‘The Restoration county community: a post-conflict culture’

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In 1969 Alan Everitt joked that the re-writing of the past undertaken by families seeking to conceal embarrassing associations during the Civil Wars had rendered the Restoration period ‘no more conducive to scholarship in the field of local history than to common sense in the field of politics’.[1] The complex historiographical debates of the English Revolution had so dominated early modern British history that few academics cared for an aftermath whose historical problems seemed trivial by comparison. Despite this, the appearance of edited collections in the 1970s demonstrated that the Restoration did have its enthusiasts, and publications began to appear on various topics.[2] By the end of the twentieth century, having attracted a critical mass of new scholars, Restoration historiography had begun to change dramatically.

The chronological boundaries of Restoration scholarship have always been elastic. Many have chosen to focus on the years from 1658 to 1667, because the period from the death of Cromwell to the fall of Clarendon was one during which the monarchy very obviously underwent a process of restoration. Others have commenced their study in 1659 or 1660, or ended with the Declaration of Indulgence (1672), the resolution of the Exclusion Crisis (1681), the death of Charles II (1685) or the Glorious Revolution (1688-9). The Restoration has also been placed within timeframes harking back to the Interregnum or forward to the long eighteenth century. These choices and the agendas which lie behind them all carry implications for local as well as national studies.

Several trends have emerged in this new history, not least a re-evaluation of the centrality of religion in local and national political culture after 1660.[3] Restoration scholars working in political and economic history have followed the lead of civil war historians in situating domestic issues in a British rather than an Anglo-centric context.[4] The emergence of Atlantic studies has broadened horizons further, although Clive Holmes had already noted that many ancient county families were involved in enterprises overseas.[5] An even more recent development has been the increasing collaboration between historians and scholars working in the field of post-conflict culture. Social scientists have learned that truth and reconciliation committees existed in seventeenth-century England, while historians have begun to gain new insights into the interplay of conflict and culture, not least, given the themes in this present chapter, ways in which ‘conflicts challenge and rearrange pre-existing systems of cultural control’, particularly ‘when they encounter modes of historicisation linked closely to unifying discourses of (gendered) national identity’.[6] This in turn has fed into an even more obvious trend in the new Restoration history: a renewed emphasis on the localities.

The new history has seen the traditional preoccupation with high politics counterbalanced by a movement towards what Tim Harris has termed a ‘social history of politics’ – uncovering experiences of, and participation in,

political processes at the level of the local community.[7] The political culture of provincial communities and their relationship with the centre has therefore come under increasing scrutiny. Whilst Harris, along with Paul Seaward and Mark Goldie, has again been a prominent supporter of this approach, this was a development anticipated by Ronald Hutton. Hutton declared his central theme in *Restoration* (1985) to be ‘the formation and implementation of national policy, and the interplay of central and local interests in this process’.[8] His narrative of events between 1658 and 1667 was therefore presented largely through the prism of provincial sources. Pondering on the political machinations at the end of the reign in his subsequent biography of Charles II, Hutton wondered whether ‘the role of central government seems so mysterious because we are looking at it from the wrong angle. The proper perspective’, he suggested, ‘could be from below, from the localities.’[9]

By an accident of history, the rise of Restoration studies and its concomitant emphasis on provincial political culture coincided with the demise of the county community model. Everitt and his fellow travellers had produced a body of work on the provinces that even critics acknowledged to be consistent and coherent.[10] Although criticisms of the so-called county community school have lapsed into caricature at times, it can be argued that in the 1960s the perception of English shires as semi-autonomous states governed by inward-looking, paternalistic county elites became the default starting position from which students approached issues such as allegiance, neutralism and the efficacy of royalist and parliamentarian war efforts.[11] This consensus was shattered by Clive Holmes (1980) and Ann Hughes (1985), who insisted that the county gentry of the mid-seventeenth century were inextricably integrated into a national political culture.[12] From the outset, therefore, much as the disciples of the new Restoration history urged their colleagues to study the political culture of the English provinces, they were also encouraged to distance themselves from the now unfashionable county community school.[13] The most strident voice belonged to Tim Harris, who in a review of Restoration historiography in 1997 went so far as to declare that ‘the ultimate sterility of the county community debate for the early seventeenth century did much to dampen the enthusiasm of publishers (or commissioning editors) for local studies.’[14] Such works had indeed become rare by this time, but a number of local studies had already appeared. Everitt had even included a chapter on the Restoration in his work on the community of Kent.

Everitt’s interpretation of the course of the Restoration was consistent with his wider thesis: he perceived a gradual rapprochement of the divided Kentish gentry, with diehard Cavaliers, moderate royalists, neuters and conservative parliamentarians inexorably drawn together by a mutual abhorrence of the Regicide and fears of social revolution. The republicans on the Kent committee (such as there were) were gradually recruited as a result of their revulsion for the Protectorate. Finally, alarmed by the chaos that followed the abdication of Richard Cromwell in May 1659, moderate Cromwellians returned to the bosom of the county community, drawn by a mutual desire for stable government. Anthony Fletcher presented a similar picture in Sussex.[15] Everitt even had a plausible explanation as to why this reunification had failed to produce regime change at a national level: Booth’s rising in Cheshire, and plots in various other localities had failed to bring back the monarchy in 1659 because the county elites had lacked the vision to

extend the process of unification beyond the boundaries of their shires. However, he believed that this shortcoming was irrelevant because a centralised Commonwealth was bound to fail. He argued that the Protectorate and the headless republican regime that succeeded it could never hope to control the provinces without the support of the traditional county gentry.[16] This was proof that the Great Rebellion (to use Everitt's chosen term) had been an internecine dispute among the gentry, temporarily hijacked by ideological *hoi-polloi* in the shape of the New Model Army. As the political experiments of the Interregnum became ever more desperate, gravitational forces were drawing the county gentry back together and allowing the natural order to re-emerge. The return of Charles II confirmed that equilibrium had been successfully restored; a remote and sacerdotal monarchy had returned to govern *de juro*, in order that the county elites could again govern *de facto*. Fletcher wrote of Sussex that 'the county gentry flooded back into power.'[17] In Kent, after the Rump had failed to preserve its authority by governing through elements of the minor gentry (because those gentlemen were themselves fatally divided along national political and ideological lines) the major county families regained their traditional hegemony by default.[18]

Having explained how the monarchy could have been restored without serious bloodshed, Everitt briefly previewed the subsequent decades. He perceived a gulf quickly opening up between those he defined loosely as 'Cavaliers' and 'moderates'; the former concentrating on national political affairs in Parliament and Court whilst the latter dedicated themselves to the good government of Kent.[19] His model predicted that tension between the centre and the Kentish gentry would thus quickly re-emerge:

> They had supported the Restoration because they wanted stable government; but they had little sympathy with the Cavalier Court. They were appointed to office because they alone had the power to govern the community. Ultimately they proved as recalcitrant to the government of Charles II as to that of Cromwell and Charles I.[20]

Everitt's Restoration epilogue reinforced his hypothesis regarding Kent in earlier decades. He conceded that the civil wars and Interregnum had changed the fabric of county society in several ways – particularly the nature of royalism. Apart from the traditionally-minded squires whose paternalistic instincts still embodied the ideal of the county community, a new species of Cavalier had now emerged; men more intent on furthering their personal interests by soliciting favours at Whitehall or Westminster than shouldering the mundane responsibilities of the shire. Nevertheless, Everitt contended that the main effect of the Interregnum had been to create an intense longing for traditional, local, government. Kent once again aspired to 'live a life of its own apart from the mainstream of national developments'.[21] Far from eroding the power of the traditional county gentry Everitt believed that the Great Rebellion had confirmed it.

The view that the county gentry had emerged from the republican experiment stronger than ever would continue to be widely accepted, even by those who chose to distance themselves from the county community hypothesis *per se*. In his 1983 survey of the government of provincial England

under the later Stuarts G. C. F. Forster pointed out that local rulers had always received orders from the centre, but had invariably put the interests of their locality before those of the state. He argued that the expansion of the tax system initiated during the Interregnum had increased the power of the justices of the Peace; an advantage which continued after the Restoration, allowing county magistrates to mitigate or ignore government directives, even in matters of finance, security and religion. Privy councillors, hampered by the absence of traditional institutions such as Star Chamber, quickly lost interest in micro-management and turned their attentions to international diplomacy and high politics. The county elites would be left to their own devices until the Exclusion Crisis, when Charles II found it necessary to re-assert royal authority in the provinces in order to safeguard the succession.[22] Believing that the apparatus of local government had survived the Interregnum substantially intact, Forster argued that the restored monarchy had not engaged in wholesale reform but had simply weeded the magistrates' benches and council chambers, replacing dubious individuals with nominees from the leading county families.[23] He conceded that variations in the availability of politically reliable replacements had required wholesale changes of personnel in some counties and compromise in others. In Everitt's hypothesis the revival of traditional county government after the Restoration had relied on a level of consensus, mutual interest and shared identity sufficient to smooth out the ideological divisions between the gentry that had developed during the previous decades. For Everitt the unity of the leading gentry families in Kent had been demonstrated by the declaration of a broad alliance headed by Sir Edward Hales in April 1660, which had stated that in the greater interest 'all revengeful thoughts against any party or persons whatsoever' were to be repudiated and utterly abhorred.[24] But even if this was the authentic voice of Restoration Kent such magnanimity was often lacking elsewhere. In Stafford, for example, recriminations were still being exchanged by aging aldermen almost three decades after the Restoration.[25] For many Cavaliers the continued presence of former rebels in county government was insufferable. As late as April 1675, Lord Aston of Tixall in Staffordshire, having been traduced for the umpteenth time as a result of his Catholicism, reflected the grievances still held by many old royalists when he confided to Sir Joseph Williamson that,

> I have that pride not to bear with patience, abiding in a country where my family has been eminent twenty descents and bore always places of trust under their kings, now to be trampled on and falsely accused by such as, till their fighting against the king and buying the estates of his loyal subjects, were not in the least known.[26]

Clearly, the process of reconciliation was more easily advanced in some shires than others. It was hampered not so much by the exclusion and harassment of Catholics such as Aston as by antagonism between the various shades of English Protestantism. The provincial Cavalier gentry's reverence for tradition and precedent, coupled with a keen sense of their families' sufferings and diminished social exclusivity, often defined their relations with their neighbours and by implication their identification with the

interests of the ‘country’ round about. Naturally, attitudes varied depending on personal circumstances. Family ties, personal friendship and mutual vested interests often overcame past differences; but hostility towards former enemies was made manifest not only in private correspondence, but also in more public and permanent forms. Soon after the Restoration the Lucas family in Essex and the Capels in Hertfordshire both erected memorials which were intended to declare to posterity that their relatives had been murdered by parliamentarians.[27] Many of Lord John Lucas’s neighbours had been active participants in the events which had led to the executions of his brother Sir Charles Lucas, Sir George Lisle and Lord Capel.

The bitter experience of the Lucas family highlights a further obstacle to the reification of the county community: the Lucases were far from unique among royalist gentry in failing to recover the wealth and influence they had lost during the civil wars. Many found themselves at the Restoration with insufficient resources to secure county offices which their forefathers had occupied as a matter of course. Those who managed to do so often found that their reduced circumstances prevented them from performing their duties efficiently.[28] Others were in a worse position: over 5,000 impoverished royalist officers can be seen in the 1663 *List* of indigent loyal officers. Hundreds more petitioned the authorities for relief.[29] Even relatives of the county elite were not immune from a plight that critics condemned as a national scandal.[30] Everitt may well have been correct in identifying a new breed of self-serving metropolitan Cavalier after the Restoration, but it should not be assumed that they were motivated by ambition and greed.[31] A disproportionate number of indigent officers of provincial origin were recorded in the 1663 *List* as residing in London and Westminster; which suggests that destitution, rather than avarice, drove many provincial Cavaliers into the capital. For these economic migrants as much as for those remaining in the localities, the bitter experience of financial loss and diminished local status presaged not reunification, but prolonged and acrimonious division. P. J. Challinor (1982), whilst supporting the view that the leading provincial gentry had closed ranks to bring back the monarchy, observed that divisions quickly re-emerged in counties such as Cheshire.[32] That matters did not then degenerate into renewed conflict can be ascribed to the chastening memories of civil war, and the unifying influence of the Crown, embodied in the Act of Indemnity and Oblivion (1660).[33]

The extent to which conflict or consensus existed within the ranks of the county gentry continued to exercise the minds of those historians who ventured into the Restoration localities during the 1980s. As it was manifestly still the ‘principal administrative unit’ with which the central Restoration regime engaged it was inevitable that these scholars remained predicated on the structure and process of county administration.[34] Nevertheless, the county community model was no longer considered an adequate explanation of the political culture of early modern England. Stephen Roberts described the county community hypothesis as a ‘suspect artefact’, whilst Andrew Coleby opined that it had ‘obscured more than it clarified about English politics in the 1640s and beyond.’[35] This new historiography sought to explain the government of provincial England by focusing on centre-local relations. The localities were now viewed, as Holmes had always urged, in the context of an integrated national political culture. Many of the county community historians had also moved on. Anthony Fletcher conceded that Holmes had provided a

‘useful corrective against too exclusive a concentration on the county’, and structured *Reform in the Provinces* (1986) accordingly.[36]

The main arena for investigating the nature of centre-local relations remained the Commission of the Peace, which Fletcher declared to be at ‘the heart of the struggles for power in the localities’.[37] The demographics of each county bench varied, but even in Sussex and Devon (where large numbers of magistrates had been removed soon after Charles II’s return) the national authorities made an effort to accommodate many former enemies in the interests of continuity.[38] Fletcher concluded that in the decade that followed there were ‘few omissions from the commissions, no purges and no full-scale factional struggles’.[39] There was, as Norrey observed, an ‘uneasy balance between cavaliers and those with a less presentable record of service in the 1640s.’[40] In many shires former enemies were willing to coordinate their efforts against those they jointly perceived to pose a threat to law and order. Such expediency allowed the royalist Sir Courtney Pole and the conformist Presbyterian Coplestone Bampfield to patrol Devon with their respective vigilante squads.[41] In other counties divisions were more evident: the Wiltshire ex-royalist colonel and JP Sir Henry Coker was continually frustrated by ‘many mongrel justices that were for Oliver, who proceed coldly and neglect duty’.[42] But Everitt’s model had never required the rulers of the shire to love one another. Insofar as the studies published in the 1980s showed that those in positions of local power after the Restoration were able to put aside their differences and work together to bring peace and order (if not uniformity) to their localities, relations only needed to be sufficiently cordial to facilitate coherent government. Unlike the solidarity Everitt had perceived in Kent, however, these were rulers more often motivated by their mutual distaste for radicalism than by a spirit of forgiveness.

The conclusions reached in the county studies of the 1980s were reasonably consistent, and endorsed some of Everitt’s claims. Fletcher argued that the influence of the provincial gentry had proved remarkably resilient during the Interregnum, and that as a result they had been able to reassert their traditional hegemony after 1658.[43] Roberts contrasted the declining influence of the Assizes with the ‘self-confidence and power’ of the county justices, concluding that, unlike Interregnum regimes, Charles II’s government had tamely ceded control of the localities to the county gentry.’[44] In no way, however, were these ‘natural rulers’ uninterested in national events: they interacted fully with the national political culture, principally because (at least in the early 1660s) they saw their desire for stability best served by working with central government.[45] Rather than those in the provinces being dependent on the centre, Charles II’s regime relied on ‘the active co-operation’, or at least the ‘tacit support, of large elements of the landed classes.’[46] As Everitt had argued nearly two decades earlier, the fear of social upheaval which had unnerved increasing numbers of moderate Puritan gentry during the late 1640s had returned after the fall of the Protectorate. For Presbyterians and Anglicans alike the monarchy came to be seen as the best chance of political stability and social order. The restored monarchy subsequently profited from its perceived fragility, because the gentry were thereby all the more motivated to protect it and less inclined to challenge it. The unpalatable alternatives to monarchy prompted many to identify ‘their fortunes with those of the central government in a way they had

not done before the 1650s.'[47] However, both Roberts and Coleby argued that by the mid-1660s the county elite saw their interests begin to diverge from those of central government, and were ready to demonstrate (as Everitt had always claimed) that it was only possible to govern the provinces through them.[48]

There was, of course, more to governing the country than law and politics: before the civil wars provincial life had also been shaped by the legal, administrative and moral authority of the state Church. In July 1660 the link between the parishes and the centre was made abundantly clear, with each and every church required to take down the arms of the Commonwealth and replace them with those of the king.[49] Despite such symbolism, during the period in which the county community debate was in full flow historians habitually underestimated the cultural and political significance of religion. Everitt did not mention religion whilst exploring the question of allegiance in *The Local Community and the Great Rebellion*; neither did Clive Holmes when mounting his challenge over a decade later. Most historians had long assumed that after 1660 there had been a reaction against the excessive religiosity of the previous decades which had resulted in the secularisation of politics.[50] John Morrill would later complain that seventeenth-century attitudes to popery (and, by implication, to religion in general) had been treated by his colleagues as 'a form of "white noise", a constant fuzzy background in the rhetoric and argument of the time against which significant changes in secular thought were taking place.'[51] In *The Community of Kent* Everitt presented the county community's response to the religious controversies of Charles I's reign largely through the dilemmas of Sir Edward Dering, caught between the centralising tendencies demonstrated by Laud in his desire to micromanage the Church of England and those evident in Presbyterian aspirations to turn the Church into an English Kirk.[52] Everitt's dismissive attitude towards the topic of religion dovetailed with the historical metanarrative current at the time he was writing: as part of the process of restoring 'natural' order to the shires, the Restoration religious settlement had replaced the centralising doctrines of the Commonwealth not with Laudianism but with an unassuming Anglicanism which minded its own business and only required lip service on Sundays. The vast majority of nonconformists were assumed to be politically quietist, which caused nonconformity to be marginalised in the historiography, and outbreaks of repression to be blamed on narrow cliques of neurotic provincial Cavaliers.

The county studies of the 1980s could have challenged these assumptions, and in doing so strengthened the case for viewing English political culture in terms of centre-local relations. However, with religious history then only just beginning to re-enter the mainstream, the treatment of such issues was uneven.[53] Stephen Roberts suspected that the parochial clergy and church courts had exerted a 'highly significant influence' on Devonian society as it recovered from the civil wars, but chose not to pursue the matter.[54] Other historians alluded to religious aspects of centre-local relations but underestimated the implications of their comments. Coleby, for example, suggested that the reinstitution of episcopacy after 1660 had given the central authorities a useful lever in Hampshire, and that bishops' visitations had yielded valuable intelligence concerning religious observance and nonconformist networks.[55] Patterns of religious toleration were repeatedly utilised in these studies as a gauge of centre-local relations, leading the

1980s generation to question assumptions that the persecution of nonconformity was driven from below.[56] Although there were certainly Cavalier-Anglican gentry in the provinces eager to harass nonconformists, nowhere did they have sufficient resources to eradicate nonconformity itself. Nonconformist networks survived, and went on to represent a constituency that would exist independently of any gentrified county community. Similarly, the inability of the central authorities in the early years of the Restoration to curb corporations who persisted in electing persons of suspect religious leanings indicates that there were limits to their ability to impose religious uniformity from above.[57] This was, of course, also a reflection of the fact that those at the centre – king, privy councillors, Lords and Commons – were hardly a model of religious uniformity themselves.

Preaching frequently brought parsons and congregations into close contact (and conflict) with local and national authorities. From the outset Charles II's ministers and bishops were well aware of the relationship between preaching and local opinion, and attempted to control the output of the pulpits. They sponsored parliamentary legislation, periodically ordered state homilies on obedience to authority to be read in place of normal sermons and instituted a compulsory programme of annual services and preaching to commemorate the restoration of Charles II and the 'martyrdom' of his royal father.[58] The Act of Uniformity and the subsequent mass ejection of dissenting ministers in August 1662 was a blatant example of intervention in the localities: Gilbert Sheldon, then Bishop of London, set up a nationwide clearing system and a pool of candidates ready to fill the livings vacated by nonconformist ministers, whilst those facing ejection used their pulpits to posit highly critical comments on the national situation.[59] Many provincial farewell sermons were published alongside those of London ministers; indeed, provincial congregations themselves were sometimes responsible for bringing their minister's words to a national audience, demonstrating not only a readiness to participate in a national political culture but also the ability to do so.[60]

In 1987 support for the idea of a Restoration county community came from an unlikely quarter, when Ann Hughes suggested that a desire for political and societal stability had caused the gentry of Warwickshire to close ranks and coordinate their activities. This new community spirit, which she argued had revealed itself in electioneering for the Convention Parliament and efforts to secure the militia, seemed 'less qualified [than previously] by the complexity of the county's economy or the variety of relationships the gentry had with their social inferiors.'[61] In one of the few county studies to appear in the 1990s, A. R. Warmington followed a similar line, suggesting that a county community had emerged in Gloucestershire between 1660 and 1672, with justices, deputy lieutenants and tax commissioners working in unison.[62] This resonated with earlier studies which had argued that the justices had put aside their past differences in order to provide leadership in their localities. Viewed through the prism of the Commissions of the Peace the emergence of a semi-autonomous county community seems a plausible deduction. However, the Restoration also saw the return of the county lieutenancy; a development which would have profound implications for the localities.

In the only paragraph to mention the Restoration lieutenancy in *The Community of Kent* – a tussle in 1668 between the county's lord lieutenant

and one of his deputies over the financing and equipping of the militia – Everitt chose to see not a demonstration of the hegemony of central authority (in that the deputy lieutenant, Sir Roger Twysden, was forced to resign) but a victory for localism in that the argument had occurred in the first place. Surely, however, it is significant that the long-serving and conscientious Twysden, who had suffered sequestration and imprisonment during the Interregnum, could be described by the Duke of Richmond as 'troublesome, unreliable and disaffected to the royal service', because he had insisted on due process of law and respect for local custom.[63]

County historians continued to underestimate the significance of the Restoration lieutenancy until well into the 1990s. Norrey believed the system to have consisted of absentee lord lieutenants, who left the supervision of county militias to lacklustre deputies, 'many of whom would rather solicit rewards for past loyalties at court than spend endless mornings in draughty provincial taverns.'[64] This was unduly harsh on provincial gentry whose fortunes had been degraded by the civil wars, and who were obliged to seek additional income in order to maintain the social standing on which their effectiveness as deputy lieutenants depended. Other historians portrayed the lieutenancy as a useful point of contact between the centre and the localities, although invariably a creature of the provincial elite rather than the Crown. They saw no incongruity in noting at the same time that Charles and his Privy Council selected each lord lieutenant with care and vetted their local nominees.[65]

Victor Stater's *Noble government* (1994) demonstrated that the Restoration lieutenancy was very different in scope and character from that which had existed before the civil wars. Charles II had made the re-establishment of the lieutenancy a priority in 1660, appointing each lord lieutenant primarily on the basis of their commitment to church and state.[66] Unambiguous, proactive loyalty to the Crown was now the primary requirement of the office rather than social cachet. Horatio Townshend, appointed in Norfolk in 1661, was one of a number of Restoration lord lieutenants who entered the office as commoners; but Townshend's impeccable Cavalier-Anglican credentials were the vital qualification, and it was a simple matter to ennoble him.[67]

Letters from the Privy Council to the county lieutenancies were not merely aspirational. County officials regularly received precise orders which they were expected to carry out promptly. A communication received by the Earl of Oxford, lord lieutenant of Essex, in March 1661 included specific directions regarding the release of Quakers who had been imprisoned in response to earlier instructions.[68] Unsurprisingly, as they were now carefully vetted and closely supervised, deputy lieutenants could be extremely zealous; assessing their neighbours' ability to contribute to the financing of the militia and punishing slow payers. Such activities, as Stater points out, would have been anathema to their predecessors, and emphasised their commitment to central government.[69]

The deputy lieutenants were particularly punctilious in following directions from the centre in times of political tension. Energised by letters sent out by the Privy Council immediately after Venner's Rising in London in January 1661, Essex deputies conducted detailed interrogations of very ordinary people such as a group of former troopers whom witnesses had

observed drinking together in a Braintree pub.[70] Before the civil wars such examinations would have been beneath their dignity, and would have been left to local justices. Deputy lieutenants and militia were kept extremely busy for some time after Venner's Rising, confiscating weapons and ammunition from ex-parliamentarians, administering the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, and reporting their activities to the Privy Council.[71] In October 1661 Hampshire deputies received reinforcements in the shape of a troop of the King's Lifeguard, and soon after began to apprehend persons passing through their county who were wanted by colleagues in counties as far away as Monmouthshire and Herefordshire. During the Uniformity crisis of 1662 they again participated in a nationwide operation, being instructed by the Privy Council to apprehend one John Woodman, and convey him to London for questioning.[72] In Shropshire the lord lieutenant, Lord Newport, received similar orders for the extradition of Richard Salwey, a notable ex-parliamentarian. Newport, in acknowledging the warrant, gave the Privy Council details of Salwey's personal network, and suggested further arrests.[73] At the same time as these extraditions were taking place, local authorities in areas such as Staffordshire and Chepstow were compiling lists of ex-parliamentarian soldiers and their places of abode, and forwarding details to Whitehall.[74] These and myriad other documents show that deputy lieutenants were fully cognisant of affairs outside their shire, were ready to act instantly on orders from central authority and to coordinate their efforts with colleagues in other counties.

The lieutenancy's increasing tendency to encroach on the preserve of other county institutions was effectively legitimised by the Militia Acts of 1662 and 1663, by which justices were often required to act under the direction of the deputy lieutenants. The Militia Acts settled the rivalry between the justices and the lieutenancy by placing the militia unambiguously under the command of the latter.[75] As the king's personal representative in each county, lord lieutenants had always played an informal part in the appointment of justices and parliamentary candidates, and their influence in this regard became more marked after the Restoration.[76] If the Militia Acts indicated that the counties were increasingly coming under the thumb of the lieutenancy, the rare incidences of obduracy in the provinces serve to demonstrate the extent to which the lieutenancy was (at least initially) under the thumb of royal authority: in 1666 and again in 1667 Norfolk deputies resisted demands for money from the county – but Charles rode roughshod over their scruples.[77] Small wonder that 'by the 1670s and 1680s the time when a lord lieutenant could be counted on to defend the interests of his county neighbours against an intrusive central government was long past.'[78] Charles II had been able to establish this new, centralised lieutenancy because his regime had enjoyed a honeymoon period with the provincial landed classes. In 1660 most Presbyterian gentry agreed with their Cavalier-Anglican neighbours that a restored monarchy was the surest guarantor of property. Both constituencies were fearful that revolutionary fervour still lurked among the population, particularly among demobilised soldiers, and it was this that drove Charles' early parliaments to emphasise the authority of the Crown rather than their own. In the localities, therefore, to support the work of the lieutenancy was to demonstrate one's loyalty to the monarchy – an important consideration for a Presbyterian seeking to hang on to local office, and for a Cavalier-Anglican

hoping to gain it. In any case, both were eager to support an institution which had the capacity to protect them from political and religious extremists.

The Exclusion Crisis, which followed the 'Popish Plot' of 1678, revived an older fear: popery. Charles had by this time lost much of his early popularity due to his repeated attempts to introduce religious indulgence. Over the same period, with the vast majority of its officers staunchly committed to the traditional church and state, the lieutenancy had gradually come under the influence of a hardening Tory-Anglican interest. When he turned to the lieutenancy to help him secure the royal succession (which it did by organising loyalist demonstrations, intimidating the opposition and influencing the outcome of parliamentary elections) Charles became a client of the Tory party. Inheriting the obligation, James II attempted to undermine the party – not least by inserting Catholics and Dissenters into the lieutenancy – and lost his throne. If the waning of the radical threat had ever allowed the centre to leave the provincial elite to their own devices during the 1670s, the emergence of party politics and the centralised lieutenancy system pulled them back into a national political culture.

An older and stronger tie to the centre was taxation, which Fletcher rightly considered to be 'central to the relationship between the centre and the localities.'[79] Michael Braddick's fine study of parliamentary taxation (1994) endorsed the impression evident in county histories that the later seventeenth century witnessed a growth in fiscal management by the centre. Localism, he argued, 'was not in fact opposition to the state but (at its worst) an evasion of the local realities of its obligations.'[80] There were, of course, variations in the pattern and speed with which the counties of England and Wales were persuaded to acknowledge these obligations. In contrast to the fiscal triumph discerned by Coleby in Hampshire during the 1660s and 1670s, Norrey argued that tax-gathering in south-western counties was 'characterized by inefficiency, corruption and even opposition.'[81] However, even in these localities the State was frequently able to intimidate obstructive justices, and responded to erratic performance by transferring tax-gathering responsibilities successively from local officials (torn between the locality and their duty to the Crown), to county receivers, to tax farmers (very often London merchants and financiers), and finally to centralised tax offices and customs houses. C. D. Chandaman, noting the 'increase in efficiency in all the main branches of revenue administration' during the course of Charles' reign has concluded that the king's problems with finance were less to do with raising tax (particularly after 1670) than with inherited economic problems and imprudent spending.[82] The county receivers, sub-commissioners and sub-farmers were invariably local men, but their introduction perhaps represented an earlier, more decisive shift to centralisation than has sometimes been appreciated. Many tax officials, such as Captain Henry Lester in Somerset, Colonel Edmund Chamberlain and Colonel Thomas Veel in Gloucestershire, were deserving ex-royalist officers. It would be useful to establish how many of their former comrades were similarly employed; not least because the frequently acrimonious exchanges between Lester, Veel and Chamberlain and their respective localities indicate that all three men identified with the centre rather than the county.[83] County elites were informed that it was their patriotic duty to acquiesce to such developments, in order to avoid the kind of divisions that had previously led to civil war.[84]

The impetus for fiscal centralisation came as a direct consequence of the past twenty years of conflict. From the outset the newly restored regime needed almost £1million to pay off the old Cromwellian army and reduce the navy. Apart from posing an obvious military threat, the armed forces represented a huge tax burden. It was in the interests of the new regime to alleviate this burden, particularly as it was widely assumed that the restoration of monarchical government would mean a return to pre-civil war levels of taxation – an expectation which had caused many to welcome Charles' return. This would turn to widespread resentment when the hated excise was retained, and schemes such as the hearth tax were instituted to ensure the financial survival of the monarchy. The poll tax of 1660-1 was a harbinger of things to come, being conceived and coordinated by the centre to fund a national objective. The initial arrangements to finance demobilisation were rushed, the revenue required was grossly underestimated, and even after the main Act for disbanding the army had been passed in August 1660 many of those appointed as local commissioners were mystified as to their duties.[85] Furthermore, although most taxpayers wanted to see the back of Cromwell's army many were reluctant to pay for it. These faltering beginnings have led some historians to believe that local commissioners and taxpayers, although recognising the necessity of the government initiative, were relatively free from coercion.[86] That Hampshire had made no contributions by the end of October Coleby ascribes largely to the reluctance of the new regime to deploy soldiers to enforce collection, and a certain amount of complacency as regards the unpaid army.[87] However, Hampshire did ultimately pay up, and more coercion may have been used there than surviving archives suggest. The central authorities were brusque enough when dealing with other counties: Kentish commissioners had already been advised that it was in their interests to expedite matters quickly in order to avoid having soldiers billeted in the county at free quarter.[88] In November, a parliamentary committee allotted the cost of disbanding O'Neil's and Ingoldsby's regiments to specific towns and counties in the West Country, the East Midlands and East Anglia. That the regiments in question had already been quartered in these same localities proves that free quarter was not an empty threat.[89]

Some eight million pounds was collected in taxes during the 1660s alone.[90] Given that this was extracted from an economy which had suffered grievously during the upheavals of the previous twenty years, this was indeed a fiscal triumph – but not for the provinces. The depleted finances of so many of the provincial gentry, the degradation of infrastructure and the desperate financial needs of thousands of incapacitated soldiers, war widows, orphans and others whose lives had been ruined by the wars posed intense economic challenges in many localities. In times past the paternalistic instincts of the county elite would have impelled them to protect their 'country' from heavy centralised taxes. After the Restoration, although the county elite were uncomfortable with increasingly centralised tax regimes the trauma of civil war had reduced their will – and their ability – to resist. The detailed records of the poll tax of 1660-1, and the government's success in raising the huge amounts of money needed, do not suggest the emergence of a confident, independent provincial gentry so much as the reification of a determined and often ruthless centre.[91]

Governmental interest in the plebeian population was similarly not confined to picking their pockets. In this respect, the Compton census of 1676 should be seen in the context of earlier surveys of parliamentarian veterans and the activities of the lieutenancy. Although Henry Compton, Bishop of London, was appointed to oversee the project, it had been conceived by the Lord Treasurer. The Earl of Danby's purpose in surveying the nationwide distribution of papists and nonconformists was to confirm that sufficient military resources existed to suppress any resistance should the penal laws be enforced more aggressively.[92] Ironically, Danby's plans to do this were derailed by subsequent events, not least because he overreached himself and lost his grip on the lieutenancy. The inconsistent quality of the census and the government's failure to act on its findings does not detract from its significance as a barometer of centre-local relations. Stephen Roberts has argued with reference to the Interregnum that '"centralization", if it means anything in this period, means the acquisition by government of a more finely tuned awareness of the behaviour of citizens.'[93] The Compton census and the veterans' lists demonstrate that the Restoration regime was extremely ambitious in this respect.

Events during the previous twenty years had left the authorities in no doubt that the plebeian population was capable of thought and agency (indeed, politicians such as Arlington and Danby habitually exploited the gentry's anxieties in this regard to bolster support for their national policies). However, with notable exceptions such as David Underdown and Richard Greaves, historians have not always taken these anxieties as seriously as they might.[94] One of Holmes' criticisms of Everitt was that the latter had underestimated the extent to which the middling and poorer sorts were 'perfectly capable of forming political opinions and of expressing them forcibly in action, independent of the gentry'.[95] In fairness, no historian of Everitt's generation ever denied the fact that the general population might have political opinions. J. R. Jones, indeed, drew attention to the comments of foreign visitors during the early modern period, who 'were astonished by the interest shown in state affairs by ordinary people, including many who had no votes in parliamentary elections'.[96] News was greedily consumed at every social level, whether delivered from the parish pulpit, in travellers' gossip at the local inn, or printed pamphlets read out in the market place or ale house. Such inquisitiveness had been encouraged during the civil wars, as royalists and parliamentarians competed for hearts and minds in order to sustain their respective war efforts. Large numbers of soldiers and civilians had travelled widely during the conflict, with a resulting impact on their mental horizons.[97] The interrogations conducted by deputy lieutenants and justices suggest that the middling and poorer sorts were more minded than ever to involve themselves in matters beyond their immediate locality, and to embrace abstract ideologies. For many such people, 'county' and 'country' were no longer necessarily synonymous terms.

Newton Key went some way towards uncovering an alternative provincial mentality in articles published in 1994 and 1995. These focused on county feasts held regularly in London during the later seventeenth century by exiles from western and midland counties living and working in the capital, and events held in the counties themselves. The merchants and displaced middling sort who attended the London events articulated a shared cultural

identity, which incorporated an intense inter-county rivalry with an unmistakable sense of county community. In the process of doing this, Key argued, the feasters laced their political rhetoric with an embryonic Tory partisanship.[98] Published accounts of these county feasts propagated the view that stable national government was grounded in well-defined, consensual county communities. Perceived threats to this 'natural' order, from Presbyterians to Quakers, were regularly excoriated in the feast sermons.[99] Members of the county elite frequently attended as guests of honour, and as late as 1680, Worcestershire and Herefordshire exiles were still being urged by feast organisers to donate money for the relief of 'loyal ex-Cavalier sufferers' in their native counties.[100] However, Key argued that although the feasters thereby appeared to be promoting the hegemony of the county gentry, the very act of organising county feasts and charitable donations served to bring 'the politics of association to social groups at the margins of the governing elite'.[101] The fact that the virtues of localism could be propagated by groups so closely connected with the commercial life of the capital is particularly poignant. If the notion of the county community has thus enjoyed an extended lease of life through Key's work, it has taken a very different path from that which Everitt and his colleagues envisaged.

A recent survey has indicated that some 540,000 people died in the British Civil Wars. In England and Wales (whose populations suffered proportionately less than those of Scotland or Ireland), Ian Gentles estimates the *per capita* loss to have been almost twice that of the First World War.[102] If the trauma of that conflict is still etched in the modern psyche, Restoration communities were far more deeply affected and immeasurably more divided by the civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century.[103] Given these factors, not least the divisions caused by the cultural shock of the regicide, the idea that the Restoration somehow represented a return to 'normality' is bizarre. The maimed, the bereaved, the traumatised and the indigent were everywhere to be seen, visible reminders of the troubled past in communities burdened by heavy taxation, damaged local economies and degraded infrastructure.

If, as has been claimed, the Restoration saw elite county families recover their former wealth and position in the provinces, they were still hamstrung in many counties by tensions between ex-parliamentarians and embittered Cavalier-Anglicans. Fears of radicalism and dissent encouraged the provincial gentry to cooperate with central government in order to ensure stability in their localities. Their feelings of insecurity were understandable: the common people had been exposed to unfamiliar stimuli and new ideas; plebeians had not only seen and participated in attacks on and humiliation of members of the gentry, but had been actively encouraged to do so. Such experiences had not transformed the middling and poorer sorts into a revolutionary proletariat; nevertheless, many had never lived under a functioning monarchy in their adult lives. Certainly, enough were known to be disaffected for Charles II and his ministers to desire a new model lieutenancy and a reorganised militia in order to police the localities. In the pursuance of this objective, the lesser gentry and yeomanry had a vital role to play in the parishes and hundreds. Further research is required on these so-called 'local elites', not least because the state of their personal finances and the extent of their willingness to act as agents for the centre might yet prove key to understanding changes in centre-local relations between 1660 and 1689.

It is a mark of the residual influence of the county community model that so many studies since the 1960s have continued to underplay the extent to which Charles II's ministers were able to intervene in the provinces. Having said this, they did not have the capacity to micromanage every aspect of provincial life, nor was it necessary to do so, provided each county remained secure, stable and willing to pay its taxes. The civil wars and Interregnum had affected local communities in different ways, and as a consequence each faced the Restoration with a different (sometimes very different) cultural legacy. Towns such as Taunton and Lyme actually continued to celebrate the anniversary of their deliverance from royalist sieges.[104] Such popular historicism, though it provoked alarm in the Cavalier-Anglican press, was invariably designed to provide those communities with comfort and certainty; both instinctive priorities in a world where conflict had inevitably obliterated both.[105] On the other side of the hill, the county feasts were one way in which provincial Cavalier-Anglicans could provide themselves with equal comfort and certainty. A more neutral solution, as Everitt observed in Kent, was for a community to retreat into its shell. But the tranquil rhythm of life discernible in local administrative records is often misleading: at the same time as reassuringly mundane alehouse licences and recognizances were being issued by the authorities in New Romney and Folkestone, justices attending county Quarter Sessions were required to grapple with problems arising directly from the civil wars and national regime change.[106] The post-conflict culture of the Restoration developed along lines which would be instantly recognisable to those studying the aftermath of more recent conflicts: the restored monarchy was reproduced and consolidated by inscribing the memory of the civil wars and regicide into both local and national culture. This meant, among other things, that after 1660 the harder local communities tried to pretend that life had returned to 'normal', the more apparent it became that much had changed.

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[1] A. Everitt, *The local community and the Great Rebellion* (London, 1969), p. 3.

[2] W. Sachse (ed.), *Restoration England 1660-1689* (Cambridge, 1971); J. Thirsk (ed.), *The Restoration* (London, 1976); J. Jones (ed.), *The restored monarchy, 1660-88* (Basingstoke, 1979); J. Miller, *Popery and politics in England, 1660-88* (Cambridge, 1973); C. Sommerville, *Popular religion in Restoration England* (Gainsville, 1977); I. Green, *The re-establishment of the Church of England* (Oxford, 1978); J. Jones, *Country and court: England 1658-1714* (London, 1978); M. Mullett, 'The politics of Liverpool, 1660-88', *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, 124 (1973), pp. 31-56; J.Hurwich, 'Dissent and Catholicism in English society: a study of Warwickshire, 1660-1720', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1 (1976), pp. 24-58; J. Pruett, *The parish clergy under the later Stuarts: the Leicestershire experience* (Urbana, 1978); L. Glassey, *Politics and the appointment of justices of the peace, 1675-1720* (Oxford, 1979).

[3] E.g., D. Lacey, *Dissent and parliamentary politics in England, 1660-89* (New Jersey, 1969); T. Harris, P. Seaward and M. Goldie (eds.), *The politics of religion in Restoration England* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 1-2, 4, 5. For surveys of the historiography up to 1997 from different standpoints, see V. Stater, 'Reconstructing the Restoration', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 29, no. 4 (October, 1990), p. 393-401; T. Harris, 'What's new about the Restoration?', *Albion*, vol. 29, no. 2 (Summer, 1997), pp. 187-222; J. Miller, *The Restoration and the England of Charles II* (2nd ed., London, 1997).

[4] Harris, 'What's new about the Restoration?', p. 189; T. Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms 1660-1685* (London, 2005), pp. xvii-xviii; R. Hutton, *The Restoration: a political and religious history of England and Wales 1658-1667* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 5, *passim*; R. L. Greaves, *Deliver us from evil: the radical underground in Britain 1660-1663* (Oxford, 1986); idem, *Enemies under his feet: radicals and nonconformists in Britain, 1664-1677* (Stanford, 1990); J. Morrill 'The Britishness of the English Revolution', in R. Asch (ed.), *Three nations: a common history?* (Bochum, 1990), 83-115; idem, 'Three kingdoms and one Commonwealth?: the enigma of seventeenth-century Britain and Ireland', in A. Grant and K. Stringer (eds.), *Uniting the kingdom? The making of British history* (London, 1995), pp. 170-90; B. Bradshaw & J. Morrill (eds.), *The British problem c.1534-1707: state formation in the Atlantic archipelago* (Basingstoke, 1996).
[5] C. Holmes, 'The county community in Stuart historiography', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 19, no 2 (Spring, 1980), p. 56; C. Pestana, *The English Atlantic in an age of revolution 1640-1661* (London, Harvard University Press, 2007).
[6] C. Demaria and C. Wright, 'What is a post-conflict culture?', in C. Demaria and C. Wright (eds.), *Post-conflict cultures: rituals of repression* (London, 2006), p. 6.
[7] Harris, 'What's new about the Restoration?', p. 189; T. Harris, 'Introduction: revising the Restoration', in Harris, Seaward, Goldie, *Politics of religion*, p. 1.
[8] Hutton, *Restoration*, p. 2.
[9] Hutton, *Charles II: King of England, Scotland and Ireland* (Oxford, 1989), p. 434.
[10] A. Hughes, 'The king, the Parliament, and the localities during the English Civil War', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 24, no. 2 (April, 1985), p. 236. A. Everitt, *The community of Kent and the Great Rebellion 1640-1660* (Leicester, 1966); J. Morrill, *Cheshire, 1630-1660: county government and society during the 'English Revolution'* (Oxford, 1974); A. Fletcher, *A county community in peace and war: Sussex 1600-1660* (London, 1975); J. S. Morrill, *Revolt of the provinces: conservative and radicals in the English Civil War, 1630-1650* (London, 1976).
[11] E.g., A. M. Johnson, 'Buckinghamshire 1640 to 1660: a study in county politics' (MA dissertation, University of Wales, 1963), pp. 7-8, 25-6.
[12] Holmes, 'County community', pp. 54-73; Hughes, 'The king, the Parliament, and the localities', pp. 236-265.
[13] Harris, Seaward, Goldie, *Politics of religion*, p. 2.
[14] Harris, 'What's new about the Restoration?', pp. 198-9.
[15] Everitt, *Kent*, p. 302; Fletcher, *Sussex*, pp. 311-20.
[16] Everitt, *Kent*, pp. 302-4.
[17] Fletcher, *Sussex*, p. 321.
[18] Everitt, *Kent*, pp. 310, 312.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 319.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 322.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 326.
[22] Forster, 'Government in provincial England', pp. 32, 42-3.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.
[24] *The declaration of the gentry of the county of Kent* (London, 1660), quoted in Everitt, *Kent*, p. 312.
[25] William Salt Library, S.MS 402, fos. 338v-339, quoted in D. A. Johnson and D. G. Vaisey (eds.), *Staffordshire and the Great Rebellion* (Stafford, 1964), p. 85.
[26] Walter, Lord Aston to Sir Joseph Williamson, 3 April 1675, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1675-6*, p. 52.
[27] The tombstone of Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle is still in St. Giles', Colchester. That of Lord and Lady Capel is sited beside the altar of St Cecilia's, Little Hadham, Hertfordshire.
[28] E.g., Sir Henry Coker JP in Wiltshire; P. J. Norrey, 'The Restoration regime in action: the relationship between central and local government in Dorset, Somerset and Wiltshire, 1660-1678', *Historical Journal*, 31, 4 (1988), p. 798.
[29] *A list of officers claiming to the sixty thousand pounds, etc.* (London, 1663). A sample of the petitions addressed to the Crown can be seen in Gervase Holles' Register Book of Petitions, 1660-1670, BL Add. MS 5759.
[30] Witness the troubles of Henry Kingsmill, son of a leading Hampshire JP at the Restoration: petition of Hester Kingsmill, to the King, July 1661, Hampshire Record Office 5M48/78; further

petition of Hester Kingsmill to the King, 1661-2, 5M48/79; C. Hammond, *Truth's discovery; or the cavalier's case clearly stated* (London, 1664), p. 5.
[31] See Everitt, *Kent*, pp. 320-1.
[32] P. Challinor, 'Restoration and exclusion in the county of Cheshire', *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester*, 64 (1982), p. 360.
[33] See R. Rudge, 'The Acts of Indemnity and Oblivion: the legal process of reconciliation' (MA dissertation, University of Nottingham, 2011).
[34] S. Roberts, *Recovery and Restoration in an English county: Devon 1646-1670* (Exeter, 1985), p. xi. See also P. Jenkins, *The making of a ruling class: Glamorgan gentry, 1640-1790* (Cambridge, 1983); A. Coleby, *Central government and the localities: Hampshire 1649-89* (Cambridge, 1987); Norrey, 'Restoration regime', pp. 789-812.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 214; Coleby, *Hampshire*, p. 2.
[36] Fletcher, *Reform in the provinces: the government of Stuart England* (London, 1986), p. 308.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 18.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19; Roberts, *Devon*, pp. 148-9; Coleby, *Hampshire*, pp. 90-1.
[39] Fletcher, *Reform*, pp. 19, 20.
[40] Norrey, 'Restoration regime', p. 791.
[41] Roberts, *Devon*, p. 140
[42] Quoted in Norrey, 'Restoration regime', p. 805.
[43] Fletcher, *Reform*, p. 18; see also Roberts, *Devon*, p. 214.
[44] Roberts, *Devon*, pp. 141, 143, 146, 184, 186.
[45] Coleby, *Hampshire*, p. 233.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 88.
[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.
[48] Roberts, *Devon*, p. 146; Coleby, *Hampshire*, p. 233
[49] As recorded in West Ham churchwardens' accounts, Essex Record Office D/P265/5, fo. 103.
[50] E.g., Jones (ed.), *Restored monarchy*, p. 7. Douglas Lacey was an early dissenter from this view.
[51] J. S. Morrill, 'The religious context of the English Civil War', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, 34 (1984), p. 173.
[52] Everitt, *Kent*, pp. 85-95.
[53] See M. Todd (ed.), *Reformation to revolution: politics and religion in early modern England* (London, 1995), pp. 1-10.
[54] Roberts, *Devon*, p. xiv.
[55] Coleby, *Hampshire*, p. 131.
[56] Roberts, *Devon*, pp. 140, 151, 184; Norrey, 'Restoration regime', pp. 803-5; A. M. Coleby, 'Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, 1649-1689' (DPhil dissertation, University of Oxford, 1985), pp. 222-4. For orthodox views at this time, see: R. Bosher, *The making of the Restoration Settlement* (London, 1957), pp. 201-4; G. Cragg, *Puritanism in the period of the great persecution 1660-1688* (Cambridge, 1957), p. 13.
[57] Coleby, *Hampshire*, pp. 91-2; Norrey, 'Restoration regime', p. 809.
[58] Starting with the Treason Act 1661 (13 Charles II. St. I. Cap. I). See J. Sawday, 'Re-writing a revolution: history, symbol and text in the Restoration', *Seventeenth Century*, 7, 2 (1992), pp. 171-99; A. Lacey, *The cult of King Charles the martyr* (Woodbridge, 2003).
[59] D. Appleby, *Black Bartholomew's day: preaching, polemic and Restoration nonconformity* (Manchester, 2007), pp. 79, 80; Bodl. Tanner MS 48, fo. 49.
[60] E.g., R. Fairclough, *A pastor's legacy* (London, 1663), frontispiece; P. Lamb, *The royal presence* (London, 1662), sig. A2.
[61] A. Hughes, *Politics, society and civil war in Warwickshire, 1620-1660* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 336.
[62] Warmington, *Gloucestershire*, p. 208.
[63] Everitt, *Kent*, pp. 322-3. Richmond had replaced the Earl of Winchelsea in May 1668.
[64] Norrey, 'Restoration regime', p. 790; see also Forster, 'Government in provincial England', pp. 41-2
[65] Roberts, *Devon*, pp. 140, 151, 152; Coleby, *Hampshire*, pp. 89, 90-1; Fletcher, *Reform*, p. 20; Warmington, *Gloucestershire*, p. 176. See also V. Stater, *Noble government* (London,

1994), pp. 78-9; R. Dunn (ed.), *Norfolk lieutenancy journal 1660-1676* (Norwich: Norfolk Record Society, 1977), p. 8. See also Challinor, 'Restoration and exclusion', p. 365
[66] Stater, *Noble government*, pp. 6, 71, 73-4, 84-5.
[67] Dunn, *Norfolk lieutenancy journal*, p. 9; Stater, *Noble government*, p. 67.
[68] ERO D/DEb/95, fo. 127.
[69] Stater, *Noble government*, pp. 67-8.
[70] ERO D/DEb/95, fos. 113, 115-126.
[71] E.g., for Essex, ERO D/DEb/95, fos. 123-126; for Hampshire, BL Add. MSS 21922, fos. 240, 240v, 241; for Norfolk, BL Add MSS 11601, fo. 2 (transcribed in Dunn, *Norfolk lieutenancy journal*, p. 24); also Norfolk Record Office, HMN 7/223; for Huntingdonshire, MS Carte 74, fo. 204.
[72] BL Add MSS 21922, fos. 249, 250, 253v.
[73] PRO SP29/57, fo. 235.
[74] PRO SP29/58, fos. 139-146; SP29/56, fo. 216.
[75] 13/14 Car. II, c. 2; 15 Car. II, c. 4; P. Hyde and D. Harrington (eds.), *Faversham Tudor and Stuart muster rolls*, Faversham Hundred Records, vol. 3 (Lyminge, Kent, 2000), p. xxx (a reference I owe to the kindness of Duncan Harrington); M. A. Faraday (ed.), *Herefordshire militia assessments of 1663*, Camden 4th series, vol. 10 (London, 1972), p. 7.
[76] Stater, *Noble government*, p. 22; Fletcher, *Reform*, p. 25.
[77] Quoted in Dunn, *Norfolk lieutenancy journal*, p. 18.
[78] Stater, *Noble government*, p. 4.
[79] Fletcher, *Reform*, p. 360.
[80] M. Braddick, *Parliamentary taxation in seventeenth-century England: local administration and response* (Woodbridge, 1994), p. 296.
[81] Norrey, 'Restoration regime', p. 796; Coleby, 'Hampshire', pp. 210-14.
[82] C. Chandaman, *The English Public Revenue 1660-1688* (Oxford, 1975), pp. 273-7
[83] Norrey, 'Restoration regime', pp. 797, 799; Warmington, *Gloucestershire*, pp. 203, 204-5;
[84] Norrey, 'Restoration regime', pp. 799-802, citing Wiltshire Record Office, A1/150/11, Michaelmas 1667; Somerset Record Office, Q/SR/127/44; 131/31; PRO T54/6/117-8.
[85] E.g. Lancashire Record Office, DDKE/acc 7848.
[86] Coleby, *Hampshire*, p. 118.
[87] *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 125.
[88] Centre for Kentish Studies, CKS-U1107/C30.
[89] BL Add. MSS 36832, fos. 74v-75v.
[90]Coleby, *Hampshire*, p. 117
[91] E.g., The National Archives, E179/311/57 (Buckinghamshire poll tax returns for the disbanding of the army); E179/272/2 (Hertfordshire returns); E179/323/11 (Caernafonshire and Cheshire returns); E179/176/555 (Hampshire, Andover division returns); E179/321/29 (Anglesey returns). See also, for example, corresponding documents in Buckinghamshire Record Office, D/LE/17/3-6 (army poll tax assessments for various divisions and hundreds of Buckinghamshire, 1660-1664).
[92] See A. Whiteman, 'The Compton census of 1676', in K. Schurer & T. Arkell (eds.), *Surveying the People* (Oxford, 1992).
[93] S. Roberts, 'Local government reform in England and Wales during the Interregnum: a survey', '*Into another mould': aspects of the Interregnum*, ed. I. Roots (2nd edn., Exeter, 1998), p. 63.
[94] D. Underdown, *Revel, riot and rebellion* (London, 1985); idem, *A freeborn people: politics and the nation in seventeenth-century England* (Oxford, 1996); Greaves, *Deliver us from evil* (1986); idem, *Enemies under his feet* (1990). See also B. Manning, *Aristocrats, plebeians and revolution in England 1640-1660* (London, 1996)
[95] Holmes, 'County community', p. 72.
[96] Jones, *Restored monarchy,* p. 4.
[97] Witness the contributions of 'Bedfordshire man', 'Buffcoate' and 'Agitator', to the Army debates of 1647; C. H. Firth (ed.), *The Clarke papers*, vol. I (London, 1992), pp. 235, 236, 251, 273, 276, 349.
[98] N. Key, 'The political culture and political rhetoric of county feasts and feast sermons, 1654-1714', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3 (July, 1994), p. 224; *idem*, 'The localism of the county feast in late Stuart political culture', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, vol. 58, no. 2 (1995), p. 217.

[99] Key, 'Political culture', p. 231.
[100] *Ibid.*, pp. 245-6.
[101] *Ibid.*, p. 225,
[102] I. Gentles, *The English Revolution and the wars of the three kingdoms* (London, 2007), pp. 436-7.
[103] See, for example, R. Gough, *The history of Myddle*, ed. D. Hey (Harmondsworth, 1981), pp. 71-5.
[104] R. L'Estrange, *Toleration Discuss'd* (London, 1663), p. 70.
[105] See modern parallels in Demaria and Wright, *Post-conflict cultures*, p. 7.
[106] East Kent Archives, NR/J/Q/1; Fo/JQ1/1; Centre for Kentish Studies, CKS/Q/SO/E1, fos. 66v, 68v; CKS/Q/SO/W1, fo. 71.