

1 Chapter 5 1  
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 3 Influence in British Colonial Africa 3  
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 5 Kate Law and Ashley Jackson 5  
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10 The concept of influence has often been interpreted as a form of ‘soft power’.<sup>1</sup> 10  
 11 Indeed, social theorists and sociologists have ably documented the linkages 11  
 12 between power and influence, with Max Weber providing one of the most 12  
 13 enduring frameworks for interpreting the connections between the two.<sup>2</sup> 13  
 14 Yet surprisingly, although there is much historical writing on the concept of 14  
 15 influence, little sustained academic attention has examined the *modus operandi* 15  
 16 of influence.<sup>3</sup> When considering the ways in which the British Empire operated, 16  
 17 in as much as the domination of indigenous peoples and land was achieved 17  
 18 by relatively few imperial actors and ‘men on the spot’, it is perhaps even more 18  
 19 striking that the concept of imperial influence remains such an understudied 19  
 20 phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> The initial colonisation of imperial spaces could of course be 20  
 21 explained by the superior weaponry of the imperial powers, and their desire 21  
 22 to dominate and control. Yet arguably the consolidation of empire, namely 22  
 23 the political, economic, geographical, social and cultural dominance over 23  
 24 indigenous actors, was achieved through the maintenance and promotion of 24  
 25 imperial influence. This chapter seeks to emphasise the idea that colonialism was 25  
 26 a tangible enterprise that was enacted, interpreted and enforced by a variety of 26  
 27 actors. It argues that colonial influence was far from amorphous; rather, that the 27  
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29 <sup>1</sup> For further details on ‘soft power’ see Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success* 29  
 30 *in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 30

31 <sup>2</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, translated and 31  
 32 edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1978). 32

33 <sup>3</sup> The term ‘sphere of influence’ is a common one in the literature of imperial history. 33  
 34 It usually denotes a region of the world not yet formally claimed by an imperial power, but 34  
 35 one where a particular country claimed primacy (or, to introduce some other familiar terms 35  
 36 in the imperial historian’s lexicon, ‘suzerainty’ or ‘paramountcy’). It is also associated with 36  
 37 the concept of ‘informal empire’ – patron–client power relations approaching the imperial 37  
 38 though not formalised through ‘official’ colonial status. The foundation text for this concept 38  
 39 is Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, *Economic History* 39  
 40 *Review* 6, no. 1 (1953): 1–15.

41 <sup>4</sup> See Shigeru Akita, ed., *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History* 40  
 41 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Roger D. Long, ed., *The Man on the Spot: Essays on British* 41  
 42 *Empire History* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995). 42

1 promotion of European values and beliefs, and the subsequent construction of 1  
 2 racialised and gendered identities, provided the underpinnings and basis of the 2  
 3 imperial system. 3

4 The chapter will review the creation of the coloniser and colonised 4  
 5 dichotomy, and how Africans were 'influenced' by their subject status and their 5  
 6 engagement with often omnipotent European forces, to which they needed to 6  
 7 react in many different ways. It will review how the relationships established 7  
 8 enabled Europeans to influence Africans, the ways in which they sought to 8  
 9 influence Africans and the manner in which European imperial powers thought 9  
 10 they needed to approach Africans in order to exert that influence. In addition 10  
 11 to reviewing the creation of the coloniser/colonised dichotomy in Africa, 11  
 12 the chapter will examine three particular episodes, one relating to wartime 12  
 13 propaganda and martial influence, the others relating to the promotion of 13  
 14 'influence' in 1950s Central Africa through the promotion of 'inter-racial' 14  
 15 politics and the politicisation of domesticity.<sup>5</sup> 15  
 16 16  
 17 17

18 **'Influence' in Colonial Africa** 18  
 19 19

20 To write about 'influencing' people in the past requires the identification of 20  
 21 who those people were, and the construction of their particular status. In the 21  
 22 case of colonial Africa, this means understanding the nature of colonial society 22  
 23 and the assumptions of the colonising power and its agents. The crucial thing 23  
 24 to note is that African people were colonised, or in the process of becoming 24  
 25 so, and colonised by an alien culture that considered itself superior and that had 25  
 26 arrived and exerted its power in a violent and destabilising manner. Studies of 26  
 27 influence in colonial Africa must begin here, at the moment of the foundation 27  
 28 of the colonial state, rather than leap to later examples of specific cases of 28  
 29 attempted influence. The impact of the various tentacles of European expansion 29  
 30 (missionaries, traders, explorers, soldiers, etc.) and the actual foundation of a 30  
 31 new colony and its 'effective occupation' shaped and conditioned all that was to 31  
 32 follow, most notably by replacing African independence with alien colonial rule, 32  
 33 rule that came to be based upon European superiority and African inferiority. 33  
 34 European rule came to Africa with startling speed, characterised by the well- 34  
 35 known phrase 'the Scramble for Africa'. In the early 1870s, most of the African 35  
 36 36

37 <sup>5</sup> Influence was clearly promoted in multiple domains. For instance see D. Gaitskell, 37  
 38 'Devout Domesticity? A Century of African Women's Christianity in South Africa', 38  
 39 in C. Walker, ed., *Women and Gender in South Africa to 1945* (Cape Town: New Africa 39  
 40 Books, 1990), 251–72; M. Labode, 'From Heathen Kraal to Christian Home: Anglican 40  
 41 Mission Education and African Christian Girls, 1850–1900', in F. Bowie, D. Kirkwood, 41  
 42 and S. Ardener, eds, *Women and Missions: Past and Present Anthropological and Historical 42  
 Perceptions* (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 126–42.

1 interior remained uncharted by Europeans; a dozen years later, every scrap of 1  
 2 territory, bar the territory that which became known as Liberia and Ethiopia, 2  
 3 had formally come under European rule. 3

4 There is little to be gained from jumping straight in to a consideration of the 4  
 5 *methods* of attempted influence if the vital context of the coming of European 5  
 6 rule has not first been considered – because, in and of itself, it was profoundly 6  
 7 influential, and shaped the manner in which all future, specific attempts to 7  
 8 influence Africans were developed, and how those approaches were received. 8  
 9 For example, the influence of the Christian gospel was more powerful than it 9  
 10 would otherwise have been because it was associated with access to the power 10  
 11 and knowledge of a clearly successful European culture; because it was often 11  
 12 introduced during periods of crisis caused by the intrusions of Europeans, 12  
 13 crises that suggested that extant African cosmologies had failed; and because 13  
 14 missionaries were often seen as potentially valuable intermediaries, to be used by 14  
 15 Africans in furthering their own strategies for survival, empowerment, and gain, 15  
 16 in particular, seeking to resist European encroachment and maintain as much 16  
 17 autonomy as possible. The ‘influence’ sought by missionaries – to detach Africans 17  
 18 from their traditional religion and lifestyle in order to make them Christians – 18  
 19 met, therefore, with greater success *because* Africans had been conditioned by 19  
 20 European intrusion (and internal African crises) and the arrival of the colonial 20  
 21 state. We argue therefore that the study of influence in Africa requires more than 21  
 22 merely selecting isolated examples of attempts to convey messages to Africans, 22  
 23 through RAF leaflet drops, for instance, or advertisements for skin-lightening 23  
 24 soap.<sup>6</sup> Assessments of British ‘influence’<sup>7</sup> techniques cannot properly begin part- 24  
 25 way through the process of colonial or semi-colonial intrusion into another 25  
 26 country. They must ‘begin at the beginning and go on till you come to the end: 26  
 27 then stop’, as the King said to the White Rabbit.<sup>8</sup> 27

28 28  
 29 29  
 30 <sup>6</sup> See, for example, Anandi Ramamurthy, *Imperial Persuaders: Images of Africa and Asia* 30  
 31 *in British Advertising* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) and Yaba Amgborale 31  
 32 Blay and Christopher Charles, eds, ‘Skin-Bleaching and Global White Supremacy’, special issue, 32  
 33 *Journal of Pan African Studies* 4, no. 4 (2011). This is a fascinating special issue dedicated to the 33  
 34 phenomenon of skin-bleaching in historical and modern day societies in Africa, America, Jamaica, 34  
 35 Zimbabwe and elsewhere. 35

36 <sup>7</sup> It is necessary to retain warning quotation marks around the word ‘influence’, because 36  
 37 the word is often employed as a euphemism for practices less benign than those that the word 37  
 38 is commonly employed to address, such as physical coercion and social control. Whilst the 38  
 39 word might be unproblematically employed in some quarters (such as Western militaries) – 39  
 40 in the sense that it can be assumed that the perceived need to influence is either benign or 40  
 41 serving a justified purpose – influence can involve persuasion, bribery, coercion, propaganda, 41  
 42 force, exclusion and the denial of resources or social goods. 42

<sup>8</sup> Lewis Carroll, *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* (London: Penguin, 1998), 105. 42

1 In order to understand influence anywhere in the colonial world one must 1  
 2 begin with an examination of the initial moments of physical, cultural and 2  
 3 political contact, to see how incoming aliens were perceived by indigenous 3  
 4 inhabitants, and how relations between the two were established. Influence 4  
 5 activities in Africa were entirely predicated upon a situation in which indigenous 5  
 6 society and culture, and the politics that framed them, had been subjected 6  
 7 to European rule, often through violence, just as much as it was shaped by 7  
 8 colonial assumptions about Africans, their intelligence and how they perceived 8  
 9 and understood things (the ‘child-like’ and/or ‘savage’ view of Africans 9  
 10 amongst Europeans was common, and shaped the way in which Africans were 10  
 11 approached).<sup>9</sup> One must also consider the context of the societies in which 11  
 12 Europeans appeared, often recovering from the effects of internal disasters such 12  
 13 as the *mfecane* in southern Africa, the deprivations of Arab slave raiders or the 13  
 14 impact of cattle disease such as rinderpest.<sup>10</sup> The foundation of European rule 14  
 15 was often accompanied by violence, on first contact or several years after the 15  
 16 declaration of a new colony when indigenous politics decided to contest the 16  
 17 European presence. European rule was usually established by disarming African 17  
 18 societies, gathering a monopoly of lethal force and seeking to abolish activities, 18  
 19 such as cattle-raiding, which in some societies were central to ideas about 19  
 20 manhood and adulthood. These founding moments were crucial in shaping the 20  
 21 manner in which two cultures would react to and interact with each other, and 21  
 22 how the one would influence the other for the remaining 60 to 80 years in which 22  
 23 colonial rule was experienced in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst influence 23  
 24 may have been different in later colonial Africa (post-First World War and 24  
 25 especially post-Second World War) in most parts of colonial Africa – generally 25  
 26 more benign and paternalistic – the earlier period, often tellingly characterised 26  
 27 as the ‘pacification’ period, cannot be overlooked if we are to get the proper 27  
 28 measure of influence in colonial Africa.<sup>11</sup> Even in the era of the vaunted Colonial 28

29  
 30 <sup>9</sup> Many different sources chart the views of Africans on initial contact with incoming 30  
 31 Europeans, from literature such as Chinua Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart* (London: William 31  
 32 Heinemann, 1958) to oral histories, such as Jeffrey A. Fadiman, *When We Began, There Were* 32  
 33 *Witchmen: Oral Histories from Mount Kenya* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 33

34 <sup>10</sup> On the *mfecane*, see Caroline Hamilton, *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates* 34  
 35 *in Southern African History* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995) and, on the impact of 35  
 36 rinderpest see Roy Mack, ‘The Great African Cattle Plague Epidemic of the 1890s’, *Tropical* 36  
 37 *Animal Health and Production* 2, no. 4 (1970): 210–19. 37

38 <sup>11</sup> One of the best ways of approaching the study of colonial efforts to ‘influence’ Africans is to 38  
 39 engage with the significant literature on the colonial administrators at the ‘sharp end’. Known from 39  
 40 the early 1950s as Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service, there are general studies such as Anthony 40  
 41 Kirk-Greene’s *Britain’s Imperial Administrators, 1858–1966* (London: Macmillan, 2000) and 41  
 42 *On Crown Service: A History of HM Colonial and Overseas Civil Services 1837–1997* (London: 42  
 I.B. Tauris, 1999), and Charles Allen’s *Tales from the Dark Continent: Images of British Colonial*

1 Development and Welfare Acts (1940 and 1945, with a Colonial Development 1  
 2 Act in 1929), an era of more enlightened views about colonial rule evinced 2  
 3 through a mild interest in African social and economic welfare, colonial rule 3  
 4 was still about getting Africans to do what Europeans wanted them to, usually 4  
 5 in pursuit of European interests. Furthermore, the late colonial state could 5  
 6 be violent and exploitative too, as witnessed by the suppression of uprisings 6  
 7 in 1940s Madagascar and 1950s Kenya. 7

8 The study of influence in Africa, therefore, must begin with an appreciation 8  
 9 of the violence, village burning, punitive raids, land alienation, enslavement 9  
 10 and emasculation that afflicted many African societies as they were subjugated. 10  
 11 As if this was not enough, African lives in new colonial settings were heavily 11  
 12 'influenced' by the white man's introduction of policies designed to oblige 12  
 13 Africans to work on European plantations and in European mines, to pay tax, to 13  
 14 obey new laws, to reside in designated 'reserves' and to become sedentary if they 14  
 15 were nomadic. The profound and often negative change that the establishment 15  
 16 of colonial rule could bring also led in some parts of Africa to religious crises, as 16  
 17 old gods and beliefs were seen to have failed and new ones, especially Christian 17  
 18 ones, became alluring. The Xhosa cattle killing, in which people slaughtered their 18  
 19 precious livestock in the belief that it would lead to the departure of the white 19  
 20 people, was one of the more extreme indications of the trauma that colonial 20  
 21 intrusions could bring.<sup>12</sup> This in itself is a measure of how the very establishment 21  
 22 of the colonial condition could be profoundly influential in the minds and lives 22  
 23 of ordinary African people. Land alienation and laws enshrining inequality were 23  
 24 significant factors in areas of sizeable white settlement. 24

25 Following on from the all-important moments of the coming of Europeans 25  
 26 and the foundation of the colonial state, the study of the manner in which 26  
 27 colonial rule 'influenced' African societies might then sensibly consider the 27  
 28 construction of a conservative authoritarian colonial system based on alliance 28  
 29 with chiefly elites – the key alliance in terms of influencing Africans – and a 29  
 30 society based upon racial discrimination.<sup>13</sup> There are then the manifold ways in 30  
 31 which the colonial state, or other European agencies such as missionary societies 31  
 32 and trading companies, attempted to influence African practices, from tilling the 32  
 33 \_\_\_\_\_ 33

34 *Africa in the Twentieth Century* (London: Sphere, 1981). Kirk-Greene's *Glimpses of Empire: A* 34  
 35 *Corona Anthology* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) provides fascinating excerpts from the colonial 35  
 36 service's in-house journal. Perhaps more usefully, and from the 'horse's mouth', there is a vast 36  
 37 range of published memoir and diary material written by former district commissioners. See, for 37  
 38 instance, Frank Staunton, *A Life in the Native Department 1934–1971* (Harare, 1991). Copy at 38  
 39 Rhodes House, MSS.Afr.r.273. 39

40 <sup>12</sup> See J.B. Peires, *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing* 40  
*Movement, 1856–7* (Oxford: James Currey, 1989). 40

41 <sup>13</sup> For the significance of the chiefly alliance, see Colin Newbury, *Patrons, Clients, and* 41  
 42 *Empire: Chieftaincy and Overrule in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific* (Oxford: OUP, 2003). 42

1 soil to marriage practices such as bride wealth. Traditional conceptions of illness 1  
 2 were influenced by engagement with Western medicine, literacy altered African 2  
 3 oral culture and there were novel additions to material culture, including the rise 3  
 4 of consumerism.<sup>14</sup> Consideration of such matters – in Africa and everywhere 4  
 5 else in the world where the hand of colonialism weighed heavily – are central 5  
 6 to any concept of ‘influencing’ indigenous people because they provide the 6  
 7 essential power relations context in which any such study must sit. 7

8 Throughout colonial Africa there existed fundamental factors, common 8  
 9 to all European colonies, that profoundly shaped relations between indigenes 9  
 10 and Europeans, and determined the way in which the latter could influence the 10  
 11 former. Once European rule had grafted itself onto the continent, the context in 11  
 12 which Africans lived was one of subjugation based upon racial discrimination, 12  
 13 in which they were ruled by aliens who purveyed the very clear message that 13  
 14 African society and culture were inferior to European, that Africa represented 14  
 15 what was ‘timeless’, pre-modern and ‘backward’ as opposed to Europe, which 15  
 16 represented modernity, progress and civilisation. The establishment of the pax 16  
 17 Europaea rendered Africans subservient, bar isolated outbursts of often brutally 17  
 18 suppressed rebellion, tax riot or religiously inspired millenarian uprising. 18  
 19 This was subjugation, and its influence was profound. If we are to understand 19  
 20 anything about influence, then the foundation of such racially divided societies, 20  
 21 where white ruled black and white culture in every sphere of existence was 21  
 22 regarded as superior, where in many places Africans could not move location 22  
 23 without white permission or work without white-approved documentation, has 23  
 24 to be understood. It informed everything, and was the basis for all subsequent 24  
 25 ‘influence’. This influence, even if couched in language backed by fervently held 25  
 26 beliefs about protecting, teaching or civilising Africans, was always about control. 26  
 27 Few colonial actors wanted to set Africans free – spiritually, economically or 27  
 28 politically – or thought at any given time that they were ready for that freedom. 28

29 Another important aspect conditioning influence was the cultural 29  
 30 assumptions of the incoming Europeans. Many, even in the late colonial period, 30  
 31 considered Africans to be ‘complete savages’ (to borrow General Montgomery’s 31  
 32 phrase) or, to tap a much earlier European classification, ‘noble savages’. Alleged 32  
 33 African simple-mindedness, laziness and lasciviousness became key aspects of 33  
 34 \_\_\_\_\_ 34

35 <sup>14</sup> Many volumes document the work of missionaries in Africa, including contemporary 35  
 36 accounts such as David Livingstone’s *Missionary Travels in South Africa* (Wyoming: The 36  
 37 Narrative Press, 2001) and *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa: Including a 37*  
 38 *Sketch of Sixteen Years’ Residence in the Interior of Africa (Volume 2)* (Wyoming: The Narrative 38  
 39 Press, 2001) and J. B. Myers’s *The Congo for Christ: The Story of the Congo Mission* (Berkeley: 39  
 40 University of California Libraries, 1895). For medicine and agricultural practices, see Megan 40  
 41 Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991) and Henrietta 41  
 42 L. Moore and Megan Vaughan, *Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural 42*  
*Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890–1990* (London: Heinemann, 1994).

1 European constructions of 'the African', and shaped, therefore, the manner in 1  
2 which they sought to influence them. Even those more liberal individuals who 2  
3 considered themselves a 'friend of the African' (a category scorned by Jomo 3  
4 Kenyatta and other African intellectuals) rarely believed that Africans were 4  
5 *equal* to Europeans, even if they were equal 'before God'. Rather, Africans were 5  
6 in need of European uplifting and tutelage, and depended upon their European 6  
7 'friends' to act as intercessors. This was, in its own way, a pernicious form of 7  
8 influence, as it peddled the idea that Africans needed Europeans to interpret 8  
9 them and their cultures to the non-African world, muffling African agency and 9  
10 reaffirming the 'child-like' status of the African in the minds of outsiders. It 10  
11 remains a problem to this day. 11

12 A central component of the promotion of imperial influence was the 12  
13 codification of racial differences that proclaimed the inherent superiority of 13  
14 all things European. The establishment and development of a white presence 14  
15 in Africa and indeed the rest of the Empire was achieved through the creation 15  
16 of a discourse that codified the suppression of indigenous peoples because of 16  
17 the assumed superiority of the imperial powers. While administrative and 17  
18 bureaucratic structures were often one domain in which imperial influence was 18  
19 disseminated, the development of racially divided societies was enabled by a 19  
20 variety of disparate historical actors. 'Colonialism' was not a homogenous force, 20  
21 and different elements of the colonial state attempted to influence Africans in 21  
22 different ways, as too did other representative elements of the colonial encounter, 22  
23 such as missionaries and traders. Sometimes these elements diverged or openly 23  
24 disagreed; thus colonial administrators often disapproved of the activities of 24  
25 missionaries, because they could influence and interfere with people's cultural 25  
26 practices, causing them to agitate or even rebel – the very antithesis of the 26  
27 wishes of administrators, whose work (and career prospects) were dependent 27  
28 upon settled rule and the steady state, permitting the unhindered collection of 28  
29 taxes and the preservation of a colonial status quo. Colonial officials despaired, 29  
30 for example, at the missionary attack on the practice of female circumcision 30  
31 in Kenya, because it was viewed as an attack on Kikuyu culture, leading to 31  
32 resistance that became political. The same could be true of educational initiatives 32  
33 (frequently, though not always, controlled by missionaries), one of the major 33  
34 areas in which Europeans sought to influence Africans. The great paradox of 34  
35 colonial education – from rudimentary missionary classes taught in the shade of 35  
36 trees to flagship 'public school' style institutions such as the Gordon Memorial 36  
37 College in Khartoum – was that, on the one hand, it sought to replicate the 37  
38 best of the English education system, but that on the other, it sought to limit 38  
39 and control what Africans came to know. Thus the Gordon Memorial College 39  
40 aspired to be the 'Eton of the Nile' – yet only wanted to produce a certain type 40  
41 of low grade educated African, loyal to the British and fitted for junior-level 41  
42 tasks. The school therefore eschewed academic freedom and banned political 42

1 discussions – because such things led to nationalism and the questioning of 1  
2 Britain’s right to rule.<sup>15</sup> 2

3 Indigenous peoples were influenced by the insertion of alien authority above 3  
4 them, sometimes established through violence and conquest, sometimes through 4  
5 more consensual means that, nevertheless, led to British supremacy. They were 5  
6 influenced by the several protrusions of colonialism – by the activities of traders 6  
7 and missionaries, explorers, settlers, educational establishments and militaries, 7  
8 each bearing their own peculiar and powerful ‘gifts’. Also, by concession hunters 8  
9 and by the drawing of spatial boundaries beyond which Africans could not 9  
10 move, and firmed up ‘tribal’ identities as Europeans based their rule upon tribal 10  
11 units and officially backed chiefs that administered them with the aid of district 11  
12 commissioners. The British believed that Africans lived in structured societies 12  
13 called ‘tribes’, and where they did not find ‘tribes’ that conformed to their 13  
14 notions, they created them.<sup>16</sup> Of course, this was a two way process (though 14  
15 one shaped by colonial rules and prognoses), and there was space in which 15  
16 enterprising Africans could take part in the invention or imagination of colonial 16  
17 identities.<sup>17</sup> But it was a measure of the power of colonial agents to influence 17  
18 Africans. British anthropologists, sometimes amateurs employed as district 18  
19 commissioners, sometimes university academics, sought to codify ‘native law 19  
20 and custom’, as well as tribal histories and genealogies, which were beamed back 20  
21 onto the Africans in the form of legal practice and custom.<sup>18</sup> 21

22 Colonial rule introduced taxation to Africa – the basis of funding colonial 22  
23 administrations given that Whitehall demanded balanced budgets and would 23  
24 only reluctantly supplement colonial coffers with grants-in-aid. Tax and the 24

25 \_\_\_\_\_ 25  
26 <sup>15</sup> See Ashley Jackson, ‘The Gordon Memorial College’, in Jackson, *Buildings of Empire* 26  
27 (Oxford: OUP, 2013). 27

28 <sup>16</sup> See, for instance, Peter Uvin, ‘Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda’, *African* 28  
29 *Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (1997): 91–115. 29

30 <sup>17</sup> For classic statements see Terence Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition in Colonial 30  
31 Africa’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: 30  
31 CUP, 1983), T. Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa’, 31  
32 in T. Ranger and O. Vaughan, eds, *Legitimacy and State in 20th Century Africa* (Basingstoke: 32  
33 Macmillan, 1993), T. Ranger, *The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe* (Gwero: Mambo 33  
34 Press, 1985) and Leroy Vail, ed., *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: 34  
35 University of California Press, 1991). 35

36 <sup>18</sup> See, for example, Isaac Shaper’s *Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom: Compiled* 36  
37 *for the Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration* (Germany: LIT Verlag, 1994). He was an 37  
38 LSE anthropologist employed by the Bechuanaland administration to study African legal 38  
39 systems and customs; his book was then used as a handbook by the colonial administration. 39  
40 Hugh Ashton was a district commissioner who wrote an influential study of the Basotho, 40  
41 *The Basuto* (Oxford: OUP, 1952); and E.E. Evans-Pritchard was an Oxford anthropologist 40  
41 whose *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among the Azande* (Oxford: OUP, 1976) was a 41  
42 pioneering study of the Sudan. 42



1 introduction of a cash economy obliged Africans, who were often reluctant, to 1  
2 enter the labour market, for colonial production depended on access to cheap 2  
3 African labour. Mining corporations such as the Witwatersrand Native Labour 3  
4 Association were permitted to recruit Africans across Southern and Central 4  
5 Africa by the region's colonial regimes. They were indeed encouraged to do 5  
6 so, because this labour migration enabled Africans to earn money which enabled 6  
7 them to pay tax. Often, district officials were deeply ambivalent about this process, 7  
8 for it 'detrified' Africans, eroded rural life and forged new and unwelcome 8  
9 connections between Africans, urbanity and modernity. The penetration of 9  
10 capitalist modes of production to the level of African village life had a profound 10  
11 effect: it altered work balances within the home and farmstead, removing male 11  
12 labour for long periods; it fostered urbanisation; it stimulated the desire for new 12  
13 consumer goods; it monetised relationships and brought the need to labour in 13  
14 order to pay tax; and low wages were justified by a convenient European belief 14  
15 that the African was a rural being and that, through his connection with the 15  
16 land, he would be able to supplement his family's income, and subsist. 16

17 If we consider the role of missionaries in Africa, their whole purpose was 17  
18 to 'influence' Africans, in an attempt to transform their spiritual and temporal 18  
19 lives. As with so many facets of the colonial experience, the 'influence' intended 19  
20 by missionaries very often failed to materialise, but other things resulted. 20  
21 Thus whilst missionaries did not make large numbers of 'proper' converts (as 21  
22 they would have defined them), their work led to the syncretic adaptation of 22  
23 hybrid versions of Christianity amongst many Africans. In the process, they 23  
24 created Christian churches and communities that were *independent* of the 24  
25 missionaries (and therefore beyond their ecclesiastical control), and that were 25  
26 often incubators of resistance to the colonial state (Watchtower movement) or 26  
27 rebellions (Chilembwe uprising). Missionaries sought to influence Africans – 27  
28 by Christianising them. They were often unsuccessful; people needed to have 28  
29 a good reason to become Christian, as it meant significant cultural change that 29  
30 could lead to ostracisation. Becoming a Christian, it was memorably said, meant 30  
31 ceasing to be an African. 31

32 Later in the colonial period, colonial governments sought also to transform 32  
33 African politics. Having for generations relied upon 'traditional' (or neo- 33  
34 traditional) African structures (chiefs and tribes), they now sought to introduce 34  
35 local government and then, late in the day, national-level politics as colonies 35  
36 were quickly kitted out with the basics of nation statehood. In the run-up to 36  
37 independence, hard-pressed district officials attempted to inculcate the basics 37  
38 of electoral politics. This usually happened at the 11th hour and therefore with 38  
39 completely insufficient preparation, as the decolonisation timetable shortened 39  
40 dramatically, and with scant resources. Ballot boxes and polling booths appeared 40  
41 in villages, fledgling political parties advertised themselves using visual symbols 41  
42 to aid the choice of illiterate people (the Botswana Democratic Party using, to 42

1 this day, a car jack, symbolising the party motto, 'Lift up'). But elections are the 1  
 2 flowers of democracy, not its roots, and it was very common for people to vote 2  
 3 along tribal lines. Sometimes chiefs rounded up their voters overnight and kept 3  
 4 them in their kraals to ensure they voted, and voted 'correctly', on election day. 4  
 5 Attempts to foster nationhood, or build support for gimcrack federations as 5  
 6 in Nigeria or Central Africa, represented failed attempts to influence Africans 6  
 7 because of their lack of legitimacy and their inadequate indigenisation. Having 7  
 8 considered some of the general ways in which colonial rule and aspects of the 8  
 9 colonial experience influenced Africans, often in deeply penetrative ways, we 9  
 10 now consider three case studies. 10

11 11  
 12 12

### 13 **Wartime Propaganda and Military Coercion** 13

14 14  
 15 Seeking to bring Pondoland within the imperial fold and impose the hut tax 15  
 16 that would secure African labour for the mines, Cecil Rhodes had a soldier mow 16  
 17 down a field of maize with a machine-gun in order to persuade the people to 17  
 18 obey. Military methods were often employed to influence Africans. One of the 18  
 19 most notorious was the use of air power as a method of 'colonial control'.<sup>19</sup> It was 19  
 20 believed that bombing, or air demonstrations, or the dropping of propaganda 20  
 21 leaflets, could have an effect on Africans. Air power was also widely used in 21  
 22 Somalia in the 1920s and during the Mau Mau emergency of the 1950s (and in a 22  
 23 more recent intervention, British fast jets were deliberately flown at low altitude 23  
 24 over Sierra Leone to both reassure and intimidate during the struggle against the 24  
 25 West Side Boys and other rebel factions). 25

26 During large-scale conflicts British colonial authorities often sought to shape 26  
 27 the way that Africans thought and acted in order to further their cause. They 27  
 28 wanted Africans to participate in various war efforts, as combatants and non- 28  
 29 combatants; they wanted to explain wartime hardships such as inflation and 29  
 30 food shortages, to demonise the enemy and to ensure African acquiescence or 30  
 31 'loyalty'. To this end, they employed a variety of means. Most important was 31  
 32 the utilisation of the alliance with African chiefs and traditional authorities that 32  
 33 colonial rule rested upon; first ensure your chief is loyal and compliant, then 33  
 34 induce him (or occasionally her) to take the message to their people, through 34  
 35 public meetings and the network of subordinate headmen. They also used other 35

36 36  
 37 <sup>19</sup> See David Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939* 37  
 38 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990) and David Killingray, "A Swift Agent 38  
 39 of Government": Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916–1939', *Journal of African* 39  
 40 *History* 25, no. 4 (1984): 429–44. The extent to which these early episodes of 'air policing' in 40  
 41 colonial regions such as Iraq and Somaliland have been viewed recently as exemplars of the 41  
 42 utility of air power (in organs such as the official RAF publication *Air Power Review*) gives 42  
 42 pause for thought.

1 methods – posters, newspapers, films, radio broadcasts – but resources were 1  
 2 usually very small indeed. This, coupled with barriers presented by illiteracy, 2  
 3 distance and lack of rural engagement with the colonial state and the wider 3  
 4 world, limited the impact. 4

5 Recruiting for the British army, and general activities intended to stimulate 5  
 6 wartime ‘loyalty’, were conducted in Bechuanaland (as throughout British Africa) 6  
 7 through the agency of chiefs.<sup>20</sup> Chiefs were reminded of all that the British had 7  
 8 done for the territory, most famously in securing its protectorate status, thereby 8  
 9 preventing it from falling to Boers or the British South Africa Company. The 9  
 10 chiefs, as subordinate allies who benefited from the establishment of colonial rule 10  
 11 in many ways, were of course in agreement. The British and the chiefs emphasised 11  
 12 the debt owed by the Batswana to the British for protecting them, the foundation 12  
 13 myth of the protectorate. Like all enduring myths, it contained an element of 13  
 14 truth. The establishment of the British protectorate in 1885 did prevent Boer, 14  
 15 German or chartered company encroachment that would have probably seen 15  
 16 land and cattle losses, though it was also very much established for reasons of 16  
 17 British strategic self-interest. The administration believed unequivocally in the 17  
 18 beneficence of imperial trusteeship, so when it came to mobilising for war, it 18  
 19 was to the debt owed to the Queen that they referred, and the chiefs did the 19  
 20 same. Though the ‘memory’ of Victoria and the notion of imperial protection 20  
 21 was unusually puissant in Bechuanaland because of the circumstances by 21  
 22 which it had become British, notions of loyalty were commonly used in British 22  
 23 Africa to leverage support for war efforts. It was a game of course that at the 23  
 24 elite level could be played both ways, and African leaders used the language of 24  
 25 loyalty to further their own local interests – Bechuanaland chiefs, for instance, 25  
 26 attempting to bargain war support for a binding British declaration that the 26  
 27 protectorate would under no circumstances be handed over to the hated South 27  
 28 African government. In the same vein, West African intellectuals sought to make 28  
 29 support for the war against Hitler conditional on constitutional advancement 29  
 30 towards self-government. 30

31 Word of mouth was probably as important as any other technique in seeking 31  
 32 to communicate with and influence Africans, rendered more effective by African 32  
 33 oral culture. The resources of the colonial state were very limited (there were, for 33  
 34 example, only a handful of mobile cinema vans available throughout the entirety 34  
 35 of British Africa); the literate population was tiny, so newspapers and other 35  
 36 printed matter had limited utility (though pictorial posters had a wider impact); 36  
 37 and only a very few individuals possessed radios. So, public meetings, usually 37  
 38 in the chief’s headquarters, were the main means of disseminating information, 38  
 39 occasionally supplemented during wartime by the appearance of a wireless set 39  
 40 40

41 <sup>20</sup> Material for this case study is drawn from Ashley Jackson, *Botswana 1939–1945: An* 41  
 42 *African Country at War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). 42

1 or cinema screen. In many important ways the British left wartime messaging 1  
 2 to the chiefs themselves. They might employ methods of soft or hard coercion 2  
 3 to meet manpower quotas, could call up age-regiments for military service and 3  
 4 ensured their own authority was embedded in the military units recruited on a 4  
 5 tribal basis. Methods of recruitment common in Europe were also employed. 5  
 6 Attempts were made to attract Africans to military life, to stimulate excitement 6  
 7 and enthusiasm and peer pressure to join up. During the Second World War 7  
 8 significant African recruitment into the British military was required. This 8  
 9 led to extensive recruitment drives which employed a range of propaganda 9  
 10 techniques to attract Africans into the armed forces including use of the 10  
 11 Bechuana Drum and Bugle Band, and an epidiascope to show both pictures of 11  
 12 the war and the Batswana then already serving in the forces. Marching bands, 12  
 13 gunfire demonstrations, displays of army gymnastics – all were used to stimulate 13  
 14 interest. They presented military service as manly and played on vague notions 14  
 15 of loyalty and defending homelands against enemy forces (less easy to do where 15  
 16 the enemy was distant).<sup>21</sup> 16

17 Another branch of wartime propaganda aimed at encouraging 17  
 18 communication between families and their soldier sons or husbands serving 18  
 19 overseas, for the sake of morale and community cohesion. Both aspects have 19  
 20 received significant scholarly attention.<sup>22</sup> Soldiers were encouraged to use air 20  
 21 mail letters to keep in touch with their families, and to send photographs of 21  
 22 themselves. More importantly, wives were encouraged to write to their husbands 22  
 23 and mothers to their sons, enlisting the assistance of missionaries if they could 23  
 24 not write themselves. Newsletters and newspapers were developed in many 24

25 \_\_\_\_\_ 25  
 26 <sup>21</sup> The classic text on masculinity is R.W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Cambridge: 26  
 27 CUP, 2005). See also Robert Morrell, 'Of Boys and Men: Masculinity and Gender in 27  
 28 Southern African Studies', *Journal of Southern African Studies* (Special Issue on Masculinities 28  
 in Southern Africa) 24, no. 4 (1998): 605–30.

29 <sup>22</sup> Rosaleen Smyth, 'Britain's African Colonies and British Propaganda during the 29  
 30 Second World War', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 14, no. 1 (1985): 65–82; 30  
 31 Smyth, 'The Development of British Colonial Film Policy, 1927–1939, with Special 31  
 32 Reference to East and Central Africa', *Journal of African History* 20, no. 3 (1979): 437–50; 32  
 33 Smyth, 'The British Colonial Film Unit and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1939–1945', *Historical* 33  
 34 *Journal of Film, Radio, and Television* 8, no. 3 (1988): 285–98; Smyth, 'The Genesis of Public 34  
 35 Relations in British Colonial Practice', *Public Relations Review* 27, no. 2 (2001): 149–61; 35  
 36 and Smyth, 'War Propaganda during the Second World War in Northern Rhodesia', 36  
 37 *African Affairs* 83, no. 332 (1984): 345–58; Wendell Holbrook, 'British Propaganda and 37  
 38 Mobilization of the Gold Coast War Effort, 1939–1945', *Journal of African History* 26, no. 4 38  
 39 (1985): 347–61; Bonny Ibhawoh, 'Second World War Propaganda, Imperial Idealism, and 39  
 40 Anti-Colonial Nationalism in British West Africa', *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 16, 40  
 41 no. 2 (2007): 221–43; Kate Morris, *British Techniques of Public Relations and Propaganda* 41  
 42 *for Mobilizing East and Central Africa during World War Two* (London: Edwin Mellen 42  
 Press, 2000).

1 parts of Africa to keep the troops overseas in touch with the home front, such as 1  
 2 *Ndlovo/Tlou* in South Africa, *Naledi ya Batswana* in Bechuanaland and *Baraza* 2  
 3 in East Africa, the latter publishing 18,000 copies per week. Newspapers were 3  
 4 intended to counter the frustrations of long-term separation from home and the 4  
 5 anxiety stimulated by a lack of news from one's home region; to scotch rumours; 5  
 6 and to boost morale through, for instance, demonising the enemy and blaming 6  
 7 it for hardships. A network of village reporters provided home news for soldiers, 7  
 8 who were often fearful of reports about disastrous happenings back home. 8

9 New radio stations were created by the war too. Omdurman radio was 9  
 10 established, and employed Sudanese singers to perform patriotic songs. The 10  
 11 first ever Setswana broadcast occurred in October 1942, thousands of people 11  
 12 gathering in the *dikogtla* of the main tribal chiefs across Bechuanaland to listen 12  
 13 (the *kgotla* was the chiefs' central court and meeting space). The first broadcast 13  
 14 reflected European perceptions about what to tell Africans, and the degree of 14  
 15 simplification required – aircraft located by the RAF were destroyed 'as one 15  
 16 destroys guinea fowl sleeping in a tree'; bombs dropped on German cities weighed 16  
 17 'as much as 40 bags of mealie meal'; and the distance flown to deliver them was 17  
 18 'further than from Mafeking to Bulawayo and back'. The colonial administration 18  
 19 came to view it as an exciting new means of messaging the African population. 19

20 As well as to help stimulate recruitment, film was widely used in the 1940s 20  
 21 and 1950s to attempt to define and control imperial citizenship for Africans. 21  
 22 Colonial propagandists employed new technologies of radio and cinema to 22  
 23 address their African subjects, offering a wartime diet dominated by the British 23  
 24 'take' on the war and the beneficence of British colonial rule. The films offer 24  
 25 an excellent perspective on how the British saw themselves as a colonial and 25  
 26 international power and how they sought to *project* this self-image onto their 26  
 27 colonial subject (and, through other techniques, onto key international actors 27  
 28 such as America, targeted during the war in order to forestall and counter 28  
 29 American criticism of British imperialism).<sup>23</sup> 29

30 Wartime propaganda offered post-war rewards for wartime service and 30  
 31 'loyalty'. The Colonial Office created a Public Relations Department and 31  
 32 attempted to foster a sense of imperial unity and war loyalty. Films such 32  
 33 as 'Morning, Noon, and Night' focused on fighting, food production and 33  
 34 manufacturing on the home front.<sup>24</sup> From its creation in 1939 until its 34  
 35 \_\_\_\_\_ 35

36 <sup>23</sup> See David Ellwood, 'Showing the World What It Owed to Britain: Foreign Policy 36  
 37 and Cultural Propaganda, 1935–45', in Nicholas Pronay and D. W. Spring, eds, *Propaganda,* 37  
 38 *Politics, and Film, 1918–1945* (London: Macmillan, 1982). Conscious attempts were made 38  
 39 by the Colonial Office, notably through the work of Lord Hailey, to convey upbeat messages 39  
 40 about progressive British colonial 'partnership' with colonial peoples, particularly Africans. 40

41 <sup>24</sup> See Lee Grieveson and Colin MacCabe, eds, *Empire and Film* (Basingstoke: 41  
 42 Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and Grieveson and MacCabe, eds, *Film and the End of Empire* 42  
 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

1 termination in the mid-1950s, the Colonial Film Unit (CFU) made over 200 1  
 2 films for colonial peoples. Experiments in the 1920s and 1930s, such as the 2  
 3 Bantu Educational Cinema Experiment, had previously collected data on the 3  
 4 efficacy of cinematic propaganda in colonial Africa. The basic premise was that 4  
 5 Africans were unsophisticated viewers, and so required unsophisticated viewing. 5  
 6 Colonial governments appointed information officers and cinema vans began 6  
 7 to do the rounds. The aim of the new Colonial Film Unit (part of the Ministry 7  
 8 of Information) was to explain the British war effort to Africans and to garner 8  
 9 African support for the war effort. They focused on the benefits of army life, 9  
 10 such as wages, uniforms, prestige and welfare provisions. Film and other forms 10  
 11 of propaganda aimed to convince Africans of the justness of the British and 11  
 12 Allied cause, to show British strength, to instil a sense of pride, to give a picture 12  
 13 of life in Britain and the wider war effort, to explain the need for wartime 13  
 14 hardships and to praise Africans for their efforts to date (there was also the need, 14  
 15 from 1940, to attempt to engender support for the new Colonial Development 15  
 16 and Welfare Act). 16

17 It was not an uncontested process. Elements of metropolitan propaganda, 17  
 18 such as the Crown Film Unit and all its British government ideas, could seem 18  
 19 dangerously 'progressive' to colonial officials on the ground, concerned as ever 19  
 20 to preserve rural African life and shield Africans from key aspects of modernity. 20  
 21 Paternalistic colonial rule, from the viewpoint of the Colonial Office and the 21  
 22 men of the Colonial Administrative Service, had both to continue to remain the 22  
 23 state of nature and also remain acceptable to Africans; heady ideas and images 23  
 24 from different worlds risked threatening the balance. Many colonial officials 24  
 25 would argue that Africans had different capabilities to Europeans so needed to 25  
 26 be treated differently, though others disagreed. They stressed the need to keep 26  
 27 things simple and clear for that perennially stodgy item, the 'native mind', to 27  
 28 be able to digest. Another reading, of course, is that things had to be done in a 28  
 29 certain way in order to preserve colonial control. They argued for the need to 29  
 30 make reference to things Africans were familiar with (Hitler being likened to a 30  
 31 cornered lion, for example, and Italian troops to jackals), also to avoid damaging 31  
 32 'traditional' culture and primitive minds by showing 'demoralising' material and 32  
 33 avoiding negative images. This meant upholding European superiority and the 33  
 34 racial balance. Showing images of defeated whites was not popular, and colonial 34  
 35 authorities were keen for the 'right' messages to be conveyed. So, too, were settler 35  
 36 populations in places such as Kenya, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. 36

37 37

38 38

39 **The Central African Federation: 'Partnership' without Progress?** 39

40 40

41 Moving to examine how two particular episodes of influence operated in Southern 41

42 Rhodesia during the Central African Federation (CAF), the chapter now turns 42

1 the formation of the Inter-Racial Association of Southern Rhodesia (IASR) and 1  
 2 the politicisation of domesticity in the country more broadly. Although both 2  
 3 organisations were presented as movements which aimed to promote racial 3  
 4 partnership, as was the rhetoric of the CAF during its brief existence (1953–63), 4  
 5 they should in fact be seen as part of (to borrow Low and Lonsdale’s term) the 5  
 6 ‘second colonial occupation’ of Africa, in which Britain attempted to further 6  
 7 secure its interests on the continent.<sup>25</sup> In doing so, it sought to influence Africans 7  
 8 by convincing them of the beneficence of continued British/white rule, with an 8  
 9 expanded ‘partnership’ role for the ‘right sort’ of Africans. 9

10 The CAF was established on 1 August 1953 and was officially dissolved 10  
 11 on 31 December 1963 when Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland gained 11  
 12 independence as Zambia and Malawi. According to Robert Blake, Southern 12  
 13 Rhodesia ‘provided the main impetus behind the federal movement, and it 13  
 14 was politically and economically the most powerful of the three constituent 14  
 15 territories.’<sup>26</sup> Southern Rhodesia not only had the highest gross domestic product 15  
 16 (GDP) of £54 per head compared to Northern Rhodesia’s £51 per head and 16  
 17 Nyasaland’s £11 per head, but its economy was the most diversified.<sup>27</sup> Regional 17  
 18 developments, such as the election of the National Party in South Africa in 1948 18  
 19 and the institutionalisation of grand apartheid, also influenced the decision to 19  
 20 create an ‘English dominated and therefore “liberal” counterpoise to Afrikaner 20  
 21 nationalism.’<sup>28</sup> It was also believed that Federation could satisfy the competing 21  
 22 interests of settler societies and the aspirant black middle class. Crucially, white 22  
 23 settlers in Southern Rhodesia believed that Federation was a stepping-stone to 23  
 24 dominion status and, ultimately, independence.<sup>29</sup> In addition, Federation was 24  
 25 also seen as a politically sanguine development by the British government in 25  
 26 the affairs of Central Africa that would bring into effect a ‘partnership’ between 26  
 27 black and white within the three territories. Yet as Anthony King observes, ‘the 27  
 28 term “partnership” was never satisfactorily defined, but in essence it was an 28  
 29 attempt to present to a sceptical world a picture of racial partnership ... it was 29  
 30 presented as a way of improving the lot of Africans while granting them a “real” 30

31 31

32 32

33 33

34 <sup>25</sup> The term was coined in D. Low and J. Lonsdale, ‘Introduction’, in D. Low and 34  
 35 A. Smith, eds, *The Oxford History of East Africa* (Oxford: OUP, 1976), 1–64. 35

36 <sup>26</sup> Robert Blake, *A History of Rhodesia* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1977), 243. 36

37 <sup>27</sup> All figures taken from Blake, *A History of Rhodesia*, 244. 37

38 <sup>28</sup> Ibid., 247. See also Ronald Hyam, ‘The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African 38  
 39 Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948–1953’, *The Historical Journal* 30, no. 1 39  
 (1987): 145–72.

40 <sup>29</sup> For more on this perspective see T.R.M. Creighton, *The Anatomy of Partnership* 40  
 41 (London: Faber and Faber, 1960) and W.M. Macmillan, *The Road to Self-Rule: A Study in* 41  
 42 *Colonial Evolution* (London: Books for Libraries, 1959). 42

1 stake in society'.<sup>30</sup> Thus the rhetoric of the CAF was still avowedly concerned 1  
 2 with promoting imperial influence, albeit in a slightly modified form. 2  
 3 3  
 4 4  
 5 **The Inter-Racial Association of Southern Rhodesia: Partnership's Apogee?** 5  
 6 6  
 7 One particular way in which 'partnership' was promoted and 'influence' spread, 7  
 8 was through inter-racial groups such as the IASR. While the IASR passed for 8  
 9 what was defined as 'liberal' in Southern Rhodesian society it is important to 9  
 10 underline the difficulty of using the terms 'left' and 'right' in this context. As 10  
 11 Ian Hancock suggests, 'the terms employed here [are] as White Rhodesians 11  
 12 used them: to denote attitudes towards race relations and, specifically, on the 12  
 13 desirability or otherwise of African political, social and economic advancement'.<sup>31</sup> 13  
 14 As an IASR member and MP in Todd's 1954 cabinet, Hardwicke Holderness 14  
 15 recalls in his memoirs that the white liberals involved in the IASR 'were not 15  
 16 a typical sample of the white electorate and that belonging to an inter-racial 16  
 17 association would be something "normal" white Rhodesians would tend to keep 17  
 18 clear of as being cranky or too left wing'.<sup>32</sup> 18  
 19 The rhetoric of the IASR continually reaffirmed the importance of granting 19  
 20 concessions to 'moderate' and 'educated' Africans, so that: 20  
 21 21  
 22 the Africans must be given the opportunity and the obligation to make their 22  
 23 maximum contributions, and Europeans must be prepared to accept the 23  
 24 individual African as a participator ... [as the attitudes of most whites were] based 24  
 25 on the generalisation that the natives were [a] homogenous, uncivilised mass ... 25  
 26 the Europeans still tend to think of all Africans as being the same as garden boys 26  
 27 or farm labourers.<sup>33</sup> 27  
 28 28  
 29 Consequently, groups such as the IASR 'were formed as meeting places where 29  
 30 all races could participate in political discussion. Many people, both White and 30  
 31 31  
 32 32

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33 <sup>30</sup> Anthony King, 'The Central African Examiner, 1957-1965', *Zambezia* 33, no. 2 33  
 34 (1996): 135-6. 34  
 35 <sup>31</sup> Ian Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia, 1953-1980* 35  
 36 (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 1. 36  
 37 <sup>32</sup> Hardwicke Holderness, *Lost Chance in Southern Rhodesia 1945-1958* (Harare: 37  
 38 Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985), 120. 38  
 39 <sup>33</sup> Eileen Haddon Collection (EHC), of Southern Rhodesia Archives, Manuscripts 39  
 40 and Documents, part of the Co-operative Africana Microfilm Project, catalogued and 40  
 41 microfilmed by the University of Chicago, Photoduplication Department, 1972, Section I/ 41  
 42 Reel 1 (Roll 1), Proposed Inter Racial Association of Southern Rhodesia Draft Declaration 42  
 on African Affairs, n[o] d[ate], 2-3, 11-12.



1 Black were attracted by the novelty of meeting on an equal footing (perhaps a 1  
 2 superficial perception) and being able to debate public issues seriously.<sup>34</sup> 2  
 3 During this period the IASR was not the only advocate of multi-racial 3  
 4 partnership. The Capricorn Africa Society (CAS) was also formed in the spirit of 4  
 5 multi-racial co-operation in 1949, by retired Second World War colonel David 5  
 6 Stirling. Philosophically, the CAS and the IASR shared much common ground. 6  
 7 Yet as Michael West notes, the CAS were avowedly more ambitious in their 7  
 8 endeavours as they established branches in Kenya, Tanganyika (Tanzania) and 8  
 9 Northern Rhodesia.<sup>35</sup> Although the two groups never amalgamated, they shared 9  
 10 many common principles and held the same beliefs regarding the prospects 10  
 11 of granting full citizenship to Africans.<sup>36</sup> For example, in its September 1954 11  
 12 manifesto the CAS was preaching a 'qualified' notion of citizenship that was 12  
 13 predicated on both respectability and responsibility: 13  
 14  
 15 the Society believes it is essential that every individual should have the opportunity 15  
 16 to become a full citizen; it does not say that every person be permitted to become 16  
 17 a citizen for the asking. The status of a citizen must be one towards which every 17  
 18 member of a community can aspire and one whose achievement is a source of 18  
 19 great pride.<sup>37</sup> 19  
 20  
 21 One way of granting citizenship to the *right* sort of Africans was the interpretation 21  
 22 of the concept of 'partnership', as the IASR believed that 'it is necessary to bring 22  
 23 the advanced Africans in as participators in native administration, and they 23  
 24 would of course take part in the new forms of local government'.<sup>38</sup> The extensions 24  
 25 of such 'concessions' were therefore predicated on the belief that high profile 25  
 26 black individuals such as Nathan Shamuyarira would exercise 'responsible' 26  
 27 leadership over the African community, choosing to work within the existing 27  
 28 political framework. 28  
 29 As the IASR's draft declaration on African Affairs argued: 29  
 30  
 31 we believe that the emergence of the class of advanced Africans is of the utmost 31  
 32 significance. We are reliably informed that throughout Africa the mass of 32  
 33 Africans is turning to this class of educated Africans for leadership. They are 33  
 34  
 35 <sup>34</sup> King, 'The Central African Examiner', 137. 35  
 36 <sup>35</sup> Michael O. West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class, 1898–1965* (Bloomington: 36  
 37 Indiana University Press, 2002), 196–7. 37  
 38 <sup>36</sup> See EHC, Section II/Reel 14 (Roll 2J), Relations with Capricorn Africa Society, 38  
 39 Minutes of Executive Meeting, Saturday 15 January 1955. 39  
 40 <sup>37</sup> EHC, Section II/Reel 14 (Roll 2J), The Capricorn Movement: Its Aims, Objects 40  
 41 and Programme, September 1954, 20. 41  
 42 <sup>38</sup> EHC, Section I/Reel 1 (Roll 1), Proposed Inter Racial Association of Southern 42  
 Rhodesia Draft Declaration on African Affairs, n.d., 12.

1 finding that their traditional leaders cannot understand the complex problems 1  
 2 which civilisation has brought to Africa and they are looking to the people they 2  
 3 believe can do so.<sup>39</sup> 3  
 4 4  
 5 As such, there was a belief that the ‘advanced Africans’ could ‘exercise a stabilising 5  
 6 influence on the African community; if this class was not absorbed it might well 6  
 7 lead other Africans into revolution.’<sup>40</sup> Consequently the IASR were working 7  
 8 with ‘advanced Africans’ in an attempt to demonstrate that ‘partnership’ was 8  
 9 a tangible and indeed significant movement towards genuine multi-racialism 9  
 10 within Rhodesia. Yet as King emphasises, ‘partnership was not intended to be 10  
 11 the preserve of the intelligentsia. It was supposed to encompass all sections of 11  
 12 society.’<sup>41</sup> However it is clear that partnership did not develop in this way. 12  
 13 Alongside appealing to Rhodesia’s nascent black middle class, the IASR 13  
 14 attempted to disseminate its message throughout white society. Eileen Haddon, 14  
 15 a high profile white liberal woman, played a particularly important role in such 15  
 16 efforts, as she was involved in writing many letters to the Rhodesian press, 16  
 17 contributing to the development of the society’s policies and publicising the ‘vital’ 17  
 18 work that the IASR undertook.<sup>42</sup> In response to the letter sent out by Haddon 18  
 19 regarding the possibility of forming a Bulawayo branch of the IASR, Frank 19  
 20 Staunton, who at this time was an Assistant Native Commissioner, wrote that ‘an 20  
 21 association of this sort [the IASR] is absolutely necessary and vital’. Yet although 21  
 22 Staunton found ‘sympathy in almost the entire draft ... [he was] apprehensive 22  
 23 of the consequences of being too “liberal” too quickly.’<sup>43</sup> Staunton’s letter 23  
 24 therefore highlights the perception that groups such as the IASR were believed 24  
 25 to be promoting a radical interpretation of ‘partnership’, which would ultimately 25  
 26 threaten white settler interests. Despite the perceived radicalism of the IASR, in 26  
 27 the main part the historiography of this period largely dismisses the activities of 27  
 28 such groups. For Elaine Windrich, multi-racial societies such as the IASR were 28  
 29 the ‘fad’ of the 1950s where ‘intellectuals ... debated, had coffee, and occasionally 29  
 30 danced.’<sup>44</sup> Indeed, even high profile members such as Shamuyararia lamented the 30  
 31 31

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32 <sup>39</sup> Ibid., 15. 32  
 33 <sup>40</sup> Hancock, *White Liberals*, 27. 33  
 34 <sup>41</sup> King, ‘The Central African Examiner’, 137. 34  
 35 <sup>42</sup> EHC, Section I/Reel 1 (Roll 1), Inter-Racial Association of Southern Rhodesia, 35  
 36 Salisbury Branch, Letter Written by Haddon about the Possibility of Forming a Branch in 36  
 37 Bulawayo, 1 October 1954, 1. For more on Haddon see Kate Law ‘Writing White Women: 37  
 38 Whiteness, Gender, Politics and Power in Rhodesia c.1950s–1980s’, PhD diss., University of 38  
 39 Sheffield, 2012. 39  
 40 <sup>43</sup> EHC, Section I/Reel 1 (Roll 1), F. A. Staunton, Letter to the Secretary of the 40  
 41 Proposed Inter Racial Association of S. Rhodesia, July 1954. 41  
 42 <sup>44</sup> Elaine Windrich, *The Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary Record 1923–1973* 42  
 42 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1975), 52. 42

1 fact that the IASR 'provoked no response of encouragement from the broad 1  
2 range of government officials or white politicians ... the organizations were 2  
3 pressure-groups without electoral power or effective influence in parliament. 3  
4 While we sat at the bottom end of town deliberating about equality and human 4  
5 dignity, parliament was still passing restrictive laws'.<sup>45</sup> 5

6 While not wishing to overemphasise the impact the IASR had on 6  
7 influencing governmental policy, the group 'formed the first bridgehead for 7  
8 African influence inside the governing United Rhodesia Party'.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, 8  
9 in July 1954 the IASR had been instrumental in organising a multi-racial 9  
10 conference on industrial relations. Yet, their impact as a pressure group remained 10  
11 fitful in the party political arena. Despite this, as Blake observes, under Garfield 11  
12 Todd's premiership a series of legislative measures were enacted in the spirit of 12  
13 partnership. Firstly in November 1956 Todd's government decided that Africans 13  
14 no longer should be classified as 'Natives' or 'AM' (African Male), rather that they 14  
15 should be referred to as 'Mr'.<sup>47</sup> In March 1957 the word 'Native' was replaced 15  
16 with the word 'African' in all government legislation, and in May 1957 a Liquor 16  
17 Amendment Bill was passed which allowed Africans to drink European beer.<sup>48</sup> 17  
18 Yet for African Nationalist Joshua Nkomo, clearly writing from a different 18  
19 perspective, such efforts were 'mere window dressing, whose main effect was to 19  
20 annoy the government's hard-line supporters'.<sup>49</sup> 20

21 While the IASR was clearly a political enterprise, the failure of the group to 21  
22 attempt explicitly to break into the party political realm effectively contributed 22  
23 to the perception that it was at best a marginal force in Rhodesian politics. At its 23  
24 fourth AGM, 'the question of a new political party was discussed, with special 24  
25 reference to the closer liaison with The Capricorn Africa Society. Various views 25  
26 were expressed; some people thought the time had come to form such a party, 26  
27 but others thought the Interracial Association should keep out of party politics'.<sup>50</sup> 27  
28 By attempting to remain apolitical, groups such as the IASR were therefore 28  
29 effectively limiting their potential to interpret and implement effective multi- 29  
30 racialism. In addition, as Haddon opined, 30

31  
32 the younger Africans are beginning to feel that there is no hope of any reforms 32  
33 through Interracial cooperation ... because they are Africans and are always treated 33  
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37 <sup>45</sup> Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (London: Transatlantic Arts, 1966), 21. 37

38 <sup>46</sup> Ibid., 20. 38

39 <sup>47</sup> Blake, *A History of Rhodesia*, 290. 39

40 <sup>48</sup> According to Shamuyarira, it was research conducted by members of the IASR that 40  
41 led to the amendment of the Liquor Act. See Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, 20. 41

42 <sup>49</sup> Joshua Nkomo, *The Story of My Life* (London: Methuen, 1984), 96. 42

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. 42

1 as such and not as individuals, they must rely on African National Movements, 1  
 2 assisted ... for any improvement in their social and economic status.<sup>51</sup> 2

3 3  
 4 While the IASR did provide an initial basis for multi-racial co-operation, 4  
 5 by the end of the 1950s the legitimacy and indeed importance of the group was 5  
 6 rapidly diminishing. As Holderness recalled in his memoirs, the IASR 'could 6  
 7 never quite escape the suspicion of being extremist in the minds of white voters. 7  
 8 Simply being multi-racial at that stage placed it on the left of white politics, 8  
 9 with nothing to the right of it'.<sup>52</sup> Haddon, recalling a conversation with African 9  
 10 nationalist George Nyandoro, who argued that the IASR did 'more harm than 10  
 11 good by "cushioning" the liberal European and moderate African', argued that 11  
 12 while the results of the association were not 'dramatic ... the association at least 12  
 13 enabled people of different races to meet together to discuss problems'.<sup>53</sup> In 13  
 14 addition, the defeat of the United Rhodesia Party (URP) effectively signalled 14  
 15 the end of African nationalist participation in white Rhodesian politics, 15  
 16 which according to Hancock reinforced the 'irrelevance of White-led politics' 16  
 17 signalling that inter-racialism was a 'hoax and a predictable failure'.<sup>54</sup> 17

18 Despite the limited role that groups such as the IASR played in mainstream 18  
 19 Rhodesian politics, Haddon was considered to be an important 'political' 19  
 20 woman because of the contacts she had made with leading African nationalists. 20  
 21 Responding to a letter from Rhys Meier, editor of the Salisbury-based *Evening* 21  
 22 *Standard*, in which he suggested she use her 'undoubted influence' over Africans 22  
 23 to persuade them to support the 1961 constitutional referendum, Haddon 23  
 24 challenged 'the quite erroneous belief that Europeans or even "moderate" 24  
 25 Africans can "influence" and "persuade" Africans to do things with which they 25  
 26 don't agree'. She argued further that she could not 'stress strongly enough that 26  
 27 the sort of people who make up the African Nationalist Parties have very strong 27  
 28 ideas, beliefs and convictions which *are their own*, and have not been worked 28  
 29 out by groups of "liberals" sitting in the background pulling the puppets' 29  
 30 strings'. Furthermore by 1960, for Haddon, 'the only function of the liberal 30  
 31 white today ... is to do everything possible to keep contact across the colour 31  
 32 line ... hoping thus to educate general white opinion'.<sup>55</sup> However as Michael 32  
 33 O. West notes, 'racial partnership's loss would eventually prove to be African 33

34 34  
 35 \_\_\_\_\_ 35  
 36 <sup>51</sup> EHC, Section I/Reel 1 (Roll 1), Eileen's Article, 28 September 1956. 36

37 <sup>52</sup> Holderness, *Lost Chance*, 121. 37

38 <sup>53</sup> EHC, Section II/Reel 7 (Roll 2C), My Impressions of the S. R. A. N. C. and 38  
 39 Individual Leaders, n.d., 1. 39

40 <sup>54</sup> Hancock, *White Liberals*, 76. 40

41 <sup>55</sup> EHC, Section I/Reel 1 (Roll 1), Letter to Rhys Meier, 20 October 1960, emphasis 41  
 42 in original. Meier was the editor of *The Evening Standard*, part of the South African 42  
 Argus newsgroup.

1 nationalism's gain.<sup>56</sup> Consequently by the late 1950s/early 1960s, the tentative 1  
 2 steps to assimilate the African middle class were permanently stalled with the 2  
 3 rise of increasingly militant African nationalist groups such as the Zimbabwe 3  
 4 African Peoples Union (ZAPU). Men such as Shamuyarira, who had once 4  
 5 been enthusiastic advocates for partnership through groups such as the IASR, 5  
 6 became increasingly important figures in the nationalist movements, precisely 6  
 7 because the concessions granted to Africans were more cosmetic than structural. 7  
 8 Consequently while the rhetoric of Federation was hypothetically concerned 8  
 9 with 'partnership' as a way to grant citizenship rights to 'educated' Africans, in 9  
 10 essence partnership was never more than a cloak to hide the still authoritarian 10  
 11 nature of colonial governance in the affairs of Central Africa. 11

12

13

#### 14 **Politicising Pots and Pans? Influence and Domesticity** 14

15

16 During Federation, a further project that promoted influence was the 16  
 17 Homecraft Movement and establishment of the Federation of African Women's 17  
 18 Clubs (FAWC) in Southern Rhodesia.<sup>57</sup> Based on a highly gendered ideology 18  
 19 that was concerned with the promotion of 'suitable' notions of domesticity, the 19  
 20 principal aim of the Homecraft Movement was for white women to teach black 20  
 21 women European cooking, hygiene and childcare methods, with the obvious 21  
 22 inference that such an approach was superior to indigenous practices.<sup>58</sup> When 22  
 23 viewed in the context of the Federation's broader 'partnership' rhetoric, the 23  
 24 FAWC fits both the assertion that Africans and Europeans were partners in 24

25

26

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<sup>56</sup> West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class*, 201.

28

<sup>57</sup> Some of this material is drawn from Kate Law, "Even a Labourer Is Worthy of His 28  
 29 Hire: How Much More a Wife?": Gender and the Contested Nature of Domesticity in 29  
 30 Colonial Zimbabwe, c.1945–1978', *South African Historical Journal* 63, no. 3 (2011): 456–74. 30

31 See also J. Comaroff and J.L. Comaroff, 'Home-Made Hegemony: Modernity, Domesticity, 31  
 32 and Colonialism in South Africa', in K. Tranberg Hansen, ed., *African Encounters with 32  
 33 Domesticity* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 37–74. 33

34 <sup>58</sup> Sita Ranchod-Nilsson, "Educating Eve": The Women's Club Movement and 34  
 35 Political Consciousness among Rural African Women in Southern Rhodesia, 1950–1980', in 35  
 36 Tranberg Hansen, ed., *African Encounters with Domesticity*, 196. For more on the origins of 36  
 37 the movement see Winifred Jane Needham, *A History of the Federation of Women's Institutes 37  
 38 of Southern Rhodesia* (Salisbury: unknown binding, 1959); National Federation of Women's 38  
 39 Institutes Rhodesia, *The W.I. Jubilee Book 1925–1975* (Salisbury: unknown binding, 1975). 39  
 40 For more on white women and imperialism see Jane Haggis, 'White Women and Colonialism: 40  
 41 Towards a Non-Recuperative History', in Clare Midgley, ed., *Gender and Imperialism 41  
 42 Imperialism: Mapping the Connections*, in Midgley, *Gender and Imperialism*, 1–19. 42

1 Rhodesia's future, whilst also encapsulating the ambiguous and paternalistic 1  
2 dimensions of 'partnership'.<sup>59</sup> 2

3 There was great emphasis placed on the fact that the Homecraft Movement 3  
4 was concerned with instructing African women in appropriate (i.e. European) 4  
5 approaches to motherhood and homecare. However, other Homecraft literature 5  
6 stressed the 'organic' roots of the movement, emphasising that the clubs: 6  
7 7

8 came into being in 1952 as a result of the vision of the young wife of an African 8  
9 chief in the Mwera district, Helen Mangwende. Mrs Mangwende and the wife of 9  
10 the Assistant Commissioner of her district both saw the great need of the African 10  
11 women for her knowledge and were inspired to form women's clubs, for teaching 11  
12 of homecrafts and child care.<sup>60</sup> 12  
13 13

14 Mangwende believed that rural African women needed instruction in 14  
15 basic hygiene matters to help combat high infant mortality rates. Rising 15  
16 from 121 clubs in 1956 to 1,100 in 1973, by 1975 the FAWC boasted a national 16  
17 membership of 23,000 women.<sup>61</sup> In conjunction with the wife of the local 17  
18 Native Commissioner, Miriam Staunton, the movement grew to include regular 18  
19 meetings and classes in which white female volunteers would travel to rural areas 19  
20 and demonstrate European cooking and hygiene methods, with the ultimate 20  
21 aim that the African women would be able to take these skills back to their 21  
22 own communities.<sup>62</sup> Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, such notions of domesticity 22  
23 turned on the highly gendered ideals of the 'good wife and mother', something, 23  
24 which Deborah Kirkwood argues has a central role in the Rhodesian context.<sup>63</sup> 24

25 For Amy Kaler, the Homecraft Movement fits into a wider category of 25  
26 Southern African colonial projects which aimed to project a benign image 26  
27 of colonialism. She argues that 'white women's visions of the women's clubs 27  
28 proceeded directly from their own senses of themselves as specifically white 28  
29 29  
30 30

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31 <sup>59</sup> For more background on the white women involved in the Homecraft Movement 31  
32 see Kate Law, "Making Marmalade and Imperial Mentalities": The Case of a Colonial Wife, 32  
33 *African Research and Documentation* 112 (2010): 19–27; Carolyn Martin Shaw, 'Sticks and 33  
34 Scones: Black and White Women in the Homecraft Movement of Colonial Zimbabwe', 34  
35 *Race/Ethnicity Multidisciplinary Global Perspectives* 1, no. 2 (2008): 253–78. 35

36 <sup>60</sup> Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies, Rhodes House, Oxford. 36  
37 Mss Afr. s. 2398 [Papers of Miriam Staunton], Federation of African Women's Clubs 37  
38 Rhodesia, n.d., 1. After this initial reference, subsequent footnotes will make use of the box, 38  
39 manuscript number and date (where available). 39

40 <sup>61</sup> *Rhodesia Herald*, 21 June 1978. 40  
41 <sup>62</sup> See Mss Afr. s. 2398, Federation of African Women's Clubs Rhodesia, n.d., 1. 41  
42 <sup>63</sup> Deborah Kirkwood, 'Settler Wives in Southern Rhodesia: A Case Study', in Hillary 41  
42 Callan and Shirley Ardener, eds, *The Incorporated Wife* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1984), 149. 42

1 women in a racial hierarchy'.<sup>64</sup> She suggests that the initial female volunteers, 1  
 2 the wives of colonial administrators and of commercial farmers, participated 2  
 3 because their vision for the clubs was one of both benevolence and philanthropy.<sup>65</sup> 3  
 4 However Kaler also argues that 'this earlier vision ... was later eclipsed by a more 4  
 5 explicitly political one, in response to the growth of nationalism among the 5  
 6 African population.'<sup>66</sup> This later political direction of the clubs was closely linked 6  
 7 to what she sees as two competing visions of domesticity both simultaneously 7  
 8 at work within the clubs. While one notion of domesticity was based on a 8  
 9 sense of benevolence with a genuine concern for African welfare, 'the other 9  
 10 vision was a more highly politicised and instrumental view of domesticity.'<sup>67</sup> 10  
 11 Furthermore, the 'emancipation of African women was a means to incorporate 11  
 12 African women as citizens/subjects of Rhodesia and to extend the "imagined 12  
 13 community of Rhodesia"'.<sup>68</sup> 13

14 Endeavours such as the Homecraft Movement were analogous to other 14  
 15 colonial initiatives within the continent that emphasised the centrality of gender 15  
 16 in the context of the promotion of domesticity. As Audrey Wipper explores in 16  
 17 the Kenyan case, the *Maendeleo Ya Wanawake* Organisation (taken from the 17  
 18 Swahili for 'Women's Progress') was established in the early 1950s under the 18  
 19 patronage of upper class white women to support the advancement of African 19  
 20 women, with Wipper arguing that *Maendeleo* was founded to promote rural 20  
 21 community development. In relation to efforts made in the Belgian Congo 21  
 22 to 'domesticate' black women, Nancy Rose Hunt highlights white women's 22  
 23 constructive efforts to foster 'mutual understanding among the races', whilst also 23  
 24 reflecting on the linkages between colonial constructions of womanhood and 24  
 25 domesticity.<sup>69</sup> For Susan Geiger, the activism of Tanganyikan women during the 25  
 26 liberation struggle is directly linked to the structures established by the colonial 26  
 27 state for women's domestic development.<sup>70</sup> 27

28 Alongside training African women in the European domestic tradition, 28  
 29 a radio programme, called 'Radio Homecraft', was established to reach even 29  
 30 more of Rhodesia's African population. According to West, 'the importance of 30  
 31 such occasions was not lost on the captains of Rhodesian commerce, and the 31  
 32 32

33 <sup>64</sup> Amy Kaler, 'Visions of Domesticity in the African Women's Homecraft Movement 33  
 34 in Rhodesia', *Social Science History* 23, no. 3 (1999): 270. 34

35 <sup>65</sup> Ibid., 279. 35

36 <sup>66</sup> Ibid., 279. 36

37 <sup>67</sup> Ibid., 270. 37

38 <sup>68</sup> Ibid., 270. 38

39 <sup>69</sup> Nancy Rose Hunt, 'Domesticity and Colonialism in Belgian Africa: Usumbura's 39  
 40 Foyer Social, 1946–1990', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 15, no. 3 40  
 40 (1990): 473. 40

41 <sup>70</sup> Susan Geiger, 'Women in Nationalist Struggles: Tanu Activists in Dar Es Salaam', 41  
 42 *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 20, no. 1 (1987): 1–26. 42

1 meetings of the radio clubs soon became a point of contact between homecraft 1  
 2 and merchandising.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, for West, 'Radio Homecraft' represented 2  
 3 Rhodesia's advancing consumer culture as it identified the potential consumer 3  
 4 market to be found within aspirational African women. Consequently, such 4  
 5 initiatives drew 'Radio Homecraft' into the Rhodesian political economy.<sup>72</sup> 5  
 6 While West notes that the creation of a black middle class was not initially 6  
 7 part of the imperial project, endeavours such as the Homecraft clubs, he argues, 7  
 8 emphasised the 'quest for bourgeois domesticity' amongst some Africans.<sup>73</sup> 8  
 9 This 'quest' for domesticity also extended to the corporeal. As Timothy 9  
 10 Burke argues, 'smell, appearance, or cleanliness acquired a certain mobility in 10  
 11 colonial culture based on their mutual credibility as markers of difference'.<sup>74</sup> 11  
 12 For Burke, commodification was a 'process driven by the imperatives of capital 12  
 13 and the "civilizing" projects of the state'.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore he argues that 'white 13  
 14 attitudes towards black bodies inspired institutions that remade the practices 14  
 15 of the body, domesticity and manners'.<sup>76</sup> Thus issues surrounding the corporeal 15  
 16 were central to the everyday functioning of Rhodesia's political economy. This 16  
 17 commodification of the body, argues Allison Shutt, was linked to notions of 17  
 18 citizenship, with the aim of 'creating a more inclusive political space'. For Shutt 18  
 19 this 'required that people be understood as properly mannered and capable of 19  
 20 respectable and responsible citizenship'.<sup>77</sup> Such instances therefore demonstrate 20  
 21 the insidious and multifarious ways in which colonialism operated in Rhodesia. 21  
 22 Colonialism was therefore not an abstract and intangible enterprise, and along 22  
 23 with the white settlers who upheld and maintained such rigid boundaries the 23  
 24 lives of black Africans were touched by colonialism in the most intimate ways, 24  
 25 with the promotion of influence literally attacking and redefining the corporeal. 25  
 26 26  
 27 27

## 28 Conclusion 28

29 29  
 30 From village burning *pour encourager les autres* and the demonstration effect 30  
 31 of aerial bombardment, to advertisements for skin-whitening products and 31  
 32 initiatives encouraging the adoption of European domesticity, colonialism 32  
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34 <sup>71</sup> West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class*, 77. 34

35 <sup>72</sup> Ibid., 77. 35

36 <sup>73</sup> Ibid., 68. 36

37 <sup>74</sup> Timothy Burke, *Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and* 37  
 38 *Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 33. 38

39 <sup>75</sup> Ibid., 167. 39

40 <sup>76</sup> Ibid., 215. 39

41 <sup>77</sup> Allison K. Shutt, "'The Natives Are Getting Out of Hand': Legislating Manners, 40  
 41 Insolence and Contemptuous Behaviour in Southern Rhodesia, c. 1910–1963', *Journal of* 41  
 42 *Southern African Studies* 33, no. 3 (2007): 672. 42



1 in Africa sought to influence Africans. Even at its most benign, colonialism 1  
2 constructed the African as inferior, and sought to influence him/her accordingly. 2  
3 Commonly in European eyes he/she was child-like, backward, rural, traditional 3  
4 and with a predilection towards laziness unless motivated and managed by 4  
5 Europeans. This construction of the African was central to European self- 5  
6 justification for being there in the first place. Colonial rule was one giant 6  
7 attempt to influence Africans in order to control them, to 'improve' them and 7  
8 to benefit from them. 8

9 It is important to challenge the logic of those who seek historical examples 9  
10 of influence in order to guide present day attempts to influence people in other 10  
11 countries. Examples from colonial Africa are almost entirely null and void 11  
12 because during that period things were so very different: not only did Britain 12  
13 *rule* its colonies, it was considered legitimate to hold colonies and vast subject 13  
14 populations, and there was an overwhelming general assumption that Africans 14  
15 were lesser beings in a world much more thoroughly racialised than our own. 15

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