Roar, China!* (*Nuhou ba Zhongguo*)—based on the Wanxian Incident of 1926, during which a British gunboat had shelled a town on the upper reaches of the Yangtze[53]—was staged by the Nanjing Theatrical Society (Nanjing juyishe) in January 1943.[54] The overtly socialist provenance of this play was all but forgotten in reports on the production's success.[55] *Roar, China!* was identified as an excellent vehicle through which to stir anti-Western sentiment (much as the abovementioned film *Eternity* would be a few months later with its cinematic reinterpretation of the First Opium War). Despite premiering in Shanghai some weeks earlier, the 1943 Nanjing production of *Roar, China!* had been modified for the RNG capital by Zhou Yuren (deputy head of Nanjing's publicity bureau) with the assistance of CPI graduates such as Lei Yimin.[56] It started with newsreel footage of Wang Jingwei's declaration of war on the Allies. The play was also interspersed with monologues delivered by an elderly narrator who claimed to have witnessed the 1926 incident upon which the play had been based.[57] So happy was the MoP with the modified version of this play that it ordered scripts to be distributed to all publicity bureaus throughout the RNG realm.[58]

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One would be justified in reading the production of this piece of theater—written by a Soviet constructivist playwright and depicting Chinese boatmen defying imperialist aggression—as a brave RNG attempt at allegorical resistance.[59] Indeed, given the widespread knowledge that *Roar, China!* was not only a Soviet play but also the title of a famed 1936 woodcut by Li Hua (inspired by popular anti-imperialist sentiment),[60] one might assume that the play's production was a clever exploitation of wartime imagery in the service of a subversive Chinese nationalism.

I would argue that the January 1943 production of *Roar, China!* had a quite different significance, however. This play brought to the stage an important figure that RNG graphic and woodcut artists had been experimenting with under the NCM but that could be found in occupation-era art going right back to the *huandu* and earlier.[61] Such depictions grew far more common in 1942, as the May Fourth nationalism inherent in the NCM began to exert a greater influence on cultural production, particularly that sponsored (as *Roar, China!* was) by the MoP. Imagery of coolies, boatmen, and rickshaw pullers was a frequent feature of the work of Chinese woodcut artists included in early issues of the journal *Zhongguo muke* after it commenced publication in December 1942 (i.e., one month before the staging of *Roar, China!*).[62] Intriguingly, even the woodcuts of Li Hua would be included in regime-sponsored pictorials in 1942. In other words, RNG-sponsored publications rebranded the icons of the anti-Japanese resistance as symbols of an amorphous NCM anti-imperialism.[63]

By bringing onto the stage the RNG working man—employed, fittingly for this riparian regime, on the Yangtze—the MoP was linking existing imagery both to prewar anti-imperialist texts (most noticeably the Li Hua woodcut) and to the realities of the RNG's transformation into a belligerent force in the Pacific War. The "roaring" boatmen who defied Western traders in this 1943 stage production could be conflated with the blindfolded figure of Li Hua's woodcut who, as Xiaobing Tang suggests, had "issue[d] an urgent order that the nation must cry out."[64] These potentially controversial references to prewar salvationist patriotism could be justified if they were made to align with Pan-Asian anti-imperialism. Indeed, by invoking Yangtze boatmen as the embodiment of Chinese resistance to imperialism, this riparian regime was claiming ownership of the defiance that had theretofore been the monopoly of resistance cultural production "upstream."

Following the RNG declaration of war, the "roaring man" image would be depicted with increasing frequency in regime-sponsored publications. In fact, rather than being granted an individual personality as Li Huizhen had been, the RNG working man would often be named after the Tret'iakov

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Figure 4.6. Line drawing of Wang Jingwei and RNG men rising up in anger. The text reads: "Those who have strength should contribute it; those who have money should contribute it. We are all of one heart. Under Chairman Wang's leadership, the people of China have joined the crest of the wave to join the war." *Zhongguo manhua* [Chinese cartoons] 5 (March 1943): 7. Courtesy of Shanghai Library.

play (and the Li Hua artwork) itself, as "Roar, China" (Nuhou Zhongguo). He would commonly be drawn as muscular and open-mouthed, roaring in rage at enemies unseen. In other cases, he would be linked to the figure of President Wang in uniform, as angry RNG men rose up (possibly on the waters of the Yangtze) to combat imperialism (figure 4.6).

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The working man "on the docks" (*matou shang*) was a particularly favorite topic for members of the Association of Chinese Woodcut Artists who published their work in Wang Yingxiao's *Chinese Woodcuts*.[65] He also appeared in Wang Yingxiao's "first collection of propagandistic woodcuts to be produced in the Rural Pacification areas."[66] To be sure, many of the images that Wang produced in this collection were rural rather than strictly riparian in theme. Nonetheless, the first image in this collection looked remarkably like Li Hua's *Roar, China* woodcut of 1936. Wang's bare-chested prisoner was bound by chains to pillars bearing the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes. A few pages later, Wang depicted the same figure freed from his chains, so that we see the thrashing of his dynamic body as he stabs two oversized, ursine hands that are imprinted with the characters *Mei* (America) and *Ying* (Britain). Wang wrote as the caption to this image: "Move to action! Strive to cast off the evil grasp of the British and American invaders." In other images in the same collection, raised fists—looking remarkably like the socialist realist imagery we now associate with 1960s China—were produced, as Wang called on people to "fight for the liberation of the Republic of China!"

Like the militarization of Wang Jingwei's image from 1941 onward, the invention of the roaring man represented a direct RNG response to what Yun Xia has described as "resistance-based masculinity" in wartime China. Attacks on those labeled by the resistance as traitors commonly took on a gendered nature, as "Chinese war propaganda uniformly depicted *hanjian* as individuals lacking in masculinity."[67] By creating this new and highly aggressive male archetype, the RNG was challenging the forced "feminization" of the regime by the resistance.

If the roaring man was imagined in illustrations and woodcuts, far more Japanese-inflected interpretations of the occupation man were represented in media such as photography. This was particularly the case when it came to depictions of Chinese men in the RNG armed forces. As we have seen, the navy took on a special significance for Wang's regime. In occupation pictorials, then, images of RNG sailors, seamen, and coastguardsmen were given particular prominence from the summer of 1941 onward—that is, around the same period in which Rural Pacification commenced. Much of the resulting imagery was derivative of Japanese propaganda of the time, itself highly influenced by Soviet precedents. Andrea Germer has shown, for example, that Soviet-derived techniques such as photomontage and photo collage were adopted to the constructivist and socialist realist aes-

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Figure 4.7. Ministry of Publicity poster celebrating the RNG's declaration of war and featuring an RNG soldier. Courtesy of the Hoover Institution Archives (Hoover Poster Collection, CC 102), Stanford University.

thetics that saturated Japanese wartime pictorials from 1942 onward. In turn, such bricolage influenced the design of occupation pictorials in China. The result was that heroic Chinese marines and soldiers were commonly presented as part of photomontages in the pages of regime-sponsored pictorials, pictured (as their Japanese peers were) from a low angle and superimposed over images of faceless crowds or battle scenes in a "co-prosperity realist" style (figures 4.7 and 4.8).[68]

Just as closely derived from Japanese precedents were images of unnamed RNG soldiers who emerged within the propaganda portfolios of the Rural Pacification campaigns. Pictorials included images of the "warriors of new China" (*xin Zhongguo de doushi*)—described as *xiongzi* (manly) or *yingzi* (dashing)—standing guard over the villages that had been purged of communist resistance.[69]

In other cases, however, these RNG soldiers were conflated with their Japanese brethren. A photograph of an unnamed Chinese soldier dressed as a Japanese warrior, for example, was first pictured on the cover of the October 1942 issue of *Dōmei gurafu* (a pictorial designed for a

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

Figure 4.8. Undated photograph of RNG seaman. Courtesy of Academia Historica.

Japanese readership). There is more than a hint of socialist realism in this image's composition, with the soldier being photographed from a low angle, his body dominating the frame and the muscles of his right arm bulging as he grasps his weapon. He stares defiantly into the middle distance to the right of the lens. The only thing that distinguished this sword-wielding Chinese warrior from any number of Japanese soldiers depicted in imperial propaganda of the same period was the inclusion of a small and negligible Nationalist ensign on his cap—a feature that may well have been added after the photograph was taken. In every other sense, this RNG soldier owed much to the canon of wartime Japanese pictorials such as *Shashin shūhō* (Photographic weekly report). Fascinatingly, however, this very same image was used on the cover of the September 1943 issue of the *New China Pictorial*—possibly the only male figure to be pictured on the cover of this magazine (figure 4.9). MoP cadres were willing to appropriate Japanese imagery of Chinese men only if the images could fit into a late-war narrative about RNG masculinity.

The Pan-Asian soldier of the RNG armed forces and the roaring man of Wang Yingxiao's woodcuts made for strange bedfellows. They represented two opposing archetypes of occupation. The former followed orders. He

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

Figure 4.9. Cover image of the *New China Pictorial* in 1942, featuring an RNG soldier. *Xin Zhonghua huabao* 4, no. 9 (September 1942). Asian Reading Room, Library of Congress.

was a decidedly Japanese vision of the Chinese man, "Pan-Asianized" by Dōmei designers and inspired by the uniformity perfected in the armed forces of Japanese-occupied Asia, especially Manchukuo.[70] The latter, in contrast, spoke of spontaneous agency and righteous anger against foreign invaders (expressed, in 1943, as "the West"). Yet this tension was indicative of RNG iconography as a whole. Despite the RNG's best efforts to graft Chinese perceptions of Pan-Asianism onto Japanese imperialism, the conformity and unity inherent in the culture of the GEACPS was never entirely compatible

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with the revival of May Fourth Chinese nationalism experienced through the NCM. Such tensions would also be felt in depictions of Chinese youth.

The Cult of Youth

When it was inaugurated in January 1942, the NCM was presented as a renewal of the revolutionary spirit that had exercised young Chinese in 1919. It combined the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the May Fourth movement with Japanese interpretations of Pan-Asianism. To be sure, the NCM drew on an array of prewar Republican imagery and ritual. Much of this was derived from the very same Nanjing-decade programs that the RNG had, earlier in the war, decried as violent (most noticeably those aligned to the Blue Shirts, or Lanyishe).[71] It also drew on earlier, pre-RNG campaigns in occupied north China that had survived the *huandu,*[72] as well as youth groups organized in east China by the RGROC (of the sort examined by Kristin Mulready-Stone).[73] This Pan-Chinese heritage was openly acknowledged by RNG cultural workers. When, in 1943, Lei Yimin took to the radio to broadcast a speech on the ideals of the NCM for an imagined audience of young listeners in unoccupied China, he spoke sympathetically to the "youth of the resistance" who had suffered so much "in these long six or seven years [of war]." He also described the (RNG) Youth League as an occupation cognate of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, the Eighth Route Army (Ba lu jun), and even the force that had first provoked Rural Pacification—the New Fourth Army.[74] All, it seemed, were working toward the same goal of national salvation.

Such appeals may have sounded far-fetched. In the context of the NCM, however, they made complete sense. Through the NCM, the RNG demanded of occupied China's young people many of the same overt acts of militarized patriotism that had been practiced in the name of resistance ever since the 1930s. The descriptions of youth mobilization that Stephen R. MacKinnon provides in his account of Wuhan in 1938, with their "overtones of European-style fascism," could fit just as easily with NCM activities in 1943.[75] All such groups marched in formation, shouted slogans, and swore allegiance to uniformed leaders.

In occupied China, joining the Scouts, the Youth Corps, or the Youth League was tantamount to being transformed into a living icon of the RNG itself. Such groups were visually marked by their dress and behavior. Membership of such groups, for example, entailed the public utterance of an oath of loyalty to Wang Jingwei and the Chinese Revolution in the presence of

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Figure 4.10. Youth groups marching in the presence of Wang Jingwei in 1943. Wang Jingwei and Lin Baisheng Photograph Collection. Courtesy of the East Asia Library, Stanford University.

others.[76] Members were required to dress and groom themselves in a strictly proscribed manner so as to achieve visual uniformity. In September 1942, the Sun Yat-sen tunic was cannily rebranded the "New Citizens uniform" (*xin guomin zhifu*) and deemed the preferred manner of dress for NCM adherents.[77] Such regulations followed an NCM-inspired *guangtou yundong* (shaved-head movement) in May 1942, through which the MoP argued that too many "gentlemen"[78] and "*xiaojiemen*" (young ladies) were wasting money and time on expensive hair care products rather than working for China's liberation.[79]

With their hair cropped and their clothing approved, occupied China's youth were mobilized by the RNG "theater state," sometimes in the thousands, at virtually all major events. By sheer weight of numbers, they became the spectacle itself. The third anniversary of the *huandu* in March 1943, for instance, was marked by the convergence of students and Youth League members on Nanjing. Many of these took part in quasi-military march-pasts in the presence of Wang Jingwei (figure 4.10). Others flooded the city's parks, where they listened to speeches by members of the RNG government itself about the need for defiance.[80] The signing of the Sino-Japanese Pact of Alliance in October 1943 was similarly marked by mass Youth League rallies—

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Figure 4.11. Undated and unattributed photograph of RNG Scouts. © Imperial War Museum (HU 73372).

in fact, the RNG archival record suggests that the Youth League played the central role in performing celebrations for this new agreement.[81]

As well as performing, NCM youths were also photographed. The resulting imagery is both striking and significant in the extent to which it defies identification with the RNG, however. Staged photographs of RNG Scouts from 1942, for instance, betray little evidence of having originated in a China under Japanese domination (figure 4.11). Instead, with their garrison caps, kerchiefs, and bugles, the saluting Scouts who emerge from the lenses of unnamed CNA photographers are deeply reminiscent of

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those pictured in quite different times and places, such as the Young Pioneers of Alexander Rodchenko's constructivist photography.[82] These subliminal references to revolutionary Russian depictions of youth were perhaps more than coincidence. Like the woodcuts of Wang Yingxiao (an artist who openly acknowledged, during the occupation, the debt he owed to Soviet artistic practices),[83] Soviet-inspired imagery of youth in occupied China could say just as much about RNG agency and Chinese revolutionary traditions as it could about Pan-Asianism.

There was more than just Soviet influence in the composition of such imagery, however. A decidedly fascist aesthetic—involving "the rendering of movement in grandiose and rigid patterns," such as those found in photographic depictions of Youth League calisthenics and marches[84]—permeated these depictions as well. This may explain why Youth League members were favored not only by the CNA but also by Japanese news agencies. Predictably, Mainichi included photo essays of Chinese youth in the *Kabun,* for such imagery fitted perfectly with the co-prosperity realist aesthetics of wartime propaganda. Dōmei publications lavished praise upon the youth of "new China" as they participated in mass rallies like their Japanese and Manchukuo peers.[85]

However, RNG youth could just as easily be turned both visually and physically against imperialism (including Japanese imperialism). Following the return of the foreign concessions, for example, photographs of an unnamed youth activist, his arm thrust into the air in anger, his gaze directed upward at some unspecified object of fury, was included in a number of regime-backed publications. In one photomontage published in the *China pictorial* to document anti-British and anti-American agitation, he was superimposed over images of student masses on the streets of Nanjing and Shanghai (figure 4.12).[86] The energy and anger that such imagery proposed may help explain the enthusiasm that members of the Youth League also displayed when physically attacking not just loathed objects of treaty port decadence (e.g., dance halls) but even institutions associated with or controlled by the Japanese, such as opium dens. As Brian Martin notes, some of the most violent protests ever tolerated under occupation were those instigated by Youth League members who, in their hundreds, ransacked opium dens in Nanjing and Shanghai in this period—and whose actions were pictorialized in the RNG press.[87] While the immediate reasons for such protests may still be debated,[88] they nonetheless demonstrated how an angry nationalism that had been framed as a form of occupation anti-imperialism, when unleashed under the NCM, could lead not simply to the mobilization of Chinese youth but also to highly visual displays of iconoclasm—even against the Japanese.

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Figure 4.12. Photomontage featuring male youth activist. *Zhonghua huabao* [China pictorial] 1, no. 1 (August 1943). Courtesy of Shanghai Library.

The September 1943 edition of the *Zhonghua huabao* includes a striking juxtaposition of two photographic portraits. On the front cover is a typical NCM-era photograph of a female Youth League member. She is dressed in her New Citizens uniform and is shown, from a constructivist angle, grinning optimistically into the middle distance. She would have looked at home in a collection of Soviet photographs from the 1920s, of a rally in Wuhan in 1938, or on the cover of *Shashin shūhō*. Here, however, she is the embodiment of RNG youth militancy. On the back cover of the same issue, however, we find a sepia wedding portrait of a smiling Nancy Chan, reprinted here to mark her marriage to a Ningbo doctor (figure 4.13). This photograph of occupied China's best-loved modern girl might as well have been produced by Bann's Studio.

That both these visions of Chinese womanhood under occupation could cohabit the covers of the same MoP-sponsored pictorial speaks volumes about the conflicting ways in which different groups within the RNG themselves envisaged the Chinese. And although we have no way of determining the editorial decision that led to the publication of these two images, their juxtaposition is evidence that even diametrically opposed archetypes competed with each other within RNG visual cultures.

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Figure 4.13. Front and back cover of the *China Pictorial* in 1943, showing image of Youth League activist and wedding portrait of Nancy Chan, respectively. *Zhonghua huabao* 1, no. 2 (September 1943). Courtesy of Shanghai Library.

The sheer familiarity of these two competing visions emphasizes how eclectic RNG iconographies had become by 1943, as well as how adept various groups within the RNG had become at adopting symbols, figures, and icons from the Shanghai International Settlement, communist Yan'an, and, of course, Japanese imperialism. Indeed, despite RNG expressions of hatred for communism, one can clearly sense in CNA photographs of Scouts and soldiers the same salvationist nationalism that animated the work of the famed communist wartime photographer Sha Fei in this very period.[89]

However, in noticing these parallels and similarities, we need not assume RNG plagiarism—even if we acknowledge the admiration for CCP propaganda techniques that are present in the RNG archival record. Instead, such parallels should prompt us to consider how similar the cultural practices, aesthetics, and modes of representation espoused by these supposedly opposing forces in this wider conflict in fact were. The organized youth of wartime Nanjing and Shanghai looked entirely at home alongside cognate youth groups mobilized throughout the "radical Right universe."[90] Equally, they could be turned into symbols of opposition to imperialism rather than supporters of it. Similarly, MoP artists shared with their communist peers

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an admiration for Soviet depictions of roaring men and Young Pioneers. And many of the same artists who had drawn modern girls on the pages of pictorials published in unoccupied Shanghai prior to December 1941 did precisely the same thing in an RNG Shanghai liberated from Western imperialism in the summer of 1943.

What set the RNG apart from these parallel visions of wartime China, however, was the new variable of the Japanese presence. Occupation brought with it new, external ideas about Chinese manhood and womanhood that sometimes sat uncomfortably with Republican Chinese orthodoxy. The response to such a challenge was to turn the fascist aesthetics of what Andrea Germer has referred to as "co-prosperity realism" back at the colonial gaze,[91] transforming the RNG from a docile regime of consumerist modern girls into one that was pictorially populated by revolutionary youths and dashing servicemen. If the visual record tells us anything, then, it is that gendered archetypes of occupation, like the wider iconographies of which they were a part, remained a space of contestation until the end of the war.

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