Lange argues that the gestationalist approach to moral parenthood fails due to its implausible reliance on a 'valuable intimate personal relationship between newborn and gestational procreator' at birth. However, his dismissal of the moral significance of the maternal-foetal connection depends largely upon inappropriate analogies to other forms of relationship. Further, Lange targets a very specific framing of the gestationalist view, overlooking the significance that many gestationalist accounts grant to *maternal* interests and experiences. Finally – perhaps due to this asymmetric focus – the version of the Harm Argument with which he engages also fails to recognise as morally significant the harm of forced separation for parents (and especially gestational mothers).

When investigating the purported value of the maternal-newborn relationship, Lange argues (plausibly) that the newborn's experiences are so limited as to cast doubt on the non-instrumental value of this relationship for the newborn, and on the likelihood of harm to the newborn as a result of the interruption of this relationship. However, Lange grants little significance to the gestational mother's experience of this relationship or her affect towards the foetus/newborn. He does not engage with literature on the epistemically transformative experience of pregnancy[1], nor, strikingly, does he discuss the possible significance of maternal love at birth. In fact, his paper mentions love only in the context of the relationships to which he *compares* the maternal-foetal relationship. The latter, he says, 'seems to lack the emotional complexity, intimacy and intensity of other paradigmatically valuable intimate relationships such as loving relationships between adults, parental love at later stages of parenthood and the love between siblings.' This is a perplexing statement, given that the image of maternal love as paradigmatically raw, intense, and reason-independent is such a widespread cultural trope. This stereotype is not necessarily true of all gestators; but given its ubiquity, the claim that the maternal-newborn bond seems to lack 'emotional complexity, intimacy and intensity' demands at least some argument in its defence.

Lange observes that the maternal-foetal relationship 'is very short-lived, simple, and sparse in its constitutive interactions. Neither participant knows much about the other's properties, and most interaction is one-directional rather than reciprocal, though the gestational procreator's investment is indeed significant.' He analogises the gestational connection to hypothetical situations involving adults: two strangers who interact through a rubber wall; and a singer with a secret admirer in the audience, who she has never seen but towards whom she feels affection. But here, Lange's analysis slips into the same error as so many scholars in the (limited) history of philosophical engagement with pregnancy: the application of conceptual tools that, as Little points out, 'were designed on the premiss that people are physically demarcated, even as gestation is marked by a thorough-going intertwinement.'[2] We might well agree that a gestational mother's knowledge about the foetus and its characteristics are limited compared to the volume of data we might learn about friends, romantic partners, or the children we raise – but it does not follow that this knowledge is limited in *substance* or *significance*. It is not a 'mere' fact about the foetus that it is the precursor to one's child, that it is growing out of and mingled with one's own body, that it is dependent and demanding and constantly present. Rothman describes pregnancy as 'an intimate social relationship,' but her argument does not hinge on analogy with other kinds of social relationships. [3] Rather, the intimacy she describes is entirely unique, found nowhere except in the creation of flesh from flesh. On Rothman's account, it is not that the gestational mother's rights over her child are contingent on the existence of a social bond with (in Lange's words) sufficient

normative significance 'to outweigh the considerations that may speak in favour of assigning the parental rights to others who have not gestated the child.' Rather, Rothman argues, the mother's 'nurturing of that child with the blood and nutrients of her body establishes her parenthood of that child.'[3]

Lange also cites Feldman's account as an example of gestationalism, but his argument fails to connect with her concerns about the harm of insufficiently recognising the importance of gestation. Feldman does not appeal to the *inherent* moral significance of the emotional relationship between gestational mother and newborn, but makes an instrumental argument for protecting the gestational mother's 'stake' in the future child, by appeal to the wellbeing of both parties. She argues that 'many or perhaps most pregnant women care for their fetuses by voluntarily adopting healthy lifestyles… because they already feel an emotional bond and a responsibility to their developing fetus.'[4] Initially 'created and enhancedby the voluntary nature of the connection between woman and fetus, and the modifications which she chooses to adopt', this bond is 'secured by the belief that the pregnancy represents just the beginning of a relationship with a soon-to-be child.'[4] This brings us to Lange's discussion of the Harm Argument. In this section, he considers the harms that might accrue to the newborn as a result of the interruption of the maternal-newborn relationship, but fails entirely to engage with the possibility that this could constitute morally relevant harm to the mother. Lange observes: 'In contrast to the person who loses a limb after an accident, who can and likely does express great grief and pain after the fact, a newborn cannot tell us what it thinks or feels right at birth, and we have no other way to discern this.' Gestational mothers, on the other hand, can and do express the agony of unwilling separation from their newborns. My own gestationalist account of parental rights appeals to the moral significance of *this* pain, arguing that gestational mothers have (at a minimum) the right not to be subject to the grave harm of this unwilling separation.[5] Lange does not explicitly presuppose or defend a child-centred approach from the outset, and yet his conclusions – including the purported implications for justifying partiality to biological children – simply do not follow on the *dual*-interest approach that grounds many gestationalist accounts of moral parenthood.

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