"Berlin of the East": India and the Politics of Cold War Asylum

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On the 25 November 1962, global tensions ran high. The American and Soviet superpowers remained locked in an anxious and uncertain truce in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In India, a shell-shocked nation struggled to regain equilibrium following a crushing military defeat in a short and bloody border war with China. The febrile international atmosphere was amplified that evening by the actions of a young Russian sailor in the Indian subcontinent. Under cover of darkness, Vladislav Stepanovich Tarasov, a twenty-five-year-old merchant seaman from the Ukraine, climbed out of a porthole on the Tchernovtei, a Soviet oil tanker anchored in Calcutta’s King George’s docks, and swam to a nearby American ship, the SS Steel Surveyor. Once aboard the American vessel, a dripping Tarasov, clad only in swimming trunks, declared his life to be in danger and requested political asylum.1 Tarasov’s defection in India set off a Cold War diplomatic storm. Uncomfortably for the Indian government, it manifested at a point in time when New Delhi was actively courting American and Soviet assistance to stave off a Chinese threat to the Republic’s very survival.

The public spotlight that Tarasov cast on defection placed non-aligned India at the epicentre of the clandestine Cold War. Over the course of the 1960s, a succession of
Soviet citizens followed Tarasov’s example, and emulated earlier Chinese and Czech defections staged in South Asia. In the process, the Indian government was embroiled in a series of superpower disputes. Notably, in 1967, two defections in New Delhi dominated global news headlines. In March that year, Svetlana Iosigovna Alliluyeva, the only daughter of the former Soviet dictator, Joseph Stalin, defected to the West through the American embassy in the Indian capital. A few months later, in December, Aziz Saltimovitch Ulug-Zade, a teacher of Hindi at Moscow State University, who was visiting India with a Soviet youth delegation, followed suit. In the Indian press, Suman Mulgaokar, editor of the influential daily, the *Hindustan Times*, noted wryly that:

To have three Russian defections occur in your country within three years is embarrassing enough. When one of the defectors is Stalin's daughter, the matter gets much worse…[and] the unusually high colour of Indian Home and External Affairs Ministry officials becomes easy to understand.²

The wider significance of nonaligned India in the clandestine Cold War has been obscured by a tendency on the part of historians and producers of popular culture to consider defection and political asylum in an East-West binary.³ Little attention has been given to defections that occurred inside the developing world, leaving the agency exercised by Asian and African nations marginalized or ignored.⁴ A corrective is in order that interrogates Cold War defection from a North-South standpoint. Defections placed considerable strain on Indian non-alignment.⁵ As will be shown, at several points during the early Cold War period defections undertaken in India
adversely impacted New Delhi’s relations with the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain.

By the late 1960s, exasperated officials in India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had cause to reflect bitterly on the country’s reputation as a Cold War clearing-house, or the "Berlin of the East". In one sense, the parallel drawn between Berlin and New Delhi reflected the degree to which India’s nonalignment accommodated the presence of large diplomatic and commercial missions from both sides of the Iron Curtain. From the mid-1950s, the numbers of Soviet defections in Europe slowed as border controls between East and West Germany tightened and, in 1961, the Berlin Wall went up. At the same time, defections staged at points of Cold War intersection outside Europe multiplied. The Berlin analogy was also symptomatic of foreign intelligence agency activity in India. The former British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer, and Soviet spy, George Blake, observed that alongside Berlin, India ranked highly in Western intelligence circles as offering, "the most favourable conditions. . .for establishing contacts with Soviet citizens." The presence in India of so many diplomats, non-governmental organisations, technicians, businessmen, and journalists from the Soviet Union, United States and Britain, provided ample scope for defection.

What applied to SIS, also held for the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Soviet intelligence bodies such as the Committee for State Security (KGB) and GRU, or foreign military intelligence. The CIA maintained a sizable and active presence in India. Having initially operated from a single ‘station’, or base of operations, in New Delhi, the Agency extended the geographical scope of its work, establishing a network of out-stations in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. One U.S. diplomat who served in India during this period, later attested that the Agency’s
presence was, ‘very large, and very invasive. . .the CIA was deeply involved in the Indian Government.’\textsuperscript{9} Equally, a series of young and dynamic KGB chairmen, such as Alexander Shelepin, Vladimir Semichastny, and the future Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, enthusiastically supported Moscow’s policy of fermenting wars of national liberation and enhancing communist influence in the developing world. By the 1960s, Soviet intelligence agencies were deploying a substantial proportion of their operational resources, outside of Europe and North America, in India.\textsuperscript{10}

The Cold War’s expansion into the developing world all but guaranteed that India would play a material role in the covert conflict, or secret intelligence struggle, between East and West. Directly to the north of the Indian subcontinent lay the communist colossuses of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. After independence came to South Asia in August 1947, Britain retained a strong political, commercial, and military links with India. From the late 1950s, the United States, under the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, came to see the region as a focal point in the containment of Asian communism. The neutral Cold War space afforded by Indian non-alignment drew large bodies of government officials and functionaries from the Eastern and Western blocs to South Asia and, in the process, acted as a magnet for intelligence operatives and would-be defectors. For two decades, between the late 1940s and the late 1960s, New Delhi functioned as a frontline city in the clandestine Cold War.

**Challenges from China and Czechoslovakia**

In October 1949, communist influence astride India’s northern borders expanded exponentially with the advent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In turn, the
fledgling Indian state was confronted with a diplomatic conundrum. Political and religious refugees from the western Chinese province of Xinjiang began streaming into the northern Indian towns of Srinagar and Leh. In February 1950, Chinese Muslim leaders, representing several hundred refugees that had completed a perilous journey from central Asia, petitioned New Delhi for asylum. The Chinese delegation included Mohammed Amin, one-time deputy governor of Xinjiang, Isa Yusuf Aliptakin, former secretary-general of the Xinjiang government, and Colonel Adam Sabri, chief of the provincial nationalist forces routed by the People’s Liberation Army.\textsuperscript{11}

India’s premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, sympathized with the Chinese exiles. Nehru had formed a bond with the Chinese nationalist supremo, Jiang Jiesh, whose Kuomintang government championed Indian independence from British colonial rule. Once the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had defeated the Kuomintang and ended China’s enervating civil war, Nehru put sentiment to one side, and recognized the PRC. Rationalizing his decision to America’s ambassador in India, Loy Henderson, the Indian premier observed that India would "firmly oppose" Chinese attempts to "infiltrate India with Communist ideology or with Communist agents." Nevertheless, his government, "hoped [that] (is this word necessary?) by maintaining friendly relations with Chinese nationalism to be of service to China and to assist in extricating that nationalism from the control of Communism."\textsuperscript{12} Above all, Nehru respected the manner in which the CCP, under Mao Zedong’s leadership, had unified and invigorated a nation that for so long had been enfeebled, divided and exploited by foreign powers. The CCP’s success in asserting national sovereignty drew plaudits from New Delhi. India’s leaders, one senior State Department official reflected, appeared to harbour a (comma deleted) "complex, sympathetic. . .feeling of kinship
for China as an Asian power which has thrown off 'white Western exploitation.'”

It was against this background (comma deleted) that the Indian government found itself in what would become a familiar bind. Fresh from their own anti-colonial struggle to reclaim basic freedoms and exercise fundamental human rights, many Indians evidenced an affinity for political refugees. Yet, broader geo-political considerations and, not least, Nehru’s policy of non-alignment, complicated the Indian government’s role in the Cold War asylum story. Moreover, the inconvenient fact that political refugees arriving in India were invariably travelling from East to West, made the question of defection and asylum a potentially explosive issue in the context of New Delhi’s relations with Moscow and Beijing. As Indian journalists noted, Chinese refugees flooding into India recognized that (comma deleted) "it will be embarrassing for the authorities here [India] to be asked for help when they have recognized the Communist Government of China, but they hope they will nonetheless be able to give them refuge.”

Contacts established on Indian soil between Chinese refugee groups and US diplomatic and intelligence officials (comma deleted) exposed Nehru’s government to charges that it was sheltering enemies of the Chinese state. Having been appraised by their American colleagues of plans hatched by Chinese dissidents to smuggle anti-communist literature from India back into Xinjiang, British diplomats noted with some unease that (comma deleted) "the request of these [Chinese] gentlemen for asylum may, quite apart from the activities which they propose to indulge in, give rise to considerable difficulties for the Government of India.”

Efforts undertaken by Indian governments to mitigate the political tensions generated by Chinese refugees failed to impress Beijing. In October 1950, following the PRC’s occupation of Tibet, the Chinese vice-minister for foreign affairs, Chang
Han-Fu berated Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, India’s ambassador in Beijing, over the numbers of asylum seekers crossing into Indian-controlled Kashmir from Xinjiang. Panikkar was left in no doubt that the presence of Chinese political dissidents in India was seen by Mao’s regime as "a threat to national security." Characterizing the refugees as "rebels," Han-Fu demanded that the Indian government take steps to prevent its territory from being exploited as a base for anti-Chinese activity. Chinese diplomatic barbs piled pressure on to an Indian state under severe logistical and financial strain. Asylum seekers multiplied the crushing burden faced by a country grappling with the socio-economic impact of the subcontinent’s partition, and the accompanying crisis occasioned by one of the largest mass migrations in human history.\(^1\)

In 1954, the *Panch Sheel* accord, or five principles of peaceful co-existence agreed between New Delhi and Beijing, ushered in a brief period of *Hindee Chinee bhai-bhai*, or Indian Chinese brotherhood. However, before the decade was out, bilateral tensions had resurfaced on the questions of defection and political asylum.\(^1\) In 1957, Nehru’s government locked horns with the PRC after Beijing announced the construction of a highway between Xinjiang and Tibet, part of which bisected territory claimed by India.\(^1\) Two years later, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated further after India granted political asylum to Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and thousands of his supporters, in the aftermath of an abortive revolt against Chinese rule. Incensed that India had offered a safe haven to Tibetan exiles, and suspicious that the Indian government was colluding with the CIA to foment unrest inside Tibet, Beijing took a dim view of what it interpreted as New Delhi’s provocative and unwarranted intrusion into its affairs.\(^1\) In April 1960, China’s premier, Zhou Enlai, made clear the extent to which disagreements over political asylum had poisoned
Sino-Indian relations. During bi-lateral talks with Indian officials, Zhou repeatedly turned to question of asylum, observing caustically that (comma deleted) "...the Dalai Lama is today carrying out anti-Chinese activities and encouraging the movement for an independent Tibet [from India]. This is beyond the definition of political asylum."\(^{20}\)

Chinese unease at burgeoning Indo-US intelligence collaboration was well founded. India’s intelligence Bureau, under the leadership of the rabidly anti-communist (comma deleted) B. N. Mullik, elected to "look the other way" as CIA aircraft infringed Indian airspace in support of Agency sponsored resistance operations in Tibet. Moreover, the CIA-backed operation to exfiltrate the Dalai Lama from Lhasa hinged on tacit support extended by the IB.\(^{21}\) At the same time, informed local observers, such as Abraham Michael Rosenthal, the New York Times’ correspondent in New Delhi, recorded a proliferation in CIA staff posted to India under the guise of Treasury experts, Air Force contractors, or members of specialised bodies, such as the Asia Foundation. The Agency’s effort to penetrate Indian political circles, Rosenthal noted, was directed, "more than anything else in getting inside the [ruling] Congress Party for purposes of information or influence."\(^{22}\) In 1959, the CIA underscored its capacity and willingness to work with the national Congress government by mounting covert operations designed to undermine a democratically elected Communist Party of India (CPI) administration in the southern state of Kerala. By secretly channelling funds to Congress Party officials and local anti-communist labour leaders, the CIA helped to destabilise, and ultimately remove, the incumbent CPI regime.\(^{23}\)

The Indian government’s problems with early Cold War asylum were, however, by no means confined to Communist China. In February 1948, after a Soviet-backed
communist coup in Czechoslovakia, India was faced with a European asylum issue. The subsequent death, in suspicious circumstances, of Czechoslovakia’s pro-Western foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, alarmed Czech diplomats working abroad. The Czech ambassador in New Delhi, Jaroslav Sejnoha, had been a close associate of Masaryk. A month after the coup, Sejnoha approached British and American officials in India with a proposition to renounce the communist regime in Prague, and declare himself a "resistance representative" of Czechoslovakia. The British were initially reluctant to associate themselves with Sejnoha and risk alienated Nehru’s government. "We do not (repeat not)," Whitehall informed the British high commission in Delhi, "wish to embarrass Government of India by giving advice or asylum to representatives accredited to them."

British plans to give Sejnoha the cold (hyphen removed) shoulder, and avoid the Czech diplomat complicating their relations with India, were soon overtaken by events. By early spring, Sejnoha and his staff in India had become increasingly concerned as news of political purges and restrictions on civil liberties emerged from Prague. Aiming to bargain a passage to the West, the Czech embassy counsellor, Mr. Dutka, initiated contact with the CIA station in Delhi, and began handing over confidential documents to the Americans of "considerable importance." Although anxious to appear a loyal servant of the Prague regime, at least until his close relatives could be spirited out of Eastern Europe, Dutka was playing a double game and, as he candidly informed his CIA handlers, "had no intention whatever of returning to Czechoslovakia." British intelligence was soon caught up in what became a significant clandestine operation to exploit dissident Czech diplomats in the subcontinent.
To the Indian government’s dismay, Dutka, Sejnoha, and the Czech ambassador’s successor in India, Dr. Bohuslav Kratochvil, all defected to the West through New Delhi. In February 1949, Sejnoha fled from India to the UK rather than comply with an order from Prague to return home. Two years later, and under similar circumstances, Kratochvil, with assistance from British intelligence, absconded from the Indian capital. Having burnt his private papers, Kratochvil walked out of the Czech embassy, took a train from Delhi to Mumbai, and boarded a steamer for England, which, appropriately enough, went under the name Jai Azad, or Hail Freedom. Encouraged by his Western “friends,” on the long voyage from India to Europe, Kratochvil availed himself of every opportunity to instruct journalists on the “evils” of a Czech communist regime that he had served faithfully for the preceding three years.

In an important respect, the Kratochvil episode highlighted the strength of Britain’s residual post-imperial intelligence footprint in the Indian subcontinent. In late 1947, the British Security Service (MI5) persuaded India’s Home Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, to approve an exchange of Security Liaison Officers (SLOs). The SLO concept was already well established at the time. In the Second World War, MI5 had posted SLOs throughout the British Empire. The SLO function was to provide security advice to local governments and act as conduit for the exchange of information between London and Britain’s imperial outposts. It was not expected to facilitate acts of subterfuge or espionage. The subsequent success of the SLO experiment in India prompted Guy Liddell, deputy director general of MI5, to crow, “There is no doubt that Nehru [and] Patel...are anxious to maintain the British connection. Their difficulty is to put their former policy of ‘driving the British out of India’ into reverse without losing face.” Liddell’s characterization of Indo-British
relations was overblown. But (comma deleted) MI5 did maintain uncommonly close links with India’s intelligence service, the Intelligence Bureau (IB).\textsuperscript{35} B. N. Mullik acknowledged that the intimacy of the bi-lateral relationship led Nehru to suspect that IB was culpable of "dishing out intelligence which the British continued to supply to it."\textsuperscript{36} When the last MI5 officer in India was withdrawn in the late 1960s, it was not at New Delhi’s behest, but as a consequence of budgetary cuts forced on the Security Service by Britain’s faltering economy.\textsuperscript{37} On being advised by Martin Furnivall Jones, MI5’s then director general, of his service’s decision to retreat from South Asia, S.P. Varma, head of IB, expressed disappointment that Britain had chosen to terminate "the longstanding [intelligence] contact at a personal level which has proved invaluable to us."\textsuperscript{38}

Attempts by the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to establish its presence in India proved less straightforward. Archibald Nye, Britain’s High Commissioner in New Delhi between 1948 and 1952, came out against "an embryo" SIS station, or base of operations, in India. Nye argued that an SIS station was likely to produce little useful intelligence and risked aggravating Indo-British relations. The case against a permanent SIS presence in India strengthened after Nehru’s government took exception to the behaviour of two SIS officers linked to the dissemination of anti-communist propaganda, both of whom were declared persona non grata.\textsuperscript{39} In response, Britain’s Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, effectively proscribed SIS activity in India.\textsuperscript{40} Under the "’Attlee Directive,’" as it came to be known, MI5 was afforded primacy in intelligence operations conducted within the empire and Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{41} It was not until 1964, that SIS opened a station in New Delhi under the direction of Ellis Morgan, a protege of the future head of the service, Maurice Oldfield.
In a broader sense, the Kratochvil case proved uncomfortable for New Delhi. To have one Eastern bloc ambassador defect to the West in India appeared unfortunate. Seeing his successor do likewise led to awkward questions being asked in the Indian press over the Nehru government’s willingness to look the other way as British and American intelligence agencies courted communist diplomats. The left-wing Indian weekly, *Crossroads*, announced that Kratochvil had been recruited as a British agent in New Delhi, and pointedly enquired what measures Nehru and his ministers were taking to forestall such Cold War intrigues. In Mumbai, the popular news sheet, *Blitz*, alleged that that "Western imperialism" had inspired the Czech ambassador’s defection, and demanded a robust response from the Indian state.

Press allegations of British collusion in Kratochvil’s defection were well founded. British officials in Delhi coached the Czech envoy on how to maximize the political impact of his flight into exile, "in India rather than in Czechoslovakia or Western Europe, where his name means little." Specifically, Kratochvil was instructed to ensure that his statements to journalists left Indians in no doubt about the "communist menace to Asia." Lauding the "effective service" that Kratochvil performed for the West in India, Sir Archibald Nye, Britain’s high commissioner, recorded with satisfaction that the Czech national had, "been able to tell the Prime Minister [Nehru] and others the real truth about conditions in his own country and behind the iron curtain generally, which they would be very reluctant to accept if it came from us or from the Americans or from any Western representatives."

**Vladislav Tarasov and the "Other" Crisis of Autumn 1962**
The public spotlight cast upon the issues of defection and political asylum in India intensified over the course of the 1960s, as the Cold War spread inexorably outwards from Europe and into the developing world. In turn, quiet but growing collaboration between the IB, CIA and MI5 served to complicate the diplomatic challenge confronting an Indian government determined to sustain its non-aligned posture and remain on good terms with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Notably, a series of high-profile CIA "failures" around this time, beginning with the loss of a U-2 spy-plane over the Soviet Union in May 1960, and culminating in the Bay of Pigs fiasco the following April, did little to dent Indo-US intelligence co-operation. In July 1961, whilst touring southern India, America’s ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith was startled, and somewhat amused, when on being introduced to local dignitaries, a man stepped forward and exclaimed loudly, "Mr. Ambassador, I am the superintendent of police here in Madras. I would like to tell you that I have the most satisfactory relationship with your spies."47

With the onset of the Sino-Indian border war, Indian and American intelligence agencies grew closer still. The CIA assisted the IB in equipping and training a clandestine warfare unit tasked with monitoring Chinese military supply routes into Tibet. Under the terms of an agreement reached between James Critchfield, chief of the CIA’s Near East operations, and Mullik, Langley proved instrumental in the formation of an Indo-Tibetan Special Frontier Force (SFF), a unit modelled on the US Army Green Berets, or special forces. From the winter of 1964, covert SFF operations along the Sino-Indian border were co-ordinated through a joint Indo-US command centre in New Delhi. The Agency went on to oversee the insertion of nuclear-powered surveillance equipment on two of India’s Himalayan peaks, with a view to collecting and sharing data on Chinese atomic tests with its Indian partners.48
In this context, the Tarasov case of November 1962 placed the Indian government in an awkward spot. Never before had Indian authorities had to field a formal request from Moscow for the extradition of a Soviet national seeking asylum in the United States. The Indian government’s response to Moscow’s insistence that Tarasov be repatriated back to the Soviet Union (comma deleted) was complicated by public sympathy in the subcontinent for the Russian sailor. The would-be defector made much of his supposed disenchantment with restrictions on personal freedom and individual liberty behind the Iron Curtain. In a series of public statements, Tarasov claimed it had been after listening to Voice of America broadcasts and reading copies of *America*, a US magazine distributed in the Soviet Union under a cultural exchange agreement, that he determined to seek a better life in the United States.\(^49\)

In fact, the Russian sailor, who had a wife and young child back in the USSR, had a history of complaining about poor pay and working conditions in the Soviet merchant fleet. Tarasov had also fallen foul of a political commissar assigned to the *Tchernovtei*. The discovery in Tarasov’s possession of letters critical of the Soviet regime, and an accompanying threat that the papers would debar him from future voyages abroad, likely provided the catalyst for a spontaneous decision to defect. Whatever Tarasov’s motivation, V. Londorev, the Soviet Consul in Calcutta, moved rapidly to forestall the sailor’s departure from the subcontinent. Londorev informed Indian authorities that Tarasov had stolen money from his ship before disembarking, was a common criminal, and should be arrested and deported back to the USSR.\(^50\)

After the Soviets had, somewhat improbably, produced twelve witnesses to Tarasov’s ‘crime’, Indian policemen boarded the *SS Steel Surveyor* and took the seaman into custody.\(^51\) On instructions from Washington, local American diplomats made clear to the Indian administration in West Bengal that the United States
regarded the Tarasov affair as political matter, that Soviet allegations of criminality were false, and that the defector should be free to seek asylum in the West. In New Delhi, the Indian government was aghast at being dragged into a Cold War tussle between the United States and the Soviet Union, at a time when the nation’s survival hinged on retaining the support of both superpowers in its conflict with the PRC. The *New York Times* reported that Nehru’s administration had been thrown into a panic by, "a Soviet sailor… put[ting] a new strain on India’s embattled policy of non-alignment in the cold war by demanding asylum on a United States merchantman in Indian waters."53

Anxious officials from India’s Ministry of External Affairs confided to local journalists that, having been "caught between the crossfire of two friendly governments," the diplomatic repercussions could adversely impact Indian national security. "It now appears," one MEA officer informed the Calcutta daily, *Jugantar*, or New Era, "that a Sobolev has appeared in Calcutta."54 The allusion made to Arkady Sobolev, Soviet ambassador to the United Nations in the late 1950s, underlined the level of concern that the MEA harboured in relation to Tarasov. Sobolev had been at the centre of a diplomatic storm in the United States, after he was charged by the US State Department with coercing five Russian sailors who had defected to the West into returning to the Soviet Union.55

As Indian officials had feared, every twist and turn of the Tarasov drama was splashed across the pages of the world’s press. Having twice been refused bail by Indian magistrates, with American assistance, Tarasov took his case before India’s High Court. On 5 January, Tarasov was released into the custody of Hugh Haight, the US consulate-general in Calcutta, on condition that he remained in the city pending a final legal decision on extradition.56 Back in Washington, the State Department
poured scorn on Soviet attempts to cast Tarasov as a common criminal, and to deny that his actions were politically motivated. Referencing previous Soviet attempts to pin false legal charges on defectors, Lincoln White, a State Department spokesman, defended Tarasov and informed reporters pointedly that (comma deleted) "we’ve heard of such charges [from Moscow] before."³⁷

The court case against Tarasov subsequently assumed the appearance of a cause célèbre in the India. Two of India’s leading criminal lawyers, Jai Gopal Sethi and Diwan Chaman Lal, a member of the Upper House of India’s parliament, were employed by the Soviet and the American embassies in a legal battle that, as one Western newspaper noted, had (comma deleted) "all the nuances of a Cold War issue."³⁸ Behind the scenes, Soviet and American officials applied intense pressure on the MEA to ensure that the case was resolved promptly, and before the international media circus it attracted had a detrimental impact on the Nehru government’s relations with Moscow and Washington. However, to New Delhi’s exasperation, the ponderous wheels of justice in faraway West Bengal turned slowly, and chafed against government exhortations to fast-track the extradition hearing.

During January and February 1963, in a series of open court sessions, Tarasov’s defence counsel called a succession of Soviet officials to the witness box, and pilloried each in turn for fabricating documents, withholding material evidence, and committing acts of perjury. To the considerable amusement of the public gallery, one unfortunate Soviet diplomat was asked to explain how, exactly, Tarasov could have absconded from his ship with a large sum of stolen cash, when he had been fished out of Calcutta’s harbour clad only in a pair of flimsy swimming trunks.³⁹

At the end of February, New Delhi’s patience snapped, and a special magistrate, N. L. Bakkar, was appointed by the Indian government to expedite the case for
extradition. Tarasov was promptly put on plane and flown from Calcutta to the capital. The denouement to the Tarasov saga played out in a small, drab courtroom, a stone’s throw from India’s parliament. Following a month of additional testimony, and sixteen weeks after Tarasov had jumped ship, Bakkar dismissed all Soviet charges against the defector, who was immediately whisked out of the country by the American embassy. In delivering his damning verdict in a detailed 40-page judgement, Bakkar undoubtedly went much further in condemning Soviet actions than his own government would have wished. Soviet officials, the Indian magistrate recorded, had "manufactured evidence" against Tarasov, had failed to produce credible witnesses, and had concocted a case that was "wholly inadequate and rife with contradictions." 60

Humiliatingly for the Soviets, Bakkar noted in his findings that, even had a prima facie case of theft been established against Tarasov, the absence of a formal extradition agreement between India and the USSR effectively ruled out the sailor’s repatriation. An Indian Extradition Act had passed through the national parliament a few months previously, but not been ratified. The MEA was also left red-faced, having secretly furnished the Soviets with advice on Indian asylum and extradition law. Throughout November and December 1962, Indian and Soviet officials exchanged a number of diplomatic notes on the Tarasov case. Within these, the MEA provided the Soviet embassy with a copy of the Indian Extradition Act and, more significantly, indicated the evidence that a magistrate would expect to see before approving a request for extradition. 61 By coaching the Soviets in the intricacies of local asylum law, however ineptly, the MEA opened itself up to accusations of manipulating the Indian legal system in the pursuit of national security. When details of the correspondence later became public, eminent Indian jurists pilloried the MEA’s
actions as inappropriate, and tantamount to "providing the Russians with a ready-made machine for achieving their object."\(^6^2\)

India’s press and, more predictably, its counterparts in the West, represented the outcome of the Tarasov affair in stark, binary terms. On 30 March, the influential Indian journalist, and then editor of the \textit{Indian Express}, Prem Bhatia, pronounced in the \textit{Guardian} that "a cold war ended today between the Russian and American Embassies over a Russian who wanted to live in the West. The Americans seem to have won."\(^6^3\) On 1 April, Calcutta’s \textit{Statesman} roundly condemned "Socialist legality" in an editorial entitled "The Ways of Justice." The Tarasov case had, the newspaper informed its readership, accentuated fundamental differences between India’s appreciation of the rule of law and individual freedoms, and the absence of rights and justice in the Eastern bloc, "a grim reality of which there have been many reminders in recent years."\(^6^4\) The influential \textit{Times of India} went further, editorializing that the "shocking features" of the Tarasov case suggested that "even after Mr. Khrushchev’s much publicised de-Stalinisation campaign… the Soviet authorities are still not able to distinguish between prosecution and persecution." Taking a swipe at Nehru’s government, the leading Indian daily concluded that satisfaction at Tarasov’s acquittal, "will be shared by all who believe that justice is not a matter than can be subordinated to political expediency."\(^6^5\)

\textbf{Svetlana Stalin heads West}

Post-colonial India’s unwelcome association with defections staged by Eastern bloc nationals bedeviled Nehru’s governments. Nevertheless, the diplomatic fallout that accompanied such activity in India after Nehru’s death, in May 1964, proved far more
taxing for New Delhi. It was Nehru’s daughter, and the nation’s third prime minister, Indira Gandhi, that had most cause to rue the politics of Cold War asylum. Notably, the defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva, in New Delhi, in spring 1967, precipitated a Cold War crisis that accomplished the unusual feat of simultaneously straining India’s relations with Washington and Moscow. The Alliluyeva drama unfolded on the evening of 6 March. Preoccupied with a reception that, aptly, celebrated Soviet "Women’s Day," Russian officials failed to notice a smartly dressed figure slip out of the Soviet embassy and into the teeming streets of India’s capital. Minutes later, stunned officers at the United States’ chancery building, in Shantipath, were approached by a woman who announced, in faltering English, that she was the daughter of the former Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, and his second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, and wished to be granted political asylum.66 The London Economist was to characterize Alliluyeva as nothing less than, "the most sensational defector that the United States has ever attracted." More presciently, the political headache that Stalin’s daughter had bestowed upon the American, Soviet, and Indian governments, the Economist noted, indicated that Alliluyeva should be "plainly marked 'Handle with care.'"67

The common-law wife of an Indian communist, Brajesh Singh, whom she met in Moscow, Alliluyeva travelled to India to scatter the ashes of her deceased husband in river Ganges.68 Having become disillusioned with communism, Alliluyeva asked the Soviet authorities for leave to remain in India. Her request having been denied, and under orders to return home on the next flight out of Delhi, Alliluyeva took an impulsive decision to defect.69 In US ambassador, Chester Bowles, Alliluyeva was fortunate to find an experienced and politically astute ally. Bowles reasoned that it would be a few hours, at best, before the Soviets discovered Alliluyeva was missing
and requested the Indian government to locate and return her to their custody. A former Under Secretary of State, and prominent figure in the Democratic Party, Bowles took the momentous decision to act without waiting for instructions from Washington, and to put Alliluyeva on a commercial flight leaving India that evening. At 2:45 a.m., on 7 March, escorted by a CIA officer, Robert Rayle, Svetlana Alliluyeva flew out of India on a Qantas flight bound for Rome, and into political exile.

Bowles’ early optimism that he had successfully pulled off a ‘ticklish’ operation proved premature. On 8 March, India’s foreign secretary, Chandra Shekhar Jha, complained to the American ambassador that the Soviet embassy was "extremely upset," and had "stated to Indian officials that American secret agents abducted her [Alliluyeva] from India by force." Coming hard on the heels of failures in the Soviet Soyuz space programme, Alliluyeva’s defection threatened to mar Moscow’s celebrations to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Revolution. The following day, the MEA issued Bowles with a formal note of protest. The Indian rebuke decried Bowles’ decision to act (comma deleted) "in such haste, without giving any inkling to the Ministry of such impending action." With a flourish of indignation, the MEA stated baldly that it, "regret[ted] this action of the US Embassy which may put in jeopardy relations between India and the Soviet Union and may have serious repercussions on Indo-US relations." In his defence, Bowles informed Jha that Alliluyeva had threatened, were her request for asylum denied, to take her case to the world’s press, and appeal directly to the people of India and the United States for support. In the circumstances, the ambassador declared, he had been left with little option but (comma deleted) "to give her a visa to the United States and help her on her way." Attempting to turn the tables
on his Indian hosts, Bowles justified his action as motivated primarily by a desire "to avoid putting the Indian government in an embarrassing position" and having India, the United States, and the Soviet Union become embroiled in "a legalistic and contentious public controversy." Hinting that India’s role in the Alliluyeva story was more complicated than hitherto acknowledged, Bowles added that Alliluyeva, whose deceased husband’s nephew, Dinesh Singh, was minister for state at the MEA, claimed to have approached the Indian government for asylum and to have been rebuffed. Dinesh Singh, and colleagues at the MEA had, Alliluyeva informed the US embassy, indicated that the government of India would take no action on the matter of asylum that ran contrary to the wishes of the USSR. Far better given this state of affairs, Bowles suggested, for the Indian government to have been presented with a fait accompli by the Americans.

Intriguingly, the Indian government was not alone in trying to keep the Soviets on side in the wake of the Alliluyeva shock. The State Department had no desire to see such a high-profile defection dislocate wider US-Soviet relations. The importance of securing Soviet goodwill on matters ranging from Vietnam and the Middle East, to arms control and consular conventions, ranked far higher on the Johnson administration’s list of priorities than Soviet apostates, no matter how prominent. Undersecretary of State Foy Kohler, who served a term as America’s ambassador to the USSR, and was committed to engineering a thaw in bi-lateral relations, reacted with fury to the news of Alliluyeva’s defection. "Tell them [Bowles’ staff] to throw that woman out of the embassy," Kohler had raged, "Don’t give her any help at all." Rather than have Alliluyeva travel directly to the United States from Rome, Washington left her kicking her heels in neutral Switzerland, chiefly to enable the
political temperature surrounding the defection to subside. Joseph Greene, Bowles’ deputy chief of mission in Delhi, confirmed that had the Alliluyeva defection had come at a time when Washington was, “very sensitive about their relations with the Soviet Union. They [Johnson administration] didn't want apparently irrelevant things to upset apple carts they were working on. They were mad at Chet [Bowles] for sending Svetlana on her way [from Delhi].”

Encouragingly for the State Department, Moscow appeared equally keen to play down the Alliluyeva episode. On 21 March, during a meeting in the Kremlin with Indian diplomats, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Nikolay Firyubin, adopted a "relatively mild" attitude to Alliluyeva’s defection. British officials in the Soviet capital picked up similar signals from their Soviet counterparts. The British embassy reassured London that the American to decision to keep Alliluyeva in Rome, "was motivated by the wish not to damage Soviet-U.S. relations at this important juncture." Nevertheless, the Soviets did warn Johnson’s government that their forbearance would last only so long as the United States displayed sensitivity to the embarrassing position in which the USSR had been placed by Alliluyeva’s actions. Specifically, the KGB instructed their American intelligence colleagues in Moscow that, should Alliluyeva be granted asylum in the US, a Soviet disinformation campaign would follow, complete with forged documents implicating the CIA in kidnapping Stalin’s daughter.

Just as the diplomatic squall surrounding Alliluyeva appeared set to subside, a statement made to the Indian parliament by M.C. Chagla, India’s foreign minister, reignited the affair. In February 1967, the American west-coast magazine, Ramparts, exposed the CIA’s long-standing financial relationships with a number of international educational institutions and cultural bodies. With an Indian general
election campaign in full swing, an outpouring of public indignation ensued when it became clear that the CIA had covertly funded organizations in the subcontinent, including the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom. Fresh from the campaign hustings and scenting a political opportunity, India’s parliamentarians fed off the rumor and suspicion surrounding America’s foreign intelligence service, competing eagerly with each other to exhibit the toughest and most populist anti-CIA line possible.\textsuperscript{83}

On March 23, to Washington’s dismay, Chagla bowed to mounting pressure from the nation’s exercised parliamentarians, and authorized a "thorough" inquiry into CIA activity in India. India’s communist legislators immediately called for the expulsion of several US embassy officials who were assumed to be CIA officers, and had been implicated in Alliluyeva’s defection.\textsuperscript{84} Blindsided by Chagla’s intervention, US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, bemoaned that it had placed the Johnson administration "under great pressure to amplify...[the] U.S. role in the Svetlana case..."\textsuperscript{85} British officials in New Delhi confirmed to Whitehall that their American colleagues, "have been embarrassed by the fact that Svetlana was accompanied from India by an American Second Secretary, Rayle, who is assumed, in the Indian press, and elsewhere in private conversation, stimulated in part by the \textit{New York Times} correspondent, to be a C.I.A. representative."\textsuperscript{86}

The Soviets shared Rusk’s irritation that New Delhi had bowed to domestic political expediency and failed to shut off public debate over Alliluyeva. One senior Indian diplomat, L. K. Jha, confided to British colleagues that he had been treated "very frigidly" in the Soviet capital following renewed press and parliamentary scrutiny of the Alliluyeva episode back home.\textsuperscript{87} Soviet press reports mirrored a growing sense of "disenchantment" with India. In discussions with the MEA, Andrei
Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, adopted an unusually hostile line, and unnerved Indian officials by attacking New Delhi’s position on the sensitive issue of nuclear non-proliferation. Alarmed by Russian insinuations that Indian officials had colluded with the CIA in Alliluyeva’s defection, R. Jaipal, India’s joint secretary for external affairs, curtly informed Soviet colleagues that, should such baseless allegations persist, there would no longer "be [a] proper basis for the development of future relations between the two countries." 

At the same time, the Johnson administration’s efforts to down-play Alliluyeva’s defection began to unravel. Influential conservative publications, including the National Review, started to attack Lyndon Johnson and his foreign policy team. "Svetlana Alliluyeva is playing out a momentous role in history...," the National Review charged, "[while Washington had decided that] Svetlana's defection must be neutralized, drained of its large historical meaning...so that the image of an increasingly benign Communist Russia may be permitted to stand undisturbed." Moreover, having reluctantly permitted Alliluyeva to end her European sojourn and travel on to the United States, a succession of press conferences, media interviews, and public appearances featuring Stalin’s daughter (comma deleted) shattered Soviet complacency that the Johnson White House could limit diplomatic backwash from the defection. Moscow’s sense of American bad faith multiplied when news broke that George Kennan, a former US ambassador to the Soviet Union declared persona non grata by Stalin, and the principal architect of Cold War containment, would assist Alliluyeva to published a tell-all memoir. Pravda reacted by accusing the CIA of exploiting, "the Svetlana affair...[to orchestrate] a massive anti-Soviet propaganda campaign." "In short," the voice of the Soviet communist party declared, "Washington is stooping to use anything...[in] making use of Soviet citizen S. Allelueva [sic]."
The immediate political ramifications of the Alliluyeva drama left Moscow, Washington, and New Delhi (comma deleted) feeling frustrated and embittered. What is more, it exercised a profound influence over the manner in which the Indian government responded to the defection of another Soviet citizen, Aziz Saltimovitch Ulug-Zade. In December 1967, with aftershocks from Alliluyeva’s decision to use India as a staging-post for her flight to the West still reverberating through the corridors of the MEA, Indira Gandhi’s government adopted a heavy-handed, legalistic, and ultimately ineffective response to the increasingly vexing issue of political asylum. In the process, India’s government drew renewed censure from domestic critics, and further weakened its embattled relations with the United States and the Soviet Union.

**Ulug-Zade and the Containment of Cold War Asylum**

On 30 December 1967, the Indian Government circulated an aide-memoire to New Delhi’s foreign missions. The note, issued by the MEA, asserted that it was (comma deleted) "well established that the affording of asylum is not within the purposes of a Diplomatic Mission." Should embassies receive a request for asylum or refuge, the MEA instructed, it should be refused and the Government of India informed immediately.92 In practical terms, the MEA missive backed Indian officials into an awkward political corner. As Indian journalists were quick to point out, should the American or Soviet embassies take in a defector, Gandhi’s government would be faced with, "the choice of either doing nothing, which would make it look impotent, or of invading the Embassy premises which would be a violation of the conventions of courtesy between nations." For minor and relatively unimportant political refugees,
the adoption of such a rigid policy appeared unnecessarily punitive and counterproductive. It made little sense in such cases, commentators argued, "for India to get into a flap merely because its soil was used to stage the defection."  

The Indian government’s aide-memoire was triggered by the defection of Aziz Saltimovitch Ulug-Zade, a Soviet teacher visiting India on a state sponsored tour. On 19 December, hours before he was due to return to Moscow, Ulug-Zade left the Hotel Ranjit in New Delhi, and took a taxi to the British high commission in Chanakyapuri, the capital’s diplomatic enclave. Turned away by suspicious British officials, Ulug-Zade tried his luck at the US embassy, located a few hundred yards further down the street. The Americans proved more accommodating and, having been offered sanctuary, US diplomats subsequently informed the MEA and Soviet colleagues of Ulug-Zade’s intention to defect.  

The following day, with newsprint barely dry on the acres of paper that India’s media had expended covering Alliluyev’s defection, the Indian government was greeted by a raft of unwelcome press headlines. The front-page of the Times of India pronounced dramatically, "Soviet youth vanishes in Delhi and causes Diplomatic sensation." The MEA, the leading Indian daily reported, had taken a "very serious view of this incident, since it does not want India to be turned into a cold war arena by the Big Powers in their game of international espionage and psychological warfare." Moreover, Indian government officials were said to be concerned that, coming just eight months after Alliluyeva’s incident, the Ulug-Zade’s defection would have "wider political repercussions" for Indo-Soviet relations.  

The reaction of the Soviet embassy to Ulug-Zade’s flight reinforced Indian anxieties that Russian patience on the issue of asylum was wearing thin. Nikolai Pegov, the Soviet ambassador, stormed into the MEA and demanded that the Indian
government return the would-be defector to his custody. Having cancelled Ulug-Zade’s passport in a bid to obstruct his departure from the subcontinent, Soviet officials informed their Indian, American, and British counterparts that Moscow would deem efforts to facilitate the teacher’s transit to the West as an unfriendly act. Under Soviet pressure, the MEA ordered the Delhi police to ensure that Ulug-Zade remained in the country until the full facts surrounding his appeal for political asylum had been established. The extent to which the Indian government could satisfy Soviet expectations in respect of Ulug-Zade were, however, limited. The Tarasov case had illustrated that, under Indian law, and in accordance with international conventions on political asylum, New Delhi was powerless to compel the defector to return to the Soviet Union. Having entered the country on a visa issued by the Indian embassy in Moscow, and following the cancellation of his passport, Gandhi’s government had few options other than to deport Ulug-Zade to a country of his own choosing.96

Soviet pique at the latest defection from East to West to occur in India was fueled by familiar suspicions surrounding the CIA. Eastern bloc diplomats confided to Indian officials that Moscow suspected the American intelligence agency of engineering the Ulug-Zade’s incident, in retaliation for the Soviets decision to grant political asylum to John Discoe Smith, a former communications clerk in the US embassy in Delhi. Earlier that year, the Soviets had arranged for a communist publisher in India to release a salacious account of purported CIA misdeeds in South Asia under Smith’s name.97 Allegations of CIA interference in India’s internal affairs continued to reverberate within the country in the wake of Alliluyeva’s defection. Consequently, accusations of American intelligence involvement in the Ulug-Zade case proved politically explosive, and engendered panic inside the Indian government.98 Moreover, from New Delhi’s perspective, worrying echoes of the
Alliluyeva case emerged in another form. Reports in the international press suggested that Ulug-Zade’s action had been motivated by Soviet constraints on freedom of expression and fundamental human rights. The son of a well-known Uzbek poet, Ulug-Zade, the London Times emphasized pointedly, had echoed Alliluyeva’s condemnation of the oppression suffered by Soviet writers and intellectuals.⁹⁹

The diplomatic furore sparked by the Ulug-Zade affair, in part, explains the decision taken by John Freeman, Britain’s high commissioner in India, to turn the Soviet teacher away when he came calling on the evening of 19 December. London’s relations with India remained in a parlous state following a spat between Harold Wilson’s government and New Delhi during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. Moreover, with Indian suspicion of Western intelligence agencies running high, the principal Information Research Department (IRD) officer in Delhi had recently come under suspicion as an "undeclared friend," or MI6 operative.¹⁰⁰ This unwelcome development threatened to expose possibly the largest covert operation ever staged by Britain in post-independent India. Accordingly, Freeman was initially acutely sensitive to any action on his part that could be construed as linking British intelligence to Ulug-Zade.

The IRD was established in 1948 by the British Foreign Office to counter the spread of Soviet propaganda within Britain and overseas.¹⁰¹ IRD personnel seconded to British diplomatic missions abroad were tasked with feeding clandestine anti-communist literature to local journalists, politicians, and academics. In India, IRD counted B. N. Mullik among its best customers.¹⁰² Within a few years, IRD was working with more than 400 "well-placed and influential individuals throughout India," some of whom received secret payments for their services. Moreover, two publishing houses in the Indian capital and a regional newspaper article redistribution
service were paid to disseminate IRD material on a non-attributable basis through a British cover organisation, the International Forum.¹⁰³

Earlier in 1967, Freeman had ordered the IRD operation in India to proceed with "particular caution," and to temporarily curtail its riskier activities. IRD officers were instructed to avoid seeking new Indian contacts; to suspend meetings with existing "assets;" and to implement tighter security measures around the distribution of financial "incentives."¹⁰⁴ In rationalizing his decision taken to "pause" IRD activity, Freeman argued that the attention that had been focused upon the CIA in India threatened to (comma deleted) "unearth the activities of other Western Missions and perhaps link these with the C.I.A. Here we [the British] should be an obvious target."¹⁰⁵

Any thoughts Freeman may have entertained about offering Ulug-Zade sanctuary were further complicated by the intervention of Nikolai Pegov. Alerted by companions of Ulug-Zade that the missing teacher might seek to defect through the British high commission, Pegov contacted Freeman and made it abundantly clear that Moscow would react strongly were his mission to harbour a Soviet citizen.¹⁰⁶ Freeman’s predicament was compounded by temporary communication problems with Whitehall. At the time, Stella Rimington, a future director-general of MI5, was working as an assistant to the resident SLO in New Delhi. Rimington subsequently recalled how, with a defector standing on their doorstep, the SLO was unable to locate the duty cypher clerk and send a request to London for instructions. It later transpired that, anticipating a quiet night at work, the clerk had slipped off to be with her Sikh boyfriend and was unobtainable.¹⁰⁷

Overlooking concern that Ulug-Zade might be a Soviet plant designed to disrupt the United States’ relations with India, and undeterred by fallout from the
Alliluyeva affair, Chester Bowles again offered sanctuary to a defector from Eastern bloc. One senior US embassy official later recalled that (comma deleted) "the British ducked and he [Ulug-Zade] wound up as a houseguest in the American Embassy residential compound. . . . We wanted to be more forthcoming than the British so we granted him asylum while we debated [what to do]."\(^\text{108}\) Alarmed that Bowles might act precipitately and, as he had with Alliluyeva, exfiltrate Ulug-Zade from India, the MEA demanded an assurance from the US embassy that the Russian would "not be whisked out of the country without its knowledge." Having been buffeted by the Alliluyeva incident, the last thing that the Johnson administration wanted was a second defection crisis on its hands. Accordingly, Galen Stone, senior counsellor at the US embassy, was quick to reassure Indian government officials that Washington would ensure every (comma deleted) "effort was made to find a way out of this tangle without undue embarrassment to either side."\(^\text{109}\)

It was the British who, having initially spurned Ulug-Zade, presented a solution to the latest Cold War defection crisis to rock India. On 22 December, Freeman informed the MEA that the British government had reconsidered its position, and was now willing to grant Ulug-Zade political asylum. In a press release issued that evening, the British high commission confirmed that (comma deleted) "a Soviet citizen, Mr. Aziz Ulug-Zade, now in New Delhi, has applied for admission to the United Kingdom. Her Majesty’s Government is prepared to grant this request and has notified the Government of India accordingly."\(^\text{110}\) Within the week, a special meeting of her Indira Gandhi’s cabinet had endorsed acceptance of the British offer, and sanctioned Ulug-Zade’s transfer from India to the United Kingdom.\(^\text{111}\)

It is not certain what prompted London’s volte-face, or the Indian government’s decision to endorse it. Averting the media spectacle of a second Soviet defector
transiting from the subcontinent to the United States in the same year, may well have been more palatable to Moscow, New Delhi, and Washington. Ulug-Zade had expressed a preference for relocating to the United Kingdom and had made the British high commission his first port of call after taking the decision to defect. The British reversal was, therefore, able to be couched in humanitarian terms. From an Indian standpoint, one of Gandhi’s own Congress Party MPs, Arjun Arora, underscored a general sense of weariness that (comma deleted) "India was becoming a Cold War arena." The time had come, Arora stated bluntly, to draw a line under the latest piece of defection theatre and put an end to foreign powers abusing India’s goodwill to score propaganda points at the expense of the nation’s broader political and economic interests. Whatever the reason, it seems certain that some form of deal was struck between Bowles, Freeman, Pegov, and Kaul to recast the Ulug-Zade issue as something other than a direct confrontation between the US and Soviet superpowers. The effect, as was undoubtedly intended, was to remove much of the immediate political tension from the defection saga.

That is not to say that the end-game of the latest Soviet defection to occur in India passed off without incident. Domestic opponents of the Gandhi administration again made political capital out of the country’s latest Cold War melodrama. On 22 December, during a stormy three-hour foreign affairs debate in the Lok Sabha, Gandhi was repeatedly thrown on the defensive. Minocher Rustom ‘Minoo’ Masani, a leading figure in the conservative Swatantra Party, baited the Indian premier for “lean[ing] over backwards to please the Soviet Government.” Outside parliament, Masani arranged for an open letter of support for Ulug-Zade. Signed by Koka Subba Rao, a former Chief Justice of India, G. L. Mehta, a former Indian ambassador to the US, and several other prominent citizens, the letter appealed to the prime minister,
"on the grounds of fundamental human rights embodied in our Constitution and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which India is a signatory to allow Aziz [Ulug-Zade] to go to the United Kingdom without further delay and in accordance with his choice." Asserting that it would be a "disgrace" to India were the Soviet defector coerced into returning home, the letter suggested that any impression Gandhi’s government had succumbed to pressure from Moscow over the case, "would injure India’s international prestige."114

At the same time, stung by what it deemed to be an abuse by Soviet defectors of freedoms prevailing in India, the MEA over-reacted and notified foreign missions that it did not accept their right to grant political asylum. "The Government of India do not recognize the right of...Missions to give asylum to any person or persons within their premises," a directive drafted by the MEA’s Legal and Nationality department stated bluntly. Insisting that it was "well established international practice" that "the affording of asylum is not within the purposes of a Diplomatic Mission," foreign diplomats were told not to grant, "any request for asylum, or temporary shelter, or refuge."115 Privately, T.N. Kaul went further, and confirmed to Freeman that his department was considering legislation to make the sheltering of defectors an offence under Indian law.116 The British and American governments ignored the Indian trial balloon. In London and Washington, officials concurred that "the main purpose of the Indian Circular was to discourage other would-be defectors from using India as their take-off point." The State Department declined to reply to the circular. Whitehall, after "a considerable amount of inter-departmental consultation," fell into line and followed suit.117 In fact, as Indira Gandhi conceded during a debate in the Lok Sabha on 14 February, the MEA failed to receive a single response to its circular on asylum from any diplomatic mission.118 In response to noise generated by the Indian
government on political asylum, the international community turned a collective deaf ear.

The Indian press, although sympathetic to the Gandhi government’s concern at the diplomatic tensions defections generated, subsequently questioned the wisdom of attempts to constrain individual human rights. An editorial in the *Hindustan Times* cautioned New Delhi that as "a continuing, human offshoot of the cold war," the problem of defection could not simply "be wished away." India’s non-alignment and close relations with both cold war blocs, the newspaper underlined, made it impractical "to avoid [the subcontinent] being a possible jumping off place for potential defectors." While regrettable, such a state of affairs was not seen as sufficient cause to warrant compromising a long-established Indian commitment "to honour individual rights and freedoms." It was "unnecessary," the *Hindustan Times* argued, for the MEA to attempt to overturn the principle that foreign missions could grant asylum. Governments elsewhere, it was noted, had respected the practice "in far more difficult circumstances." Adopting such a stance also appeared to risk setting a dangerous precedent, and seeing India associated with authoritarian foreign regimes "that do not share India's commitment to individual freedom and are unsure of the loyalty of the vast majority of their citizens." One contributor to the *Times of India* articulated the sentiment that Gandhi’s administration had badly erred in its handling of the asylum issue. "This hasty and possibly ill-considered step," a letter to the newspaper lamented, appeared unseemly and motivated by a desire of the Indian government "to cover its embarrassment over the defection of three Soviet citizens in a short period of time."
Conclusion

Recovering the secret history of political asylum in the hitherto elided context of the developing world illuminates the extent to which leading non-aligned states, such as India, assumed prominent roles in the high drama of Cold War defection. Significantly, the Indian government’s engagement with the thorny diplomatic problems posed by political asylum exposed the existence of deep fault-lines between Indian domestic sentiment, which broadly favoured a liberal and compassionate policy on defection, and New Delhi’s conviction that the nation’s wider interests were best served by an uncompromising and legalistic response to political refugees from the Eastern bloc. Indian officials invariably found themselves squeezed by seemingly contradictory demands to defend New Delhi’s post-independence commitments to freedom of political expression, individual liberty, and universal human rights while, simultaneously, pursuing national security interests that hinged on the maintenance of constructive relationships with the Cold War superpowers.

If the Indian government’s campaign to inhibit early Cold War defections in the subcontinent did not yield tangible results, it nevertheless represented a significant event. The MEA’s involvement offers up evidence of a democratic government reinterpreting international law to suit diplomatic exigencies. Furthermore, the episode enhances understanding of how Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and India (comma deleted) approached political asylum, and the broader covert Cold War, in a non-European context. The association of foreign intelligence services with high profile defections staged on India soil threatened political disaster for the ruling Congress Party. From the very inception of the Indian state in August 1947, Indian policymakers balanced state security interests against popular conceptions of post-
colonial national sovereignty. By clandestinely working with British and American intelligence agencies to contain regional threats, whether in the guise of indigenous communist movements, or external pressures from the People’s Republic of China, Indian governments risked public censure were such activity exposed. Through placing MI5, SIS, the CIA, and the KGB in the Indian public spotlight, East-West defections threatened to uncover New Delhi’s murky role in the covert Cold War, and corrode citizens' confidence in non-alignment and state autonomy.

Considerable scholarship has been expended on interrogating defection in an East-West framework, but more expansive considerations of this issue remain opaque and are much less well understood. An enhanced awareness of the individuals that planned, implemented, and authorised Indian reactions to incidents of defection and political asylum allows for a more considered understanding of New Delhi’s covert Cold War diplomacy. The transformation of India’s capital city into a Far Eastern Berlin at the height of the Cold War was always going to be problematic for a nascent non-aligned nation burdened with a colonial history of political oppression and human rights abuses. Manufacturing a satisfactory solution to the conundrum of Cold War asylum proved beyond India’s policymakers.


10 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II, 9–10 and 312–14. See also, Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (New York, 2009), 141.

11 Hutchinson (Peking) to F[oreign] O[ffice], 15 November 1950, DC 1061/1, FO 371/92207, UK National Archives [hereafter TNA]; “Sinkiang Refugees’ Leaders in Delhi: Permission to Stay in India Sought,” Statesman, Delhi, 5 February 1950; “Chinese Fugitive Governor in Delhi: Account of Sinkiang Coup,” Hindustan Times, 6 February 1950.

12 “Discussion with Prime Minister on Indian Foreign Policy,” February 1950, Box 8, India Misc. folder, Loy W. Henderson Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.

13 Allen to Jones, 6 August 1955, RG59, Office of South Asian Affairs, Lot 59 D 75, folder India 1955, US National Archives, College Park, Maryland [hereafter NARA].

14 “Sinkiang Refugees’ Leaders in Delhi: Permission to Stay in India Sought,” Statesman, Delhi, 5 February 1950.

15 Selby (New Delhi) to Maclennan (C[ommonwealth] R(elations) O[ffice]), 7 February 1950, FL10310/2, FO 371/84261, TNA.


17 The "Panch Sheel" or “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” were incorporated into the 1954 Sino-Indian Treaty on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet. These encompassed commitments to mutual non-aggression and respect for national sovereignty. The slogan and policy of Hindee Chinee bhai-bhai, or Indian-Chinese brotherhood, was popularized in India following the treaty, the text of which is reproduced in A. Appadorai (ed.), Select Documents on India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947–1972, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 459–66.

19 Jawaharlal Nehru to Apa B. Pant, 11 July 1958, Ref. No.1634-PMH/58, Subject File 6, 1st Instalment, Apa B. Pant Papers, Nehru Museum and Memorial Library, New Delhi [hereafter NMML]; "Chinese Intentions against India." Joint Intelligence Committee report, 22 November 1962, CAB 158/47, TNA.


22 Abraham Michael Rosenthal to Mr. Salisbury, undated, Box 159, CIA Series 1965-66, Raw Data, Harrison Salisbury Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University (hereafter HSP).


24 More junior US officials, such as David S. Burgess, Labour attaché at the US Embassy in New Delhi between 1955 and 1960, have corroborated bunker’s testimony. See, David S. Burgess, Oral History, 7 April 1991, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project (hereafter FAOHP), INTERNET.

25 The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002)


27 New Delhi to CRO, No. 630, 13 March 1948, DO 133/1, TNA.

28 CRO to New Delhi, No. 1001, 18 March 1948, DO 133/1, TNA.

29 Symon (New Delhi) to Gordon-Walker (CRO), No. 49, 20 March 1948, DO 133/1, TNA.

30 Shone (New Delhi) to Noel-Baker (CRO), No. 74, 27 April 1948, DO 133/1, TNA; Shone (New Delhi) to Noel-Baker (CRO), No. 77, 8 May 1948, DO 133/1, TNA.

31 Selby to Shattock, Symon, May and U'Ren, 4 August 1948, DO 133/1, TNA.


34 Andrew (2009), p. 137.


36 5 May 1948, Guy Liddell Diaries (GLD), 90-92, KV/4/470, TNA.

37 "Visit of Captain Liddell to the Middle East," 9 June 1947, CAB 159/1; and Hollis to Burke Trend, 13 November 1965, CO 1035/171, TNA.


39 Hollis to Burke Trend, 13 November.1965, CO 1035/171, TNA.

40 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, 481.

41 Kellar minute, 2 July 1951, KV/2/2512/4, TNA.

42 "Notes on Communism in India, Pakistan and Ceylon No. 24 for the period January/March 1951," FL 101618/G, FO 371/92864, TNA.

43 "Notes on Communism in India, Pakistan and Ceylon No. 24 for the period January/March 1951," FL 101618/G, FO 371/92864, TNA.

44 Pierson (FO) to Roberts (Delhi), 24 October 1950, DO 133/2, TNA.

45 Cuming-Brice to Roberts, 3 November 1950, DO 133/2, TNA.

46 Nye (New Delhi) to Liesching (CRO), 24 November 1950, DO 133/2, TNA.


54 Jugantar (Calcutta), 29 November 1962.


60 Jaigopal Sethi, the defence counsel for Tarasov, produced evidence in court that documents furnished by the Soviet authorities in the case against the Russian sailor could not have dated from the time of his flight to the SS Steel Surveyor, but had been fabricated much later in a bid to strengthen the legal basis for extradition to Russia. Specifically, Sethi demonstrated that although Tarasov defected on 25 February 1962, Soviet documents put before the court originated after 29 December, when the MEA sent a copy of the Extradition Act (1962) to the Soviet embassy in New Delhi. "Fabricated Case," The Times of India, 4 March 1963, 3; "Russian Not to be Extradited: Evidence that was 'manufactured,'" The Times, 30 March 1963, 7.


62 G. D. Khosla, retired Chief Justice, Punjab High Court, foreword in Sareen, Bid for Freedom, iii-iv.


65 "Current Topics," The Times of India, 1 April 1963, 6.

66 Chester Bowles, Memorandum for the Record, "Defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva, [sic]." 15 March 1967, NSF, Intelligence File, Box 3, Folder Svetlana Alliluyeva (Stalin), Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter LBLL]. (period deleted)


70 Waterfield (New Delhi) to Duff (Commonwealth Office), "Stalin’s Daughter," 17 March 1967, FCO 3776, TNA.

71 Bowles decisive foray into the murky world of clandestine operations belied a reputation in Washington for inaction and verbosity. The CIA, notably, had characterised the US ambassador as a "man with a visceral dislike of covert operations." One senior CIA officer, Desmond FitzGerald, opined that giving Bowles "authority over covert operations was like entrusting a ship to a captain who hated the sea." Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 105 and 169. Chester Bowles, Memorandum for the Record, "Defection of Svetlana Alliloueva, [sic]." 15 March 1967, NSF, Intelligence File, Box 3, Folder

"Britain is willing to give asylum to Soviet youth," *The Times of India*, 23 December 1967, 9.


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*Lok Sabha*, Unstarred Question No. 360, S. M. Banjeree et al, "Instructions issued to foreign embassies regarding political asylum," 14 February 1968.
