The Price of Anarchy in flow networks as a function of node properties

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PACS 89.75.-k - Complex systems
PACS 89.75.Hc - Networks and genealogical trees
PACS 89.90.+n - Other topics in areas of applied and interdisciplinary physics

Abstract – Many real-world systems such as traffic and electrical flow are described as flows following paths of least resistance through networks, with researchers often focusing on promoting efficiency by optimising network topology. Here, we instead focus on the impact of network node properties on flow efficiency. We use the Price of Anarchy \mathcal{P} to characterise the efficiency of least-resistance flows on a range of networks whose nodes have the property of being sources, sinks or passive conduits of the flow. The maximum value of \mathcal{P} and the critical flow volume at which this occurs are determined as a function of the network's node property composition, and found to have a particular morphology that is invariant with network size and topology. Scaling relationships with network size are also obtained, and \mathcal{P} is demonstrated to be a proxy for network redundancy. The results are interpreted for the operation of electrical micro-grids, which possess variable numbers of distributed generators and consumers. The highest inefficiencies in all networks are found to occur when the numbers of source and sink nodes are equal, a situation which may occur in micro-grids, while highest efficiencies are associated with networks containing a few large source nodes and many small sinks, corresponding to more traditional power grids.

Introduction. – Flows on networks, such as traffic 1 taking routes of shortest travel time or electrical current 2 taking paths of least resistance though a network of connections can waste resources because they follow a local rather than a system-wide optimisation of the flow. For 5 example, drivers generally behave non-cooperatively when 6 selecting shortest routes, leading to traffic congestion that could be avoided by the intervention of a central man-8 agement with a global perspective [1]. When agents com-9 pete selfishly for resources or to minimise their effort, they 10 eventually attain a Nash equilibrium [2, 3], whereby any 11 change in their strategy fails to further lower their costs. 12 The Price of Anarchy \mathcal{P} [4] gauges the inefficiency caused 13 by this lack of cooperation [5] and is defined as the ra-14 tio of the cost of the worst Nash equilibrium to that of 15 the system's global optimum (GO). In this Letter, \mathcal{P} is 16 established as a computationally efficient measure of inef-17 ficiency and network redundancy for flows such as electric-18 ity. The dependence of \mathcal{P} on the numbers of flow sources 19 and sinks, and network structure, is also addressed, and 20 found to possess properties that are invariant with regard 21

to networks of different topology.

 \mathcal{P} has been studied in a variety of contexts, such as in 23 network growth games [6], job scheduling [7], resource al-24 location in public services [8], supply chains [9], and in net-25 work traffic flows where a cost (*i.e.* travel time) is incurred 26 for traversing edges [10, 11]. If the individual drivers com-27 prise only a very small amount of the overall flow, then 28 it can be treated as a continuous quantity. Such flows 29 also serve as a model for electrical current, comprising in-30 finitesimally small particles, following paths of least resis-31 tance [12]. The Nash equilibrium corresponds to all routes 32 on the network between an arbitrarily chosen source-sink 33 pair having equal cost [13], or local voltage drop in the 34 case of an electrical network, such that no change in flow 35 pattern or routing can lower the cost. In [14] the upper 36 bound on \mathcal{P} was found to be 4/3 if the edge cost functions 37 are linear functions of flow volume. Although these worst 38 case values of \mathcal{P} are independent of network topology, de-39 pending only on the class of edge function, values of \mathcal{P} 40 that differ from these extremes are strongly influenced by 41 topology, flow volume, placement of sources and sinks and 42

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⁴³ distribution of parameters in cost functions [4, 11]. For ⁴⁴ example, [15, 16] considered the case of a lattice network ⁴⁵ and revealed how \mathcal{P} is affected by the size, aspect ratio ⁴⁶ and total flow through the lattice.

In some cases, the addition of new edges into a net-47 work can cause a counter-intuitive increase in the cost of 48 the flow due to the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium. 49 This is referred to as Braess's paradox [17, 18], and has 50 been studied in traffic networks [11, 19], where the addi-51 tion of a road can increase average travel time, and elec-52 trical circuits [12]. Variants of this phenomenon have also 53 been reported in supply chains [20] and oscillator networks 54 [21, 22]; refer to [23] for an overview. 55

Previous studies of the Price of Anarchy have considered 56 sources and sinks of flow only in specific arrangements. In 57 [14] a single source-sink pair was considered whereas [11] 58 treated ordered source-sink pairs with characteristic flows 59 along overlapping paths occurring between them. The 60 present Letter first establishes a connection between \mathcal{P} 61 and the efficiency and redundancy of least-resistance net-62 work flows, and then investigates the dependence of \mathcal{P} on 63 the relative and absolute numbers of flow source and sink 64 nodes, to ascertain whether, for a given network, the con-65 figuration of node types can be altered to change efficiency. 66 This is of importance to the design and control of electri-67 cal micro-grids which typically have varying numbers of 68 low output intermittent sources of electrical power dis-69 tributed throughout their structure. As the drive towards 70 smaller, distributed generators becomes more urgent in 71 order to mitigate climate change, understanding the im-72 pact of variable generation on electrical networks presents 73 74 a pressing interdisciplinary challenge [24].

Network flow model. – We consider flows though graphs $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, with $n = |\mathcal{V}|$ nodes and $m = |\mathcal{E}|$ edges, wherein n_s node have the property of being sources of flow, n_d are sinks and the remaining n_p are passive or empty. Each edge $e \in \mathcal{E}$ has a linear cost function $c_e(f_e) =$ $\alpha_e f_e + \beta_e$, where f_e is the volume of flow or electrical current on that edge. The functions c_e can be interpreted as the voltage drop across the edge, while the coefficients α_e and β_e represent Ohmic resistance and flow independent voltage drops respectively. For a flow vector $f \in \mathbb{R}^m$ the total cost across the network is $\mathcal{C}(f) = \sum_e c_e(f_e)f_e$, representing total power loss. The global optimum flow $f_{\rm GO}$ is then the flow pattern that minimises this cost:

$$\min_{f} \mathcal{C}(f) \quad \text{constrained by } Ef = b, \tag{1}$$

where $E \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$ is the node-edge incidence matrix and b is the flow injection vector with components

$$b_{v} = \begin{cases} (1+\xi_{v})F/n_{s}, & \text{if node } v \text{ is a source,} \\ -(1+\xi_{v})F/n_{d}, & \text{if node } v \text{ is a sink,} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$
(2)

with F being the total flow or current injected into the network, and ξ_v being random noise. The condition Ef = b enforces conservation of flow at nodes, equivalent to Kirchoff's current law. The Nash equilibrium flow f_{Nash} is given by the optimisation problem [13]

$$\min_{f} \sum_{e} \int_{0}^{f_{e}} c_{e}(q) \, \mathrm{d}q \quad \text{constrained by } Ef = b. \tag{3}$$

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The optimisation problems in (1) and (3) are both convex and solved using subgradient projection methods [26]. The Price of Anarchy is then $\mathcal{P} = C(f_{\text{Nash}})/C(f_{\text{GO}}) \equiv C_{\text{Nash}}/C_{\text{GO}}$.

Nash equilibria conditions are equivalent to Kir-79 **choff's voltage law.** – A physical interpretation of the 80 Nash equilibria obtains from a consideration of Kirchoff's 81 voltage law (KVL), which states that voltages around 82 closed cycles in an electrical network sum to zero. If 83 there is a cycle embedded in a network, then there will 84 be at least two distinct paths between a pair of source 85 and sink nodes. At the Nash equilibrium, each arm of the 86 cycle must have equal cost; hence the cost of any traversal 87 around the cycle is zero, and so the Nash equilibrium con-88 dition is equivalent to KVL. The Nash flow therefore nec-89 essarily satisfies both Kirchoff's current and voltage laws 90 and is thus a physically legitimate electrical flow for an 91 electrical network in stable operation with matched sup-92 ply and demand. The relative inefficiency of this flow, re-93 sulting in $\mathcal{P} > 1$, stems from the constraints of Kirchoff's 94 conservation laws that define the Nash equilibrium. 95

Relationship with network redundancy. – \mathcal{P} measures the disparity between the costs associated with the Nash and GO flows. In an electrical context the GO would correspond to a flow being able to violate KVL in order to minimise total power loss; however, such an equilibrium would nevertheless be desirable to obtain because it minimises the power consumed by the network. Therefore, \mathcal{P} remains a useful metric for assessing efficiency in networks with flows following paths of least resistance, and also for topological redundancy as we now show.

Consider the network shown in fig. 1(a), first introduced 106 by Pigou [27], being the smallest graph admitting a value 107 of $\mathcal{P} > 1$, and which serves as the canonical example to 108 demonstrate the Price of Anarchy [11, 13]. Edge 1 has 109 variable cost $c_1 = f_1$, whereas edge 2 has fixed cost $c_2 = 1$. 110 F units of flow enter on the left and exit on the right. 111 Fig. 1(b) shows the value of \mathcal{P} in this network as a function 112 of F. For 0 < F < 1/2, indicated by the unshaded area, 113 all flow is routed over edge 1 under both the Nash and 114 GO equilbria, with identical costs $\mathcal{C} = F^2$; consequently 115 $\mathcal{P} = 1$. For $1/2 < F \leq 1$ (light gray area), $f_1 = F$ under 116 the Nash flow, so $C_{\text{Nash}} = F^2$. The GO minimises its cost when $f_1 = 1/2$, $f_2 = F - 1/2$ and the total cost is then $C_{\text{GO}} = F - 1/4$, giving $\mathcal{P} = F^2/(F - 1/4)$. For F > 1 (dark 117 118 119 gray area), the Nash equilibrium routes all flow surplus 120 of 1 through edge 2, giving $C_{\text{Nash}} = F$, whereas the GO 121 remains unchanged – hence, $\mathcal{P} = F/(F - 1/4)$. 122



Fig. 1: (a) The example Pigou network comprising a source and sink node connected by a variable and fixed cost edge. (b) \mathcal{P} (red line) and \mathcal{R} (blue dashed line) for the Pigou network in (a) are shown as functions of F. (c) A small world network with q = 0.1, k = 4, n = 16, $n_s = n_d = 8$, $n_p = 0$. (d) \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} shown as functions of F for the small world network shown in (c).

We now establish a qualitative relationship between \mathcal{P} and network redundancy. Recall that the Nash equilibrium condition and KVL are equivalent in electrical networks. It is possible to drive the Nash flow, with cost $\mathcal{C}_{\text{Nash}}$, towards the GO by manipulating the network such that excess flow is transferred from edge 1 to edge 2. This is achieved by reducing the capacity on edge 1. This excess capacity is given by the difference between the flow on edge 1 for each equilibrium, i.e. $f_1^{\text{Nash}} - f_1^{\text{GO}}$. The equilibrium on this modified network has cost $\mathcal{C}'_{\text{Nash}} \leq \mathcal{C}_{\text{Nash}}$. This means that edge 1 provides redundant capacity that can be removed. Defining this edge redundancy in terms of the costs obtains:

$$\mathcal{R}^{e} = \frac{\mathcal{C}_{\text{Nash}} - \mathcal{C}'_{\text{Nash}}}{\mathcal{C}_{\text{Nash}}} = \begin{cases} 0, & 0 \le F < 1/2, \\ (F - 1/2)^2 / F^2, & 1/2 \le F < 1, \\ 1/4F, & F > 1, \end{cases}$$
(4)

which is the relative decrease in cost available by remov-123 ing capacity from edge 1. No relative decrease in cost is 124 possible by removing any capacity from edge 2. In order 125 to generalise this measure to larger networks it is aver-126 aged over both edges to give $\mathcal{R} := \overline{\mathcal{R}^e}$, which is the mean 127 decrease in cost attainable by removing capacity from an 128 edge. Fig. 1(b) shows \mathcal{R} , whose form emulates \mathcal{P} . For 129 larger and more complex networks, such as the small world 130 network depicted in fig. 1(c), this correspondence between 131 \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} prevails, as shown in fig. 1(d). 132

The correspondence between P and \mathcal{R} is observed for real world networks such as the Austrian power grid, displayed in fig. 2(a), where the flow has been computed using the network flow model outlined above. The peaks in \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{P} clearly coincide as shown in fig. 2(b). Further examples of the correspondence are shown in fig. 2(c) and



Fig. 2: (a) The Austrian power grid, constructed from open source topological data from [29]. (b) \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} for the network in (a) as a function of total current F, where F has been normalised using the per-unit system. (c) and (d) show \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{R} for the IEEE 14 bus and 118 bus test networks respectively, where the flow F has again been normalised into the per-unit system,

fig. 2(d), which show \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{P} for the IEEE 14 bus and 118 bus test networks [30,31]. Here the peak values of \mathcal{P} are ~ 1.035, corresponding to a value of \mathcal{R} indicating an average 0.4% increase in efficiency available to the whole system from reducing the capacity of a single edge; as this is a per edge value, it reveals a substantial amount of inefficiency across the network as a whole.

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Key to what follows is that the maximum values of \mathcal{P} 146 and \mathcal{R} occur at the same flow volume F. Determination 147 of \mathcal{R} is computationally onerous, requiring the evaluation 148 of a convex optimisation problem for each of a network's 149 edges, rendering it impractical for all but the smallest of 150 networks. Evaluating \mathcal{P} therefore provides a simple com-151 putational proxy for identifying regimes of relative redun-152 dancy, enabling very large networks of complex topology 153 and composition to be investigated. The algorithm for 154 computing \mathcal{R} in a complex network is presented in the 155 below. 156

Computation of \mathcal{R} **.** – Recall that \mathcal{R} is defined as the 157 mean relative increase in flow efficiency attainable by cap-158 ping the capacity of an edge in the network. This requires 159 computing the optimal amount by which each edge should 160 be capped, which can be evaluated analytically for the net-161 work in fig. 1(a). However, \mathcal{R} is not analytically tractable 162 in the general case of complex networks with overlapping 163 paths from sources to sinks; therefore, the method out-164 lined in algorithm 1 is used. 165

This algorithm takes a graph $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, c)$ comprising a set of nodes and edges, \mathcal{V} and \mathcal{E} respectively, together with a set of edge functions c, and compares the Nash flow volume on each edge to the GO flow volume on that edge in order to determine by how much its capacity should be



Fig. 3: (a) The Nash equilibrium edge power $x_e = c_e(f_e)f_e$ distribution in small world networks with q = 0.1, k = 4, n = 32, $n_s = n_d = 16$, $n_p = 0$. Distributions of (b) $C_{\rm GO}$ and (c) $C_{\rm Nash}$ in an ensemble of 1000 such networks with total flow volume F = 20. The solid lines are fitted shifted gamma distributions with shape parameter $\nu = 3.44$, scale parameter $\mu = 3.50$ and shift parameter $\sigma = 12.3$ in (b) and $\nu = 3.51$, $\mu = 3.51$ and $\sigma = 12.4$ in (c). (d) The mean Price of Anarchy $\overline{\mathcal{P}}$ as a function of F, with maximum at $(F^*, \overline{\mathcal{P}}^*)$. The shaded region indicates the 95% confidence interval, computed using the statistical bootstrapping method [28].

Algorithm 1 Compute \mathcal{R}

Input: A network $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, c)$ **Output:** The redundancy measure \mathcal{R} on \mathcal{G} 1: Compute the Nash and GO flows f_{Nash} and f_{GO} 2: $C_{\text{Nash}} = \sum_{e \in \mathcal{E}} c_e(f_{\text{Nash}}^e) f_{\text{Nash}}^e$ 3: for $e \in \mathcal{E}$ do 4: if $f_{\text{Nash}}^e > f_{\text{GO}}^e$ then Set an upper limit $\kappa = f_{\rm GO}^e$ on edge e5: Compute modified Nash flow f'_{Nash} 6: $\begin{array}{l} \mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{Nash}}' = \sum_{e \in \mathcal{E}} c_e(f_{\mathrm{Nash}}') f_{\mathrm{Nash}}' \\ \mathcal{R}^e = (\mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{Nash}} - \mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{Nash}}') / \mathcal{C}_{\mathrm{Nash}} \end{array}$ 7: 8: else 9: $\mathcal{R}^e = 0$ 10: end if 11:12: end for 13: $\mathcal{R} = \overline{\mathcal{R}^e}$

¹⁷¹ capped. A new Nash flow C'_{Nash} is then computed after ¹⁷² capping edge e, from which \mathcal{R}^e is then computed. This ¹⁷³ process is repeated for all edges to obtain the mean $\mathcal{R} :=$ ¹⁷⁴ $\overline{\mathcal{R}^e}$. For some edges there may be no possible improvement ¹⁷⁵ in cost by removing capacity, in which case we set $\mathcal{R}^e = 0$. ¹⁷⁶ For examples of results using this method, see fig. 1(d) and ¹⁷⁷ fig. 2(b)-(d).

¹⁷⁸ **Dependence of** \mathcal{P} **on flow and network compo-**¹⁷⁹ **sition.** – We first consider networks whose source and ¹⁸⁰ sink nodes have homogeneous flow outputs and inputs re-¹⁸¹ spectively, given by the case where $\xi_v = 0$ for all v in ¹⁸² eq.(2). For a total flow volume F, the dependencies of \mathcal{P}

on network structure and composition are obtained from 183 an ensemble of 1000 such random small-world network re-184 alisations [32, 33]. These networks are parameterised by 185 the rewiring probability q, initial degree k, and the num-186 ber of nodes n, comprising n_s , n_d and n_p source, sink 187 and passive nodes respectively, whose locations are ran-188 domly allocated. The edge cost coefficients α_e and β_e are 189 both uniformly distributed random variables in the range 190 [0,1]. At the microscopic scale in the network, fig. 3(a)191 shows that the individual edge costs are exponentially-192 distributed. Unsurprisingly, at the macroscopic scale the 193 total Nash and GO costs (representing total power loss) 194 are gamma-distributed with a probability density function 195 $P(\mathcal{C}) = (\mathcal{C} - \sigma/\mu)^{\nu-1} \exp(-(\mathcal{C} - \sigma)/\mu)/\mu\Gamma(\nu)$, since they 196 are formed from an ensemble of exponentially-distributed 197 edge costs. This is shown in fig. 3(b), (c) and confirmed 198 by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (see supplementary mate-199 rial for more detail). For each F, the mean of the resulting 200 distribution of \mathcal{P} , denoted $\overline{\mathcal{P}}$, is shown in fig. 3(d). With 201 increasing flow, $\overline{\mathcal{P}}$ rapidly rises to a maximum $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ at F^* , before declining to unity. How the values of $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ and F^* 202 203 depend on the network configuration, defined by n_s , n_d 204 and n_p is now considered. 205

The condition $n_s + n_d + n_p = n$ constrains the space 206 of possible network configurations to a triangular-shaped 207 simplex whose vertices touch one of the n_s, n_d, n_p axes, 208 as depicted in fig. 4(a). The variation of $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ and F^* for 209 constant n are then projected onto this simplex, as shown 210 in fig. 4(b), (c), respectively. The contours are symmetric 211 about a line bisecting the simplex, corresponding to net-212 works with $n_s = n_d$ and shown by section (i) in fig. 4(b). 213 Along this line the value of $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ decreases monotonically 214 with increasing n_s , as shown by the plot in fig. 4(d). Sec-215 tion (ii) is a slice across the simplex at whose mid point 216 $n_s = n_d$. $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ increases monotonically as this point is ap-217 proached from either direction, as shown in fig. 4(e), re-218 vealing that inefficiency and average edge redundancy are 219 maximised as the number of source and sink nodes be-220 comes equal. fig. 4(f) shows $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^* \sim a + b n_s^{-1/2}$ on sec-221 tion (iii), along which n_s increases (and n_p decreases) 222 with $n_d = 1$. The morphology of the contours shown in 223 fig. 4(b),(c) remains invariant with q, meaning that these 224 results pertain to both small-world and random Poisson 225 (q > 0.6) networks, as demonstrated in fig. 5. This in-226 variant property also persists (supplementary material) 227 when considering scale-free networks [34], whose topology 228 is quite distinct from the small-world and Poisson classes. 229

In practice sources and sinks may be expected to have 230 heterogeneous levels of output and input, such as an elec-231 trical grid containing a range of generators with differ-232 ent output capacities. To account for this, ξ_v in eq.(2) 233 is now set to be a normally distributed random variable 234 with mean 0 and variance 0.2. This represents a substan-235 tial amount of heterogeneity whilst typically still preserv-236 ing the types of the nodes, and therefore the location on 237 the simplex. Fig. 6 demonstrates this heterogeneity in en-238



Fig. 4: (a) A sketch of the node configuration space simplex. The black dot represents a configuration of $n_s = 5$, $n_d = 10$ and $n_p = 5$. (b,c) $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ and F^* , respectively, for ensemble of 500 small world networks, each with n = 150, k = 4 and q = 0.1 projected onto the simplex in (a). (d–f) $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ as a function of n_s along the sections (i–iii) indicated in (b). In (f), the red line indicates the function $a + bn_s^{-1/2}$ with a = 1.003, b = 0.024.

²³⁹ sembles of small world networks and reveals that the key ²⁴⁰ features of the simplex remain. In particular the highest ²⁴¹ values of $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ are found on the centre line of the simplex ²⁴² where the numbers of sources and sinks are equal.

Whilst the morphology of the contours remains approx-243 imately invariant with network size (supplementary ma-244 *terial*), the values of $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ and F^* do scale with network 245 size. Fig. 7(a) shows that the maximum value of $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ for 246 small-world, Poisson and scale free networks saturates to 247 a constant value for n > 50, whereas fig. 7(b) shows that 248 F^* increases linearly with network size. These scaling re-249 sults can be used in conjunction with fig. 4 to interrogate 250 networks of arbitrary size. 251



Fig. 5: (a) $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ and (b) F^* for an ensemble of 500 random Poisson networks each with n = 64, generated by the Watts-Strogatz method [32] with q = 0.6 and k = 4.

The linear scaling shown in fig. 7(b) can be explained. F^* corresponds to a threshold beyond which the network flows adjust such that the two equilibrium costs begin to converge. To exceed the threshold the total flow must increase linearly because the expected density of flow decreases with increasing n.



Fig. 6: (a) $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ and (b) F^* for an ensemble of 500 random n = 64 small-world networks with q=0.1. In these networks ξ_v is a normally distributed random variable, with mean 0 and variance 0.2, inducing sources and sinks to have heterogeneous flow inputs and outputs.

Conclusion. - This Letter has investigated how in-258 efficiency of flows occurring on different classes of random 259 network, as gauged by the Price of Anarchy \mathcal{P} , is affected 260 by the network structure and the function of its nodes. 261 It has also established a correspondence between \mathcal{P} and 262 measures of network redundancy, an important consider-263 ation in addressing issues of network resilience and cost-264 effectiveness. This is primarily motivated by understand-265 ing properties associated with flows of current in electrical 266 micro-grids, wherein nodes are either sources or sinks of 267 current, or are passive conduits. Poisson, scale-free and 268 small-world networks are used to establish the general-269 ity of the results with respect to network topology; this 270 reveals a predictable dependence of \mathcal{P} upon node compo-271 sition for networks of arbitrary structure. 272

The simplex plots fig. 4(b) and (c) and their symmetry and invariance properties, when taken in conjunction 274



Fig. 7: (a) $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$ and (b) F^* as functions of n for small world networks (blue squares) with q = 0.1 and k = 4; Poisson networks (gray triangles) generated using the Watts-Strogatz method with q = 0.6 and k = 4 and scale-free networks (red circles), generated using the Barabási-Albert method [34]. All networks are chosen to have a node configuration $n_s = n_d = n_e$.

with the system size scalings shown in fig. 7, provide an 275 operating space that defines maximal inefficiency and re-276 dundancy for an ensemble of networks with general topol-277 ogy and with variable node composition. With applica-278 tion to micro-grids, a given network's composition will 279 change both diurnally and seasonally, traversing a trajec-280 tory through this configuration space. This path will de-281 pend on the nature of the sources of power and the load 282 consumed by the sinks – features that will vary with pop-283 ulation behaviors and the variable outputs from renewable 284 power sources, for example. This information can be ex-285 ploited to aid in the dynamic design and management of 286 smart networks so as to constrain trajectories to preferred 287 regions on the simplex. Insofar as redundancy is related 288 to resilience [35–37], this aspect of the system's perfor-289 mance can be manipulated dynamically via the network's 290 node type configuration and edge costing. A striking fea-291 ture is that greatest values of inefficiency (or redundancy) 292 occur when the number of sources and sinks are equal, 293 as apparent in fig. 4(b) and fig. 5(a), a situation that is 294 prevalent for small renewable energy networks where the 295 numbers of generators and consumers are comparable. By 296 contrast, the results show that a centralised electrical dis-297 tribution grid comprising a few sources but many sinks 298 has a low $\overline{\mathcal{P}}^*$, indicating it is both efficient and lacks re-299 dundancy. Equivalent plots can be constructed that are 300 particular for an individual network's structure and com-301 position with which its performance can be gauged. 302

These findings have established that even for simple linear edge functions, network topology and flow conservation laws are sufficient to induce inefficiency that depends predictably on the configuration of nodes. An interesting extension to this work would be the consideration of nonlinear cost functions, for which the values of \mathcal{P} may be substantially larger [11, 14].

The inefficiency caused by redundancy is only one metric with which to assess performance and it is inefficient networks that will generally also be the most resilient to faults or attack. Redundancy may also give networks flexibility to operate in a variety of conditions; however, since inefficiency and redundancy coincide, as we show in our results, optimising a network's structure and composition purely for efficiency may result in a loss of useful redundancy. Hence in using the simplex to aid network design it is likely that options will be constrained to an operating space offering an acceptable efficiency-resilience trade-off. 320

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OS acknowledges the support of the Leverhulme Trust via the "Modeling and Analytics for a Sustainable Society" doctoral training scheme. 323

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