**Michael Palliser, 1966-9**

**John W. Young**

Michael Palliser was unique among the Private Secretaries to the Prime Minister discussed in this volume, in that he later held the highest position in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, serving as Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) for seven years, in 1975-82. He arrived in Downing Street at a key point in March 1966, just as Labour was re-elected with a clear majority and shortly before a major economic crisis, which led on to swingeing overseas spending cuts and pushed the government towards a second application to join the European Economic Community (EEC). In Southeast Asia, while the Vietnam War was turning into a quagmire for London's key ally, the United States, another conflict, the 'confrontation' between Indonesia and the former British colonies in Malaysia, was coming to an end, freeing the British to consider a military withdrawal from the region. In southern Africa, it was becoming clearer that it would not be possible to put an early end to the white supremacist regime of Ian Smith, which had unilaterally declared its independence from Britain the previous year. Nearer to home, the Cold War in Europe seemed less intense and there were hopes of engaging the Soviet bloc in a process of détente, but in March 1966 the French President, Charles de Gaulle, pulled his country out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), asserting his independence of Washington. Within Whitehall, the end of the Empire was symbolised by the winding-up of the Colonial Office in August 1966; the Commonwealth Office merged with the FO in October 1968. Palliser's time as Private Secretary (PS) to the

Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, therefore proved a highly significant one for British foreign policy, when decisions were made that effectively ended Britain's world role and focused instead on a European future.[1] After reviewing the nature of his work at Number 10, this essay will attempt to trace Palliser's influence over this shift in overseas priorities.

**Appointment to Downing Street**

The reasons for appointing Palliser as PS were brought out, albeit briefly, in Wilson's memoirs: he 'was commended to me by officials and ministers alike as one of the high-flyers of the diplomatic service – and so he proved.'[2] Palliser later said that the summons to Downing Street came 'out of the blue'. He seems to have been the only candidate put forward by the FO for the post; though Wilson, smoking his trademark pipe, did give him an interview in the Cabinet Room before confirming the appointment. The Prime Minister also consulted, George Thomson, who had been Minister of State at the FO since 1964 and who supported the idea, perhaps seeing Palliser as an ally in pressing EEC membership.[3] The appointment was announced in late February and, following some leave, Palliser took up the post in April. He wrote to his godfather, a former diplomat, George Rendel, 'My feelings are a little mixed, as you can imagine. But I know it will be a fascinating experience and most interesting.'[4] In 1954-56, Palliser had already been Private Secretary to the PUS and, in 1964-66, he was the first head of the Foreign Office's Planning Staff, which was set up to study long-term challenges. Born in 1922, the son of an admiral, educated at Wellington College and Oxford University, and with five years service in the Coldstream Guards before joining the Foreign Office (FO) in

1947, he also had postings in Athens (1949-51), in the wake of the Greek civil war, Paris (1956-60), as the Fourth Republic disintegrated and de Gaulle established the Fifth, and Dakar (1960-63), in the early years of Senegalese independence.[5] The American diplomat, Philip Kaiser, who worked with Palliser in Dakar and served as number two in the London embassy in 1964-69, later described his British colleague as follows:

> Tall, handsome and congenial, he was a superb public school-Oxford product. He combined a relaxed personal style with a thorough knowledge of international relations, a keen intellect, and an exceptional ability for easily and clearly articulating his ideas.

Kaiser was 'delighted but not surprised' when Palliser became Wilson's PS[6] and they were able to have frank conversations about differences that arose between the two countries.[7]

The task of PS could be a gruelling one, especially for someone like Palliser who was married with three children, the last only a few years old. He liked to get 'regular box-loads of paper to work on at home [where] one can deal with it quietly and in orderly fashion', in contrast to Number Ten, where 'the office is always a turmoil.'[8] Looking back on his career, he did not feel the Downing Street job was any more difficult in terms of time, energy and effort than his subsequent roles as Permanent Representative at the EEC or PUS, but that was only because those jobs, too, were so challenging. Oliver Wright told him, when handing over the job, 'There are only two qualifications for it, an iron constitution and an understanding wife.' Palliser was fortunate to have both. He could only recall being badly ill once, with a bad cold during a visit from Soviet premier

Alexei Kosygin, and his wife learnt to cope with countless late evenings, when Palliser would stay in Downing Street until Wilson came back from the House of Commons, typically around 10.30.[9] When an urgent issue arose on overseas visits, Palliser might sometimes be the one who had to wake Wilson up, even in the dead of night.[10]
The disruption caused by the job extended to holiday planning: 'I have to plan to be away at the same time as the PM and he goes invariably in August…'.[11] In August 1968, Palliser was holidaying in the Ardennes and Wilson was in the Scillies, when both had to return to Downing Street because of the sudden Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.[12]

Within Downing Street itself, Palliser was the primary, but not the only individual, working on foreign policy. The Principal PS was Michael Halls, who also joined the team in 1966 but stayed until 1970. He had served Wilson when the latter was President of the Board of Trade back in the 1940s and was generally felt be over-promoted by the Prime Minister. It was view Palliser shared[13] and Halls, who in any case was likeable enough, never became a rival in the foreign policy field. However, he sometimes became involved on the economic side of international policy, as when Wilson hoped to boost Anglo-Soviet trade[14] or when he was interested in organising a meeting of the Governor of the Bank of England with his EEC counterparts during Britain's second entry bid.[15] Halls would also become involved in administrative matters, for example, when George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, failed to arrive to chair of a ministerial meeting on the EEC talks in July 1967[16]. Sometimes, Palliser and Halls would unite to press a view on Wilson, as in March 1967, when they argued in support of

Brown that it would be better to launch a fresh application for EEC membership than to revive the one made by the Conservatives in 1961.[17]

A more significant and impressive figure, who certainly influenced Wilson's view of world affairs on a regular basis, was the Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend. Although he was not physically based at Number 10, Trend was literally just around the corner, in the Cabinet Office. He had enormous influence not only because of his acute intelligence, long experience and grasp of business across Whitehall, but also because Wilson respected him. It was in the nature of his role to provide the Prime Minister with a covering analysis to all memoranda that came before the Cabinet or its key ministerial committees.[18] Thus, Trend would give Wilson a view on how to handle the questions that came before the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, the most important committee on international matters. Palliser himself later acknowledged Trend's enormous importance, talking of,

> … the influence, discreet but ever present, of the Secretary of the Cabinet: someone who is always at the Prime Minister's right hand, lacking the power of a departmental Permanent Under-Secretary with a big Ministry behind him, but more than compensating for that by the influence flowing from his unique position at the heart of government.[19]

One of the points that will emerge below is that Palliser, too, was able to use a position, close to the Prime Minister, 'at the heart of government' to have an important influence on policy.

**Routine**

Palliser's daily routine was much the same as his predecessors. As he put it, 'I had to ensure that the Prime Minister was fully informed about every aspect of foreign relations, to convey his… comments to the Foreign Secretary and to ensure in turn that the latter's views… were drawn fully to the Prime Minister's attention.'[20] He also provided advice of his own to Wilson and there were more mundane, if sensitive, issues such as recommending which foreign leaders should receive Christmas cards from the Prime Minister[21] or where precisely to sit guests at dinner.[22] As far as liaising with the FO is concerned, his most important contacts were the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, Murray Maclehose in 1965-67 and Donald Maitland in 1967-69. As 'the collision mats of the civil service'[23], they would keep each other informed of thinking in the FO and Number 10. Thus, in April 1966, Palliser wrote to Maclehose that, in contrast to de Gaulle, who had just pulled France out of NATO, Wilson was determined to pursue détente with the Soviet bloc on the basis of a *united* Atlantic alliance.[24] In November 1967, he warned Maitland that Wilson was 'decidedly allergic' to George Brown's idea of increasing arms sales to the apartheid regime in South Africa.[25]

Palliser came to realise, like others before and after, that a key problem as PS was 'precisely how to reconcile being totally loyal to the Prime Minister, who is your boss and who you are there to serve, while at the same time preserving a relationship with the Foreign Secretary… which is actually crucial to the national interest.' With the calm, agreeable Michael Stewart, who was Foreign Secretary in Palliser's early months and again after March 1968, this was not a major challenge. But the relationship was fraught

when Brown became Foreign Secretary. During one meeting, in Wilson's presence, Brown accused Palliser of effectively being a traitor to the FO. However, Palliser and his colleagues in the FO prevented any serious rupture. It helped that Palliser and Maclehose got on personally so well, having worked together in the Paris embassy. They lunched together very week or so, trying 'to repair such bits of china as had been broken during the week…' Although, ultimately, Downing Street held the upper hand in any showdown, Palliser believed his job was 'not to dominate the Foreign Office or to run other Departments, it was to ensure the smooth liaison between the two while preserving the loyalty to the Prime Minister…'[26]

Since Palliser was also in post during the last years of the Commonwealth Office, he also had contact with the PS to the Commonwealth Secretary, Oliver Forster (1965-67), and the latter's successor, John Williams (1967-68). Downing Street and the Commonwealth Office had to cooperate on a wide range of issues, including Indian premier Indira Gandhi's visit to London in April 1966, and an Australian idea, in September 1966, for a renewed Commonwealth peace mission to end the Vietnam war, as well as the more persistent problem of Rhodesia.[27] In fact, there was a range of departments in Whitehall with which Downing Street had to co-operate on international policy. For example, Palliser was in contact with the Ministry of Technology, in October 1967, on ideas for technological cooperation in Western Europe.[28] However, Halls dealt most with his former department, the Board of Trade.[29]

In working with the Prime Minister, Palliser often simply appeared to pass messages back and forth. Some were designed to keep the right people informed about issues, not least the records of meetings that were exchanged between Downing Street and the FO. But he would also select the material that the Prime Minister, faced by a tight schedule, should or should not see. This included material from the so-called 'Red Book', submitted weekly by the Joint Intelligence Committee. Palliser sometimes found this 'long and boring' and many of the materials were not passed to Wilson, because 'the situation they are dealing with is not of concern to him at present.' At other times, however, 'there are several items which I find well worth showing to the Prime Minister, and… he often sparks on them and throws up comments…'[30] Palliser was also expected to provide advice on how best to handle foreign policy challenges. 'A private secretary is not just there to shuffle papers – you're there to advise your minister; that is your job.'[31] Some were short-term and relatively simple. In December 1966, ahead of a visit by the Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin, there was a delicate challenge posed by the need to deter him from criticising the Americans or Germans while he was in London. Palliser recommended that the matter should be raised with him verbally, after he arrived, and Wilson agreed.[32]

However, Palliser was quite capable of expressing strong views of his own on major questions. In early 1967, when London discovered that it had been kept uninformed about a US attempt to contact Hanoi using a Polish intermediary, the PS accused Washington of 'muddle, lack of confidence and incompetence.'[33] His impact on certain policy areas will be explored more fully below, but an early memorandum to

Wilson on détente is worth quoting. In it, Palliser revealed his own openness to détente and his willingness to criticise other foreign policy experts. Arguing that the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 had been an admission of Soviet defeat in its attempts to expand westwards and that Moscow had learnt lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis, the PS argued:

> It seems to me that our Soviet experts spend so much of their time doing analyses of Soviet Holy Writ that they tend to ignore the actions of the Soviet Government. Which all goes to show that if war is too serious a matter to be left to Generals, East-West relations are too serious a matter to be left to Kremlinologists.[34]

**Downing Street Diplomacy**

Another aspect of Pallier's work was to accompany the Prime Minister to meetings, at home and abroad. At the highest level, these included 'summit' conferences with foreign leaders, which were a growing phenomenon in the 1960s, as jet aircraft made it easier for heads of state and government to travel the world.[35] Palliser recognised that, thanks to summits, prime ministers were involved in foreign policy, 'not just… because it's important but because he or she has now to handle much more of it personally.'[36] In May 1966, along with Trend, Halls and various FO officials, Palliser was part of the British team that held talks with a German delegation under Chancellor Ludwig Erhard.[37] Several weeks later, Palliser sat in on a plenary meeting between Wilson and Lyndon Johnson at the White House, when Trend and Halls were again present.[38] Palliser might sometimes get involved with setting the agenda for summits, as when he talked to the Minister of the French embassy about Wilson's planned summit with de Gaulle in mid-

1967.[39] Wilson was impressed by Palliser's skills as an interpreter, especially when these proved more than a match for his French opposite number during a summit with de Gaulle in January 1967.[40] Some foreign ministers would also see the Prime Minister, when visiting London, including Israel's Abba Eban in February 1967 and Palliser would keep a record, later forwarded to the FO.[41]

There were other visitors to Downing Street, not least the ambassadors of key allies. These meetings, too, were recorded by Palliser and passed to the FO. Perhaps the most important were Wilson's quite frequent meetings with America's David Bruce. Within months of taking up his post, Palliser had sent Maclehose notes of meetings with Bruce about the ambassador's pessimism about American progress in Vietnam, a possible visit by Wilson to Washington and the Johnson administration's determination that such a visit must be 'carefully prepared.'[42] Palliser also recorded meetings between Wilson and other Cabinet ministers where they were relevant to foreign affairs. Thus, in June 1966 he passed on record to Maclehose of a meeting between Wilson and Stewart, about the upcoming US bombing of industrial targets in North Vietnam.[43] Sometimes, it was also worth making a record of telephone conversations, as when Wilson and Brown discussed their attitude towards a possible UN Resolution on an Arab-Israeli peace settlement in July 1967.[44]

Inevitably, the PS was also at the centre of any diplomatic exchanges that focused on Downing Street, perhaps the most famous in this period being the 'Sunflower' talks of February 1967 when there was an Anglo-Soviet attempt to bring Washington and Hanoi

together. Palliser helped liaise with the CIA officer, Chester Cooper, who was sent over by President Johnson, attended key meetings and, in the aftermath of Sunflower, helped prevent Wilson's criticisms of US tactics from damaging the transatlantic relationship.[45] In late 1968, Palliser was involved in planning for the somewhat ludicrous, secret mission to Rhodesia by Wilson's lawyer, Lord Goodman, and the press baron, Max Aitken, in August 1968, which paved the way for a summit meeting with Rhodesian premier Ian Smith on board HMS *Fearless*.[46]

There were occasions when Palliser would conduct diplomatic business on his own, as in August 1966 when, in the wake of a major monetary crisis, he tackled a member of the French embassy over Downing Street's suspicions that Paris had helped to destabilise the Pound on the money markets.[47] A more delicate, clandestine meeting was with a representative of the breakaway 'Biafran' regime during the Nigerian civil war.[48] Palliser might also have direct communication with certain British ambassadors, like Patrick Dean in Washington who, in June 1966, passed on views about a possible Wilson visit to Washington, based on conversations with the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the National Security Advisor, Walt Rostow.[49] Soon afterwards, on the Prime Minister's instructions, Palliser also took up with Dean the question of a press leak, in the *Sunday Times*, about messages between Wilson and President Johnson.[50] Inevitably, the PS also played an important role in securing agreement between Number 10 and the FO on certain issues, as in June 1966 when Wilson wanted to issue a statement dissociating London from the US bombing of oil installations around urban centres in North Vietnam.[51]

Downing Street was frequently at the very centre of British foreign policy. One unusual example of diplomacy was the clandestine contact that took place between London and North Vietnam, using two supposed Vietnamese 'journalists', who were actually diplomats. Given that London did not recognise Hanoi's official existence, it was necessary to contact the pair via irregular channels, in this case a junior minister in the government, Harold Davies, who was both personally loyal to Wilson and knowledgeable about North Vietnam, having once met its leader, Ho Chi Minh.[52] Davies' conversations with the Vietnamese 'journalists' were reported directly to Downing Street, but Palliser kept the FO informed about them.[53] There are other cases of Palliser sharing delicate information with his former colleagues. In late 1966, for example, the American diplomat Averell Harriman visited Wilson and asked that no record be kept of the fact that, in pursuing a Vietnam peace settlement, President Johnson would be ready to accept Soviet assurances of North Vietnamese behaviour provided there was a guarantee of 'something positive.' However, Palliser did record the fact – and passed it on to Maclehose.[54]

Not all Palliser's overseas visits were in Wilson's company. In November 1968 he went with George Thomson to Rhodesia, to follow up the summit on HMS *Fearless*.[55] On certain occasions, the PS became involved in overseas visits of his own. He went to Washington, for example, just ahead of Wilson's June 1967 visit, in order to sound out the Americans on British plans to withdraw from military bases East of Suez: he found both disappointment at the decision and resignation that it would be carried out.[56] Several weeks later, at a critical moment in the second EEC membership bid, he went to Brussels,

where he found that the five members other than France were united behind a British application.[57] Perhaps most important of all, Palliser helped to establish links to the incoming Nixon administration, following the Presidential election of November 1968. Initially, Wilson thought of sending his old friend John Freeman, who had been selected as the next Ambassador to Washington to do the job. But the incumbent ambassador, Patrick Dean argued against this. Among other considerations, Freeman was too high profile a figure for the mission to remain secret. It was then that Palliser put his own case forward. Henry Kissinger, slated to become Nixon's National Security Adviser, was 'a very old friend of mine and we have been seeing each other 2 or 3 times a year. If you want a direct line to the President-elect… I think I can do it for you…'.[58] Palliser subsequently had a 'very friendly and relaxed' talk with Kissinger, in which they were able to discuss a possible visit by Wilson to Washington key personalities in the new administration and pressing international questions.[59]

**Spying on the Foreign Office**

An intriguing aspects of Palliser's work was the creation of a kind of intelligence-gathering operation *inside* the Foreign Office so as to discover the likely policies of George Brown, the deputy leader of the Labour Party, when he became Foreign Secretary in August 1966. There was little warmth between Wilson and Brown. They stood on different wings of the Party, had competed for the leadership in 1963 and had rather different views on Britain's role in the world. In his memoirs, Brown complained about the 'troublesome arrangement' whereby a PS was appointed to Downing Street from the FO and claimed, without providing any concrete example, that this 'raised considerable

conflict on occasions.'[60] Ironically, in many ways, Palliser's international outlook might be seen as similar to Brown, who was a keen advocate of EEC membership and ready to wind down the position East of Suez. But Brown was also a controversial, volatile figure, fond of alcohol, who soon alienated many diplomats. The precise reasons for setting up an intelligence operation are nowhere set down, but given the distrust between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Wilson's desire to play a leading foreign policy role and the unpredictability of Brown, it is clear that advance information on the latter's likely doings could be useful for Downing Street.

Palliser seems to have had no trouble in having colleagues in the FO pass in formation to him and, within months, he had established a means of obtaining key pieces of information. When passing to Wilson a telegram from Brown to the German foreign minister, Willy Brandt, in January 1967, Palliser added. 'I hope you will not reveal that you know of this message. My private line to the FO is very useful and I should not wish it to be cut off.'[61] In May 1967, having procured another 'private' copy of an FO document, he expressed the fear that 'in certain important matters the Foreign Office are being less than frank with us', but he assured Wilson that 'I am reasonably confident that I can keep us in the picture through my own network.'[62] This network clearly included individuals at the highest level in the FO, who could pass on documents intended for Brown himself. One was probably Lord Chalfont, who had been personally appointed to the role of Minister for Disarmament by Wilson back in 1964, who later focused on the EEC application and who seem to have remained personally committed to the Prime Minister. In July 1967, Palliser was able to obtain a memorandum from Chalfont to

Brown for the 'private eye' of Downing Street; and in December he obtained a similar document, 'sent to me on the usual *personal* and *non-attributable* basis' (emphasis in the original), before Brown had even seen it.[63] Once established, the 'private line' continued to operate even after Brown suddenly resigned in March 1968, being replaced by the more dependable Stewart. Thus, Wilson received a minute from Chalfont to Stewart in May 1968 regarding policy towards the EEC[64] and the Prime Minister was informed early on about the FO's consideration of an invasion of Anguilla, a former British colony in the West Indies that had slipped into political instability, although this time by Halls rather than Palliser.[65]

Despite such signs of distrust between Number 10 and the FO at ministerial level, the evidence is that relations between the two was generally good at a lower level, not least because of Palliser's relationship with his opposite numbers at the Office. Any problems that did spring up seem to have been quickly smoothed over. In May 1967, for example, Maclehose admitted that the FO, without consulting Downing Street, had issued a statement about an exchange of messages between Wilson and de Gaulle. Palliser wrote back that Downing Street certainly should have been consulted but he suggested 'we leave it at that.'[66] Palliser hoped that Wilson and Brown could be kept working in harness on the EEC application if the former focused on strategic questions, like winning over de Gaulle, while the Foreign Secretary handled details like agricultural policy. However, Brown was always likely to take initiatives of his own: at one point in June 1967, Wilson only learnt of the Foreign Secretary's latest plans to publicise Britain's EEC negotiating position, when he read the newspapers.[67] Palliser also seems to have tried to avoid openly

taking sides in the Wilson-Brown feud. The PS was present during the bitter row that took place in the Cabinet Room between the pair in March 1968, which was followed by Brown's resignation, because he had not been consulted over a decision to declare a Bank Holiday as a way of forestalling a financial crisis. Among all the shouting, Palliser was pointedly asked by Brown how long Wilson had spent trying to contact him, before taking the decision on a Bank Holiday. Palliser simply refused to answer.[68] Many individuals were caught up in the tension and uncertainties created by Brown's appointment but one of them, the PUS at the FO, Paul Gore-Booth, was generous enough to say that he thought Palliser's position had perhaps been 'the most difficult':

> [The] man at No. 10… has two loyalties; he is the servant of the Prime Minister but he is bound to keep closely acquainted with and reflect the thinking of the Foreign Office at all levels on the international situation. Palliser managed both with great skill.[69]

**The 'Second Try'**

Being at the centre of British government, with a wide remit over foreign affairs, the Prime Minister's Private Secretaries for foreign affairs found themselves involved in a vast array of issues. Palliser himself recalled, 'I had, so far as possible, to cover the globe.'[70] To give just a short selection of items, Palliser's work involved him in receiving reports on: the dangers of a nuclear arms race in Asia (where India was concerned about the Chinese threat); the 'snail-like' advance of talks with the illegal regime in Rhodesia; and the attempts to bring an Arab-Israeli peace settlement following the June 1967 six-day war.[71] But his involvement in many of these issues was intermittent, partly because

they were not so consistently important as to require the regular input of the Prime Minister. The main issue that illuminates Palliser's role in shaping foreign policy, and which certainly demanded a lot of Wilson's time, was the so-called 'second try' to enter the EEC. This was closely linked to the discussion about Britain's continued presence 'East of Suez' where, in 1966, it still had a military presence in Malaysia-Singapore, Aden and the Persian Gulf.

Under Oliver Wright, it had seemed that Britain might remain East of Suez for many years. Military withdrawal *was* discussed, in the context of cuts in defence spending that were discussed from the moment Labour took office, largely thanks to the country's persistent balance of payments problems. Palliser himself later recalled that foreign policy under Wilson was carried out under 'a permanent economic thundercloud'.[72] But until 1966 the 'confrontation' with Indonesia made it impossible to contemplate a precipitate retreat from Malaysia-Singapore, the US government would have been upset by such a move (especially as it became increasingly entangled in Vietnam) and Wilson himself portrayed himself as an 'East of Suez man', seeing the bases as essential to Britain's role as a major power.[73] Wright believed that, with the Cold War stalemated in Europe, the challenges for the West in the 1960s lay in the less-developed world, where British efforts should be focused.[74] This outlook rapidly disappeared after he left Downing Street.

It is not the case that his friend and successor, Palliser, wanted a precipitate retreat from the world role. In March 1967, when ministers discussed plans for a rapid

withdrawal from East of Suez, he was quite clear about the dramatic implications, telling the Prime Minister, 'we should be under no illusion that it is anything but the end of Britain's "world role" in defence.' The PS even struck a cautious note, warning that such a withdrawal could be seen as a reversal of Wilson's earlier policies and must be given very careful presentation, so that it would be wise to take more time over it.[75] This advice shows that, however much he may himself have favoured a shift towards Europe, Palliser preserved his loyalty to the Prime Minister. Subsequently, he also advised Wilson that, however difficult the process, London must consult Washington about the process of withdrawal. President Johnson would feel hurt if he found out about British intentions only at the last minute.[76] Palliser recognised that one danger of withdrawal from East of Suez was that it would reduce Britain's significance in the world and risk damaging relations with the US and other allies, like Australia, at a time when entry to the EEC was not yet secure. 'All of this means, I suggest, that the logic of our Far Eastern policy is to add considerably greater urgency to our European policy.'[77] But Palliser never stood in the way of a withdrawal from East of Suez; his concern was how to manage the process to minimise any deleterious side-effects.

As a corollary to his enthusiasm for the world role, Wright had been sceptical about another bid to enter the EEC.[78] Here the difference with his Palliser was more marked. The latter was very much identified as a supporter of entry to the EEC. To some extent this may have reflected the FO opinion that membership was the best way to maintain Britain's international significance, Wright being something of an exception to the consensus. With Palliser, however, there was also a deep personal commitment to the

cause. He traced this back to the destruction he witnessed as a tank officer in Europe in 1944-45 and subsequently as a member of the occupation forces in Germany.[79] A Roman Catholic, in 1948 he married to Marie Marguerite, daughter of one of the so-called 'fathers of Europe', the former Belgian prime minister, Paul-Henri Spaak. As head of the Planning Staff, in early 1965 he had already pressed the government on the dangers of isolation from the growing power of the EEC and the need to develop a positive, coherent policy towards it.[80]

His enthusiasm for EEC membership had initially put some doubts in Palliser's mind about working with the Prime Minister, who always took an outwardly cool and calculating approach to the question. Many of Wilson's political allies, including Cabinet ministers like Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman, were sceptical about EEC membership, as were some of his Downing Street political staff, notably the economist Thomas Balogh. Indeed, Palliser was so concerned about possible differences with his new boss over the EEC that he raised the matter in their initial interview, telling Wilson, 'I'm a convinced believer in British membership… and I wouldn't want you to take me under false pretences in a situation where you and I might find each other in disagreement over Europe…' But Wilson immediately told his new PS, 'we shan't have any problems over Europe.' Palliser soon became familiar with Wilson's strategy on Europe, moving 'in his usual devious crab-like fashion so it was almost impossible to know what his views were.'[81] Wilson later explained that he had been interested in the prospect of EEC membership 'for quite a long time. You've got to realise that the Labour Party is pretty hostile, and I can't sort of go out on a limb, without having the party

behind me.'[82] But the clear majority in the March 1966 election freed the Prime Minister to take greater risks. Palliser's appointment has been seen, alongside the change in role of George Thomson, who now became the informal 'minister for Europe' inside the FO, as evidence that, 'Wilson shifted the personnel around him to facilitate any potential initiative towards the Community.'[83]

For Palliser, the decision on withdrawal from East of Suez was closely linked to the need to enter the EEC, but this too created a problem of managing the process. With an eye on British influence in international affairs, he advised Wilson in July 1967, as the withdrawal was announced, that, 'we cannot afford to reach a position where the Americans have discarded us as a useful world ally before we have managed to join the Community.'[84] This was one reason why the PS wanted to press on with an application promptly. Palliser's ability to influence the Prime Minister on European questions was obvious at an early date. In March 1966, the new PS took up the linked issues of détente and de Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO. He argued that the French President, while uncooperative, was not always mistaken in his views. There was little chance of war breaking out in Europe, so the withdrawal was not necessarily dangerous. Indeed, 'the French have given us all the opportunity to rethink on East-West relations and the problems of the Western alliance.' Palliser's preferred line was to seek détente on the basis of holding the rest of NATO together and, at the same time, to seek disarmament in Europe. Disarmament was already a favoured project of the Prime Minister and it may be that, to an extent, Palliser was exploiting some of Wilson's own ideas in this

memorandum, but it is noteworthy that these views were subsequently sent on to Foreign Secretary Stewart and the Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, as recommended policy.[85]

Clearly, Palliser did not simply press for an EEC application in isolation: his argument that de Gaulle's views on détente made some sense were intended to show that London and Paris could work together. Palliser also encouraged Wilson's interest in the idea of technological cooperation with Europe as a way of encouraging the EEC members to welcome British membership. In September 1966, the PS was quick to draw to the Prime Minister's attention an Italian scheme for European action to match America's technological prowess and to urge the FO to stay informed about this.[86] It was another example of Palliser's ability to dovetail his own outlook with that of the Prime Minister, known as an enthusiast for technological investment. The dream of a European technological community eventually became part of Wilson's strategy for pressurizing France into accepting British membership. As Palliser explained to Maitland in November 1967, Paris 'should be confronted with a certain dilemma': it could not have the benefits of a technological community without letting Britain inside the EEC.[87]

Unlike some other observers, Palliser believed that Wilson's commitment to 'the second try' was more than some Machiavellian, tactical ploy. 'Harold Wilson was an extraordinarily complex human being, combining intellectual brilliance with political cunning… Many of those closest to him found it difficult to divine his purposes…' But his 'desire to see Britain join the EEC… was indeed sincere…'[88] When it was announced that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary would make a tour of EEC capitals in early

1967, to prepare the way for an application, Brown himself was sceptical about what might result. But Palliser told him, 'You should be pleased. It means that Harold is committing himself to Europe.' The PS had no doubt that the Prime Minister was genuine in seeking membership.[89] At this point, Palliser became particularly important for advising Wilson on tactics to enter the EEC. The key challenge was to circumvent a likely veto from de Gaulle when Britain formally submitted a membership application. Looking back a generation later, Palliser said, 'I think I always made it clear to Wilson that I was very sceptical of his being able to get General de Gaulle to change his mind, But I do not think that I would ever have told him that there was no hope of success.'[90] Contemporary evidence confirms that Palliser continued to urge Wilson to press on with the 'second try' right down to – and beyond – the French veto of November 1967. In January 1967 he told Wilson that, rather than making common cause with the President on limiting supranational elements in the Community, an approach that could only alienate the other five members, it was better to appeal to his 'sense of history and monumental vanity', by arguing that only British membership would allow the EEC to match the superpowers.[91] Palliser also wanted to keep the other five members closely behind the membership bid and he spoke out against those, like Chalfont, who hoped to browbeat the West Germans into putting pressure on de Gaulle. It was better to win German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger's sympathy by 'subtle', rather than 'crude' means.[92]

On 16 May, during a press conference, de Gaulle came close to a veto, saying that Britain would be better to apply for 'association' with the Community rather than full membership. Palliser, however, pressed Wilson to 'bash on, regardless'; the Prime

Minister was engaged in 'a war of nerves – to see whether your nerve is as strong as the General's. My money is confidently on yours.'[93] Palliser still believed it could be possible to get into the EEC, 'provided we play our negotiating hand with skill and with speed', although there was always the danger that, if backed into a corner, de Gaulle could 'lash out in any case.'[94] In September, he seems to have been less certain of de Gaulle's purpose, telling Wilson that rumours of a forthcoming veto might be a 'War of nerves, truth, perfidy – who can tell?'[95] In October, more convinced that de Gaulle was on the defensive, Palliser felt this was 'a signal success for your policy up-to-date of not taking no for an answer.' Wilson should maintain this line, keep the other five EEC members on Britain's side and avoid giving de Gaulle any excuse for a veto.[96] Ahead of a visit from Kiesinger that same month, Palliser's remained a moderate voice. He did not want to back de Gaulle into a corner for fear of driving him to issue another veto; and Kiesinger would only resent being asked to put pressure on the French leader. British tactics should be built around undermining de Gaulle's claims that London was not ready for EEC membership. 'Surely this must continue to be our approach', he told Wilson, 'patient perseverance coupled with your refusal to take no for an answer.'[97] But around this time it became clear that the French had a potential excuse to try to kill the application, because of the weakness of the Pound on international money markets.[98] Within weeks the Pound was devalued and de Gaulle seized his chance to issue a veto. Reading over the General's 'ironical, not to say sarcastic' statement, Palliser was forced to conclude that he had 'not moved an inch in his general approach.'[99]

Yet this did mark the end of the second application. As well as urging Wilson to pursue an immediate application, Palliser was also responsible, at an early date, for developing the argument that London should continue pressing for membership in the long-term. He argued that, even if de Gaulle did not want her, his successors might alter that policy, not least because Britain could help balance the growing economic might of West Germany. Thus, in October 1966, the PS said that Britain should 'prepare for a post-de Gaulle situation where our entry… can become possible within the reasonably near future… perhaps even before the next general election.'[100] This line of thought was highly significant because it meant that, when de Gaulle did issue his veto, Wilson said London must keep the second application 'on the table', waiting for it to be picked up[101] – as it eventually was in 1970, following de Gaulle's resignation. This explains why, during 1968-69, Wilson, advised by Palliser, continued to look for ways to keep the pressure on the EEC to recognise Britain's case. It was a strategy backed by Palliser's father-in-law, Spaak[102], but it was not an easy process. In May 1968, only six months after the embarrassment of a veto, Cabinet ministers were extremely reluctant to take any initiative and even Palliser advised Wilson to await events although, 'If we simply withdraw into our shell… it will become increasingly hard to make future progress…'.[103] Such logic meant that Palliser encouraged the Prime Minister to continue regular meetings with EEC leaders, like Kiesinger, because 'the major hurdles, internally, have been taken', thanks to the 1967 application, and 'we are still in the best posture… to take advantage of any sudden change in circumstances.'[104]

Palliser summed up his preferred tactics as 'skirmishing around the citadel' before finally breaking into the EEC.[105] The problem was that it was not easy to find any route forward. During the closing months of 1968 and into early 1969, Palliser suggested that London might propose an up-dated version of the Fouchet Plan, a French initiative of the early 1960s that would have developed foreign policy cooperation among the EEC members. But the FO feared that such an initiative would instead provoke divisions among Britain's supporters.[106] In November, Palliser was dismayed by the heavy pressure ministers, led by Wilson, put on West Germany to revalue the Deutschmark, so as to relieve continuing pressure on the Pound. He argued that, 'given present realities in Europe, we cannot attain our European objectives by… being beastly to the Germans…', who might turn against EEC enlargement.[107]

On 4 February 1969, came a rather different opening when de Gaulle himself suggested to the British Ambassador to Paris, Christopher Soames, that their two countries should work towards a free trade area in Europe, with agriculture included. This initiative fitted into established ideas that de Gaulle had for limiting the supranational element in the EEC and protecting French farmers, but it was likely to upset the other five members of the Community, on whose support Britain relied. With Wilson due to meet Kiesinger for another summit, the British were now faced with a dilemma about whether they should mention the Soames interview. If they did not, and word of it subsequently leaked, the Germans would be offended. However, if they did decide to reveal the details, they must forewarn the French leader, who was unlikely to welcome the prospect. The FO wanted to tell Kiesinger; Soames argued that this would betray de

Gaulle's confidence. Typically, Palliser tried to keep both the French and Germans content, and was willing to differ from his colleagues at the FO. He advised Wilson to be very cautious in what he said to Kiesinger, warned of the dangers of upsetting de Gaulle and also feared that Soames might resign over the issue.[108] As it transpired, Wilson eventually followed FO advice and, while Soames remained at his post, de Gaulle was livid. Anglo-French relations reached a new low, though fortunately one that proved short-lived, since de Gaulle suddenly resigned, over a domestic setback, in April. It was around the same time, however, that Palliser left Downing Street.

**Conclusion**

After three years in Downing Street, it was Palliser himself who decided, around the time of the 'Soames Affair', that it was better to move on, fearing that, otherwise, he might be forced to remain through another election. He was more interested, he said later, 'in the nature of the job than in the status' it had.[109] Wilson offered to try to find him an ambassadorship, but Palliser preferred to return to Paris, as number two to Christopher Soames, because this offered such an 'interesting' challenge at the time. Palliser became Minister at the Paris Embassy in June 1969. While he was still there, negotiations finally began for enlarging the EC. Palliser remained central to this process over the following years, as Ambassador to the Community in Brussels, in 1971-73, and then as Britain's first Permanent Representative to the Community, in 1973-75.[110] It was his continuing success in these challenging position that made him the natural choice to become PUS, at the relatively early age of 53.

In his rise to the top, Palliser's time in Downing Street had clearly been a major success. He had won the Prime Minister's trust and coped triumphantly with the intense pressures of the post; he had maintained a good working relationship with the FO, even during the challenging years when Brown was Foreign Secretary; and he had carried out some effective diplomacy of his own. Above all, though, he had a real effect on strategic decisions. The PS to the Prime Minister may only be a small part of a much larger foreign policy-making machine. The FCO, its embassies abroad, the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, the Cabinet Secretary, the Prime Minister himself – all of these had important role to play. But Palliser's experience shows that the Private Secretary, by occupying a pivotal role between the Prime Minister and the rest of the machine, may help push policy in particular directions. True, Palliser was helped by what might be termed the march of events, with the retreat from a world role continuing, a need to cut costs abroad, persistent economic difficulties and a feeling that EEC membership was the only viable future if Britain wished to remain an important player on the world stage. He was also helped by the fact that Wilson himself seems to have recognised this shift and adapted himself to it. But Palliser was capable of stating the British dilemma in clear terms that could only help give confidence that the new direction, leading towards EEC membership, was the right one. In retrospect, Palliser viewed Wilson's international policy as 'one of failure', partly because of his inability to achieve entry into the EEC.'[111] But this is surely too negative a judgment. De Gaulle may have issued his veto but, by 1970, partly thanks to Palliser's strategy of leaving the second application 'on the table', Britain was on the brink of successful negotiation for EC entry.

**Note on Edward Youde, 1969-70**

Palliser was succeeded as PS by Edward Youde, who only remained in the post until January 1970. Born in 1924, he had entered the Foreign Office in 1947, following wartime service in the Royal Navy. Educated at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, he became a China specialist, serving in Nanking and Peking at the time of the Chinese civil war (1948-50), as well as two later occasions (1953-55 and 1960-62). He had made his name early, when he was on *HMS Amethyst* in 1949 and took a central role in negotiating the ship's release, after Mao's Red Army attacked it on the Yangtze. He also had experience of the United States, working at both the Washington embassy in the aftermath of the Suez crisis (1956-59) and at the British Mission to the United Nations, where he was Head of Chancery at a difficult time (1965-69), when the Communist bloc and newly-independent states often allied to condemn British imperialism.[112] In 1967 he was considered as a possible PS to the Foreign Secretary, but George Brown preferred to appoint Donald Maitland.[113] As well as seeing improving chances to join the EEC, Youde's period as PS to Wilson was dominated by the closing stages of the Nigerian civil war.[114] Like Palliser, he was trusted by Wilson with delicate missions, going over to Washington to talk to Kissinger in September 1969[115], but there are few major examples of long items of policy advice to the Prime Minister, such as his predecessor had produced. The shortness of Youde's term in Downing Street was probably linked to the onset of heart disease that eventually led to a by-pass operation.[116] It proved no setback to his career, which included four years as Ambassador to Beijing (1974-78) and ended with his appointment as Governor of Hong Kong (1982-86). He was

there when the Sino-British declaration was signed that eventually returned the colony to Chinese sovereignty. He was the only one of the Colony's governors to die in office.[117]

## Endnotes

I am grateful to the British Academy for funding the archival research on which this essay is based.

[1] On the foreign policy of these years see John W. Young, *The Labour Governments, 1964-70: Volume 2, International Policy* (Manchester University Press, 2003).
[2] Harold Wilson, *The Labour Government, 1964-70: a personal record* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 334.
[3] Churchill Archive Centre, Cambridge, British Diplomatic Oral History Project (BDOHP), Palliser interview (28 April 1999), 13.
[4] National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth, Rendel Papers (by kind permission of Miss Rosemary Rendel), File, Palliser to Rendel, 22 February 1966.
[5] *The Diplomatic Service List, 1971* (London: HMSO, 1971), 317.
[6] Philip M. Kaiser, *Journeying Far and Wide: a political and diplomatic memoir* (New York: Scribner's, 1992), 231-2.
[7] For example, in the wake of the British decision to withdraw from 'East of Suez': The National Archives (TNA), Kew, TNA/TNA/PREM13/2459, Palliser to Wilson, 15 August 1967.
[8] Rendel Papers, Palliser to Rendel, 17 October 1967.
[9] BDOHP, Palliser interview, 21-23. But note that Palliser also seems to have been ill at home in October 1967: TNA/PREM13/1485, G.F. (for Palliser) to Wilson, 6 October.
[10] Wilson, *Labour Government*, 636.
[11] Rendel Papers, Palliser to Rendel, 11 April 1968.
[12] Wilson, *Labour Government*, 552-3.
[13] Ben Pimlott, *Harold Wilson* (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 519.
[14] TNA/PREM13/1863, Halls to Nicoll (Board of Trade), 14 January 1967.
[15] TNA/PREM13/1420, Halls to Baldwin, 5 February, and reply, 31 March 1967.
[16] TNA/PREM13/1361, Halls to Trend, 14 July 1967.
[17] TNA/PREM13/1479, Palliser to Wilson, 22 March 1967.
[18] See: Philip Ziegler, *Wilson: the authorised life* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), 184-5.
[19] Michael Palliser, 'Foreword' to Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: the choice between Europe and the world?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), xi.
[20] Michael Palliser, 'Introduction' to Helen Parr, *Britain's Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain's world role 1964-67* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), x.
[21] TNA/PREM13/2308, Palliser to Wilson, 29 November 1968.
[22] BDOHP, Palliser interview, 22-3.
[23] Geoffrey Moorhouse, *The Diplomats: the Foreign Office today* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), 149.
[24] TNA/PREM13/902, Palliser to Maclehose, 4 June 1966.
[25] TNA/PREM13/2400, Palliser to Maitland, 28 November 1967.
[26] BDOHP, Palliser interview, 14-17.
[27] TNA/PREM13/970, Forster to Palliser, 26 April (Gandhi); TNA/PREM13/1266, Palliser to Forster, 5 September 1966 (Vietnam); TNA/PREM13/2320, Palliser to Williams, 5 February 1968 (Rhodesia). See also TNA/PREM13/1372, Forster to Palliser, 12 July, and reply, 17 July 1967, regarding the dangers of a coup in Cyprus.
[28] TNA/PREM13/1851, Palliser to Knighton, 25 October 1967.
[29] See, for example, TNA/PREM13/1479, Halls to Meynell, 9 April 1967, and TNA/PREM13/2980, Halls to Meynell, 8 and 16 January 1968.
[30] TNA/PREM13/1343, Palliser minute, 4 November 1966; and see Peter Hennessy, *The Prime Minister: the office and its holders since 1945* (London: Allen lane, 2000), 292.
[31] Moorhouse, *Diplomats*, 149, quoting an anonymous official.
[32] TNA/PREM13/1221, Palliser to Wilson, 13 December 1966, with handwritten minute by Wilson.
[33] TNA/PREM13/1917, Palliser to Wilson, 4 January 1967.

[34] TNA/PREM13/1043, Palliser to Wilson, 4 April 1966. On East-West relations see Geraint Hughes, *Harold Wilson's Cold War: the Labour government and East-West politics, 1964-70* (London: Royal Historical Society, 2009).
[35] See John W. Young, *Twentieth Century Diplomacy: a case study of British practice, 1963-76* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chapters 6 and 7.
[36] Palliser, quoted in Simon Jenkins and Anne Sloman, *With Respect Ambassador: an inquiry into the Foreign Office* (London: BBC, 1985), 139.
[37] TNA/PREM13/933, record of plenary meetings, 23 and 24 May 1966.
[38] TNA/PREM13/1083, record of plenary meeting, 29 July 1966.
[39] TNA/PREM13/1521, Palliser to Wilson, 26 May 1967.
[40] Wilson, *Labour Government*, 334-5.
[41] TNA/PREM13/1582, Palliser to Morphet (FO), 20 February 1967.
[42] TNA/PREM13/1273, Palliser to Maclehose, 11 May; TNA/PREM13/1083, Palliser to Maclehose, 2 June 1966; and TNA/PREM13/1276, Palliser to Maclehose, 4 July 1966.
[43] TNA/PREM13/1083, Palliser to Maclehose, 10 June 1966.
[44] TNA/PREM13/1622, Note for the record by Palliser, 1 July 1967.
[45] See Sylvia Ellis, *Britain, America and the Vietnam War* (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 222-4, 240-43 and 278.
[46] TNA/PREM13/2323, Palliser minutes of 30 July and 2 and 5 August; PREM13/2324, Palliser to Mackilligin, 22 and 26 August 1968; and, on this mission, see Brian Brivati, *Lord Goodman* (London: Richard Cohen, 1999), 194-7.
[47] TNA/PREM13/917, Palliser to Maclehose, 3 August, and see de la Martiniere to Palliser, 8 August 1966.
[48] TNA/PREM13/2817, Record of Palliser-Onyegbula meeting, 11 January 1969.
[49] TNA/PREM13/1274, Dean to Palliser, 22 June 1966.
[50] TNA/PREM13/1275, minute to Palliser, 26 June, FO to Washington, 26 June, and Dean to Palliser, 28 and 30 June 1966.
[51] TNA/PREM13/1273, Palliser to Maclehose, 3 June, and PREM13/1274, Palliser to Wilson, 3 June, Palliser to Maclehose, 17 June, and Palliser to James, 22 June 1966.
[52] On clandestine contacts with Hanoi and Davies's role see: John W. Young, 'The Wilson government and the Davies peace mission to North Vietnam', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 24 (1998), 545-62.
[53] See, for example, TNA/PREM13/1276, Palliser to Maclehose, 4 July 1966.
[54] TNA/PREM13/1277, Palliser to Maclehose, 8 November 1966.
[55] TNA/PREM13/2330, *passim*.
[56] For discussions of this visit see: Jonathan Colman, *A Special relationship? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American relations at the summit, 1964-68* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 139-40; and P.L. Pham, *Ending East of Suez: the British decision to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964-68* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 174-5.
[57] TNA/PREM13/1851, Palliser to Wilson, 15 July 1967.
[58] TNA/PREM13/2444, Palliser to Wilson, 2 December 1968. But this idea, too, was later presented as coming from Wilson: see TNA/PREM13/2097, Palliser to Gore-Booth, 9 December 1968.
[59] TNA/PREM13/2097, record of Palliser-Kissinger meeting, 20 December, and Palliser to Wilson, 23 December 1968.
[60] George Brown, *In My Way: memoirs* (London: Gollancz, 1971), 134.
[61] TNA/PREM13/1476, Palliser to Wilson, 26 January 1967.
[62] TNA/PREM13/1482, Palliser to Wilson, 13 May 1967.
[63] TNA/PREM13/1484, Palliser to Wilson, 20 July 1967; and PREM13/1487, Palliser to Wilson, 2 December 1967. On Chalfont's role as a 'minder' for Brown see Alun Chalfont, *The Shadow of My Hand* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000), 126.
[64] TNA/PREM13/2112, Palliser to Wilson, 24 May 1968.
[65] TNA/PREM13/2517, Halls to Wilson, 16 March 1968.
[66] TNA/PREM13/1518, Maclehose to Palliser, 2 May, and reply, 3 May 1967.
[67] Parr, *Britain's Policy*, 161.
[68] Pimlott, *Wilson*, 497.
[69] Paul Gore-Booth, *With Great Truth and Respect* (London: Constable, 1974), 350. There were other clandestine activities in which Palliser participated as PS. Documents show that he was involved in

discussing certain deliberate 'leaks' of information to the Press, for example about arms supplies that were reaching the rebel Biafran regime in the Nigerian civil war (TNA/PREM13/2260, Williams to Palliser, 2 and 30 October 1968) or of information from inside the Rhodesian government about opposition to a settlement with Britain (TNA/PREM13/2895, Mackilligin to Palliser, 17 January 1969).
[70] Palliser in Parr, *Britain's Policy*, x.
[71] TNA/PREM13/966, MacKilligin to Palliser, 2 June 1966 (on India); TNA/PREM13/1122, Wright to Palliser, 10 June 1966 (on Rhodesia); TNA/PREM13/1621, Day to Palliser, 12 and 13 June 1967.
[72] Michael Palliser, 'Foreign Policy', in Michael Parsons, ed., *Looking Back: the Wilson years* (Pau: University of Pau Press, 1999), 23.
[73] The best study of the whole question is Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez* .
[74] TNA/PREM13/103, Wright to Wilson, 2 December 1964.
[75] TNA/PREM13/1384, Palliser to Wilson, 21 March 1967.
[76] TNA/PREM13/1457, Palliser to Wilson, 10 July 1967.
[77] TNA/PREM13/2636, Palliser to Wilson, 7 July 1967.
[78] See, for example, TNA/PREM13/905, Wright to Wilson, 28 January 1966. In general on policy towards the EEC see: Oliver Daddow, ed., *Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain's second application to join the EEC* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Parr, *Britain's Policy*; Melissa Pine, *Harold Wilson and Europe: pursuing Britain's membership of the European Community* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007), which focuses on the years 1968-70; Jane Toomey, *Harold Wilson's EEC Application: inside the Foreign Office* (Dublin: University College Press, 2007) and James Ellison, *The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: rising to the Gaullist challenge, 1963-68* (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2007), chapters 3-6.
[79] Palliser in Parr, *Britain's Policy*, x.
[80] Parr, *Britain's Policy*, x and 41-2.
[81] BDOHP, Palliser interview, 14.
[82] Palliser interview with Pine, 12 July 2002, quoted in Pine, *Wilson and Europe*, 17.
[83] Parr, *Britain's Policy*, 70; Ellison, *Transatlantic Crisis*, 63.
[84] TNA/PREM13/2636, Palliser to Wilson, 7 July 1967.
[85] TNA/PREM13/1043, Palliser to Wilson, 11 March, and Wilson to Stewart (copied to Healey), 15 March 1966.
[86] TNA/PREM13/1850, Palliser to Wilson, 23 September (note Wilson's handwritten agreement), and Palliser to Maclehose, 27 September 1966. In general on the proposal see: John W. Young, 'Technological Cooperation in Wilson's strategy for EEC entry', in, Daddow, ed., *Wilson and European Integration*, 95-114.
[87] TNA/PREM13/1851, Palliser to Maitland, 10 November 1967.
[88] Palliser in Parr, *Britain's Policy*, xi.
[89] Pimlott, *Wilson*, 438, citing interview with Palliser; and see Pine, *Wilson and Europe*, 20-21 and 175, citing interview with Palliser.
[90] Palliser to Parr, 18 September 1999, quoted in Parr, *Britain's Policy*, 103.
[91] TNA/PREM13/1475, Palliser to Wilson, 16 January 1967.
[92] See especially TNA/PREM13/1527, Palliser to Wilson, 21 October 1967.
[93] Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages, Volume V, Vers le Terme, 1966-9* (Paris : Plon, 1970), 155-73; TNA/PREM13/1482, Palliser to Wilson, 20 May 1967, and see Palliser to Maclehose, 22 May (an example of Palliser's views later being portrayed as the Prime Minister's own).
[94] TNA/PREM13/2646, Palliser to Wilson, 17 May 1967.
[95] TNA/PREM13/1484, Palliser to Wilson, 22 September 1967.
[96] TNA/PREM13/1485, G.F. (for Palliser) to Wilson, 6 October 1967.
[97] TNA/PREM13/1527, Palliser to Wilson, 21 October 1967.
[98] TNA/PREM13/1486, Palliser to Wilson, 25 October 1967.
[99] TNA/PREM13/2646, Palliser to Wilson, 27 November 1967.
[100] TNA/PREM13/897, Palliser to Wilson, 13 October 1966. Palliser recognised that, in the long-term, an extension of the EEC was likely to lead to a deepening of integration, in order to hold it together, a view he put to Wilson: TNA/PREM13/1468, Palliser to Wilson, 12 September 1967.
[101] TNA/PREM13/2646, Palliser to Maitland, 28 November 1967.
[102] TNA/PREM13/2113, Palliser to Wilson, 10 September 1968.
[103] TNA/PREM13/2112, Palliser to Wilson, 24 May 1968.

[104] TNA/PREM13/2113, Palliser to Wilson, 19 July 1968.
[105] TNA/PREM13/2113, Palliser to Wilson, 4 October 1968.
[106] See Pine, 86-9 and 100-101.
[107] TNA/PREM13/2586, Palliser to Wilson, 22 November 1968.
[108] TNA/PREM13/2628, Palliser to Wilson, 10 February 1969. On the details of the 'Soames affair' see Pine, *Wilson and Europe*, chapter 6.
[109] BDOHP, Palliser interview, 19-20.
[110] On Palliser's role as Permanent Representative in Brussels see Young, *Twentieth Century Diplomacy*, 80-83.
[111] Palliser, 'Foreign Policy,' in Parsons, ed., *Looking Back*, 28.
[112] *Diplomatic Service List, 1971*, 394.
[113] BDOHP, Donald Maitland interview, 11.
[114] For his input into policy regarding Nigeria see, for example: PREM 13/2820, Youde to Wilson, 3 June; TNA/PREM13/2821, Youde to Graham, 17 July; and Youde to Wilson, 25 July and 17 October; and PREM 13/2822, Youde to Wilson, 5 December 1969.
[115] TNA/PREM13/2874, Washington to FO, 16 September 1969.
[116] See his obituary in *The Times*, 6 December 1986.
[117] The fullest treatment of his career is Jason Tomes, 'Youde, Sir Edward', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004), online at http:www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/70398 (accessed 24 August 2011).