

# 1 Workforce Resilience in the Post-COVID-19 Era: Differences Based on Manufacturing– 2 Service Orientation and Firm Size

## 3 4 **Abstract**

5  
6 The devastating impact of COVID-19 on businesses has led to the redefinition of workforce  
7 resilience. This study hence explores workforce resilience factors that will be important in the  
8 post-COVID-19 era. It investigates whether these factors perform differently in the  
9 manufacturing vs. the service sector and in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) vs. large  
10 firms. Sixty-five firms were studied in Malaysia and analysed through Rasch modelling. The  
11 results indicate that three workforce resilience factors (positive thinking, sense of  
12 responsibility, and emotional control) are difficult to overcome in the manufacturing sector.  
13 Regarding the SMEs and large firm contexts, six workforce resilience factors (positive thinking,  
14 differentiation, degree of involvement, sense of responsibility, cognitive processes, and  
15 innovation) are complicated for SMEs. In comparison, two workforce resilience factors (work–  
16 life balance and decision-making) are difficult for large firms. Capitalising on these findings,  
17 managers in various organisations (manufacturing vs. service and SMEs vs. large firms) can  
18 adopt different strategies to leverage workforce resilience post-COVID. Moreover,  
19 government agencies can use these findings for policy-making when leading post-COVID-19  
20 projects and initiatives.

21  
22 **Keywords:** Workforce resilience, COVID-19, Manufacturing sector, Service sector, SMEs,  
23 Large firms, Malaysia

## 24 **1. Introduction**

25  
26 COVID-19 pandemic volatility and uncertainty have led to the redefinition of the concept of  
27 resilience (Aldianto *et al.*, 2021). The disruption has redefined the workforce management  
28 concept, whereas the struggle to protect employment and improve productivity during the  
29 pandemic has exposed flaws in people management (Corrales-Estrada *et al.*, 2021). The  
30 severity and long-term consequences of COVID-19 are expected to be prolonged and will  
31 continue to test individuals and organisations in many ways (Kuntz, 2021). As the most critical  
32 organisational resource, workforce resilience must be improved for an organisation suffering  
33 from an underperforming economy and a negative work–life balance (Lintz, 2020; Hillmann  
34 and Guenther, 2021). If observed from the positive side, COVID-19 has helped to create some  
35 opportunities in the area of digitalisation—particularly in terms of disruption through  
36 Industry 4.0 technologies such as big data, robotics, 3D printing, machine learning and  
37 artificial intelligence—which can improve workforce resilience (Hizam-hanafiah, Soomro and  
38 Abdullah, 2020; Soomro, Hizam-hanafiah and Abdullah, 2020).

39 Being more resilient may be seen as the panacea for organisations who wish to  
40 mitigate the effects of COVID-19, and redefining and redesigning a type of people  
41 management that suits the current environment is one of resiliency’s critical components  
42 (Koh *et al.*, 2020; Lin and Liao, 2020). Workforce resilience is defined as a capability, capacity,  
43 characteristic, outcome, process, and sometimes a combination of these (Seville, 2018). **It is**  
44 **the capacity of employees to recover quickly from difficulty, an adverse event, or a crisis**  
45 **(Brusset and Teller, 2017) and to enable the workforce to be agile in adapting and seizing**

46 **opportunities from adverse circumstances (Seville, 2018).** Due to the new business landscape  
47 caused by COVID-19, the concept of workforce resilience has gained increased attention in  
48 management studies (Hillmann and Guenther, 2021). Even before COVID-19, organisations  
49 were being called upon to pay urgent attention to improving their workforce readiness (i.e.,  
50 Parker and Ameen, 2018); hence, a pressing need is an in-depth explanation of how the  
51 workforce can survive and thrive after the turbulence of COVID-19. Furthermore, the  
52 resilience concept related to COVID-19 is dynamic depending on the organisational and  
53 industrial context (Vanany *et al.*, 2021). The theoretical understanding of post-COVID-19  
54 workforce resilience should be investigated in multiple contexts following this argument.  
55 Therefore, this article compares two important firm typologies: manufacturing–service  
56 orientation and firm size.

57 Manufacturing and service businesses and products and services have significant  
58 differences. In manufacturing, technical skills dominate, whereas in service businesses,  
59 interpersonal skills take a considerable lead. In both cases, the organisations can be labour  
60 intensive and require workforce resilience. In short, manufacturing businesses are more  
61 equipment oriented, whereas service businesses are more people oriented (Ivanov, Dolgui,  
62 and Sokolov, 2018). COVID-19 has led to severe challenges in some manufacturing businesses'  
63 supply chains, whereas remote services have made work easier for most service-based  
64 businesses (Papagiannidis, Harris, and Morton, 2020; Vanany *et al.*, 2021). In terms of final  
65 products and services, the production and delivery of goods are usually handled separately,  
66 whereas in the service business, the production, delivery, and consumption of services often  
67 occur at the same time (Duchek, 2020; Salleh and Zulkifli, 2020). Physical distancing is the  
68 primary method of mitigating of the spread of COVID-19, and it has affected business in  
69 different ways. For example, in manufacturing firms, goods can be purchased to store in  
70 inventory to satisfy customers' needs, but services are offered upon customer demand in  
71 service firms. These differences have created unique challenges for workforce management,  
72 and understanding the contrasts can help develop better workforce resilience for  
73 organisations moving towards the post-COVID-19 era (Lagowska, Sobral, and Furtado, 2020).

74 Firm size is also an essential determinant of organisational resilience (Polyviou,  
75 Croxton and Knemeyer, 2020; Vanany *et al.*, 2021). A similar impact is expected on workforce  
76 resilience. In general, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) expect immediate results,  
77 but large companies work better under long-term sustainable circumstances (Cho, Lee, and  
78 Cho, 2017). SMEs have fast and unstructured supply chain and work processes, but large firms  
79 have slow and well-defined processes. COVID-19 has been brutal for SMEs because they have  
80 minimal cash flow, and extended lockdown situations have hampered their sales and business  
81 activities. In some cases, these circumstances have led to bankruptcies and layoffs (Carroll  
82 and Conboy, 2020). In SMEs, decision-making lies with few people, but decision-making  
83 occurs across the board with several departments in large firms. Moreover, small businesses  
84 initially thrive on owners' equity, but large firms need robust funding from multiple sources.  
85 Similar to revenue, the SME customer base is small, but large firms enjoy a broader customer  
86 base (Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn, 2017). In the COVID-19 pandemic, SMEs' lack of  
87 technological infrastructure has disadvantaged them. In contrast, large firms have, in most  
88 cases, leveraged digital technologies such as blended learning and remote deliveries. Doing  
89 so will further improve their collaborations in workforce resilience with the advent of the  
90 metaverse concept (Shin and Park, 2021). Overall, SMEs have been severely affected, and  
91 workforce resilience is even more concerning in emerging economies due to minimal  
92 resources and a lack of regulations (Ncube *et al.*, 2021).

93 The majority of the previous literature on workforce resilience has concentrated on  
94 leadership (Bargavi, James Daniel Paul and Samuel, 2016; Förster and Duchek, 2017);  
95 organisational crises (Teo, Lee, and Lim, 2017; Koh *et al.*, 2020); digital disruptions (Caza and  
96 Milton, 2012; Britt *et al.*, 2016; Birkie, Trucco and Fernandez Campos, 2017); and, to some  
97 extent, the COVID-19 pandemic (Aldianto *et al.*, 2021; Corrales-Estrada *et al.*, 2021; Queiroz,  
98 Fosso Wamba and Branski, 2021). However, the forward-looking literature is scarce on  
99 workforce resilience in the post-COVID-19 era discussing topologies such as the  
100 manufacturing–service orientation and firm size in a single study. The main goal of this paper  
101 is to perform a comparative analysis of (1) manufacturing and service firms and (2) SMEs and  
102 large firms in terms of their differential performances on workforce readiness in the post-  
103 COVID-19 era. The insights from the dichotomies surrounding these two firm topologies  
104 provide an interesting theoretical extension. Moreover, the valuable insights may serve as a  
105 useful guide for firms to improve the capacity of employees to deal with volatile and uncertain  
106 situations. In addition, the current research offers a deeper understanding of dynamic  
107 workforce resilience in different settings. In this study, Rasch measurement theory (RMT) was  
108 used to study 65 firms across Malaysia. In brief, the following research questions guided this  
109 research study:

110 RQ1: Which workforce resilience factors perform differently between the  
111 manufacturing and service sectors? Which of these factors are the most challenging to  
112 overcome in the post-COVID-19 era for each group?

113 RQ2: Which workforce resilience factors perform differently between SMEs and large  
114 firms? Which of these factors are the most challenging to overcome in the post-COVID-  
115 19 era for each group?

116 This paper is structured as follows. First, based on the literature, a theoretical  
117 landscape is presented in Section 2. The Rasch research method is described in Section 3.  
118 Then, Section 4, followed by the results, presents the findings of workforce resilience in terms  
119 of both the manufacturing–service orientation and firm size. Section 5 then expands the  
120 discussion in terms of the theoretical and managerial implications. Finally, the conclusion,  
121 recommendations, and study limitations are addressed in Section 6.

## 122 **2. Theoretical Background**

### 123 124 **2.1. Workforce Resilience and Manufacturing–Service Orientation**

125 The lessons on crisis and workforce management that worked earlier seem to be faltering  
126 now (Bargavi, James Daniel Paul and Samuel, 2016; Starr, 2020). Despite the large body of  
127 literature on the post-COVID-19 era, studies on workforce resilience are lacking, especially  
128 those that directly compare the manufacturing and service sectors in a similar country setting  
129 (Aldianto *et al.*, 2021; Ali and Govindan, 2021). Dynamic capabilities theory states that  
130 organisations purposefully create, extend and modify their resource bases (Arend and  
131 Bromiley, 2009; Teece and Pisano, 1994). According to this theory, workforce resilience in  
132 service firms is better than it is in manufacturing firms, as service firms can modify their  
133 resource bases more efficiently and faster. During the COVID-19 lockdowns, the business  
134 opportunities for service firms significantly increased as service firm business operations ran  
135 without significant disruption (Lintz, 2020). Employees in service firms had more chances to  
136 take advantage of the pandemic, which improved workforce resilience in the service sector,  
137 particularly in terms of change perceptions, flexible decision-making, business continuity, and  
138 agility. Therefore, service firms have higher workforce resilience than do manufacturing firms

139 (Manfield and Newey, 2018; Salehzadeh, 2019). Although most manufacturing firms survived  
140 the pandemic, service firms survived, adapted, and grew in the face of turbulent changes  
141 related to the pandemic.

142 The COVID-19 pandemic has hurt all economic sectors, including the manufacturing  
143 and service industries, in developed and developing countries (Aldianto et al., 2021; Shin and  
144 Park, 2021). Workforce resilience is vital, as recovering from a crisis such as COVID-19 requires  
145 extra productivity and performance (Lintz, 2020; Hillmann and Guenther, 2021). Naturally,  
146 employees with high resilience levels were better motivated to return to normalcy. There are  
147 theoretical differences between how manufacturing and service organisations responded and  
148 were affected by COVID-19 from internal organisational and output perspectives.

149 Manufacturing firms produce physical products, which require physical labour (Han,  
150 Chong, and Li, 2020; Shani, 2020). When the extended lockdowns were introduced to mitigate  
151 COVID-19, staff and labour mobility was a challenge and forced the firms to be more flexible  
152 and to exercise redundancy (Vanany et al., 2021). Manufacturing firms have very little room  
153 for flexibility in their product offerings, as the COVID-19 disruption was sudden and novel.  
154 The time needed for product development is lengthy and not feasible to a large extent. The  
155 changes in the product may not meet consumer demands or workforce knowledge, skillsets,  
156 and abilities (Lorenz et al., 2018). At the same time, service firms during the pandemic could  
157 easily change their course and processes to match the severity of COVID-19 restrictions.  
158 Another example is that manufacturing firms have been victims of delayed deliveries, which  
159 were unable to operate as usual due to the unavailability of raw materials (Bustinza et al.,  
160 2019). On the other hand, service companies experienced the converse situation. Service  
161 firms that do not require a physical interface have earned more revenue than ever through  
162 remote deliveries (Powell et al., 2018). In terms of competition, manufacturing firms and  
163 products with lower technological dependence are relatively easy for competitors to imitate,  
164 and workers in the manufacturing sector generally struggle to achieve sustainable  
165 competitive advantages (Khan, Farooq, and Rasheed, 2019; Näswall et al., 2019). A service  
166 standard is difficult to copy, but the trained workforce in service firms found it easier to  
167 change course, if needed, during the pandemic (Duchek, 2020).

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## 170 2.2. Workforce Resilience and Firm Size

171 SMEs and large firms exhibit stark differences, particularly regarding the output tangibility,  
172 labour intensiveness, operational automation, and resource access, which have had a  
173 significant effect on workforce resilience during the pandemic (Oosthuizen, 2016; Cho, Lee  
174 and Cho, 2017). The World Health Organization (WHO) announced that COVID-19 is a global  
175 pandemic, causing significant economic shocks worldwide as nations exerted efforts to  
176 contain the virus (Aldianto et al., 2021). As per dynamic capabilities theory, organisations  
177 adopt, implement and change their internal and external firm-specific competencies into new  
178 competencies based on the environment. In this regard, workforce resilience in the post-  
179 COVID-19 era can be strengthened by developing new competencies for the firm and its  
180 people (Chowdhury and Quaddus, 2017).

181 SMEs have endured the worst of this situation, as they have limited budgets and  
182 slimmer margins (Li, Li and Dalgic, 2004). In terms of workforce resilience, among the SMEs,  
183 start-up businesses have suffered the most, as the training and education of the workforce is  
184 not a priority for start-ups, and they are less prepared to deal with unfavourable external  
185 situations (Aldianto et al., 2021). Large companies, on the contrary, have robust

186 organisational structures and well-defined processes, which help them be readier in terms of  
187 bouncing back from adversity and hence to have a workforce that is more resilient (Tan et al.,  
188 2012; Gottman et al., 2018; Lucy and Shepherd, 2018). The global business environment has  
189 become increasingly complex due to this pandemic. Moreover, business resilience in the SME  
190 sector has become a challenge in terms of business continuity (Papagiannidis, Harris, and  
191 Morton, 2020). Business continuity is better for large businesses, and workforce resilience is  
192 vital. Leadership style also plays a significant role (Aldianto et al., 2021). SMEs mostly have an  
193 autocratic leadership style, whereas large businesses have distributed leadership due to  
194 diversity. When leadership has a wider span of decision-making, the workforce is more  
195 resilient due to its speed and the variety of decision-makers.

196 In terms of resources and infrastructure, SMEs are struggling, and difficult  
197 circumstances such as COVID-19 add another layer of threats to their business operations  
198 (Kittipanya-Ngam and Tan, 2020; Kuntz, 2021; Queiroz, Fosso Wamba, and Branski, 2021).  
199 Likewise, due to the entrepreneurial nature of SMEs, financial investments are on the low  
200 side for small businesses, which gives them less leverage to take advantage of emerging  
201 technologies such as 3D printing, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data (Tan et  
202 al. 2015; Hizam-Hanafiah, Soomro and Abdullah, 2020; Soomro, Hizam-Hanafiah and  
203 Abdullah, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has eliminated many SMEs in various countries,  
204 mainly because they could not join the digitalisation initiative and join the digital economy.  
205 Scale-ups similar to start-ups in these pandemic times have also struggled, as they received  
206 funds from investors who demanded returns that were frequently not achieved during these  
207 difficult times. Moreover, in terms of innovation, large organisations have for a greater ability  
208 to research and develop, and their workforce adaptability is better in terms of resilience  
209 (Corrales-Estrada et al., 2021; Kuntz, 2021). Overall, workforce resilience is the ability to deal  
210 with challenging conditions, and SMEs have mainly been vulnerable to survival. Hence, their  
211 response towards uncertain situations has been the least workable.

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### 213 **3. Methodology**

#### 214 3.1. Data Collection

215 Malaysia is an emerging economy with a good representation of manufacturing and service  
216 concerns. In addition, Malaysia has a fair share of both SMEs and large organisations. As per  
217 the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM), Malaysia has over 3,000 manufacturing  
218 companies. The private sector is a significant contributor to Malaysia's economy, with  
219 industrial zones spread across the country, especially in states such as Penang, Johor, and  
220 Selangor. In terms of services, the banking, insurance, and education industries have a  
221 significant footprint in Malaysia's economy. Firm sizes vary across the country. However,  
222 according to the Malaysia Statistical Business Register (MSBR), the SME landscape is  
223 witnessing massive growth.

224 A Rasch analysis performs equally well on smaller sample sizes (Linacre, 2009). A sample  
225 of 50 targeted respondents is sufficient for obtaining a useful estimate through Rasch  
226 modelling (Linacre, 2002, 2004). In another study, 30 respondents were sufficient from a logit  
227 scale perspective to conclude the findings of the Rasch analysis (Andrich, 1978; Wolins,  
228 Wright and Rasch, 1982). Similarly, another study stated that at least 20 sample sizes should  
229 be considered for establishing decisions about respondents with sufficient certainty (Fisher,  
230 2006). However, the current study used 65 firms as the sample size, which is satisfactory and  
231 sufficient based on the various Rasch standard studies.

232 Two selection criteria were designed to identify and select respondents for the survey of  
 233 the subject study: (a) senior manager with organisation-wide understanding and (b) at least  
 234 one year of experience working in that company. Similarly, the respondents who became part  
 235 of this research stud were primarily directors and department heads, all of whom had work  
 236 experience in their company of more than three years. The data collection was performed  
 237 across the different Malaysian states. As a result, 65 firms were studied on the research aims  
 238 of this study, of which 22 were manufacturing firms (34 percent), 43 were service firms (66  
 239 percent), 27 were SMEs (42 percent), and 38 were large firms (58 percent). A diverse range  
 240 of service companies were studied for this survey, which included banks, insurance  
 241 companies, courier companies, utility companies, business consultancy firms and technology  
 242 support firms. No single industry occupied a dominant share of the service sector. In terms of  
 243 firm age, most of the firms (40 percent) were over 30 years old. The definition was followed  
 244 of the SME Corporation Malaysia based on the number of employees to distinguish SMEs  
 245 from large firms within the manufacturing and service sectors. As a result, 22 manufacturing  
 246 firms consisted of 13 SMEs (number of employees  $\leq$  200) and 9 large firms (number of  
 247 employees  $>$  200), and 43 service firms consisted of 14 SMEs (number of employees  $\leq$  75)  
 248 and 29 large firms (number of employees  $>$  75). Details of the sample structure are presented  
 249 in Table 1.

250 Table 1. Description of the Sample

		Number of firms
<b>Firm orientation</b>	Manufacturing firms	22
	Service firms	43
<b>Firm size</b>	SMEs	27
	Large firms	38
<b>Firm age</b>	< 5 years	4
	6-10 years	10
	11-20 years	17
	21-30 years	8
	> 30 years	26
<b>Manufacturing firms split</b>	SMEs	13
	Large firms	9
<b>Service firms split</b>	SMEs	14
	Large firms	29
<b>Total</b>		65

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### 252 3.2. Rasch Measurement Theory

253 Rasch measurement theory (RMT) is grounded in latent-variable probabilistic models (Rasch,  
 254 1982). RMT is based on item response theory, a mathematical model explaining the latent  
 255 traits of unobservable characteristics (Marais and Andrich, 2008) and their observed  
 256 outcomes (Thissen & Orlando, 2021). Rasch's mathematical features for psychometric testing  
 257 and measurement enable the model to explain a range of possibilities (Andrich, 1978). In past  
 258 empirical studies, RMT has been used in workforce management (Boone, Yale, and Staver,  
 259 2014; Aziz, Wee, and Mahmud, 2015) and resilience (Alavi, Isa, and Palpanadan, 2020; Papini  
 260 et al., 2021). However, work on the subject using Rasch Measurement Theory is needed that  
 261 is more extensive, such as finding differences between two samples studying various  
 262 phenomena.

263 Andrich (1978) and Rasch (1982) formulated a model for dichotomous items, which  
264 resulted in the Rasch Rating Scale Model (RRSM). The RRSM helps to define the latent variable  
265 through polytomous items in ordered categories (Azizan *et al.*, 2020). The Naiperian  
266 expression of this model is:

$$267 \quad L_n \left( \frac{P_{nij}}{P_{ni(j-1)}} \right) = \beta_n - (\delta_i + \tau_j)$$

268  
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270 where

271  $P_{nij}$  = probability of the observed category j

272  $P_{ni(j-1)}$  = probability of the observed category j-1

273  $\beta_n$  = measurement of the ability of subject n

274  $\delta_i$  = measurement of the difficulty of item I

275  $\tau_j$  = differential of the difficulty of observed category j in relation to j-1.

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277 The adoption of Rasch measurement theory is appropriate for this study because  
278 Rasch supports the analysis of differential item functioning (DIF). Rasch models have an  
279 invariance feature that is inherent to their structure and that establishes support for some  
280 items that perform a different function in measuring the construct (Andrich, 1978). For this,  
281 differential item functioning (DIF) is used to confirm the presence of a bias when a group of  
282 subjects, with some common feature, significantly obtains a different calibration from that of  
283 another group in an item's difficulty (Schauberger and Mair, 2020). The RRSM is ideal for  
284 measuring latent variables such as workforce resilience, as it is the result of the  
285 measurements assessed by the respondents from different firm topologies. Workforce  
286 resilience items are positioned on the linear continuum, allowing them to be measured  
287 according to their ability and difficulty, from left (less) to right (more). Similarly, a DIF analysis  
288 can identify difficulty levels between two pairs of differentiated groups: manufacturing vs.  
289 service firms and SMEs vs. large firms.

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### 291 3.3. Measurement Scale and Fit Diagnosis

292 The resilience literature varies, with some studies focussing on change (Higgs and  
293 Rowland, 2000), team management (Förster and Duchek, 2017), and foresight (O'Brien and  
294 Robertson, 2009); likewise, certain studies focus on functions such as supply chain (Baryannis  
295 *et al.*, 2019), operations (Grotan and Vorm, 2015) and logistics (Nayak and Choudhary, 2020).  
296 In this study, the construct of workforce resilience is based on five elements: propensity  
297 (PRO), attitude (ATT), perception (PER), preferences (PRE), and management (MAN). These  
298 five elements broadly cover the personality, characteristics and competencies of employees  
299 in workforce resilience, which makes these elements a suitable fit for this study. The  
300 measurement was adapted from Bargavi, James Daniel Paul, and Samuel (2016) and  
301 measures resilience through 5 constructs and 25 items. Overall, with its constructs and items,  
302 this study is suitable for the current research, as the 25-item instrument used is reliable and  
303 valid, relates to contemporary times of leadership and organisational styles, and explores a  
304 wide range of employee characteristics in the context of resilience. Furthermore, as the  
305 measures (25 items) can reflect significant variance between teams and organisations, the  
306 differences in workforce resilience can be better identified and analysed, which is the main  
307 objective of this study.

308 The adapted items relate to employees' personalities, characteristics, and  
 309 competencies, which can be exhibited differently based on firm type and size. For example,  
 310 the stress level in aviation companies (service sector) (Oliveira and Roth, 2012) is different  
 311 from that in automobile companies (manufacturing sector) (Prause and Atari, 2017). These  
 312 differences can result in variable emotional control for employees service vs. manufacturing  
 313 firms when measuring perception (PER) as a construct of workforce resilience. Likewise,  
 314 employees' personalities, characteristics, and competencies for workforce resilience can  
 315 exhibit differences between SMEs and large firms due to the complexity of and resources  
 316 available in the organisational structure (Dassisti et al., 2017).

317 A 1-5 point scale was adopted to measure the ratings. This 5-point Likert-type scale  
 318 had the following levels: 1 ('very little extent'), 2 ('little extent'), 3 ('some extent'), 4 ('great  
 319 extent'), and 5 ('very great extent'). Winsteps version 4.4.7 was used for the data handling.  
 320 Table 2 shows the main specifications of this study. The measurement items for workforce  
 321 resilience are listed in Table 3.

322  
 323 Table 2. Technical Specifications

<b>Context</b>	<b>Malaysia</b>
<b>Information Type</b>	Primary
<b>Data Collection Method</b>	Survey
<b>Temporal Scope</b>	September 2021–November 2021
<b>Sample Size</b>	65 firms
<b>Data Handling</b>	Rasch Winsteps software, version 4.4.7

324  
 325 Table 3. Construct Items for Workforce Resilience

<b>Construct</b>	<b>Items</b>
<b>This study is undertaken to understand the workforce resilience characteristics important in the post-COVID-19 era. In the context of COVID-19, on a scale of 1-5, to what extent do you agree with the below statements?</b>	
<b>Propensity</b>	PRO1 Our employees tend to have flexible personalities.
	PRO2 Our employees avoid uncertainties.
	PRO3 Our employees dislike knowing what will happen.
	PRO4 Our employees give preference to health and safety.
	PRO5 Our employees view chances as challenges.
<b>Attitude</b>	ATT1 Our employees try out new ideas.
	ATT2 Our employees see events as opportunities.
	ATT3 Our employees do things in new ways.
	ATT4 Our employees challenge others' points of view.
	ATT5 Our employees find it easy to make business decisions.
<b>Perception</b>	PER1 Our employees value positive thinking.
	PER2 Our employees are good at cognitive processes (sensation, attention, and perception).
	PER3 Our employees have control over their emotions.
	PER4 Our employees maintain good relationships with others.
	PER5 Our employees feel a sense of responsibility.
<b>Preferences</b>	PRE1 Our employees wish to be different from others.
	PRE2 Our employees show a high degree of involvement.
	PRE3 Our employees face opportunities confidently.



	PRE4	Our employees face threats confidently.
	PRE5	Our employees maintain a healthy work–life balance.
<b>Management</b>	MAN1	Our employees can control changing behaviours.
	MAN2	Our employees can predict the damage level of fluctuating behaviours.
	MAN3	Our employees have a fixed mindset that can reduce variation.
	MAN4	Our employees can identify events demanding different behaviours.
	MAN5	Our employees can confidently ascertain consequences.

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Diagnosis of the fit was carried out following the recommendations of Linacre (2009) by establishing a structure with five categories. The estimates of the Andrich threshold parameters guaranteed the absence of disorders in the difficulty levels of the items, confirming the effectiveness of the category structure. Furthermore, the latent traits of workforce resilience reflected only one reality. Three analysis types were carried out to confirm the operational requirement of the RRSM: (1) principal component analysis of Rasch residuals (PCAR), in which the values of the indicators obtained (variance explained, 46.2 percent; unexplained variance in first contrast, 6.05 percent) allowed the multidimensionality tensions to be discarded (Linacre, 2009); (2) the point–measure (PTM) correlation positive sign confirmed the adequacy of the measurements, as shown in Table 4; and (3) the reliability and validity analysis was assessed by using the Rasch estimators of measurement for subjects and items. The 65 measures and 25 items have Person Reliability of 0.87 and Item Reliability of 0.95, respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha for the measures was 0.92. As the values were above 0.70, they satisfied the Rasch standard levels, confirming the reliability and validity of the measurement. Regarding the individual validity analysis, the outfit mean square of residuals (MNSQ) for item PRO3, ‘Our employees dislike knowing what will happen’, was above the recommended level (Wright and Linacre, 1994), with an outfit MNSQ of 1.91 and an outfit ZSTD of 3.60, as shown in Table 4. After checking, this item was removed. The diagnosis confirmed the fit of the data to Rasch measurement theory; hence, the measures obtained adopt the properties of the model.

Table 4. Item Calibration

S.N	Measure ment	STD ERROR	INFIT MNSQ	INFIT ZSTD	OUTFIT MNSQ	OUTFIT ZSTD	PTM
PRO1	.20	.14	.74	-1.48	.70	-1.64	.58
PRO2	1.01	.13	1.17	1.03	1.43	2.28	.53
PRO3	1.93	.14	1.93	4.19	1.91	3.60	.56
PRO4	-.70	.18	1.15	.74	1.11	.53	.41
PRO5	-.15	.15	1.49	2.23	1.50	2.17	.44
ATT1	-.64	.18	1.09	.48	1.05	.27	.45
ATT2	-.55	.17	.80	-.95	.77	-1.03	.48
ATT3	-.20	.16	1.02	.16	1.12	.63	.46
ATT4	.32	.14	1.22	1.23	1.20	1.06	.46
ATT5	.94	.13	.95	-.26	.92	-.41	.64
PER1	-1.36	.22	1.19	.83	.95	-.09	.35
PER2	-.46	.17	.71	-1.49	.69	-1.48	.50

<b>PER3</b>	.22	.14	.85	-.84	.80	-1.03	.55
<b>PER4</b>	-.55	.17	1.17	.85	.98	-.02	.47
<b>PER5</b>	-1.22	.21	1.13	.60	.84	-.52	.39
<b>PRE1</b>	-.46	.17	1.13	.69	1.07	.38	.41
<b>PRE2</b>	-.46	.17	.93	-.27	.93	-.27	.42
<b>PRE3</b>	-.49	.17	.81	-.91	.75	-1.15	.47
<b>PRE4</b>	-.11	.15	1.14	.74	1.43	1.91	.41
<b>PRE5</b>	.22	.14	1.31	1.62	1.16	.83	.56
<b>MAN1</b>	.39	.14	.97	-.12	.96	-.14	.57
<b>MAN2</b>	.47	.14	.81	-1.12	.75	-1.45	.62
<b>MAN3</b>	.68	.13	.82	-1.09	.90	-.55	.61
<b>MAN4</b>	.37	.14	.55	-3.02	.49	-3.30	.64
<b>MAN5</b>	.58	.13	.67	-2.18	.66	-2.10	.64

#### 349 4. Results

350

351 The responses from 65 firms were grouped according to their manufacturing–service  
352 orientation (22 manufacturing and 43 service firms) and firm size (27 large firms and 38 SMEs).  
353 These groups were analysed using the RRSM of the DIF to identify whether workforce  
354 resilience exhibited significant differences among the two comparative pairs (Linacre, 2009).  
355 The statistical Welch’s t test of difference in means was used, and the indicators of a  
356 differential behaviour were interpreted (Bond and Fox, 2003). The hypothesis of differences  
357 in the item’s differential behaviour is accepted when the significance value is under 0.05. In  
358 addition, the differences were considered based on the DIF contrast value: a DIF contrast less  
359 than 0.43 is deemed small, a DIF contrast between 0.43 and 0.64 is deemed moderate, and a  
360 DIF contrast greater than 0.64 is considered large (Wright and Linacre, 1994; Linacre, 2002).

361 The DIF analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, the manufacturing–  
362 service orientation was compared in terms of workforce resilience. Table 5 shows the  
363 workforce resilience item's significance value and DIF contrast for a probability under 0.05.  
364 The results confirm the existence of differences between the manufacturing and service  
365 groups for three items: PER1, ‘positive thinking’; PER2, ‘emotional control’; and PER5, ‘sense  
366 of responsibility’. The first intergroup difference of PER1, ‘positive thinking’, probability value  
367 was 0.0063 (significant at  $P < 0.05$ ), and the DIF contrast value was 1.30, indicating a large  
368 difference. The positive direction of the comparison from the manufacturing to the service  
369 sectors revealed that achieving workforce resilience in terms of PER1, ‘positive thinking’, was  
370 more difficult in manufacturing vs. service firms. The second intergroup difference of PER3,  
371 ‘emotional control’, had a probability of 0.0074 (significant as  $P < 0.05$ ) and a DIF contrast of  
372 0.82, indicating a large difference. Regarding the positive comparisons, the findings reveal  
373 that achieving workforce resilience in terms of PER3, ‘emotional control’, was more difficult  
374 in manufacturing vs. service firms. Likewise, the third intergroup difference of PER5, ‘sense of  
375 responsibility’, had a probability of 0.0101 (significant at  $P < 0.05$ ) and a DIF contrast of 1.15  
376 (also categorised as a large difference). The positive direction of the comparison from the  
377 manufacturing to the service sectors, the third finding of the study, reveals that achieving  
378 workforce resilience in terms of PER5, ‘sense of responsibility’, was more difficult in  
379 manufacturing vs. service firms.

380 In the second stage, the SMEs and large firms were compared in terms of workforce  
381 resilience. As shown in Table 6, the workforce resilience item is based on the responses

382 analysed using the significance value and DIF contrast, which has a probability of less than  
 383 0.05. The results obtained confirmed the differences between these two firm groups for eight  
 384 workforce resilience items: ATT3, 'innovation'; ATT5, 'decision-making'; PER1, 'positive  
 385 thinking'; PER2, 'cognitive processes'; PER5, 'sense of responsibility'; PRE1, 'differentiation';  
 386 PRE2, 'degree of involvement'; and PRE5, 'work-life balance'. Correspondingly, the firm size  
 387 difference results showed the probability value (significant at  $P < 0.05$ ) of ATT3, 'innovation'  
 388 (0.0356); ATT5, 'decision-making' (0.0161); PER1, 'positive thinking' (0.0074); PER2, 'cognitive  
 389 processes' (0.0170); PER5, 'sense of responsibility' (0.0350); PRE1, 'differentiation' (0.0030);  
 390 PRE2, 'degree of involvement' (0.0030; significant at  $P < 0.05$ ); and PRE5, 'work-life balance'  
 391 (0.0090). The DIF contrast values of 0.68, 0.66, 1.30, 0.83, 0.93, 1.06, 1.06, and 0.81 for the  
 392 respective workforce resilience items indicated a large difference. Furthermore, the positive  
 393 direction of comparison from SMEs to large firms indicated that all these workforce resilience  
 394 items were more challenging for SMEs vs. large firm except for ATT5, 'decision-making', and  
 395 PRE5, 'work-life balance'.

396  
397

Table 5. DIF of the Manufacturing-Service Orientation

No.	Groups		DIF Contrast	t of Welch	Probability	Items
PER1	Manufacturing	Service	1.30	2.83	.0063	Our employees value positive thinking
PER3	Manufacturing	Service	.82	2.80	.0074	Our employees have control over their emotions
PER5	Manufacturing	Service	1.15	2.66	.0101	Our employees feel a sense of responsibility

398  
399

Table 6. DIF of the Firm Size

No.	Groups		DIF Contrast	t of Welch	Probability	Items
ATT3	SMEs	Large firms	0.68	2.15	.0356	Our employees do things in new ways
ATT5	Large firms	SMEs	0.66	2.48	.0161	Our employees find it easy to make business decisions
PER1	SMEs	Large firms	1.30	2.78	.0074	Our employees value positive thinking
PER2	SMEs	Large firms	0.83	2.46	.0170	Our employees are good at cognitive processes (sensation, attention, and perception)


PER5 SMEs	Large firms	.93	2.16	.0350	Our employees feel a sense of responsibility
PRE1 SMEs	Large firms	1.06	3.10	.0030	Our employees wish to be different from others
PRE2 SMEs	Large firms	1.06	3.10	.0030	Our employees show a high degree of involvement
PRE5 Large firms	SMEs	.81	2.72	.0090	Our employees maintain a healthy work–life balance

## 400 5. Discussion

401

402 The present study contributes to the literature on workforce resilience with a specific view  
 403 on the post-COVID-19 era by comparing manufacturing and service firms as well as SMEs and  
 404 large firms. This study further empirically evidenced the differences in workforce resilience,  
 405 specifically through three main findings on the differences between manufacturing and  
 406 service firms, followed by eight main findings on the differences between SMEs and large  
 407 firms. Based on these findings, the proposed framework of workforce resilience for the post-  
 408 COVID-19 era is presented in Figure 1.

409



410

411 Figure 1. Proposed Workforce Resilience Framework in the Post-COVID-19 Era

412

### 413 5.1 Post-COVID-19 Workforce Resilience in the Manufacturing vs. Service Sectors

414 **Personal characteristics and organisational culture differ considerably between**  
 415 **manufacturing and service firms. In manufacturing firms, technical skills dominate primarily,**  
 416 **whereas in service firms, soft skills take the lead (Cotet, Balgiu and Zaleschi (Negrea), 2017).**  
 417 **In terms of people leadership, cost leadership takes precedence over differentiation in**  
 418 **manufacturing vs. service firms (Gottman et al., 2018). Employees in manufacturing firms**  
 419 **experience more stress due to physical production and floor assembly line pressure, whereas**  
 420 **service firm employees' targets are less stressful in terms of turnaround time (Vivares,**  
 421 **Sarache and E. Hurtado, 2018). The findings confirm that workforce resilience in terms of**  
 422 **PER1, 'positive thinking', is significant and more complex in manufacturing vs. service firms.**

423 This finding resonates with Corrales-Estrada *et al.* (2021) and Gabriele Sauberer, Andreas Riel  
424 (2008). The primary reason is that disruptions such as COVID-19 paralysed many  
425 manufacturing firms' supply chain and business operations, particularly with extended  
426 lockdowns. A sizable number of manufacturing firms declared bankruptcy and were not  
427 allowed to operate production and physical sales, as opposed to service firms that thrived by  
428 remote delivery and sales. Hence, the resilience of the workforce in terms of thinking  
429 positively has been a challenge in manufacturing firms.

430 PER3, 'emotional control', is more difficult in manufacturing vs. service firms, echoing  
431 the workforce management literature (Kuntz, 2021, Gottman *et al.*, 2018). Difficulty in  
432 controlling emotions among the manufacturing workforce can be explained because they  
433 have taken a significant brunt of the hardships in terms of job losses and production halts;  
434 hence, the workplace culture has deteriorated, although transitionally, for manufacturing  
435 firms. Based on business opportunities and competition, manufacturing (vs. service) firms  
436 have struggled more, and the same frustration can be generally seen in the workforce. This  
437 study further confirms that workforce resilience in terms of PER5, 'sense of responsibility',  
438 exhibits difficulties in manufacturing firms, which resonates with Jiang, Ritchie, and  
439 Verreyne (2019) and Lagowska, Sobral, and Furtado (2020). Manufacturing firms mostly  
440 have complex operations spreading over the different stages of production. Thus, a sense of  
441 responsibility is shared but collectively increased. In service firms, employees mostly have  
442 individual contributor-based roles; hence, the importance of accountability is easier to  
443 manage, as responsibility is the lowest in a collective culture.

444 In comparing manufacturing and service firms, this study also confirmed that other  
445 characteristics—such as PRO1, 'flexibility'; ATT4, 'challenging others'; and PRO4, 'concern for  
446 health and safety'—regarding workforce resilience are insignificant. This finding implies that  
447 firm orientation does not play a key role in employee flexibility, as it is different in  
448 manufacturing firms compared to service firms (Bargavi, James Daniel Paul and Samuel,  
449 2016). Likewise, the attributes of challenging others' points of view in the workplace and  
450 concern for the health and safety of are is not dealt with differently in manufacturing  
451 compared to service firms (Starr, 2020; Stefan and Nazarov, 2020). In summary, the results  
452 indicate three workforce resilience factors (positive thinking, sense of responsibility, and  
453 emotional control) that are difficult to overcome in the manufacturing sector.

454

## 455 5.2 Post-COVID-19 Workforce Resilience in SMEs and Large Firms

456 Likewise, personal characteristics and organisational culture differ fundamentally in SMEs and  
457 large firms. Employees in large firms have better time management skills due to better  
458 corporate planning than do those in SMEs (Cho, Lee and Cho, 2017). Employees in large firms  
459 are also comfortable making decisions due to systematic structures and centralisation  
460 (Välikangas and Romme, 2013). In terms of culture, SMEs struggle with research and  
461 development initiatives and drive, whereas large firms find it relatively easy to promote an  
462 enterprising culture of research and innovation (Aldianto *et al.*, 2021).

463 In the context of the SME vs. large firm dichotomy, eight valuable findings were found.  
464 In general, workforce resilience in SMEs is more challenging than in it is larger firms. Even  
465 though the myriad of the previous literature has highlighted this connotation in a broader  
466 resilience discussion (Polyviou, Croxton and Knemeyer, 2020; Vanany *et al.*, 2021), this study  
467 identified differences in the workforce resilience context. This study confirms that attitude-  
468 related workforce resilience differs vastly between SMEs and large firms. ATT3, 'innovation',  
469 is more challenging for SMEs, a finding that complements the studies by Queiroz, Fosso

470 Wamba, and Branski (2021) and Corrales-Estrada *et al.* (2021). Large companies have more  
471 funds, resources, and room to experiment with their products, services designs, and  
472 workforce. Hence, innovation is a challenge for the SME workforce in particular (Sharma *et*  
473 *al.*, 2021). ATT5, 'decision-making', among the SME workforce highlights an exciting finding  
474 that is not found in the extant literature. Some possible arguments for this finding may best  
475 be explained by the fact that SMEs are commonly run by a single person or by few people  
476 who manage most of the business's operations. Decision-making, in this case, is faster for  
477 SMEs vs. large firms.

478 Workers' perceptions are also an essential resilience measure in times of disruption.  
479 Workforce resilience in terms of PER1, 'positive thinking', is more challenging for SMEs than  
480 it is for large firms. Large firms are more sustainable, and their organisational strength is  
481 higher, which translates into more positivity among their workforce and, eventually, higher  
482 workforce resilience. Furthermore, the findings highlight that PER2, 'cognitive processes', are  
483 more challenging for SMEs. Cognitive processes deal with sensation, attention, and  
484 perception, and in large companies, employees generally have better cognitive processes  
485 because the companies place more focus on learning and education. PER5, 'sense of  
486 responsibility', is more challenging for the SME workforce. SMEs are commonly flatly  
487 structured and more organic; thus, the duties held by the workforce are larger and more  
488 interfunctional. In contrast, large firms have a better sense of responsibility, as they have  
489 structured processes and well-defined operations.

490 This study also confirms that SMEs have difficulty attaining workforce resilience. Large  
491 firms have technological resources, particularly in Industry 4.0 technologies, which can offer  
492 differentiated product offerings, especially when dealing with the novel COVID-19 disruption.  
493 For the SMEs that are not endowed with these advantages to provide differentiation, being  
494 different from the others is not a characteristic of the SME workforce. This factor explains the  
495 PRE1, 'differentiation', findings as being more challenging for SMEs, in alignment with  
496 Schauberger and Mair (2020) and Nastacă (2020). Similarly, SMEs' lack of resources and  
497 technologies limits the number of employees, who have multiple responsibilities. Often, an  
498 individual is expected to perform numerous roles at once. Although the workforce roles in  
499 SMEs are multifunctional, attaining PRE2, 'degree of involvement', is more challenging for  
500 SMEs when they are not assisted by the technologies (Papadopoulos, Baltas, and Balta, 2020).  
501 Interestingly, PRE5, 'work-life balance', is more challenging for large firms vs. SMEs, which  
502 corresponds with the study by Gottman *et al.* (2018) and Hodges (2017). In SMEs, employees  
503 and entrepreneurs take charge and are flexible with their personal and professional  
504 obligations. In contrast, large firms mostly have fixed work timings, resulting in less of a work-  
505 life balance.

506 This study comparing SMEs with large firms also confirmed that workforce resilience in  
507 terms of other characteristics—such as PRO2, 'uncertainty avoidance'; PER3, 'emotional  
508 control'; and ATT4, 'challenging others'—was insignificant. This finding suggests that firm size  
509 does not play a significant role in employees' approaches to avoiding uncertain and  
510 ambiguous events. Therefore, the SME and large firm workforces deal with volatility in a  
511 similar fashion (Fletcher and Griffiths, 2020). Furthermore, the attributes of emotional control  
512 in the workplace and the conduct of challenging others frequently are not dealt with  
513 differently in SMEs vs. large firms (Gottman *et al.*, 2018; Starr, 2020).

514 In summary, six workforce resilience factors (positive thinking, differentiation, degree of  
515 involvement, sense of responsibility, cognitive processes, and innovation) are challenging for  
516 SMEs, and two workforce resilience factors (work-life balance and decision-making) are

517 challenging for large firms. Finally, the workforce resilience factor that does not differ  
518 between the two firm types is not discussed at length in this study, as it is readily available  
519 and well discussed in the literature. The focus of this study is to highlight the findings that  
520 have a large DIF contrast, implying a large significant difference for each of these eleven items  
521 between the two pairs of firm typologies.

522

### 523 5.3 Theoretical Contributions

524

525 This study complements and extends the research on workforce resilience in the following  
526 nine aspects. First, the categorisation of manufacturing and service firms in the workforce  
527 resilience area has made it possible to reconcile the empirical evidence in this regard, which  
528 is lacking. Second, the classification of SMEs and large firms in the workforce resilience area  
529 has added further empirical evidence, which is scarce.

530 Third, the study identifies differences in positive thinking, sense of responsibility, and  
531 emotional control between two sectors: manufacturing and service. Fourth, the study  
532 identifies differences in innovation, decision-making, positive thinking, cognitive processes,  
533 sense of responsibility, differentiation, degree of involvement, and work–life balance  
534 between SMEs and large firms. Fifth, this study supports and extends the findings of Aldianto  
535 et al. (2021), Kuntz (2021), Lintz (2020), (Senna et al., 2021), and Näswall et al. (2019). Sixth,  
536 it introduces a measuring instrument that has not been previously used to compare the  
537 workforce resilience for the post-COVID-19 era between manufacturing–service orientations  
538 and firm size.

539 Seventh, the results indicate three workforce resilience factors (positive thinking, sense  
540 of responsibility, and emotional control) that are difficult to overcome in the manufacturing  
541 sector. Amongst them, positive thinking is most critical (Nayak and Choudhary, 2020; Fügener  
542 et al., 2021). More efforts are needed to improve employees' mental and psychological states  
543 by giving them hope to deal with a crisis such as COVID-19, which helps to develop workforce  
544 resilience (Seville, 2018). Eighth, the findings of this study confirm that six workforce  
545 resilience factors (positive thinking, differentiation, degree of involvement, sense of  
546 responsibility, cognitive processes, and innovation) are difficult for SMEs. For example, one  
547 major challenge SMEs face is differentiation (Ekanayake, Shen, and Kumaraswamy, 2021;  
548 Ivanov and Dolgui, 2021). Workforce resilience can be significantly improved by promoting  
549 flexibility and agility among employees to offer new and modified product and service  
550 offerings, allowing SMEs to seize new opportunities and counter threats in difficult times such  
551 as COVID-19 (Nayak and Choudhary, 2020). However, SMEs can find it challenging to gain that  
552 agility and introduce differentiated offerings (Förster and Duchek, 2017; Hodges, 2017; Teo,  
553 Lee, and Lim, 2017).

554 Last, the results indicate that two workforce resilience factors (work–life balance and  
555 decision-making) are complicated for large firms. In terms of decision-making, large firms  
556 make decisions that are more significant, resulting in more severe consequences and benefits.  
557 To improve workforce resilience, organisations should increase their employees' sense of  
558 being decisive (Ekanayake, Shen and Kumaraswamy, 2021; Senna et al., 2021). However, large  
559 firms struggle more in decision-making, as their processes are often lengthy and slow,  
560 adversely affecting decision-making ability and hence workforce resilience (Ali and Govindan,  
561 2021). In the COVID-19 era, work from home demands better decision-making and resilience  
562 (Gottman et al., 2018; Lucy and Shepherd, 2018). In summary, this study adds theoretically to

563 the literature on crisis and workforce management, especially in extending the studies of Lintz  
564 (2020), Shani (2020) and Starr (2020).

565

#### 566 5.4 Managerial Implications

567 This study has three managerial implications. The first is for manufacturing companies, which  
568 should pay more attention to positive thinking, a sense of responsibility, and emotional  
569 control to improve their workforce readiness for the post-COVID-19 era. As part of their  
570 production plan, managers in manufacturing companies should promote a culture of  
571 positivity and a sense of responsibility (Nayak and Choudhary, 2020; Fügener *et al.*, 2021).  
572 Developing and executing corporate training in emotional intelligence can also improve  
573 resilience.

574 The second implication is for SMEs. In SMEs as well, positive thinking helps, as training  
575 the workforce to be more optimistic in times of crisis signifies hope and well-being, which  
576 positively impacts resilience. For innovation, SMEs should partner with large firms to  
577 collaborate externally for intrinsic innovation (Ekanayake, Shen and Kumaraswamy, 2021;  
578 Senna *et al.*, 2021). Open innovation—relying on external knowledge for the internal  
579 innovation of products and services—can improve SME resilience in manifold ways. This will  
580 enable SME employees to do things in new ways.

581 Finally, the third set of implications is for large firms. Using the findings of this study,  
582 large firms can improve the work–life balance of their workforce by designing worker-friendly  
583 policies. Particularly after COVID-19, the flexibility of work from home and the four-day  
584 workweek concept can be capitalised upon. Furthermore, the drive for digitalisation among  
585 large firms makes it possible to manage a decent work–life balance (Ali and Govindan, 2021;  
586 Ivanov and Dolgui, 2021). The government can also play an active role in helping large firms  
587 better promote the work–life balance philosophy. Moreover, large firms can better utilise  
588 Industry 4.0 technologies such as big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence to  
589 make faster and more streamlined decisions, eventually resulting in stronger resilience  
590 (Fügener *et al.*, 2021; Gibson *et al.*, 2021). In practice, within the industry, collective guidelines  
591 from working groups in best practices can further motivate large firms to strengthen their  
592 workforce resilience for the post-COVID-19 era.

593

#### 594 6. Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research Directions

595

596 The COVID-19 situation has been challenging because it is difficult to predict how things will  
597 develop as circumstances change rapidly (Fügener *et al.*, 2021; Kuntz, 2021). The problems of  
598 social isolation, disrupted work and family routines, economic instability, and mental health  
599 suffering have added layers of complexity for individuals and organisations in business today  
600 (Brusset and Teller, 2017; Senna *et al.*, 2021). However, the lessons learned during the COVID-  
601 19 disruption should not be wasted and should be well utilised in preparation for the post-  
602 COVID-19 era. This study, through its findings, has identified the critical areas of workforce  
603 resilience important for dealing with the post-COVID-19 scenario, especially from two bases:  
604 manufacturing–service orientation and firm size.

605 This study has some limitations. The current study chose Malaysia as the geographic  
606 context by analysing 65 firms operating in the manufacturing vs. service sectors and who were  
607 SMEs vs. large firms. As all the firms were from Malaysia, this context adds to the study  
608 limitations of this paper. However, Malaysia is an excellent case to study, as it witnessed a  
609 prolonged lockdown and strict restrictions for almost 1.5 years starting in March 2020. The



610 study instrument of this paper will be beneficial for evaluating workforce readiness in other  
611 countries, regions, and territories to enhance cross-cultural learning on workforce readiness.  
612 **The responses for this study were captured from senior managers with management control**  
613 **on behalf of employees, which adds to the limitation of generalisability.**

614 Workforce resilience is a skillset that can be cultured (Breen, 2017), implying that with  
615 reasonable effort, one can learn to resist challenges when preparing for the post-COVID-19  
616 world (Gottman et al., 2018). Employing people who are more resilient is no assurance that  
617 the workforce will be resilient. Having resilient people does not inevitably translate into  
618 having a resilient organisation or team, although they are related (Aldianto et al., 2021).  
619 Therefore, the mechanics of how individuals come together can create a team that is either  
620 more or less resilient, which can be a focus area for future research (Seville, 2018).

621

622 Acknowledgement:

623 The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and the  
624 Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia for funding the study under the GP-2020-K019179 and GSB-  
625 2021-008 scheme.

626

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