

The Consequences of Quotas: Assessing the Effect of Varied Gender Quotas on Legislator Experience in the European Parliament

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Abstract: This article explores the consequence of quotas on the level of diversity observed in legislators' professional and political experience. We examine how party system and electoral system features that are meant to favor female representation – such as gender quotas for candidate selection or placement mandates on electoral lists – affect the composition of legislatures, by altering the mix of professional and political qualifications held by its members. Using data collected for all legislators initially seated to the current session of the European Parliament (EP) – one of the largest and most diverse democratically elected legislatures in the world, we find that quotas eliminate gendered differences in experience within the institution, particularly when used in conjunction with placement mandates that ensure female candidates are featured on electoral lists in viable positions. Our findings suggest that electoral institutions can generally help to 'level the playing field' between the backgrounds of men and women in elected office, while also increasing the presence of desirable qualities among EP representatives of both genders.

1. Introduction

Scholars link increases in the descriptive representation of diverse backgrounds with positive outcomes for representation, writ large. Within this literature, a focus on gender and representation is particularly prominent. Higher levels of women’s descriptive political representation boost legitimacy and trust in institutions (Mansbridge 1999), greater political engagement and activism (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007), and increased political knowledge (Fridkin and Kenney 2014). Other works explore more substantive effects for women’s descriptive representation within a legislature, such as impacts on legislative output and efficiency (Anzia and Berry 2011; Volden and Wiseman 2014). Yet another body of literature investigates ways to improve women’s access to political office, exploring the impact of electoral institutions (Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2015; Valdini 2012), candidate selection (Krook 2010b; Luhiste 2015; Pruyzers et al. 2017), and gender quotas (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010; Krook 2010a; Matland 2006). Research on gender quotas, in particular, has focused on the types that are the most effective in securing elected positions for women (e.g., Schwindt-Bayer 2009), as well as the qualities of women who are selected and then elected, both with and without the use of quotas (Baltrunaite et al. 2014; Davidson-Schmich 2016; Murray 2010; Schwindt-Bayer 2011; Weeks and Baldez 2015). The latter literature tends to focus on the quality of female legislators in terms of political experience and performance in office. In addition, Besley (2017) has even shown that quotas effect the quality of men that are recruited by parties once a gender quota is in effect, raising the competence of male politicians alongside raising the level of female representation. We contribute to this literature by exploring the aggregate impact of quotas on the diversity of political and professional background experience among male and female legislators elected to the European Parliament (EP).

While most scholars would agree that increasing the number of women in office is a normatively desirable development, the use of gender quotas to achieve this outcome is not without controversy. Arguments against the use of gender quotas tend to center on the potential decrease in

quality brought on by ‘quota candidates’ or a reduction of merit-based competition that quotas might entail. With respect to merit, opponents of quotas argue that a lack of female representation is simply the result of individual choices made by women not to opt for political careers; artificially inflating the number of women on electoral ballots makes competition more about identity than quality (Baltrunaite et al. 2014; Holzer and Neumark 2000). Another perception of women elected using quotas is that they may not have been able to obtain office on their own and are therefore less qualified to serve (Murray 2010). Not only does this perception discredit women in office, but it suggests that quotas may actually decrease the quality of political institutions on the whole (Lovenduski 2005; Murray 2010). However, research specifically examining the women who enter elected office after the implementation of quotas has shown that these concerns are largely baseless. In fact, most of this literature uses single-country studies to show that “quota women” are not inferior to men or “non-quota women”, both in their qualifications for office and in their ability to work within legislatures (Baltrunaite et al. 2014; Murray 2010; Weeks and Baldez 2015).

We expand upon this debate by examining the consequences of gender quotas for the diversity of experience witnessed in a legislature’s composition. However, instead of examining the impact of quotas on the competency or qualifications of female legislators, we ask whether the presence of quotas is associated with a different overall composition of legislatures in significant ways. Using the unique electoral structure of the EP, where some members are elected under national and party-level quotas systems and others are not, we are able to draw comparisons between those systems where quotas are associated with no gaps between men and women’s professional and political experience those in which quotas continue not to be used. Our analysis speaks to a larger debate on the extent to which quotas are associated with the removal of common barriers to entry for women who run for office in Europe. In general, we find that systems using a combination of quotas and placement mandates, which are rules requiring the nomination of women to winnable constituencies or list positions (Schwindt-Bayer 2009), have more balanced representation between men and women and also higher levels of qualified politicians from both genders.

The EP makes for an interesting test case for this inquiry. Not only is it among the most gender-equal legislatures in the world, but it is also comprised of directly-elected representatives from 28 liberal democracies and more than a hundred national political parties. While EU law sets a loose, common framework for EP elections, it also provides national parties and electoral systems with a great deal of agency to dictate the terms under which these elections will take place. With respect to the promotion of women in elected office, nine of the 28 EU member states actively incentivize the election of women via gender quotas that are directly required by national electoral law, in addition to dozens of national political parties who do so at an organizational level (Prpic and Chahri 2017).

Using individual-level data on the previous professional and political experience of members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we compare the composition of delegations elected to the EP using quotas, both with and without electoral list placement mandates, to the institution as a whole. We are thereby able to leverage the uniquely diverse electoral features of the EP to assess the impact of quotas on the composition of the parliament in a way that single-country studies cannot, making a unique empirical contribution to the broader literature on gender quotas.

Our findings demonstrate that while gender quotas and other institutional decisions meant to boost the quantity of female representation are significantly associated with indicators of professional experience and political expertise, they are not the direct cause of differences in the experience and expertise of MEPs. In fact, in systems where quotas and placement mandates are in use, differences between men and women tend not to exist, with respect to previous political and professional experience. In addition, we find that systems with quotas contain more experienced MEPs overall, across both males and females, which thereby increases the general quality of the EP. These findings echo the work of scholars from other legislative venues and show that quotas and protocols intended to increase female representation may not only ‘open the door’ or ‘even the playing field’ for elected women, but may also more broadly improve the quality of representatives present in the legislature.

2. Assessing the Impact of Quotas on Female Representation

A number of studies have considered the degree to which quotas and other mechanisms for boosting female representation are effective at increasing the number of female representatives, as well as enhancing the quality of representation. We begin by discussing the traditional barriers to entry present in electoral contexts that impact on both the quantity and composition (in terms of experience) of the pool of female candidates in democratic societies. We then focus on gender quotas as one institutional tool to can be used to overcome these barriers.

Improving the Recruitment Environment:

Women have traditionally faced barriers to election that affect both the supply and demand sides of the political recruitment environment. Among these barriers, electoral systems are one of the most important. At a basic level, the difference between proportional representation (PR) systems and single-member majority districts (SMD) affects women by defining the scope of competition. The nature of this competition also affects both the type of women willing to run and the type of women that parties nominate. SMD and open-list PR systems require women to compete directly against other candidates. In single member districts this is only their opponent, while in open-list PR systems this may be both their fellow party members and opponents from other parties. This means that they compete on their personal merits, either alone or alongside the merits of their group, whereas closed-list PR systems structure competition around the group. This influences the type of candidates that will run for office, because not all women feel qualified to compete in an individual manner. Fox and Lawless (2004) show that women doubt their qualifications to run for office more so than men, even when they are objectively as qualified. Kanthak and Woon (2015) use an experimental design to show that women are more averse to the competitive nature of elections, in general, and are only more likely to run if the private costs of doing so can be eliminated. Accordingly, when women do run, we might expect them to be a particular ‘kind’ of woman, in terms of their experience, qualifications, and ambition.

Women who run for office in more individually-competitive electoral systems tend to share similar characteristics and qualifications for office. Schwindt-Bayer (2011), in her study of women in Latin American legislatures, finds that women who win elections for legislative office represent a particular type of candidate. Specifically, she finds that these women tend to represent more traditionally defined ‘male’ roles. To compete against men, these women are highly educated and have considerable political and professional experience in areas that traditionally lead to political careers. They are also less likely to be married or have a family and are more likely to be politically ambitious. In other words, they are like the men that they run against and may not be providing the ‘women’s’ perspective that descriptive representation is thought to entail.

Being more ‘like men’ has also shown to be lucrative in elections outside of Latin America. For example, Huddy and Terkildsen (1993) show that candidates with ‘masculine’ traits are considered more competent in important policy areas like the military and the economy, which can be helpful in winning elections. But displaying masculine characteristics also has a downside. More recent research has shown that voters also prefer female politicians with more traditional family roles, which can put women candidates in a “double bind” (Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth 2018). Having the traits similar to men that signal competence and the ambition to run for office may make a female candidate appear less likeable and overall less competitive.

Each of these factors, combined with the fact that women are rarely encouraged to run for office in the way that men are (Fox and Lawless 2004), contributes to an undersupply of women across the board. It’s no wonder that women, regardless of their qualifications, are less likely to run for office than men and that legislatures still have relatively fewer women than men overall. So, how can women be encouraged to run for office? Institutional rules, like quotas, can help to create a female-friendly environment to encourage ambitious women.

Parties in a variety of national contexts have therefore experimented with the usage of gender quotas at the nomination stage, where various mechanical thresholds require parties to select certain numbers of female candidates. These quotas may be set as either national law or as internal party

policies and vary widely from overtly tokenistic schemes to ones meant to ensure full gender parity. What they have in common is a requirement for female candidates that can eliminate some of the more individually competitive aspects of candidate selection in non-quota systems, which encourages a more diverse pool of candidates.

Quotas and the Dynamics of Representation

That gender quotas can lower barriers in the recruitment environment of elections for women is largely supported in the quota literature. A number of studies examine how electoral laws and policies – particularly gender parity quotas at the recruitment and nomination stage – affect legislator quality within the national political systems of Europe. Allen, Cutts, and Campbell (2016) examine this question within the UK, following the introduction of party-level gender quotas in 1997. They find that women elected under the new quota system are not significantly different than women who were not nominated under quotas, with respect to their backgrounds, vote totals, and further abilities for political advancement. Similarly, Murray (2010) finds that women’s background qualifications and experience, prior to election to the French parliament, were not reduced by the introduction of quotas; there were simply more women listed on the ballot. Such findings suggest that women may not be more (or less) qualified when elected on quotas, but that their ‘numerical’ representation successfully increased.

The question of whether an increased number of female representatives elected via gender quotas affects the overall background qualities of legislators has also been addressed at some length. Taking advantage of a natural experiment in Italy, where quotas were introduced and then removed, both Baltrunaite et al. (2014) and Weeks and Baldez (2015) find that quotas increased the numbers of women elected to the Italian parliament. In the case of Baltrunaite et al.’s study, the increased number of female representatives corresponded with a heightened level of education across all legislators, while it reduced the number of male legislators without advanced degrees. Weeks and Baldez’ work echoes this finding, concluding that gender quotas helped to boost the number of women in national office who had prior local political experience and lowered absenteeism across

the national legislative body. Somewhat pessimistically, however, these same trends reversed, shortly after the Italian quotas were removed.

In addition, O’Brien and Rickne (2016) show that the strict gender parity required by local Swedish social democratic party boards not only increased women’s representation within the party, but also enabled more women to advance into national positions of political leadership more quickly than their colleagues from parties without such regulations. One of the positive externalities of this change in party leadership was the removal of mediocre male party leaders. Besley et al. (2017) suggest that increased competition for male seats after the introduction of a quota made it harder for mediocre leaders to nominate mediocre men in elections and maintain their grip on power in the party. The result was that more competent leaders arose, sometime through the support of women making the most use of the new quotas. These leaders then nominated more competent candidates overall, therefore raising the entire level of quality of candidates across both genders.

Finally, experimental work has demonstrated that the elimination of competition for leadership roles encourages qualified women to seek out these opportunities. Neiderle, Segal, and Vesterlund (2013) argue that the absence of women in high profile and competitive jobs might be caused by the competitive environment, in which highly qualified women choose not to enter competitions that they could win. They use experimental evidence to show that introducing affirmative action policies not only encourages more women to participate in competitive tournaments but also maintains the overall quality of all participants. In a similar study, Kanthak and Woon (2015) test whether women are more sensitive to competitive elections than men, regardless of their objective ability to win or their beliefs about others abilities. They find that even qualified women are averse to electoral competition and show that removing the competitive aspects of elections in favor of volunteer opportunities increases the likelihood that women will step forward as candidates.

In sum, the literature suggests that quota laws and other institutional choices meant to boost gender parity increase the number of female representatives, but do not hurt the quality of

representation offered by female legislators. Indeed, quotas may even help to raise the quality bar across the bodies in which these rules are found by both introducing competent and quality female candidates and making the nomination of less qualified men more difficult. We therefore expect the presence of quotas in European elections to also impact the type of legislator elected from European Union member states that use them.

Contextual Factors and Women’s Recruitment

In addition to institutional rules like quotas, a variety of contextual factors and party characteristics also affect the recruitment environment. At the national level, the inclusion of more women in politics, lower incumbency rates, and overall increased gender equality can encourage more women in office. When women are in elected positions, they serve as role models for other women and girls and encourage political participation (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). When overall gender equality is high, traditional gender roles and stereotypes about women in office are less pronounced, encouraging more women to seek office (Krook and Norris 2014). Party characteristics such as ideology, the organization of candidates selection, and the number of women activists within the party also play a role (Caul 2001). Here, the literature finds that the most gender-equal legislatures will come from countries in which the recruitment environment is the most positive towards women’s issues and gender equality concerns. This cultural predisposition should be helpful to women’s recruitment at both the party and at the national level. Furthermore, it suggests that an electoral system that combines proportional representation with gender quotas should be most helpful at increasing women’s descriptive representation in legislatures. Having considered the general picture, we now examine how these factors are at play in Europe’s largest directly-elected legislature.

Women’s Representation in the European Parliament

In many ways, the EP operates as a microcosm for the comparative study of institutional design in Europe. While MEPs follow a common set of rules and procedures within the assembly, they are elected via systems that vary widely from country to country and come from parties that represent the

full spectrum of political beliefs present across the continent. Reflective of the European Union’s (EU) motto, ‘United in Diversity,’ EP elections provide an interesting empirical example of the various systems and peoples found across the EU, unified within a singular institution.

However, the EP is also an outlier with respect to female representation. The most-recent May 2014 EP elections produced an all-time high for women’s representation at the EU level, with female members of the EP (MEPs) occupying more than a third of seats in the multinational legislative assembly. By the midpoint of the term in 2017, this number had grown to 37.9% of all MEPs—making the EP one of the world’s most gender-equal legislatures. At the same time, only 22 national legislatures – six of which are EU member states – from around the world could boast a higher degree of female representation (Prpic and Chahri 2017). What explains this success in boosting the number of female representatives and what are its consequences for the EP?

Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015) examine women’s recruitment to the EP during the 2009 elections and find that female MEPs benefit from recruitment strategies that allow for centralized party selection mechanisms at a mix of regional and national levels. In other work, they also find that women are more likely to win election to the EP when they come from countries or parties that employ gender quotas, are nominated to closed lists, and come from districts with greater numbers of MEPs (Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2014; Lühiste 2015). While these findings are broadly in keeping with the thrust of the literature that we discuss above, it is particularly interesting to note that, while all EP elections are inherently proportional, the varying sizes of country delegations suggest that some elections are more proportional than others.

Beyond the mechanical effects of differing electoral systems, other scholars examine intra-party differences for the success of women’s election to the EP. Lühiste and Kenny (2016) find that while female MEPs are more likely to come from leftist parties, which are more likely to use inclusive quotas, women from more conservative and rightist parties are actually more likely to demonstrate relevant political experience and may be more successful in advancing their legislative careers. Aldrich (2018b) finds that centralization of party organizations affects the likelihood of

selection and nomination for women candidates to the EP. Chiva (2014) finds that the traditional left-right ideological spectrum is less successful than the pro-/anti-EU dimension in accounting for the presence of female MEPs from Central and Eastern European member states. Her findings suggest that anti-EU parties may view pro-gender equality as a ‘Western’ norm that is imposed upon parties from the EU. Finally, Xydias (2016) examines the role of the second-order elections model on women’s representation and discovers that women MEPs are at a comparative advantage for EP elections when they come from national parties that take the EP less seriously and are therefore less competitive with their candidate selection practices.

While this mixed bag of cultural and institutional variables may make election to the EP more or less difficult for certain types of women, Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2014) also explain how the EP may be a particularly attractive place for women to work, as compared with national political systems. Because EP elections are less competitive, ambitious women can be advantaged in both ballot selection and election times – as parties and voters pay less attention to who is being elected. Because EP elections are all at least somewhat proportional, women do not suffer the high barriers to entry faced in majoritarian elections. And because the EU is more gender-mainstreamed and typically more developed in its gender-equality policies, women MEPs may find a neater substantive fit with EU policymaking.¹

In sum, the EP appears to have more female legislators than many national parliaments for the same mix of cultural and institutional reasons that many European legislatures have more female legislators than in other parts of the world. However, given the diverse national systems that coexist within the EP space, every female MEP who benefits from a more gender-equal national political environment and comes from a political party with advantageous selection criteria may also work alongside MEPs from political environments that are less friendly to women’s political recruitment. Therefore, we now consider how the sources of variation present in women’s selection to the EP may also influence the dynamics of representation on offer there.

3. Theorizing the Effect of Gender Quotas on Representative Qualities

Thus far, we have considered the effect of quotas on women’s legislative representation, with a particular emphasis on the intra-institutional diversity of the EP. In this section, we move on to theorize how the varied usage of gender quotas may also have unintended side effects on the qualities that MEPs demonstrate in their work as legislators. While the EP was once viewed as an overly complex and technical institutions with an extraordinary turnover rate among legislators (e.g., Daniel and Metzger 2018), its increased professionalization since the introduction of legislative co-decision with the Council in the early 1990s has led to a growing class of politicians whose primary ambition lies in working for the European body (e.g., Daniel 2015). At the same time, national parties have increasingly used European elections strategically to further their national and European goals (Aldrich 2018a; Pemstein, Meserve, and Bernhard 2015), often favoring incumbent MEPs in the selection of candidates (Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2018). Nonetheless, incumbent MEPs are not the only politicians recruited for EP elections.

The seniority-driven hierarchies found in many of the EP’s internal institutions (Daniel 2013; Ringe 2010; Yoshinaka, McElroy, and Bowler 2010) suggest that national parties should seek out politicians who are prepared to take on the subject matter dealt with at the EP level, as well as to protect career MEPs. While we expect that all parties have the rational incentive to select high quality politicians for office, when it comes to women’s recruitment and selection initiatives, we expect that parties using quotas will also feature a higher number of women in electable positions. This will have the related effect of an increased number of quality female politicians, while also making the remaining spots left for male politicians more competitive. In other words, we expect that parties that use quotas will field a quality list of both male and female candidates, but that they may also have fewer spots left over for less qualified men. This will lead such parties’ politicians to be of an overall higher quality.

In the absence of direct previous experience in the EP, the literature consistently views political experience as synonymous with quality candidacy. We thusly expect that when gender

quotas require parties to bring in new candidates, these candidates should not only be disproportionately women, but should also be more experienced in politics. For this contention and all others, we further expect that quotas will be most effective if they operate alongside placement mandates, which force parties not to squander female candidates in unlikely electoral positions. In other words, our first hypothesis is as follows:

H₁: Countries and Parties using gender quotas (alongside placement mandates) will be associated with MEPs who have higher levels of previous political experience.

However, political experience is not the only important aspect for completing effective work in EP policymaking. Specifically, within the literature on the committee-driven nature of EP legislating, the highly technical and oftentimes apolitical nature of EP work is cited as necessitating the recruitment of MEPs who are more likely to be equipped for the demands of specialized committee work (Daniel 2013, but see also Yordanova 2013). Within the context of gender rules, we expect to see a similar relationship as in H₁, whereby parties that use gender quotas will recruit MEPs that demonstrate higher levels of the sorts of education and professional expertise that are most relevant for EP work. However, what makes an MEP a ‘quality’ one in this case is not just political experience. More specifically, we anticipate that MEPs from such parties will have more advanced educations and come from employment backgrounds that are more directly compatible with EP work, such as law, international relations, or finance.

H₂: Countries and Parties using gender quotas (alongside placement mandates) will be associated with MEPs who have higher levels of relevant professional expertise for EP work.

To summarize the full argument, we view gender quotas and placement mandates to be useful institutional innovations that can increase women’s descriptive representation because they eliminate some traditional barriers to entry for female candidates. Because the candidate pool is increased when more women are encouraged and recruited for office, quotas should raise the bar for the presence of legislators with characteristics more broadly suited to the technical nature of legislative work in the EP. Naturally, a variety of additional variables may also contribute to the

success of national parties to send politicians to the EP with heightened political experience and relevant professional expertise. We explore such alternate expectations in the following section.

4. First Cut: Identifying Gendered Differences in MEP Quality

In order to test a theory about gender quotas and legislator experience, we explore the distribution of experience in the EP in 2014 in two ways. We first explore the previous political experience of both male and female MEPs, before examining the kinds of expertise gained from their professional backgrounds. In terms of political experience, we identify those MEPs who have previously held positions on national party boards, served as members of national parliaments, held local office, or who are returned incumbents from the EP. The measures of relevant professional expertise identify MEPs that have either demonstrated professional experience or educational training, prior to their EP mandate, that is directly related to a particular policy area prescient to the EP’s specialized committee system. These categories include MEPs with expertise in agriculture, legal experience, medicine, economics and finance, transportation and telecommunications, education and teaching, international affairs, and journalism.ⁱⁱ

We begin by examining simple associative patterns between all MEPs elected in 2014, their levels of political experience and professional expertise, and their gender. Table 1 displays descriptive information on the percentage of MEPs having each type of experience and expertise across gender and the results of a chi-square test for significant differences between genders. The first subset of columns (1) presents the percentage of women, men, and total MEPs with each category of experience for the entire EP. The second subset (2) presents the percentage of MEPs from member states that use any quota and the third (3) presents the percentage of MEPs in states that use both a quota and a placement mandate. Thus, all percentages are calculated based upon the total number of MEPs. For example, for gendered differences of MEPs that have experience as a former MP, the first subset indicates that 35.37% of all MEPs have this type experience. However, female MEPs with this type of experience make up only 11.30% of the EP and male MEPs with such experience represent 24.07% of the EP. The data from quota countries (subset 2) tells us that only

12.77% of all MEPs come from quota countries *and* have experience as a national MP; 3.46% of all MEPs are female former national MPs from quota countries and 9.31% of the EP are male former MPs from quota countries, and so on.

The columns for the entire population of MEPs, signified through bold and underlined cells, show that differing levels of experience in national party office, past national parliamentary membership and having held a local office are each significantly gendered (in other words, the likelihood of male and female MEPs to display different propensities to appear in each category is significantly different). More specifically, there are significantly more men than women with these types of experience in the EP. On the other hand, gender is not significantly associated with differences in the level of many professional background categories, nor are there many differences in age. This suggests that, on the whole, differences in MEP background that are attributable to gender are mostly limited to political experience.

[Table 1 about here.]

In contrast to the population as a whole, if we only examine patterns among the subsets of MEPs that come from countries with quotas or countries with both quotas and placement mandates, then these patterns change. Information on quotas at the national level (i.e., legislated quotas) is taken from Freidenvall and Dahlerup (2013). The columns show that combining quotas with placement mandates effectively eliminates significant gendered differences for political experience. For example, simple quotas reduce the presence of significant gendered differences in previous local office and national party office, but the addition of placement mandates eliminates significant difference in all forms of political experience. These preliminary results show that while differences in experience across genders do exist in the entire population of MEPs, they do not exist in those countries where both quotas and placement mandates are in place.

5. Explanations for Women’s Representation: Logistic Regression Results and Discussion

While the associative tests indicate that differences exist between male and female MEPs, and that these differences are mitigated by the presence of quota and placement rules, there are several other

factors that can also lead to the selection and election of experienced legislators. In order to test the hypothesized relationships across a variety of national and party-level factors, we next model a series of logistic regressions that control for various institutional and cultural differences at the national level. These models take each type of professional and political experience and expertise separately, as their dependent variable. In these models, we use an ordinal measure of quota strength, *National Gender Quota*, to measure the variance in gender quota laws at the national level. This variable takes three values, 0 in countries where no quotas exist, 1 in countries where simple quotas exist that require no specific placement of women on electoral lists, and 2 for countries where placement mandates exist.ⁱⁱⁱ In keeping with our hypotheses, the expectation is that higher values of the quota index will correspond with a heightened presence of experience and expertise.

In addition to these national characteristics, the models also include additional indicators that may have bearing on the presence of certain types of experience and expertise and that may also help or hurt women’s descriptive representation. We use an updated version of Gallagher’s (1991) measure of the disproportionality (based upon calculations from European Election Survey 2009) of the national electoral system (*Disproportionality*) and the presence of *Closed Lists* in European elections to identify variations across differing national electoral systems. *Districts* accounts for the number of electoral districts used for European elections in a given country.^{iv} Each of these indicators proxies for institutional environments that may impact on the ability of women to be elected. In order to capture the gendered nature of the national political environment, we use three measures that address the general level of gender equality in each EU member state: *Women with Degree*, which measures the percentage of women per 100 men with an advanced education in each member state,^v *Women in National Parliament*, which provides the percentage of each national legislature that is female,^{vi} and *Gender Equality Index*. This index is a composite indicator of general levels of equality across work, money, knowledge, time, power and health provided by the European Institute for Gender Equality.^{vii}

We begin by estimating a set of regression models that include country-level data on all MEPs that were initially seated in 2014, excluding replacement MEPs. We then re-estimate the models, using only the subset of MEPs for which party data was available. For each dependent variable, we estimate models using the entire sample of MEPs, just female MEPs, and just male MEPs, in order to also test the effects of quotas across both genders. All logistic models use country-clustered standard errors to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level.

Country-Level Quotas and Experience

Figure 1 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis for a few key areas of professional and political experience for MEPs across the three data groupings (all MEPs, female MEPs, and male MEPs). The first set of plots report the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of national gender quotas and placement mandates on the presence of MEPs with political experience and the second set of plots report the coefficients for relevant professional experience and expertise.^{viii}

[Figure 1 about here.]

Examining the coefficient plots for previous political experience shows mixed results for the effect of national gender quotas across women and men. Here we see the average effect of national gender quotas on the entire population of MEPs is not significantly associated with the likelihood of an MEP demonstrating most types of previous political experience with only national MPs showing a significant and positive relationship. However, testing the relationship between quotas and political experience across the gendered subgroups highlights more nuanced results that are consistent with H₁. Most notably, the presence of gender quotas does correlate with the likelihood that women will have national experience (*Former MP*) prior to entering the EP, as well as the likelihood that men will be have held national party office. This provides evidence in support of H₁, which predicted that countries with national gender quotas will have more politically experienced MEPs. The positive and significant effect of the quotas demonstrate the increased likelihood that both male and female MEPs have had previous national experience that may be useful to them in their work in the EP.

Interestingly, Figure 1 also shows that quota countries are significantly less likely to contain reelected MEPs from the previous term (marked as incumbents), which does not conform to basic assumptions made by H_1 , but the effect appears to be driven by a significant decrease of male incumbents when quotas are used. While the lack of longitudinal information in the structure of our dataset makes it difficult to isolate the mechanism at play specifically, this supports our argument that when countries or parties include gender quotas with placement mandates, competition increases for male MEPs, who may be less assured of winning re-election. In particular, the presence of a national gender quota decreases the predicted probability that an MEP will be a male incumbent by about 11.4%, with placement mandates reducing this by an additional 9.3%. This reduces the male incumbency advantage by nearly half: falling from a 43% predicted likelihood, when no quotas are in place, to only about 22.5% when quotas and mandates are used, *ceteris paribus*.^{ix} With respect to professional experience, Figure 1 also shows that both men and women from quota countries are significantly more likely to hold qualifications in law and international affairs, and men are more likely to have a PhD when they come from countries in which national-level gender quotas exist, both of which are attributes that are useful for success in the EP’s technical ‘working parliament’ environment. This provides evidence in support of H_2 , which argues that national-level quotas should increase the number of professionally experienced candidates entering the EP. Of course, the nature of gender equality within each member state might also influence the type of experience MEPs have as professional and educational success might be subject to gendered patterns within society. In order to account for some of these patterns, we included several controls variables for gender equality both in politics and education and an overall general measure. The relationship of these control variables to our experience categories is presented in Tables A1.1 and A1.2 in the appendix. These results show that these measure are, in most cases, not significant predictors of experience. The most notable relationship is between women’s education and experience, where the education for women is significantly associated with more women in international affairs, and between women in national parliaments and local politicians which also has a significant and positive relationship.

[Figure 2 about here.]

In order to further evaluate the substantive effects of quotas and placement mandates described above, Figure 2 presents the predicted probability that female MEPs will have former experience as a national MP (left), expertise in legal professions (center), and expertise in international affairs (right), given the presence of a national quota law in their home country. The results suggest that the power of gender quotas to increase the likelihood of these types of experience comes mostly with the presence of placement mandates, in conjunction with quotas. In fact, the confidence intervals for the Former MPs show that the effect of implementing a placement mandate nearly doubles the effect of a quota. The predicted probability of a woman holding previous experience as an MP increases by half from the baseline, jumping from roughly 9% to nearly 14% when simple quotas are instituted. The inclusion of a placement mandate increases this likelihood again, to over 20%. The power of placement mandates is also evident when evaluating experience in international affairs. The right panel of the figure shows that the effect of national quotas is essentially indistinguishable from the absence of quotas with overlapping confidence intervals and average probabilities of about 16% and 20%. However, placement mandates increase the predicted probability of international experience by an additional 10%.^x

The center column of Figure 2 shows similar results with respect to legal experience, suggesting that the EP appears to benefit from more women with legal experience when countries use both a simple quota and a placement mandate. Here, the baseline probability that a female MEP has legal experience is about 12%, with a quota increasing this probability to about 23% and placement mandates increasing this to about 39%. Again, the use of the quota combined with a mandate has a significantly larger effect than the use of simple quotas. In this case, national quotas also have a similar effect on men, increasing the probability they will have legal experience by about 5% with quotas and 10.5% with placement mandates from a baseline of about 17.5%. These results provide additional evidence in support of H_1 with respect to women in the EP, and also highlights how placement mandates are a powerful tool for increasing the level of women with relevant experience

and expertise in the EP. Overall, these models show fairly substantial effects that support H_1 and H_2 and suggest that quotas are generally good for increasing the professional expertise among those entering the Parliament and that placement mandates amplify these effects.

In assessing the impact of quotas on the type of MEP expertise, it is also important to note the influence of other factors that may bias for or against the sorts of expertise examined above. Among common electoral system variables, we found significant and independent effects for closed list systems, disproportionality, and the number districts. Regardless of MEP gender, more disproportional systems tended to have more former MPs and local politicians in the EP while states with more districts tended to have less former MPs. This result is unsurprising, given that electoral systems with several, less proportional districts will have many party lists that elect only a single or a few MEPs. Therefore, we would expect to see more homogeneity in the types of candidates that enter the EP through these systems. A more important effect is that of closed list ballots. In the model for political experience, this variable increases the likelihood that men will have political experience while decreasing the likelihood that women will have political experience. Figure 3 shows the coefficients of this variable across genders.

[Figure 3 about here.]

As Figure 3 shows, closed list ballots appear to increase the likelihood that all MEPs will have experience as incumbents and local politicians and decrease the likelihood that women will have been former MPs. This result is especially interesting, given that national gender quotas were shown to increase this type of experience in women. This suggests that closed ballots may attenuate the positive effects of gender quotas on female MEPs. In order to explore this further, Figure 4 presents the effect of national gender quotas on the predicted probability that a female MEP will have served in the national parliament in states with closed list systems and states that have open ballots. As the figure shows, states with closed list ballots in place have, on average, fewer total women in the EP that have served in national parliaments than do states with open list systems.

[Figure 4 about here.]

However, the overall effect of gender quotas on recruiting MEPs with previous expertise remains positive. In states with closed lists, the use of a simple gender quota increases the predicted probability that women will have experience as a former MP by about 4% and placement mandates increase this by about another 7% (11.5% overall). In states with open lists, the marginal effect is slightly larger and the baseline probability is higher. Here, gender quotas increase the likelihood a female MEP will have held national legislative office by about 12% and placement mandates increase this by about 23 (or an additional 11%)%. Overall, this means that women in the EP are less likely to have held national office in closed list systems without quotas (about 5%) and more likely to have this experience in state with open lists and placement mandates (about 60%). This demonstrates the positive impact that electoral institutions can have in creating equal access to all political positions for women at the national level. The high correlation of the probability of being a former MP and working in the EP for women in these states is likely the result of having fewer barriers to entry in national politics and is representative of political institutions where cross-institutional careers are possible. We also controlled for several social factors that may influence the overall gender equality present in some societies, across the EU member states, as we consider this to be plausibly endogenous to our causal story. However, we find that these factors do not have consistent effects across our models. For example, the number of women in national parliaments has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that male MEPs have previous local political experience, but it does not significantly affect the career trajectories of female MEPs. In addition, a country’s general level of gender equality decreases the likelihood that male MEPs will have held local elected office (at the 90% significance level), but it does not have any other effect. Each of these results generally suggests that, as gender equality increases differences associated with gender and political expertise are diminished.^{xi}

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have taken up the important problem of women’s descriptive representation in legislative politics and examined the effect of national- and party-level gender quotas and placement

mandates for the election of quality candidates to the European Parliament. As an international legislature that places a premium on its intra-institutional diversity, the EP represents an important venue for testing the varied electoral systems at play in Europe, with respect to women’s representation. In keeping with the broader findings of the literature, we assumed that the presence of gender quotas and placement mandates would not only be useful to the promotion of female candidates to the EP, but that it might also come with an added benefit of improving the quality of all MEPs, through the recruitment of candidates that possess both the previous political experience, as well as professional and educational criteria that might improve the effectiveness of their service in the EP.

In keeping with our expectations, we were able to identify that the association between such institutional choices and representative backgrounds does indeed have a gendered nature to it. More specifically, we found that national quotas can reduce differences between MEP gender and background qualities and that placement mandates are even more effective at erasing differences between male and female MEPs, in terms of their prior experience. This finding suggests that quotas may remove some barriers to entry that women typically face when deciding to run for office, help to promote women with prior political experience to further positions, and also raise the number of politically experienced representatives at the European level. While previous research has also found the important role of placement mandates in the election of women (Jones 2004; Schmidt 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009), we show that this is also an effective tool for eliminating differences between men and women’s prior experience when entering a legislature.

We were also able to identify some areas in which national rules for female recruitment might actually lead to more experienced and quality representatives, across both genders. Our results indicate that national-level quota and placement rules are positively associated with higher overall number of MEPs with doctoral degrees, as well as those with valuable professional backgrounds in law, economics and finance, and international affairs and diplomacy. National quotas are also correlated with the presence of more MEPs with a former national MP background. This provides

ample evidence that quotas can impact the overall composition of a legislature and supports our hypotheses that countries and parties that use gender quotas are more likely to have experienced MEPs. It also suggests that the use of quotas co-vary with a heightened number of overall MEPs whose experience is especially suited for the unique needs of the EP.

In sum, our findings reveal that the EP is a suitable laboratory to examine the effect of diverse electoral laws focused on women’s numerical and descriptive representation. We also add to the debate on the impact of electoral laws on women’s representation by assessing whether or not some laws may also come with the added value (or perhaps detriment) of the quality of representation on offer. Our findings suggest that while gendered differences in political and professional experience do exist in the European Parliament, gender quotas and placement mandates may somewhat abate these differences. Future work can continue to assess the role of party-level rules, as well as to problematize how such institutional innovations may impact on the career trajectories of female politicians across the multiple levels of office available within the EU. In addition, it’s worth noting that our research could also be extended to ensuring other kinds of diverse descriptive representation. While gender quotas are perhaps the most pervasive institutional innovation in the EU, other systems – such as reserved seats for ethnic or religious minorities, as well as recruitment mechanisms to boost numbers of other forms of minority representation – can and do exist in various international contexts. While beyond the scope of this particular project, future work should continue to examine how institutional innovations can enhance the quality of representation via the recruitment, selection, and election of additional diverse dimensions.

ⁱ Of course, it’s worth pointing out that the grueling EP calendar, which typically meets two weeks per month in Brussels, one week per month in Strasbourg, and adjourns one week per month to work in home districts, may also be a particular disadvantage for women who attempt to balance private family life with public professional demands.

ⁱⁱ Citation of the data source has been omitted in draft to preserve anonymity. [Raw numbers for each category are available in Table S1.4 of the Supplemental Materials.](#)

ⁱⁱⁱ We also test whether party-level gender quotas affect the quality of representation. Results from these models are found in the supplementary appendix. The party level analyses generally support our hypotheses, but due to limitations on data availability at the

party level, we have chosen to focus our main discussion only on national-level rules. Data on gender quotas at the party level is taken in part from Brodolini et al. (2014) and (citation omitted). In these models, we are also able to control for ideology at the party level using a series of party family variables from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017)

^{iv} Contextual data for European and National Elections comes from Egmond, et. al (2013) where it was calculated based on Gallagher (1991). Gallagher’s index for Croatia was calculated by the authors based on the 2011 national election with data from the European Election Database, available here: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/croatia/

^v These data are taken from the Eurostat Database measure “Tertiary education graduates” for 2012 and is available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/equality/data/database>.

^{vi} This a measure of women in national legislatures in May 2014 from the database of the Inter-parliamentary Union.

^{vii} We use the data from 2012 and the Index ranges from 0 to 100 with 100 being the most gender equality. The data can be accessed here <https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/gender-equality-index> and it was downloaded on 11/19/2018.

^{viii} Tables A1.1 and A1.2 in the appendix report the complete logistic regression results for all of these plots. The supplementary materials also include models for additional categories of professional experience.

^{ix} Plots of predicted probabilities for male MEPs are available in figure A1.1 the supplementary materials.

^x All predicted probabilities reported in the paper are calculated holding all controls at their mean or median value and using the `clarify` function in Stata (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Coefficient plots were constructed using the `Coef` package (Jann 2014).

^{xi} These results are also robust to an array of alternative measures for societal gender equality, as discussed in the supplementary appendices.

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
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
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Figure 1: Experience and National Gender Quotas



The plots above display the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of *National Gender Quota* for each dependent variable measuring experience.

Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Female MEPs and National Gender Quotas



The plots above display the mean predicted probability and 95% confidence intervals for each dependent variable measuring given the level of quota. All remaining variables in model set to their mean with the exception of closed list which is set at its median.

Figure 3: Political Experience and Closed Ballot Effects




Figure 4: Ballot Effects and Female MEPs as Former MPs




Table 1: Gender and Experience in the European Parliament

		(1) Entire Population ¹				(2) Quota Countries				(3) Placement Countries			
		Women	Men	Both	<i>p</i>	Women	Men	Both	<i>p</i>	Women	Men	Both	<i>p</i>
% of Full EP		36.70	63.30	100.00		11.57	21.68	33.24		8.91	13.70	22.61	
Political Experience	National Party Office	<u>5.32</u>	<u>14.49</u>	<u>19.81</u>	<u>0.01</u>	<u>1.86</u>	<u>5.72</u>	<u>7.58</u>	<u>0.07</u>	1.86	4.52	5.98	0.18
	Former MP	<u>11.30</u>	<u>24.07</u>	<u>35.37</u>	<u>0.05</u>	<u>3.46</u>	<u>9.31</u>	<u>12.77</u>	<u>0.04</u>	1.86	4.26	6.12	0.15
	Former Local Politician	<u>17.31</u>	<u>25.30</u>	<u>42.61</u>	<u>0.05</u>	6.13	9.72	15.85	0.22	5.06	7.99	13.05	0.84
	Incumbent	18.09	29.65	47.74	0.52	5.45	8.64	14.10	0.23	4.52	6.12	10.77	0.33
Professional Experience	Agriculture ²	1.61	4.56	6.17	0.13	0.67	1.48	2.15	0.75	0.67	0.67	1.34	0.48
	Legal	7.25	15.17	22.42	0.19	3.36	6.31	9.66	0.96	3.09	4.97	8.05	0.83
	Medical	2.01	2.15	4.16	0.17	0.40	0.81	1.21	0.92	0.40	0.67	1.07	0.91
	Economic and Finance	8.99	17.58	8.99	0.34	3.09	5.37	8.46	0.76	2.01	3.36	5.37	0.78
	Transportation and Telecom	2.68	4.03	6.71	0.61	0.40	0.67	1.07	0.88	<u>0.27</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.27</u>	<u>0.08</u>
	Teacher	<u>5.64</u>	<u>14.50</u>	<u>20.13</u>	<u>0.01</u>	2.28	6.17	8.46	0.13	<u>1.48</u>	<u>4.03</u>	<u>5.50</u>	<u>0.06</u>
	International	8.59	17.05	25.64	0.30	2.95	6.31	9.26	0.53	2.15	3.36	5.50	0.95
	PhD	<u>5.91</u>	<u>13.42</u>	<u>19.33</u>	<u>0.09</u>	<u>1.34</u>	<u>5.91</u>	<u>7.25</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.94</u>	<u>3.09</u>	<u>4.03</u>	<u>0.03</u>
	Journalist	3.76	6.98	10.74	0.75	0.94	2.55	3.49	0.37	<u>0.27</u>	<u>1.74</u>	<u>2.01</u>	<u>0.03</u>
	Age	Age ≥ 20 & < 30	<u>0.80</u>	<u>1.33</u>	<u>2.13</u>	<u>0.09</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.13</u>	<u>0.13</u>	0.46	0.00	0.13	0.13
Age ≥ 30 & < 40		<u>5.85</u>	<u>7.45</u>	<u>13.30</u>	<u>0.10</u>	<u>1.60</u>	<u>1.99</u>	<u>3.59</u>	0.03	1.46	1.60	3.06	0.38
Age ≥ 40 & < 50		9.57	17.15	26.73	0.76	<u>3.19</u>	<u>4.52</u>	<u>7.71</u>	0.23	2.13	3.06	5.19	0.81
Age ≥ 50 & < 60		13.56	20.61	34.18	0.22	<u>3.99</u>	<u>8.51</u>	<u>12.50</u>	0.46	3.06	5.19	8.24	0.64
Age ≥ 60 & < 70		<u>5.98</u>	<u>13.70</u>	<u>19.68</u>	<u>0.08</u>	<u>2.39</u>	<u>4.79</u>	<u>7.18</u>	0.80	1.86	2.79	4.65	0.94
Age ≥ 70 & < 80		0.93	2.79	3.72	0.19	<u>0.40</u>	<u>1.46</u>	<u>1.86</u>	0.28	0.40	0.80	1.20	0.70
Age ≥ 80		0.00	0.27	0.27	0.28	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.27</u>	<u>0.27</u>	0.30	0.00	0.13	0.13	0.42

¹ The subset of columns provides the percentage of women, men, and all MEPs that hold each category of experience, among all MEPs initially seated in 2014 (1), the percentage of all women, men, and MEPs that hold each category of experience and that also come from Quota countries (2), and the percentage of all women, men, and MEPs that hold each category of experience and that also come from placement countries (3), respectively. Each *p* column provides the *p* value of a X² test of association between genders for each category of experience, in each subgroup. Bold and underlined values indicate X² values with significance ≥ 90%.

²For all professional categories, N=745 and thus the percentage calculations for these experience categories use 745 as the denominator. Categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Appendix

Table A1.1: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas

VARIABLES	(1) National Party Office			(2) Former MPs			(3) Local Politicians			(4) Incumbents		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
National Gender Quota	0.328* (0.196)	0.123 (0.319)	0.418** (0.168)	0.298** (0.138)	0.467*** (0.136)	0.282* (0.171)	-0.036 (0.121)	-0.035 (0.102)	-0.013 (0.161)	-0.332** (0.142)	-0.087 (0.159)	-0.497*** (0.143)
Closed List	0.059 (0.321)	0.320 (0.461)	-0.024 (0.373)	-0.957*** (0.272)	-1.769*** (0.235)	-0.674* (0.361)	0.698*** (0.197)	0.567*** (0.197)	0.757*** (0.262)	0.773*** (0.262)	0.719*** (0.272)	0.851*** (0.269)
Disproportionality	0.089* (0.049)	0.127 (0.091)	0.085 (0.054)	0.028 (0.057)	0.076 (0.048)	0.000 (0.080)	0.134*** (0.047)	0.083 (0.052)	0.158*** (0.058)	0.025 (0.052)	-0.033 (0.089)	0.055 (0.053)
# of Districts	-0.074** (0.034)	-0.074 (0.063)	-0.086*** (0.030)	-0.092*** (0.029)	-0.158*** (0.038)	-0.073** (0.032)	0.043* (0.024)	0.018 (0.020)	0.058 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.024)	-0.102*** (0.035)	-0.006 (0.022)
% Women in Natl Parliament	-0.005 (0.021)	0.013 (0.037)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.020)	0.000 (0.019)	0.032*** (0.028)	0.087*** (0.021)	0.064*** (0.017)	0.100*** (0.031)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.040 (0.026)	0.021 (0.018)
% Women with degree	0.005 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.010)	0.010 (0.009)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.032*** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)	0.007 (0.006)
Gender Equality Index	-0.034 (0.021)	-0.043 (0.037)	-0.027 (0.020)	0.010 (0.025)	-0.031 (0.029)	0.031 (0.033)	-0.036* (0.019)	-0.030 (0.024)	-0.047* (0.027)	0.033 (0.022)	0.039 (0.030)	0.033 (0.021)
Age	0.024** (0.011)	0.041* (0.023)	0.015 (0.013)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.054*** (0.015)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.011 (0.010)	0.053*** (0.006)	0.057*** (0.012)	0.055*** (0.009)
Constant	-1.581 (2.034)	-1.257 (2.956)	-1.990 (2.450)	-7.120*** (2.260)	-5.764** (2.833)	-7.867*** (2.672)	-2.829** (1.225)	-3.365* (1.903)	-2.082 (1.784)	-5.998*** (1.864)	-4.771** (2.079)	-7.119*** (2.056)
Observations	752	276	476	752	276	476	751	275	476	752	276	476
Pseudo R ²	0.0469	0.0517	0.0532	0.172	0.254	0.145	0.0657	0.0695	0.0747	0.0831	0.0880	0.0976
Wald X ² (12)	34.13	11.55	33.04	85.97	181.3	47.97	63.20	35.46	34.06	130.5	41.55	89.66
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.172	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A1.2: Professional Experience and National Gender Quotas

VARIABLES	(1) Legal			(2) Economics and Finance			(3) International Affairs			(4) PhD		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
National Gender Quota	0.439*** (0.075)	0.757*** (0.167)	0.305*** (0.085)	-0.088 (0.072)	0.063 (0.131)	-0.159*** (0.056)	0.341*** (0.103)	0.288* (0.159)	0.375*** (0.137)	0.226 (0.160)	-0.223 (0.144)	0.433** (0.216)
Closed List	0.189 (0.196)	-0.003 (0.324)	0.309 (0.241)	0.230 (0.161)	-0.284 (0.287)	0.464*** (0.183)	-0.616** (0.245)	-0.434 (0.356)	-0.757*** (0.289)	-0.040 (0.292)	0.093 (0.415)	-0.077 (0.339)
Disproportionality	-0.040 (0.033)	-0.153** (0.070)	0.013 (0.051)	-0.014 (0.029)	0.039 (0.047)	-0.040 (0.036)	0.020 (0.056)	0.060 (0.071)	0.001 (0.059)	-0.100* (0.053)	-0.043 (0.089)	-0.125** (0.060)
# of Districts	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.050 (0.050)	-0.006 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.021)	0.018 (0.043)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.116*** (0.032)	-0.072** (0.036)	-0.130*** (0.037)	-0.050 (0.034)	-0.043 (0.040)	-0.065 (0.042)
% Women in Natl Parliament	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.093*** (0.035)	0.021 (0.027)	-0.010 (0.016)	0.004 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.048* (0.027)	-0.011 (0.036)	-0.069** (0.031)	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.049 (0.035)
% Women with degree	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.008)	0.005 (0.004)	0.015** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.004 (0.009)	0.014 (0.009)
Gender Equality Index	-0.007 (0.018)	0.036 (0.041)	-0.029 (0.021)	0.007 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.031)	0.014 (0.020)	0.043 (0.034)	0.033 (0.036)	0.051 (0.038)	0.014 (0.032)	-0.015 (0.033)	0.035 (0.043)
Age	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.002 (0.019)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.003 (0.008)	0.023*** (0.009)	0.012 (0.020)	0.026*** (0.007)	0.012 (0.008)	0.017 (0.020)	0.009 (0.009)
Constant	2.080 (1.647)	0.392 (3.051)	2.773 (1.815)	-1.724 (1.478)	-1.105 (2.519)	-2.245* (1.337)	-5.484** (2.274)	-7.043*** (2.645)	-4.470* (2.522)	-2.719 (2.283)	-0.983 (2.295)	-3.961 (2.990)
Observations	745	273	472	745	273	472	745	273	472	745	273	472
Pseudo R ²	0.0402	0.0821	0.0456	0.00426	0.00987	0.0134	0.0664	0.0702	0.0738	0.0325	0.0343	0.0431
Wald X ² (12)	166.6	30.34	92.59	9.478	4.320	46.49	53.73	29.58	47.80	31.49	11.89	18.23
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.304	0.827	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.156	0.020

Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

'United in Diversity?' Assessing the Effect of Varied Gender Quotas on Legislator Experience in the European Parliament

Andrea S Aldrich
William T Daniel

Supplemental Materials

1. Appendix of Figures and Tables

Figure A1.1 Predicted Probabilities of Male MEPs and Experience




Table S1.1 All MEPs and Additional Professional Experience

VARIABLES	(1) Agriculture	(2) Med	(3) Transportation and Telecom	(4) Teacher	(5) Journalist
National Gender Quota	-0.097 (0.169)	0.047 (0.222)	-0.867*** (0.225)	0.307*** (0.070)	0.154 (0.101)
Closed List	0.172 (0.480)	-0.219 (0.442)	0.322 (0.378)	0.710*** (0.113)	-0.980*** (0.224)
Disproportionality	-0.089 (0.119)	0.074 (0.064)	-0.008 (0.108)	-0.021 (0.038)	0.022 (0.061)
# of Districts	0.042 (0.044)	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.044)	-0.067*** (0.019)	-0.084*** (0.024)
% Women in Natl Parliament	0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.033)	0.027 (0.024)	-0.024*** (0.009)	0.009 (0.018)
% Women with degree	0.001 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	0.000 (0.007)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)
% Regular Service Attendance	-0.003 (0.013)	0.016 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.009* (0.006)	0.007 (0.009)
Age	0.033** (0.014)	0.000 (0.017)	0.011 (0.012)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.010)
Constant	-4.747* (2.852)	-2.330 (2.283)	-4.012* (2.318)	-4.850*** (0.744)	-4.267*** (1.463)
Observations	745	745	745	745	745
Pseudo R ²	0.0260	0.0189	0.0437	0.0658	0.0592
Wald X ² (12)	13.79	6.377	30.60	140	102.1
Prob > X ²	0.0874	0.605	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S1.2 Female MEPs and Additional Professional Experience

VARIABLES	(1) Agriculture	(2) Med	(3) Transportation and Telecom	(4) Teacher	(5) Journalist
National Gender Quota	1.097** (0.438)	-0.158 (0.374)	-0.547*** (0.195)	0.251* (0.130)	0.266 (0.207)
Closed List	-0.656 (0.574)	-0.677 (0.852)	0.079 (0.415)	0.420 (0.381)	-2.651*** (0.515)
Disproportionality	-0.281 (0.176)	0.083 (0.091)	0.055 (0.097)	0.004 (0.071)	0.011 (0.101)
# of Districts	-0.489* (0.290)	-0.001 (0.066)	-0.170*** (0.039)	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.139** (0.057)
% Women in Natl Parliament	-0.080 (0.064)	0.006 (0.053)	-0.009 (0.032)	-0.027 (0.022)	0.008 (0.031)
% Women with degree	-0.043** (0.021)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.020* (0.012)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.008 (0.010)
% Regular Service Attendance	-0.152*** (0.055)	0.012 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.020* (0.012)	0.017 (0.015)
Age	0.073** (0.029)	0.015 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)	0.020 (0.014)	0.031 (0.022)
Constant	7.092 (5.446)	-2.953 (3.049)	1.385 (3.006)	-4.915** (2.031)	-4.810* (2.558)
Observations	273	273	273	273	273
Pseudo R ²	0.209	0.0326	0.0680	0.0657	0.179
Wald X ² (12)	793.6	4.905	139.1	52.59	45.73
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.768	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S1.3 Male MEPs and Additional Professional Experience

VARIABLES	(1) Agriculture	(2) Med	(3) Transportation and Telecom	(4) Teacher	(5) Journalist	(6) Agriculture
National Gender Quota	-0.312 (0.333)	0.299 (0.302)	-0.192*** (0.068)	-1.250*** (0.348)	0.350*** (0.091)	0.176 (0.136)
Closed List	0.188 (0.684)	0.099 (0.609)	0.567*** (0.156)	0.470 (0.507)	0.874*** (0.187)	-0.486 (0.297)
Disproportionality	-0.027 (0.154)	0.061 (0.101)	-0.013 (0.042)	-0.100 (0.175)	-0.030 (0.051)	0.019 (0.066)
# of Districts	0.062 (0.050)	-0.016 (0.038)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.054 (0.054)	-0.074*** (0.026)	-0.066** (0.026)
% Women in Natl Parliament	0.012 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.033)	-0.003 (0.013)	0.040 (0.027)	-0.017** (0.008)	0.011 (0.025)
% Women with degree	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.009)	0.004 (0.004)	0.014 (0.008)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.003 (0.008)
% Regular Service Attendance	0.006 (0.017)	0.021 (0.015)	0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.019)	0.004 (0.008)	0.002 (0.010)
Age	0.024 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.015)	0.003 (0.008)	0.021* (0.011)	0.020* (0.011)	0.029** (0.011)
Constant	-4.300 (3.746)	-1.727 (2.693)	-1.861** (0.942)	-6.535** (2.785)	-5.241*** (1.017)	-4.277** (1.980)
Observations	472	472	472	472	472	472
Pseudo R ²	0.0248	0.0310	0.0131	0.0735	0.0735	0.0333
Wald X ² (12)	9.661	14.20	42.18	30.63	140.3	56.60
Prob > X ²	0.290	0.0766	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S1.4 Gender and Experience in the European Parliament

		Entire Population				Quota Countries				Placement Countries			
		Women	Men	All	<i>p</i>	Women	Men	All	<i>p</i>	Women	Men	All	<i>p</i>
	Gender	276	476	752		87	163	250		67	103	170	
Political Office	National Party Office	<u>40</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>0.005</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>0.065</u>	14	34	48	0.184
	Former MP	<u>85</u>	<u>181</u>	<u>266</u>	<u>0.046</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>0.043</u>	14	32	46	0.145
	Former Local Politician	<u>130</u>	<u>190</u>	<u>320</u>	<u>0.050</u>	46	73	119	0.223	38	60	98	0.843
	Incumbent	136	223	359	0.521	41	65	106	0.269	34	46	80	0.334
Professional Experience	Agriculture ¹	12	34	46	0.125	5	11	16	0.749	5	5	10	0.48
	Legal	54	113	167	0.190	25	47	72	0.963	23	37	60	0.832
	Medical	15	16	31	0.166	3	6	9	0.918	3	5	8	0.91
	Economic and Finance	67	131	198	0.339	23	40	63	0.763	15	25	40	0.777
	Transportation and Telecom	20	30	50	0.610	3	5	8	0.877	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	2	0.078
	Teacher	<u>42</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>0.014</u>	17	46	63	0.125	11	30	41	0.058
	International	64	127	191	0.297	22	47	69	0.531	16	25	41	0.954
	PhD	<u>44</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>0.091</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>0.004</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>23</u>	30	<u>0.047</u>
	Journalist	28	52	80	0.747	7	19	26	0.365	<u>2</u>	<u>13</u>	15	<u>0.03</u>
Age	Age ≥ 20 & < 30	6	10	16	0.095	0	1	1	0.464	0	1	1	0.419
	Age ≥ 30 & < 40	44	56	100	0.104	12	15	27	0.0265	11	12	23	0.375
	Age ≥ 40 & < 50	72	129	201	0.762	24	34	58	0.23	16	23	39	0.814
	Age ≥ 50 & < 60	102	155	257	0.221	30	64	94	0.457	23	39	62	0.64
	Age ≥ 60 & < 70	45	103	148	0.076	18	36	54	0.798	14	21	35	0.94
	Age ≥ 70 & < 80	7	21	28	0.190	3	11	14	0.28	3	6	9	0.701
	Age ≥ 80	0	2	2	0.281	0	2	2	0.3	0	1	1	0.419
	Age < 40	50	66	116	0.120	12	16	28	0.342	11	13	24	0.487
	Age > 60	<u>52</u>	<u>126</u>	<u>178</u>	<u>0.018</u>	21	49	70	0.32	17	28	45	0.0794
N of Gender Group		276	476			90	169			70	107		
N of Experience Subgroup		752	752			259	259			177	177		

¹For all professional categories, N=745 and thus the percentage calculations for these experience categories use 745 as the denominator. Categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

2. Party level Analysis

In addition to analysis conducted at the national level, we also chose to investigate the relationship between gender quotas at the party level and MEP experience. At the party level, we are able to account for voluntary gender quotas and placement mandates, in addition to national gender requirements. These are quotas in parties where there is no national law on gender quotas or in parties that have rules that go above and beyond the national law. Data on gender quotas at the party level is taken in part from Brodolini et al. (2014), which provides data for parties that were serving in the EP and had registered electoral lists for the European Election of 2014, as of May 2014. This was supplemented, when necessary, by the Quota Project, which includes data on all parties serving in the national parliaments of EU member states. Parties that serve in the EP are excluded from this data if we were unable to confirm either the presence of a quota or its absence. In addition, the control variables listed above, we are also able to control for ideology at the party level. We do this with a series of party family variables. These include radical right, conservative, liberal, Christian democrat, socialist, radical left, and green parties. These data come from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017).

Tables S2.1 and S2.2 report the results of similar logistic regression models to those analyzed in text with a smaller subset of MEPs and also including party-level data for political experience professional experience. The results reported below largely confirm the conclusions of the text but have less power given the availability of the data at the party level. Party Gender quotas, while not increase the likelihood that female MEPs will have been national MPS, decrease the likelihood that Male MEPs will have this type of experience. National gender quotas again increase the likelihood that male MEPs will have held national party office and decrease the likelihood that they will be incumbents. Table S2.2 shows that party quotas little effect on the type professionally experience MEPs serve in the EP. This table shows that national quotas are much more important in influencing the type of MEP representing each party and country.

Table S2.1 Professional Experience and Party Gender Quotas

VARIABLES	(1) National Party Office			(2) Former MPs			(3) Local Politicians			(4) Incumbents		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
Party Gender Quota	0.332 (0.318)	0.324 (0.363)	0.240 (0.372)	-0.547*** (0.205)	-0.502 (0.527)	-0.657*** (0.223)	-0.062 (0.242)	-0.100 (0.309)	-0.096 (0.264)	-0.449 (0.298)	-0.279 (0.326)	-0.473 (0.384)
National Gender Quota	0.458*** (0.153)	0.203 (0.396)	0.441** (0.179)	-0.038 (0.150)	0.057 (0.227)	0.065 (0.216)	0.173 (0.170)	-0.149 (0.265)	0.382** (0.174)	-0.466** (0.206)	-0.088 (0.294)	-0.619** (0.255)
Closed List	-0.868* (0.498)	-0.320 (0.850)	-1.085** (0.479)	-0.222 (0.273)	-1.512*** (0.402)	0.443 (0.388)	0.581* (0.300)	0.197 (0.518)	0.899** (0.402)	1.519*** (0.500)	1.056* (0.562)	1.895*** (0.678)
Disproportionality	0.037 (0.066)	0.027 (0.150)	0.096 (0.074)	0.152*** (0.047)	0.182*** (0.050)	0.143* (0.086)	0.108 (0.076)	0.037 (0.097)	0.149* (0.088)	0.017 (0.085)	-0.137 (0.143)	0.082 (0.090)
# of Districts	-0.148*** (0.039)	-0.195** (0.089)	-0.146*** (0.041)	-0.136*** (0.024)	-0.148** (0.070)	-0.143*** (0.035)	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.018 (0.042)	-0.036 (0.034)	-0.064* (0.037)	-0.106** (0.044)	-0.049 (0.051)
Women in Natl Parliament	-0.042 (0.027)	0.035 (0.059)	-0.049 (0.030)	0.029* (0.017)	0.001 (0.032)	0.034 (0.027)	0.073*** (0.021)	0.059* (0.033)	0.085*** (0.025)	0.045* (0.026)	-0.035 (0.037)	0.072** (0.033)
Women with Degree	0.003 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)	0.043*** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.010)	0.005 (0.006)
Religiosity	0.002 (0.007)	0.009 (0.026)	0.003 (0.009)	0.022*** (0.007)	0.017 (0.012)	0.028** (0.011)	0.002 (0.011)	0.005 (0.017)	0.005 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.022 (0.017)	0.010 (0.016)
Age	0.039** (0.015)	0.055 (0.037)	0.030* (0.017)	0.058*** (0.010)	0.071*** (0.027)	0.058*** (0.013)	0.016** (0.007)	0.049*** (0.013)	0.003 (0.009)	0.056*** (0.011)	0.040* (0.023)	0.070*** (0.016)
Radical Right	0.350 (0.679)	1.396 (1.378)	0.209 (0.700)	-0.596 (0.381)	-1.926 (1.746)	-0.400 (0.421)	0.665 (0.921)	1.568 (1.489)	0.445 (0.915)	-1.375 (0.908)	-3.741** (1.598)	-1.008 (0.888)
Conservative	-1.165 (0.774)		-0.860 (0.759)	-1.341*** (0.496)	-1.600 (1.810)	-1.182* (0.674)	0.418 (0.795)	0.237 (1.391)	0.515 (0.800)	-0.136 (0.865)	-1.172 (1.454)	0.015 (0.919)
Liberal	0.093 (0.749)	-0.829 (1.582)	0.634 (0.664)	-0.687 (0.617)	0.205 (1.307)	-1.321* (0.690)	0.184 (0.897)	0.008 (1.592)	0.003 (0.823)	-0.417 (0.794)	-1.449 (1.462)	-0.140 (0.847)
Christian Democrat	-1.505** (0.721)	-1.548 (1.911)	-1.442* (0.738)	-0.918* (0.535)	-1.793 (1.552)	-0.674 (0.556)	0.717 (0.929)	0.522 (1.546)	0.649 (0.855)	0.066 (0.778)	0.431 (1.525)	-0.194 (0.803)
Socialist	-0.498 (0.647)	-1.125 (1.645)	0.021 (0.650)	-0.771 (0.558)	-0.082 (1.557)	-1.201* (0.647)	0.455 (0.776)	0.139 (1.417)	0.477 (0.626)	-0.644 (0.910)	-1.378 (1.600)	-0.607 (0.861)
Radical Left	-0.290 (0.750)		0.381 (0.693)	-1.975** (0.978)	-1.034 (1.610)	-2.405** (0.998)	0.652 (0.908)		-0.498 (1.004)	-0.184 (0.796)	-1.127 (1.760)	-0.019 (0.798)
Green	-1.326 (0.991)	-1.988 (1.537)	-1.127 (1.186)	-1.407** (0.550)	-0.447 (1.722)	-1.682** (0.779)	-0.286 (0.865)	-0.411 (1.324)	-0.398 (0.955)	0.604 (0.905)	-0.437 (1.540)	0.918 (1.088)
Constant	-1.924 (2.124)	-4.300 (4.013)	-2.393 (2.361)	-10.504*** (1.501)	-10.704*** (2.336)	-11.000*** (2.144)	-4.875*** (1.395)	-4.689** (2.370)	-5.536*** (2.080)	-4.493** (2.165)	1.661 (2.847)	-6.789** (2.812)
Observations	410	126	260	410	150	260	409	143	260	410	150	260
Pseudo R ²	0.126	0.145	0.169	0.266	0.377	0.263	0.0738	0.0896	0.0925	0.152	0.210	0.174
Wald X ² (12)	124.7	129.9	126.1	487.1	419.8	235.3	87.92	54.06	127.1	195.7	151.7	156.6
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Country clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S2.2 Professional Experience and Party Gender Quotas

VARIABLES	(1) Legal			(2) Economics and Finance			(3) International			(4) PhD		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
Party Gender Quota	0.168 (0.200)	-0.049 (0.365)	0.298 (0.287)	0.025 (0.174)	-0.268 (0.326)	0.182 (0.207)	0.259 (0.241)	0.030 (0.470)	0.469 (0.335)	0.289 (0.259)	-0.396 (0.363)	0.643* (0.385)
National Gender Quota	0.186 (0.159)	0.685* (0.374)	0.017 (0.185)	0.115 (0.090)	-0.033 (0.293)	0.212** (0.107)	0.095 (0.213)	-0.002 (0.268)	0.143 (0.247)	0.112 (0.148)	-0.698** (0.275)	0.526*** (0.185)
Closed List	-0.379 (0.407)	-0.720 (0.696)	-0.303 (0.523)	0.419*** (0.162)	0.249 (0.521)	0.468* (0.266)	-0.790** (0.361)	-0.873 (0.650)	-0.690 (0.543)	0.509* (0.279)	1.070* (0.632)	0.114 (0.365)
Disproportionality	-0.065 (0.076)	-0.221* (0.119)	0.007 (0.107)	0.040 (0.042)	0.141* (0.080)	-0.012 (0.064)	0.040 (0.054)	-0.046 (0.061)	0.139 (0.087)	-0.054 (0.060)	-0.053 (0.124)	-0.058 (0.079)
# of Districts	0.014 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.041)	0.021 (0.041)	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.040)	-0.012 (0.028)	-0.064** (0.032)	-0.029 (0.044)	-0.096 (0.059)	-0.100*** (0.038)	-0.174** (0.073)	-0.086 (0.056)
Women in Natl Parliament	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.128*** (0.047)	-0.014 (0.033)	-0.003 (0.013)	0.012 (0.032)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.033 (0.021)	-0.030 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.026)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.035)	-0.023 (0.023)
Women with Degree	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.004)	0.006 (0.008)	0.003 (0.007)	0.015** (0.006)	0.019** (0.007)	0.012 (0.009)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.015* (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)
Religiosity	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.003 (0.006)	0.008 (0.016)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.024* (0.013)	0.013 (0.015)	0.011 (0.009)	0.012 (0.021)	0.009 (0.012)
Age	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.038 (0.026)	-0.030** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.005 (0.013)	0.019 (0.016)	0.007 (0.036)	0.019 (0.017)	0.025* (0.014)	0.071** (0.029)	0.010 (0.018)
Radical Right	-0.210 (0.527)	-2.978** (1.491)	0.324 (0.742)	0.331 (0.379)	-0.551 (0.871)	0.143 (0.507)	0.215 (0.782)	-1.470 (1.502)	0.631 (0.944)	1.316 (0.936)	1.344* (0.766)	0.769 (1.069)
Conservative	-0.659 (0.454)	-3.726* (2.086)	-0.042 (0.569)	0.608 (0.442)		0.194 (0.471)	0.038 (0.835)	-1.055 (1.338)	0.204 (0.973)	1.100 (0.828)		0.866 (0.917)
Liberal	-0.514 (0.486)	-3.437** (1.750)	0.365 (0.704)	0.434 (0.598)	0.105 (0.766)	-0.103 (0.657)	1.478** (0.744)	0.236 (1.094)	1.785* (0.960)	0.481 (0.863)	-1.459 (1.072)	0.642 (0.969)
Christian Democrat	0.083 (0.364)	-1.833 (1.758)	0.414 (0.571)	0.604 (0.471)	-0.727 (0.686)	0.431 (0.501)	1.238* (0.742)	0.685 (1.065)	1.331 (0.986)	0.737 (0.845)	0.248 (0.815)	0.278 (0.928)
Socialist	-0.951** (0.445)	-2.938* (1.704)	-0.385 (0.457)	0.508 (0.462)	-0.167 (0.521)	0.298 (0.473)	0.296 (0.679)	-0.427 (1.241)	0.305 (0.992)	-0.143 (0.843)	-1.353 (0.852)	-0.182 (0.885)
Radical Left	-0.793 (0.636)	-2.657 (1.794)	-0.334 (0.814)	-0.165 (0.571)	-0.963 (1.062)	-0.400 (0.649)	0.052 (0.846)		0.524 (1.012)	0.277 (1.009)	0.648 (1.043)	-0.926 (1.317)
Green	-1.362*** (0.502)	-3.408** (1.605)	-0.930 (0.649)	-0.716 (0.654)	-1.125 (0.778)	-1.155* (0.622)	0.252 (0.850)	-0.162 (1.287)	-0.291 (1.033)	0.671 (0.894)	0.158 (0.832)	-0.146 (0.981)
Constant	3.479 (2.205)	9.274** (3.996)	1.952 (2.545)	-2.280** (1.070)	-2.153 (2.180)	-1.571 (1.526)	-3.652* (1.927)	-1.642 (2.523)	-4.462* (2.520)	-6.096*** (1.851)	-6.358* (3.292)	-5.284** (2.109)
Observations	406	148	258	406	148	258	406	142	258	406	148	258
Pseudo R ²	0.0471	0.152	0.0421	0.0249	0.0521	0.0393	0.113	0.133	0.131	0.0873	0.184	0.106
Wald X ² (12)	47.51	52.14	55.52	158.2	73.52	90.64	172.9	170.1	105.7	127.7	249.6	101.5
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Country clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3. Robustness check of alternative measures

In order to check the robustness of our analysis we used a series of alternative measures for our control variables. Recall that main analysis seeks to control for overall levels of gender equality in society using a measure of women's tertiary education as a percentage of men's education and religiosity as the percentage of people attending church services once per month or more as answered by respondents to the European Values Survey (EVS 2015; WVS 2015). This is the percentage of respondents that answered answer to "Do you belong to a religious denomination?" which is variable V105 in the EVS. In terms of gender equality, we also tested the gap in the employment rate between men and women aged 20-64 and the gap in hourly wages between men and women as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of men. These data are available from Eurostat at the following address: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/equality/data/database>. As the models below show, these alternative analyses confirm the conclusions of the paper and provided evidence in support H1 and H2.

Table S3.1: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas: Pay Gap Control for Equality

VARIABLES	National Party Office			Former MPs			Local Politicians			Incumbents		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
National Gender Quota	0.329 (0.207)	0.098 (0.345)	0.405** (0.195)	0.245 (0.238)	0.508** (0.203)	0.168 (0.293)	0.011 (0.176)	0.193 (0.152)	-0.071 (0.212)	-0.414** (0.207)	-0.132 (0.256)	-0.589*** (0.206)
Closed List	-0.079 (0.359)	0.370 (0.630)	-0.160 (0.389)	-1.255*** (0.421)	-2.399*** (0.415)	-0.712 (0.461)	0.565** (0.251)	0.047 (0.208)	0.843** (0.340)	0.888** (0.357)	0.683 (0.453)	0.965*** (0.355)
Disproportionality	0.065 (0.056)	0.082 (0.103)	0.079 (0.068)	0.026 (0.076)	-0.012 (0.060)	0.062 (0.102)	0.091 (0.059)	0.010 (0.043)	0.126 (0.079)	0.062 (0.063)	-0.017 (0.109)	0.087 (0.067)
Districts	-0.094** (0.041)	-0.095 (0.066)	-0.107*** (0.040)	-0.082* (0.049)	-0.118* (0.066)	-0.075* (0.045)	0.026 (0.023)	0.013 (0.023)	0.033 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.022)	-0.079** (0.036)	0.009 (0.022)
Women in Natl Parl	-0.030 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.032)	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.034 (0.026)	-0.044** (0.022)	-0.029 (0.032)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.029** (0.014)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.025 (0.020)	-0.019 (0.030)	0.041** (0.019)
Gender Pay Gap	-0.016 (0.026)	-0.040 (0.059)	-0.006 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.037)	-0.020 (0.041)	-0.003 (0.030)	0.058** (0.026)	-0.040 (0.037)	-0.017 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.041)	-0.027 (0.030)
Religiosity	0.000 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.018)	0.008 (0.010)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.021* (0.012)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.008)
Age	0.024** (0.011)	0.038 (0.024)	0.016 (0.012)	0.045*** (0.007)	0.053*** (0.014)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.045*** (0.011)	0.013 (0.010)	0.054*** (0.006)	0.058*** (0.012)	0.056*** (0.009)
Constant	-1.799 (1.126)	-2.565 (2.152)	-1.612 (1.218)	-1.483 (1.349)	-0.679 (1.045)	-2.098 (1.601)	-3.902*** (1.001)	-4.422*** (0.893)	-3.616** (1.453)	-3.821*** (1.012)	-1.988 (1.574)	-4.457*** (1.030)
Observations	752	276	476	752	276	476	751	275	476	752	276	476
Pseudo R ²	0.0417	0.0513	0.0461	0.128	0.196	0.115	0.0617	0.0753	0.0727	0.0802	0.0830	0.0959
Wald X ² (12)	38.34	8.832	20.33	59.53	65.59	28.88	58.22	68.63	40.36	169.2	40.99	146.4
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.357	0.009	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S3.2: Professional Experience and National Gender Quotas: Pay Gap Control for Equality

VARIABLES	Legal			Economics and Finance			International Affairs			PhD		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
National Gender Quota	0.451*** (0.117)	0.704*** (0.182)	0.365*** (0.133)	-0.041 (0.111)	0.226 (0.172)	-0.160 (0.099)	0.252 (0.192)	0.253 (0.242)	0.254 (0.204)	0.426** (0.187)	-0.023 (0.242)	0.627*** (0.242)
Closed List	0.266 (0.220)	-0.007 (0.364)	0.330 (0.271)	0.099 (0.188)	-0.657* (0.343)	0.446*** (0.170)	-0.832** (0.331)	-1.145** (0.513)	-0.638** (0.324)	-0.581* (0.303)	-0.319 (0.456)	-0.659* (0.357)
Disproportionality	-0.043 (0.043)	-0.163** (0.079)	0.007 (0.053)	-0.021 (0.042)	0.016 (0.074)	-0.026 (0.043)	0.004 (0.055)	-0.048 (0.083)	0.044 (0.058)	-0.196** (0.077)	-0.112 (0.131)	-0.233** (0.091)
Districts	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.038)	-0.026* (0.015)	0.002 (0.016)	0.027 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.077** (0.039)	-0.027 (0.062)	-0.106*** (0.037)	-0.015 (0.040)	-0.040 (0.048)	-0.007 (0.046)
Women in Natl Parl	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.081*** (0.021)	0.011 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.024)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.040** (0.020)	-0.041 (0.028)	-0.040* (0.022)	-0.060*** (0.017)	-0.050 (0.037)	-0.064*** (0.024)
Gender Pay Gap	0.002 (0.024)	-0.037 (0.036)	0.026 (0.030)	0.020 (0.019)	0.059* (0.033)	0.007 (0.019)	-0.043 (0.033)	-0.065* (0.038)	-0.031 (0.034)	0.057** (0.025)	0.063 (0.041)	0.057 (0.038)
Religiosity	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.022 (0.016)	0.005 (0.009)	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.009)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.039** (0.017)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.010)
Age	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.032*** (0.010)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.014)	0.002 (0.008)	0.026*** (0.008)	0.018 (0.019)	0.028*** (0.007)	0.010 (0.008)	0.016 (0.022)	0.006 (0.008)
Constant	0.363 (0.956)	2.771** (1.259)	-0.660 (1.494)	-0.923 (0.743)	-1.536 (1.614)	-1.083 (0.780)	0.331 (1.292)	1.910 (2.119)	-0.536 (1.286)	0.210 (0.979)	-1.186 (2.394)	0.855 (1.204)
Observations	745	273	472	745	273	472	745	273	472	745	273	472
Pseudo R ²	0.0371	0.0848	0.0430	0.00443	0.0181	0.0124	0.0599	0.0670	0.0679	0.0374	0.0426	0.0448
Wald X ² (12)	98.96	84.11	140	10.92	6.848	38.76	47.79	39.46	52.32	45	15.63	13.39
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.206	0.553	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.0480	0.0990

Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S3.3: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas: Employment Gap Control for Equality

VARIABLES	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	National Party Office			Former MPs			Local Politicians			Incumbent		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
National Gender Quota	0.489** (0.195)	0.347 (0.323)	0.529*** (0.180)	0.427*** (0.150)	0.642*** (0.202)	0.376** (0.157)	0.013 (0.149)	0.049 (0.121)	0.025 (0.197)	-0.301** (0.138)	-0.010 (0.163)	-0.460*** (0.148)
Closed List	-0.149 (0.274)	0.323 (0.534)	-0.229 (0.299)	-1.302*** (0.270)	-2.340*** (0.299)	-0.831*** (0.289)	0.548** (0.215)	0.298 (0.262)	0.642** (0.285)	0.877*** (0.314)	0.777** (0.365)	0.887*** (0.322)
Disproportionality	0.053 (0.044)	0.076 (0.103)	0.070 (0.059)	0.032 (0.045)	-0.003 (0.054)	0.060 (0.063)	0.091 (0.056)	0.018 (0.052)	0.117 (0.074)	0.061 (0.057)	-0.017 (0.089)	0.082 (0.068)
Districts	-0.118*** (0.039)	-0.111 (0.071)	-0.130*** (0.036)	-0.131*** (0.024)	-0.159*** (0.048)	-0.126*** (0.023)	0.027 (0.024)	0.010 (0.024)	0.033 (0.030)	-0.042** (0.018)	-0.102*** (0.031)	-0.010 (0.019)
Women in Natl Parliament	-0.030* (0.015)	-0.016 (0.029)	-0.029* (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.040* (0.021)	-0.025 (0.024)	0.057*** (0.017)	0.029* (0.017)	0.067*** (0.025)	0.028* (0.015)	-0.016 (0.024)	0.043*** (0.015)
Employment Gap	-0.058** (0.024)	-0.088* (0.049)	-0.049** (0.023)	-0.094*** (0.018)	-0.066** (0.028)	-0.106*** (0.018)	0.003 (0.021)	0.004 (0.018)	0.004 (0.029)	-0.052*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.021)	-0.048*** (0.016)
Religiosity	0.011 (0.008)	0.009 (0.019)	0.015* (0.009)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.015* (0.008)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.001 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.012 (0.013)	0.008 (0.010)
Age	0.023** (0.011)	0.036 (0.025)	0.015 (0.012)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.014)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.012)	0.011 (0.010)	0.053*** (0.006)	0.057*** (0.012)	0.055*** (0.009)
Constant	-1.356 (0.987)	-2.669 (1.915)	-1.091 (1.228)	-1.017 (1.123)	-0.465 (0.971)	-1.440 (1.454)	-3.972*** (1.194)	-3.433*** (1.175)	-4.146** (1.681)	-3.657*** (0.913)	-1.707 (1.450)	-4.382*** (1.132)
Observations	752	276	476	752	276	476	751	275	476	752	276	476
Pseudo R ²	0.0574	0.0746	0.0577	0.174	0.218	0.169	0.0617	0.0669	0.0688	0.0933	0.105	0.105
Wald X ² (12)	18.58	5.144	24.83	102.6	96.78	151.9	67.98	48.04	40.83	291.5	66.33	206.8
Prob > X ²	0.0173	0.742	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S3.4: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas: Employment Gap Control for Equality

VARIABLES	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
National Gender Quota	0.380*** (0.081)	0.723*** (0.188)	0.243*** (0.080)	-0.043 (0.061)	0.141 (0.115)	-0.137** (0.060)	0.453*** (0.119)	0.578*** (0.125)	0.380** (0.168)	0.337** (0.164)	-0.204 (0.220)	0.615*** (0.217)
Closed List	0.290 (0.181)	-0.156 (0.380)	0.461** (0.232)	0.200 (0.134)	-0.323 (0.286)	0.468*** (0.138)	-0.947*** (0.262)	-1.197*** (0.310)	-0.744** (0.310)	-0.393 (0.295)	-0.148 (0.508)	-0.506 (0.335)
Disproportionality	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.191** (0.086)	0.022 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.030)	0.026 (0.048)	-0.021 (0.039)	-0.008 (0.054)	-0.052 (0.073)	0.031 (0.060)	-0.151** (0.059)	-0.084 (0.115)	-0.195** (0.078)
Districts	-0.010 (0.016)	0.002 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.011)	0.005 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.102*** (0.032)	-0.061** (0.028)	-0.120*** (0.043)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.040 (0.055)	-0.042 (0.038)
Women in Natl Parliament	-0.020 (0.014)	-0.093*** (0.025)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.041** (0.016)	-0.036 (0.023)	-0.040** (0.019)	-0.050*** (0.014)	-0.047 (0.034)	-0.053*** (0.018)
Employment Gap	0.033*** (0.011)	0.043* (0.026)	0.030** (0.015)	-0.034*** (0.011)	-0.046** (0.020)	-0.027*** (0.010)	-0.054*** (0.020)	-0.097*** (0.026)	-0.031 (0.026)	-0.027 (0.019)	0.021 (0.033)	-0.056** (0.025)
Religiosity	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.007 (0.005)	0.008 (0.009)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.023)	-0.008 (0.011)
Age	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.000 (0.017)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.015)	0.002 (0.008)	0.023*** (0.009)	0.013 (0.021)	0.026*** (0.007)	0.012 (0.008)	0.019 (0.021)	0.009 (0.009)
Constant	0.019 (0.951)	2.127 (1.522)	-0.748 (1.374)	-0.411 (0.615)	0.013 (1.149)	-0.763 (0.763)	0.273 (1.135)	1.529 (1.796)	-0.576 (1.183)	0.895 (0.951)	-0.464 (2.155)	1.847 (1.138)
Observations	745	273	472	745	273	472	745	273	472	745	273	472
Pseudo R ²	0.0427	0.0910	0.0456	0.00945	0.0208	0.0159	0.0696	0.0965	0.0700	0.0330	0.0340	0.0517
Wald X ² (12)	112.5	31.09	80.03	45.20	12.46	84.59	61.71	57.11	60.85	32.43	8.734	27.44
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.132	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.365	0.000

Standard errors clustered on 28 countries in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S3.5: Political Experience and National Gender Quotas: Belonging to Religiosity Measure

VARIABLES	(1) National Party Office			(2) Former MPs			(3) Local Politicians			(4) Incumbents		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
National Gender Quota	0.349*	0.209	0.404**	0.208	0.484***	0.139	0.012	0.045	0.028	-0.384**	-0.117	-0.538***
	(0.207)	(0.320)	(0.176)	(0.142)	(0.132)	(0.184)	(0.138)	(0.119)	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.205)	(0.186)
Closed List	0.046	0.077	0.074	-0.613**	-1.714***	-0.145	0.597***	0.373	0.671**	0.893**	0.697	0.962**
	(0.373)	(0.549)	(0.407)	(0.306)	(0.215)	(0.392)	(0.226)	(0.257)	(0.304)	(0.417)	(0.427)	(0.429)
Disproportionality	0.077	0.061	0.103	0.102**	0.071*	0.123	0.095*	0.025	0.119*	0.063	-0.014	0.088
	(0.055)	(0.109)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.079)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.110)	(0.077)
# of Districts	-0.096**	-0.098	-0.115***	-0.115***	-0.174***	-0.099***	0.025	0.009	0.031	-0.023	-0.079**	0.007
	(0.039)	(0.068)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.022)
Women in Natl Parliament	-0.022	-0.028	-0.016	-0.000	-0.015	0.003	0.059***	0.032*	0.068***	0.027	-0.017	0.044**
	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.021)
Women with Degree	0.007	-0.005	0.012	0.032***	0.035***	0.030***	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Religiosity	0.004	-0.010	0.009	0.017***	0.005	0.024***	-0.001	-0.007	0.001	0.002	-0.003	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Age	0.023**	0.039	0.015	0.045***	0.052***	0.043***	0.021***	0.045***	0.011	0.053***	0.058***	0.055***
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Constant	-3.530*	-2.134	-4.060*	-8.243***	-7.619***	-8.378***	-4.302***	-3.915***	-4.318**	-4.611**	-2.570	-5.615***
	(1.904)	(2.723)	(2.231)	(1.394)	(1.768)	(2.013)	(1.269)	(1.408)	(1.710)	(1.797)	(2.206)	(1.882)
Observations	752	276	476	752	276	476	751	275	476	752	276	476
Pseudo R ²	0.0442	0.0485	0.0536	0.178	0.252	0.155	0.0618	0.0673	0.0687	0.0799	0.0830	0.0948
Wald X ² (12)	30.47	7.652	36.28	163.3	234.4	117.9	60.76	45.89	28.34	157	38.35	126.1
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.468	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S3.5: Professional Experience and National Gender Quotas: Religiosity Measure

VARIABLES	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	Legal			Economics and Finance			International Affairs			PhD		
	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male	All	Female	Male
National Gender Quota	0.464***	0.833***	0.314***	-0.103	0.077	-0.192***	0.325**	0.363**	0.307**	0.260	-0.191	0.459**
	(0.090)	(0.183)	(0.096)	(0.080)	(0.144)	(0.068)	(0.127)	(0.171)	(0.147)	(0.160)	(0.177)	(0.200)
Closed List	0.111	-0.359	0.300	0.273	-0.330	0.567***	-0.693**	-0.851*	-0.596	-0.187	0.020	-0.222
	(0.206)	(0.371)	(0.254)	(0.177)	(0.379)	(0.156)	(0.325)	(0.458)	(0.366)	(0.322)	(0.572)	(0.327)
Disproportionality	-0.061	-0.218**	0.004	-0.002	0.029	-0.013	0.017	-0.012	0.045	-0.133**	-0.064	-0.165**
	(0.044)	(0.085)	(0.056)	(0.037)	(0.064)	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.094)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.116)	(0.073)
# of Districts	-0.020	-0.013	-0.025	0.001	0.019	-0.003	-0.082***	-0.026	-0.109***	-0.028	-0.047	-0.023
	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.032)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.037)
Women in Natl Parliament	-0.026	-0.099***	0.006	-0.004	-0.001	-0.003	-0.028	-0.017	-0.034	-0.041**	-0.037	-0.040*
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.022)
Women with degree	-0.009*	-0.010	-0.008	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.012**	0.019***	0.006	0.009	0.005	0.012
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Regular Service Attendance	-0.004	-0.020	0.003	0.001	-0.002	0.003	-0.009	-0.024*	0.001	-0.009	-0.002	-0.014
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Age	-0.021**	-0.002	-0.031***	-0.002	-0.013	0.003	0.024***	0.013	0.026***	0.012	0.016	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.009)
Constant	2.033	4.519**	1.031	-1.494	-0.977	-1.861**	-2.599	-3.141	-2.139	-1.168	-1.480	-1.210
	(1.291)	(2.169)	(1.564)	(0.986)	(2.130)	(0.942)	(1.736)	(2.602)	(1.873)	(1.714)	(2.958)	(1.808)
Observations	745	273	472	745	273	472	745	273	472	745	273	472
Pseudo R ²	0.0404	0.0869	0.0437	0.00413	0.00994	0.0131	0.0626	0.0780	0.0670	0.0338	0.0337	0.0444
Wald X ² (12)	137.4	31.46	86.48	8.725	4.517	42.18	42.79	24	49.79	35.85	9.865	16.53
Prob > X ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.366	0.808	0.000	0.000	0.00229	0.000	0.000	0.275	0.0354

Standard errors clustered on 28 parties in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1